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ABSTRACT 
The transition to democracy in 1989 forced the Bulgarian health system to change. 
Falling government revenues and popular demand for a more transparent regime brought 
pressure for a new system of financing. 
The process of reform was slow and inconsistent. In part this reflected a lack of political 
will but there was also an absence of relevant information on the consequences of 
different options. This thesis seeks to fill this gap by means of an integrated series of 
studies to analyse the previous system and evaluate the options for change. The research 
uses literature review, documentary analysis, quantitative research (a population based 
survey) and qualitative research (interviews and focus groups). 
The research documents the scale of inequalities in health and health seeking behaviour. 
Self reported health varies considerably. Utilisation is more evenly distributed, although 
the poor access less care after allowance for their poorer health. They are also more 
likely to be cared for in lower tiers in the system. 
Informal transactions play an important role in the Bulgarian health care system. This has 
two components. One is a traditional 'culture of gifts which typically imposes no more 
than minor inconvenience and is not a prerequisite to receive care. A second has 
appeared more recently. It compensates for genuine shortages and reductions in salaries 
and does have an impact on access. 
The existing financing system is regressive and hospital stays can incur considerable 
expenditure. This is generally found from current income and there was little evidence of 
ill health leading to impoverishment. This was, however, largely because of the 
persistence of strong informal support mechanisms. 
The introduction of social insurance is seen as a solution to the problems of the existing 
system and receives widespread support, but it is poorly understood. The misconceptions 
threaten its sustainability. 
This thesis demonstrates how different methods can be integrated to evaluate a health 
care financing system and provides important new insights into payment for health care 
in countries in transition. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Background 
The democratic transition of 1989 dramatically influenced all aspects ofthe economy and 
politics in Bulgaria, creating the expectation of reconstruction of the social sector, health 
care in particular. Soon after the initial enthusiasm, it became clear that health care 
reform was, in reality, low on the political agenda. 
During 1990-1994, priority was given to political and macro-economic reforms which 
aimed to dismantle the command-and-control economy, rather than to initiatives in the 
social sphere. Health care reform was perceived as secondary to general economic 
recovery. The dominant view of successive governments was that general economic 
measures such as privatisation, stimulation of small businesses, competition and 
establishment of market mechanisms would improve incomes and thus the people's 
ability to pay more for health care, whether out-of-pocket or through heavier taxation. 
This was not unique. There was a similar focus on macroeconomic transition, with a 
lower priority given to reform of the 'non-productive' health sector in other Central and 
Eastern European countries. Furthermore, even in Western Europe, development of 
national and European Union (EU) health care policies has been considered secondary to 
macroeconomic policies aimed at regulating industry, trade and agriculture1 2 and at EU-
level health was considered a "non-issue" and "only a component of any economic 
policy"3 • 
The main reform developments of the early 1990s were re-establishment of the Bulgarian 
Medical Association and the Bulgarian's Physicians Union (1990), legalisation of out-
patient private medical practice (1991) and new Constitution which guaranteed the right 
of Bulgarian citizens to free health care in the state facilities (1991), as well as some 
liberalisation of pharmaceutical trade. 
While radical economic measures were viewed as unavoidable, health care was supposed 
to undergo a process of gradual incremental adjustment through a "step-by-step 
strategy", similar to the slower and more evolutionary pace of health care reforms in 
Poland4 5• However, the "shock therapy" applied to the general economy failed to deliver 
expected economic recovery and visible improvement in living standards. Macro-
12 
economic restructuring was long delayed for political reasons. A series of ill-advised and 
unpopular policies further exacerbated the crisis. The polarisation of wealth increased 
the vulnerability of poorer groups as there were no means of protection built into the 
system. Such divisions in society did not allow the emergence of consensus on the aims 
and pace of the health care reform. 
The failure of the macroeconomic reform had direct consequences for the context within 
which health care reform was to take place. Falling incomes and social insecurity 
contributed to the worsening health status of the population. The implications for the 
health care system were a larger share of out-of-pocket expenditure and higher payments 
for pharmaceuticals and for what had been state-subsidised services. 
As a consequence, in the early 1990s, there was no coherent impetus for reform of the 
Bulgarian health sector. The prerequisites for reform, such as a legal and institutional 
framework, had not been developed. The policy debate regarding health care reform was 
dominated by the professional unions, and in particular the physicians, who pressed for 
introduction of a compulsory social insurance system, viewing it as an instrument for a 
rapid increase in their income. Compulsory health insurance was also attractive to many 
policy makers and members of the public who viewed it as an opportunity to bring extra-
budgetary resources to the system and improve the deteriorating quality of care. Other 
options for health care financing in Bulgaria were barely considered. 
A further factor delaying health care reforms was that, unlike other sectors that were 
obviously collapsing, such as manufacturing industry, the health care sector gave the 
impression of coping with the consequences of transition. In fact this was due to a range 
of often cosmetic changes and adaptive mechanisms, including increasing direct user 
payments and hidden subsidies. Such an approach, coupled with a failure to invest in 
maintenance, training and new technology, was ultimately unsustainable. 
Other than offering political slogans, governments and political leaders were unwilling to 
address the sensitive issues of health care reform. It was recognised that fundamental 
reform would incur high political risks in the short-term. Thus health care reforms in 
Bulgaria have been slow and inconsistent. Successive governments have avoided 
making far-reaching decisions, instead opting for specific, small scale, more manageable 
or politically acceptable problems. 
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An important obstacle to a coherent reform framework was a lack of debate about 
alternative models for organisation and financing of the health system. Government 
officials often acted on the advice of international consultants who sought to apply 
models from elsewhere, either with little relevance to the Bulgarian context, or using 
statistical data irrelevant to health care. No primary surveys addressing issues such as 
affordability were commissioned. There was no specialised information on health 
expenditures, ability of households to cope and options for restructuring the financial 
basis of the system, which would have facilitated the decision-making process in health 
care reform. 
In December 1994, partly as a result of the failure of previous governments to achieve 
social improvements, the Socialist party (reformed Communists) won the general 
election. Their platform offered an agenda for comprehensive social sector reform, with 
an accent on health care sector reform. The socialist government's main achievement 
was to enact a "National Health Strategy" in co-operation with the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) (1995), setting broad policy guidelines for health reform and 
formulating explicitly goals and principles of health policy and directions of health 
reform (Box 1.1). Other developments included several decrees to regulate the 
pharmaceutical market and a series of primary care initiatives, such as training for 
general practitioners (GPs). Health policies remained incremental and targeted particular 
isolated symptoms rather than focusing on the underlying causes. 
Reform of health care financing was low on the government's priority list. Although a 
draft law for universal health insurance, which gained support from a number of 
stakeholders, was submitted to the Parliament in 1993, the government withdrew it, and 
sidetracked the preparation of another draft. The government was involved in several 
scandals involving mismanagement in the health sector, leading to confrontation with 
medical professionals, which had the effect of derailing their efforts and reduced political 
support for reform. 
The political and economic situation in Bulgaria changed dramatically in 1996-1997, 
with major implications for health sector reform. 1996 marked the beginning of severe 
economic decline, culminating in January-February 1997 in what was described as 'the 
worst economic crisis in the country since the demise of the communist regime in 19896 • 
The national currency (Lev) suffered catastrophic devaluation by 11% (1996: S 1 =70 
Leva and January 1997: $1=660 Leva). In January-February 1997 alone, the value of the 
14 
Lev decreased five-fold. Monthly inflation of 20% at the end of 1996 rose to 300% in 
January. While in 1996 the average monthly wage in Bulgaria was about $70 per month, 
by January 1997 it had fallen to $30, and in February to $10-12, thus diminishing 
purchasing power and eroding savings. Bread, fuel, and other basic commodities were in 
short supply, or available at disproportionately high prices compared to unadjusted 
wages and penswns. The banking system was close to bankrupt due to insolvent 
borrowing. The dramatic decline in living standards caused mass protests which 
ultimately led to the downfall of the Socialist-led government and early elections, won 
by the right wing Union of Democratic Forces. 
Box 1.1. Key features of the National Health Strategy, 1995 
Goal: To put an end to the adverse trends that currently characterise the nation's health and 
to ensure its sustainable improvement in agreement with the WHO Health For All by 
the Year 2000 strategy. 
Main achievements: 
• Assessment of demographic factors, morbidity and physical development indicators. The 
main problems: ageing, low birth rates, recent increases in total and infant mortality, 
negative natural growth, high abortion rates. Circulatory conditions, neoplasm, and 
traumas are main causes of death, with resurgence of tuberculosis, mental disorders 
and STD. 
• Identifying the main broad groups of risk health factors: life-style related risks (smoking, 
alcohol abuse, physical inactivity, unbalanced nutrition, psycho-social distress, drug 
addiction); environmental risks (air, water and soil pollution, risks in work 
environment, and socio-economic factors such as income loss, unemployment, 
changing consumption patterns; health care system deficiencies. 
• Assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the current health care system and its 
ability to respond to the pressing health needs. 
• Outline of reform priorities: containing cardiovascular diseases, increasing the 
effectiveness of cancer prevention and treatment and focus on protecting the health of 
children, women in fertile age and other vulnerable groups such as the elderly, the 
disabled, and the socially disadvantaged. 
Recommendations: 
• Health policy should promote lifestyle changes, environmental factors, and reform of 
health care, to achieve better health outcomes. 
• Design of programmes addressing the risk factors and main causes of morbidity, mortality 
and disability, specific to Bulgaria. 
• Intersectoral and international collaboration and joint health and social initiatives. 
• Involvement of all stakeholders: professional associations, trade unions, research 
institutions, health care staff, NGOs, international organisations, mass media and 
public. 
• Following a 'national consensus', to introduce full-coverage national health insurance 
system, according to 'the principles of equality and solidarity'. 
• Implementation management system to monitor, evaluate and control reform. 
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This crisis had a devastating effect on the health care system, and the earlier appearance 
of coping collapsed. The government budget was insufficient to provide even basic 
supplies of antibiotics and other essential drugs and materials in state hospitals. Many 
scheduled operations were cancelled. Those who had opted for out-patient private 
services were increasingly unable to pay, many returned to the public system, increasing 
the pressure for additional public funds. Although the crisis was a result of structural 
economic failure and had been forecast by experts, almost no safety nets for the 
population were provided. Belatedly, the importance of social sector reform to protect 
against similar crises of transition became widely recognised. 
For these reasons, following the April 1997 elections, health care reform has risen on the 
political agenda, with high motivation for reform. In the light of economic events it 
became clear that the current financing of the health sector was unsustainable, invoking a 
new understanding of reform priorities. Health financing reform was one of the salient 
recommendations in the election manifesto of the Union of Democratic Forces and 
enacting of a legal framework was viewed as the first step in this direction. The 1998 
Law on Health Insurance was among the first passed by the democratic government, only 
a month after they took office. Implementation of the Law was scheduled for 1999-2000. 
Nevertheless, many of the original obstacles remain. In particular, there has been little 
discussion of different options for design of a health financing system, and policy-makers 
have little empirical information on which to base their decisions. 
In effect, at the beginning of the 21st century, the Bulgarian health care system is still 
largely based on the "Semashko" model, although some of its features have been 
modified under pressure from the transition to democracy and open markets. There is no 
evidence of a consensus-based reform strategy or coherent health policies. Some of the 
legal framework is already in place, but there is a need for institutional capacity building 
and training of experts. Most health reform developments in 1989-98, although 
significant, remained partial and isolated and did not change radically the structure of the 
health care system. For example, private practice in the out-patient setting is perfectly 
compatible with the state-controlled system; in fact, forms of private practice legally co-
existed with the state sector until mid-1970s. The next logical step, which involved more 
preparation and higher risk, was to establish a health insurance system, which would 
allow for liberalisation of in-patient facilities, which was not attempted until 1998. 
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Furthermore, it was not until late 1997 that universal health financing was considered 
crucial to further reform and began to be actively discussed in the mass media. 
This thesis focuses on financing the health system and examines the applicability of 
several types of health financing methods. Experience from a range of countries in 
Western and Eastern European will be examined in the light of Bulgaria's specific 
economic, cultural and historical circumstances. It is impossible to impose unmodified 
health financing solutions from elsewhere. Nevertheless, Bulgaria is not unique as some 
policy makers think and the knowledge of other countries' financing arrangements could 
be beneficial. Bulgaria is similar to other Central and Eastern European countries in 
terms of its inheritance and obstacles facing the health system reform. The newly 
introduced market mechanisms create challenges similar to those in Western Europe. 
Similarly, the massive impoverishment of large segments of society means that financing 
options used in some of the wealthier countries of Africa and Asia may offer valuable 
insights8 • 
Topic of the thesis: why focus on financing? 
This thesis seeks to inform the process of health care reform in Bulgaria. It focuses on 
the financing side of the system. This can be justified for several reasons: 
I. The centrality of financing in the reform framework 
The process of health care reform in Bulgaria so far has largely ignored the issue of 
health care financing. The reforms have addressed other areas, which are also important. 
Nevertheless, looking at other countries' experience, it is clear that failure of health care 
reform has often been due to unsustainability of financing mechanisms. It has been 
clearly demonstrated7 that countries such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which have national 
health insurance systems implemented after 1989 or existing beforehand, spend more on 
health care as share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (6-8%) and in real terms, than 
countries which finance their health care from general taxation, such as Albania, 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania (3-5% of GDP). 
a The World Bank classifies Bulgaria as lower middle-income economy with $1, 140 GNP per 
capita in 1997 (GNP per capita: $786-$3,125). Lower middle-income countries often face issues 
similar to those confronting low-income countries; The World Bank, World Development 
Report. Knowledge for development, 1998/99, published for the World Bank, Oxford University 
Press 
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The 'Bismarck' model of health system financing has been considered economically 
feasible and matching cultural, historical and political traditions and preferences of 
different interest groups across Central Europe. In 1992 a health insurance system was 
fully implemented in the Czech Republic, but within a short period led to cost-escalation 
as a result of incentives for overtreatment, an over-comprehensive package of benefits 
and fee-for-service 'point' remuneration of the physicians in the private sectors. These 
design faults led to an increase in the share of GDP for health, from 5.2% to 9.4% in the 
first year, and the system proved to be unsustainable without additional subsidies9 • 
Similarly, inadequate financial incentives for providers led to a rise in health insurance 
costs and fiscal crisis in Hungary and Slovakia. Side effects of the health insurance 
system have been structural deficits of the insurance funds, requiring subsidies from the 
general health care budget in most of the CEE countries that adopted the compulsory 
insurance system. Deficits occurred due to lack of cost-containment mechanisms, failure 
to adjust the premiums to the prevailing employment structure, limits to insurance 
coverage and higher cost of services for state-covered groups than was provided for by 
transfers from the state. However, little of this experience with national insurance 
schemes has been discussed in Bulgaria. 
The key question to be asked is, therefore, what is feasible financially in the 
circumstances of a particular country. Although in the 1990s nine Central and Eastern 
European countries implemented, and several others were in the process of preparing to 
implement, insurance legislation, this question has not been addressed adequately. 
As already noted, in the late 1990s it became clear that there was a need to reorganise the 
financial basis of the Bulgarian health care system. As in the West, there is sustained 
upward pressure on health care costs from ageing of the population, new medical 
technology and rising demands for increasing health expenditure which is not matched 
by growth in the resources available from the health budget. The government has been 
unable to increase, or even maintain, social spending in the face of demands from other 
sectors such as energy and defence. The scope for savings from efficiency improvements 
is also limited. The current solution is to shift some of the health care costs to users, this 
research will seek to demonstrate whether this is affordable for them. 
It is also important to consider the financial and policy context within which reform will 
take place, i.e. economic stagnation, inflation, unemployment and low purchasing power. 
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Reform of financing mechanisms is a radical, but necessary, approach to revitalising the 
health sector. It is a decisive issue around which the whole reform process is organised 
and influences every part of the health system. 
There is widespread agreement that whatever system of financing is adopted should seek 
to achieve certain objectives. These include: a) to be sustainable and to attract additional 
extra-budgetary resources for health; b) to guarantee high-quality care and availability of 
pharmaceuticals and treatments; c) to contain cost-escalation but to maintain the budget 
for health care both as a share of GDP and in real terms; d) to define clearly the rights of 
users and professionals; e) to improve the well-being and motivation of the medical 
profession and to discourage corruption; f) to induce cost-consciousness; g) to provide 
scope for some consumer choice; h) to be transparent; i) to be equitable; j) to be 
politically and administratively feasible in the current economic conditions, with no 
requirement for large-scale health sector restructuring. 
II. The need for a comprehensive analysis of alternative financing methods and an 
exploration of their applicability to Bulgaria. 
The complexity of health care financing reform has not been well recognised by policy-
makers in Bulgaria. The public discussion in 1996-7 relied on inadequate knowledge of 
how mechanisms of financing might work in Bulgaria and which might be compatible 
with the value system of the Bulgarian society. It is known that different policies affect 
groups differently, hence there is a need to look at distributional effects across society 
and to identify losers and winners under each scheme. It is clear that simplistic solutions 
will not work and could further damage the system. The reform process has been 
seriously handicapped by the lack of information on the nature of different financing 
mechanisms and their impact on the households. 
No systematic research has been conducted on the finance side of the health system. 
There is only one independent review of alternative strategies and options for financing, 
funded by NAT010 (Box 1.2). 
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Box 1.2. Key issues discussed in the NATO funded report: Comparative Analysis of 
Different Insurance Health Care Systems Aimed at the Development of Theoretical and 
Practical References for the National Health Policy 
Objective: To review systematically options for health financing and experiences in a range 
of countries, and to develop theoretical and practical references for the needs of 
policy-makers and reform in Bulgaria. 
Main achievements: 
• Detailed overview of elements of the health financing systems: institutions, type of 
contribution, actors, and types of payment to providers etc. 
• Definition of public expenditure, structures, and other concepts, as used in Bulgaria in 
order to facilitate international comparative research. 
• Developing a reference guide to financing systems for policy-makers. 
• Practical recommendations for harmonisation of terminology, collection of health data 
etc., with those used in Western Europe. 
• Stresses the importance of societal and psychological factors, such as values, which have 
to be considered when reforming a health financing system 
A review of the development of the reform process, through official documents and the 
limited available research, indicates that only a few topics, such as assessment of 
volumes of work, medical ethics, regulation of professional organisations etc., have 
received attention. Most of this work, apart from a few experiments on the provider side, 
has been completely theoretical and not well validated empirically or with reference to 
the international literature. Had a general framework for reform of the health system 
financing and delivery existed, this research could have been used productively to clarify 
the finer details. However, the available research, although interesting, has been rooted 
in an unclear general conception of how health care should be financed. In this form it is 
isolated and, in practice, less useful for policy makers. 
III. The need for a comprehensive analysis of alternative financing methods from the 
user's perspective. 
Over the last ten years, the majority of Bulgarian households have experienced a 
dramatic decline in their welfare, caused by increased poverty, unemployment and 
income insecurity. Democratic reforms in Bulgaria were marked by a series of 
conflicting paradigms for recovery and frequent political mistakes. Surveys show that, 
for average households, the predominant attitudes are those of pessimism, indifference 
and lack of enthusiasm for further liberalisation of the economy1 1 • The lack of feedback 
from the population or public participation in the reform process by means of 
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representative organisations and other civil society channels was an important obstacle to 
achieving consensus in society at large. Furthermore, the users' willingness to pay for a 
particular scheme is decisive for compliance and ultimately for the success of the a 
scheme. Too often, in the past, policies have not taken into account the preferences and 
interests of different groups. 
The government approach to research, as implied by funding decisions, has been directed 
entirely towards the supply side of the health care system, even though many studies 
have demonstrated the importance of understanding the demand side12 : current 
expenditure, ability and willingness of households to pay for health care or to exercise a 
choice. There are no household surveys with data on health status, utilisation or 
spending. Explanations could be sought in the persistence of totalitarian attitudes of the 
administration towards citizens; its inability to enter a discussion; and undeveloped 
political dialogue in which the users could be empowered to participate. One element of 
this thesis will seek to fill this gap. 
The ability of the population to pay for an acceptable quality of health services, measured 
in terms of disposable income, is an important aspect of the finance reform of the health 
system. Yet such knowledge is just one input into the policy debate. Societal values and 
actual willingness of users to pay under different financing schemes is an essential, but 
poorly recognised precondition for compliance with health system re-organisation. It is the 
intention of this work to give an indication ofboth ability and willingness to pay. 
IV. To draw attention to the discussion of alternative financing options in parallel with 
public debate regarding health financing reform and implementation of health insurance. 
It is important, through further research conducted by both the Ministry of Health and 
independent sources, to inform those involved in the decision-making process. A new 
proposal for health insurance was voted on in June 1998 by the Parliament. The 
implementation of health insurance system is scheduled for implementation in 2000-
2001. This research seeks to inform these policy developments and aims to provide new 
perspectives on options for financing any new system. 
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Scope of the research 
The research that constitutes this thesis will be confined to the financing of health care 
reform in Bulgaria. For the reasons noted above, it will be essential to get right this 
element of any new system right. The importance of supply side factors is, of course, 
fully recognised, as is the need to ensure that they are consistent with whatever financing 
system is chosen. To some extent these issues will be addressed, but the necessary 
primary research on how best to provide services cannot be undertaken within the 
resources available for this project. 
In brief, the research has two objectives. The first is to provide an empirical basis on 
which to base decisions about which systems are equitable and sustainable, exploring 
their effects on different groups. The second is to assess the attitudes of different 
elements of society to the various options available. In combination, the achievement of 
these objectives will provide a sound basis for decision-makers. Based on these data, a 
critical analysis of possible methods for health care system financing in Bulgaria will be 
undertaken. Inevitably this covers an extremely broad area. 
The thesis aims to apply some theoretical ideas and applications of financial solutions 
from developed and developing countries to the particular political, economic and social 
circumstances of Bulgaria and its health sector. The limitations and advantages of each 
finance method will be discussed in terms of patterns of household income and health 
expenditure, societal values, culture and attitudes towards payment for health care etc. 
Rather than recommending a single financing strategy, this research will seek to present a 
detailed analysis of several models according to their suitability and actual potential for 
implementation. The concluding discussion will examine possible ways to present 
information to inform the public and policy makers and enable them to analyse the 
ability and willingness of users to pay. More importantly, the validity of the underlying 
ideas will be tested empirically. 
This thesis will argue that there is scope for a substantial revitalisation of financing of the 
health service and thus ultimately, the health status of the population in Bulgaria through 
the establishment of a different financial framework. Such a framework will seek to 
achieve a more efficient allocation of resources spent on health care by government and 
by households, control of excessive informal payments and establishment of effective 
incentives for staff. 
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Beyond the scope of this work are several important dimensions that are clearly related to 
the financing of health care: how to provide care more efficiently; how to raise revenue, 
distribute resources and reduce wastage within the existing budget; and how to improve 
resource management at national and health establishment level. Attention will be 
focused on the choice of health financing mechanism rather than on the process of 
implementation and adaptation of the existing bureaucratic structure. Similarly, an in-
depth policy analysis of alternative financing options could be a focus for further 
research. Lifestyle and environmental risk factors, rooted in the economic and political 
conditions, are considered to have a decisive impact on the health of the CEE 
populations13, and require separate analysis. It is recognised, however, that to achieve 
best results, all these aspects of health care financing reorganisation should be addressed 
simultaneously in an integrated reform effort. 
Potential contribution 
The potential contribution of this research lies in: 
1. developing an interdisciplinary approach towards selection of a suitable health 
financing model for the circumstances of a country in transition, in this case Bulgaria, 
incorporating a range of factors critical to the success of a given financing option: 
willingness and ability to pay for health care; political and administrative and 
economic circumstances. 
2. providing an insight into the forces behind, and obstacles facing, the restructuring of 
health sector financing in the economies of transition, namely Central and Eastern 
European countries. It aims to prepare the ground for further analysis and comparisons 
between countries in the region. 
3. producing an independent empirical analysis of factors related to health care 
financing 
4. attempting to inform decision-makers about alternative options for financing a health 
system and their applicability in Bulgaria, and empirically testing premises that have 
formerly been taken as givens. 
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CHAPTER 2. MODELS FOR HEALTH CARE FINANCING: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
This chapter will analyse critically several approaches to health care financing by means 
of a review of the relevant literature. It will seek to describe key features of each health 
financing model, including common variants, and review the evidence on whether the 
model actually achieves its purported objectives. The next step will be, on the basis of 
findings from this study, to project how models might work in Bulgaria (chapter 12). 
In the light of the large volume of materials, some criteria have been used to limit the 
subject area. First, the analysis will concentrate on health care financing, with occasional 
references to provision. Second, only financing methods with direct relevance to the 
current situation in Bulgaria will be discussed. These are the still dominant "Semashko" 
tax -based model, user payment, compulsory health insurance (currently being 
implemented), and voluntary insurance. 
The reviewed literature was located through searches of databases and libraries, priority 
being given to materials directly addressing financing issues for Central and Eastern 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union. For user charges, literature on developing 
countries has been used due to lack of other relevant information. The materials include 
journal papers, monographs and textbooks. 
Approaches to classification of financing models 
There are various classifications of health care financing models. It is important, at the 
outset, to distinguish between financing and provision (Table 2.1). Each financing model 
can co-exist with public or private provision14• Abel-Smith also emphasises the need to 
clearly distinguish between sources of health finance and ownership of facilities15 . These 
distinctions have tended to be overlooked in policy debate in Bulgaria. 
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Table 2.1 Public/private mix in health care financing and provision 
Donaldson C, Gerard K. Economics of Health Care Financing. The Visible Hand. MACMILLAN: 
1993 
Provision 
Finance Public Private 
Public 
Private 
A framework for analysis of health systems, suggested by Saltman16, is based on three 
core elements: financing (revenue raised through tax, insurance premiums or out-of-
pocket), production (service delivery), and allocation mechanism (integrated, contractual 
or reimbursement-type transfer of revenue) (Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1. Basic structure of health systems 
Saltman R. A conceptual overview of recent health care reforms. European Journal of Public 
Health 1994; 4 (4): 287-293 
Financing 
II 
General tax 
revenue 
Soczal-znsurance 
premiums 
[P rz vat e 1 n sur an c e 
premiums 
II 
Self-pay 
II 
II 
Structure of the health systems 
Allocation 
mechanism 
Integrated 
Contract 
Reimbursement 
Production 
Service delivery 
Public health 
services 
Financing systems are often divided into public (taxation and insurance) and private 
(voluntary insurance), according to the source of revenue17 14 . Public systems are further 
classified according to whether contributions are earmarked for health care, and whether 
health service entitlement is conditional on contribution (general taxation, earmarked 
payroll tax and social insurance)17 . Other important funding sources in developing 
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countries and economies m transition are private (household), and external sources 
(foreign aid or donations)15 • 
An analytical framework used by the OECD18 19 sought to construct a comprehensive 
picture of health care systems incorporating both financing mechanisms and elements of 
provision. The financing models were grouped in separate, but not mutually exclusive 
generic types according to sources of finance (public and vo luntary) and methods of 
paying providers (out-of pocket payment without insurance; out of pocket payment, 
reimbursed by insurance; payment by third parties via contracts; or by third parties via 
budgets and salaries within an integrated organisation) (Figure 2.2). The combinations of 
these two sources of financing and four methods of paying providers give eight sub-
systems, with compulsory out-of-pocket payment type being rare. This framework also 
takes into account five groups of actors (consumers; first- and second-level providers, 
third-party payers, and the government) and their interaction with the health system. 
Figure 2.2. Financial flows in the health care system (only possible ones) 
Based on OECD. The Reform of Health Care. A Comparative Analysis of Seven OECD 
Countries. Paris: OECD, 1992 
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In a recent analysis of health reforms, Saltman and Figueras divide the European health 
systems into compulsory (Beveridge-type taxation systems and Bismarck-type social 
insurance systems); voluntary (voluntary msurance and out-of pocket payment); and 
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systems in transition between the two models7 • Typically, health care financing systems 
across Europe are based on tax or social or compulsory health insurance, in many cases 
accompanied by co-payments or voluntary insurance, but with different proportions of 
public and private financing sources20 7 21 • 
This framework for classification of financing models has been adapted for use in this 
work (Figure 2.3) due to its relevance to health financing in Bulgaria. Financing and 
provision of health care are clearly separated, with a focus on sources of financing and 
mechanisms for raising funds. The main distinction will be between compulsory (social 
insurance and taxation) and voluntary (private insurance, formal and informal cost-
sharing) sources of funding. 
Figure 2.3. Framework for classification of financing models used in the thesis 
Based on Saltman R, Figueras J. European Health Care Reform. Analysis of Current Strategies. 
WHO Regional Publications, Copenhagen: World Health Organisation, Regional Office for 
Europe, European Series, No. 72, 1997 
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These classifications treat health financing models as "ideal types", having a set of 
characteristics. In reality, most health care financing systems are mixed, with different 
elements co-existing. Thus, capital and recurrent expenditure may be financed 
differently. 
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The rest of this chapter will examme m tum voluntary insurance, out-of pocket 
payments, social insurance and taxation. This will be done for clarity, although since 
mid-2000 the Bulgarian health care system has been financed through a mixture of social 
insurance, out-of-pocket payments and tax. The strengths and weaknesses of each model, 
its objectives, and the lessons from elsewhere, especially from Central and Eastern 
Europe, will be considered. Provider payment methods will be referred to where 
relevant. Other aspects of financing, such as public/private control and ownership; 
decentralised/centralised management or regulation; monopoly/competition m 
commissioning, collecting and spending for health care, though important, are beyond 
the scope of this review. 
Voluntary insurance 
Characteristics 
It is recognised that demand for health care is highly uncertain as illness is an event with 
low probability but high cosf2 • The burden of expenditure on the household budget can 
be catastrophic, and often occurs when income is the lowest17 14 • The proportion of those 
who can cover health care costs entirely out-of-pocket is small. The unpredictability of 
illness, outcome of treatment (for consumers, as well as professionals), and health care 
costs can be countered through insurance. Against a regularly paid premium, the insurer 
covers the cost of health care for a pre-determined range of services. In this sense, 
voluntary insurance offers users protection from the risk of impoverishment. 
Private health insurance typically counters uncertainty of health care consumption with 
premiums adjusted to individual risk. Insurers could be private agencies, friendly 
societies, or provider-controlled bodies. Profits could be redistributed as lower 
premiums; as dividends; or where the insurance and provision are integrated as with the 
non-profit hospitals in the US, profits are reinvested in the facilities23 . 
Voluntary insurance usually covers specified risks and services, at certain levels of care 
and in designated facilities. The premium is determined strictly according to the scope of 
services included. Services that can be risk-rated and which are potentially profitable are 
the most likely to be covered, excluding services where expenditure is likely to be high, 
open-ended, controlled by the patient, or occurring regularly17 • A larger choice of 
services is associated with higher premiums. 
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Voluntary health insurance usually provides top-up supplementary coverage for 
particular services not covered by the public system17 7 . Importantly, private insurance 
may cover people who are ineligible for public insurance24 • Even in predominantly 
public systems such as the British NHS, it may be the only pathway to certain treatments. 
Private insurance often expands where coverage by government or social insurance 
schemes is insufficient, as in the US and in many developing countries, with private 
insurance ensuring access to adequate health care24 • 
Voluntary insurance can potentially alleviate the burden on government services15 and 
focus scarce state resources on those not covered24 • It is often seen as widening 
consumer choice and improving quality and efficiency of care. Private insurance can 
facilitate capital investment in the health delivery system24 • In many cases, insurance 
premiums may be covered partly by employers or social security funds. Premiums may 
be tax-deductible, thus encouraging personal investment in health insurance. 
The problems with private health insurance are well recognised. Some, such as moral 
hazard (of users and providers), are, although controversial, intrinsic to all third party-
funded systems. In voluntary insurance markets there are asymmetries of information 
between insurer and insured, and between insurer and physicians as the risks, while often 
obvious to a physician, are difficult to quantify by means of formulae22 • It has been 
argued that patients who do not pay for treatment directly may be less cost-conscious and 
might overuse health services. User moral hazard is exacerbated by fee-for-service 
provider payment with reimbursement by insurers, which creates incentives for supplier-
induced demand14 25 26 • In this situation both users and providers lack incentives to 
constrain medical costs17 as illustrated by the experience of the United States. 
Theoretically, under voluntary insurance, health services are provided at zero price at the 
point of use 14 • However, the incentives for overutilisation and user moral hazard are 
often countered by co-payments, deductibles, co-insurance, or other cost-sharing 
instruments, some payable at the point of use. Non-utilisation may be rewarded by 
discounts or no-claim bonuses. 
Other problems, such as cream-skimming (selection of low risks) and adverse selection 
(selection ofhigh risks), are specific to the voluntary insurance industry. Insurers seek to 
maximise their profits. Insurers make a profit if the sum of premiums collected is higher 
than claims paid out plus operational costs. This could be achieved by reducing risk 
through risk-rating, where the premium is adjusted to the expected claims paid out. High-
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risks groups are charged higher premiums17 • Better-off, younger and healthier patients, 
might be offered better insurance packages. Older, poorer, or chronically ill people are 
less likely to be offered affordable premiums. If the risk is spread evenly, with low and 
high risks charged similar premiums, low risk groups will subsidise high risks, giving 
incentive for low risks to leave the scheme thus increasing the premiums for those 
remaining. Adverse selection is difficult to counter, even when quotas, and requirements 
for wider risk-pooling, are in place. To minimise adverse selection, there is a preference 
for insuring large groups of people so as to achieve random selection of risks, with 
employers often sharing the costs24 • 
Voluntary insurance is a relatively expensive method for funding health care. 
Competition to 'sell' services involves higher transaction costs, as in the USA15• These 
costs translate into higher premiums for users. In contrast, compulsory insurance 
schemes typically are not required to realise profit. Governments also face the costs of 
monitoring the system. 
Voluntary insurance affects equity and solidarity adversely. Premiums are regressive, 
related to individual risk rather than to income, as in social insurance. Access to 
voluntary insurance depends on ability to pay, and the poor are more likely to be ill and 
to be classified as "poor risks". Voluntary insurance could potentially provide coverage 
(basic or supplementary) to high-income, low risk, employed people, but risks creating a 
two-tier system. Other groups can be left with partial or no cover, as in the USA23. 
Utilisation of health services by those less well-off would ultimately be reduced or 
deterred due to unaffordability of the premiums. In addition, extensive use of cost-
sharing means that even those who are insured privately often have to pay at the point of 
use. Untreated illness among the uninsured can also increase costs in the public sector as 
people who have limited or no coverage are likely to use the public sector as a last resort. 
Voluntary insurance is thus inefficient at either a macro- or micro-economic level18. 
Another concern is that private insurance companies usually create an "oligopolistic" 
market dominated by several large companies14 . Despite potential economies of scale, 
companies have an incentive not to compete with each other, but to agree on maintaining 
high premiums. Individual insurers are in a weak position relative to providers due to 
their collective monopoly power15 • According to Reinhardt, in the USA the introduction 
of a national insurance scheme that would have stronger monopsony power has been 
opposed by provider lobbies23 who benefit from the existing fragmentation27 • 
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Some have attempted to reduce the risks associated with private msurance through 
regulation. In the Netherlands, private insurers use reduced premiums (no-claim bonus), 
deductibles, block contracts and insurance for hospital care only, but the effects of such 
measures are controversial. Attempts to reduce the effects of adverse selection may 
include subsidies for users at high risk, such as vouchers for purchasing insurance. 
Although governments have attempted to regulate such systems, it has proved difficult to 
protect equity without discouraging insurers from entering the markef4 • 
Experience with voluntary insurance 
The relative contribution of voluntary insurance to health care financing varies. It usually 
supplements other methods, and covers only minor, routine or elective services. Even in 
the USA, where private health insurance has been viewed as the 'financial cornerstone' 
of the health system23, it still covered only 37% of all individual health expenditure in 
199424 • 
Voluntary insurance is also used in Europe, in combination with statutory tax-based or 
insurance systems7 • In Western Europe voluntary insurance mainly provides optional 
supplementary cover for certain sections of the population already covered by statutory 
tax or insurance health financing; or in cases of statutory insurance systems, as an 
insurance cover for high-income or other non participating groups7 . Compulsory private 
insurance models have been rare with the exception of Korea, where 94% of the 
population is covered by compulsory private insurance2\ and Singapore's Medical 
Savings Accounts. 
Private insurance is comparatively less common in the tax-based systems, as in the UK, 
Italy and Spain, which aim at comprehensive coverage. In most cases it is sought as a 
supplementary luxury cover, in order to obtain quick and convenient access to a 
physician of one's choice. In some statutory insurance systems, exclusions of high 
income groups or high co-payments require additional coverage. In a predominantly 
compulsory health insurance system, voluntary insurance may cover otherwise non-
reimbursable out-of-pocket health expenditure (Belgium, France, Switzerland). In some 
cases, a significant percentage of high-income population can opt out of the statutory 
insurance schemes (20% in Germany and 40% the Netherlands), and take private 
insurance cover. 
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In Central and Eastern Europe, following the demise of the Semashko model, there has 
been pressure to adopt private insurance in line with economic liberalisation7 • An 
increasing private involvement reflects diminishing solidarity and an emphasis on 
individual responsibility. Private insurance is available in Slovakia, the Czech Republic, 
Russia and Latvia as basic and supplementary cover, and is likely to grow further. 
Potential constraints have been immature financial markets, small-sized private 
(insurance) sector, low living standards and introduction of universal compulsory 
insurance24 • 
In the developing countries, private msurance plays a relatively insignificant role. 
Although in some cases coverage might reach 5% of the population, the high cost of 
premiums limits further expansion15 • High burdens of disease, especially HIV/AIDS 
often make it economically non-viable, and thus, benefit ceilings are low24 • 
Summary 
In developed and transitional economies, facing shortages of resources, the market can be 
seen as a "magic pill" that will improve the health care system28 • Often, the hypothetical 
advantages of the market have been extolled to justify its use in health care. However, 
market based strategies in health care financing - in particular, private insurance do not 
necessarily deliver efficient and equitable services, due to market failure. The voluntary 
insurance sector aims to achieve profit, rather than better health outcomes for the 
population. A greater role for private insurance requires significant government 
regulation, especially where insurers are underdeveloped and users largely unprotected24 • 
Out-of-pocket payments 
Out-of-pocket payments are often seen as a specific case of health financing. They are a 
tool that can be used within all financing systems, illustrated by co-payment in health 
insurance systems, and user charges in tax-based models17 14 . Although largely a 
supplementary source of health financing, out-of-pocket payments will be considered as 
a separate financing method due to their significant contribution to health expenditure in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
Out-of-pocket payments are a direct transaction between patients and providers. 
Payments are typically fee-for-service. Private out-of-pocket spending as a proportion of 
total health expenditure is highest in poorer countries with a large informal sector. In 
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most cases direct payment is out-of-pocket, with limited financial support from 
employment-related insurance, state budget, or another third party29 30 . Under this model, 
multiple providers compete for patients on the basis of quality, choice, but usually not 
price, according to market rules. 
Out-of-pocket payments for health care may be formal or informal. Cost-sharing has 
been at the centre of an international debate. Out-of-pocket payments are a major source 
of health financing in many developing countries. Most user payments in industrialised 
countries are covered by insurance. In Central and Eastern Europe, in the 1990s, there 
has been substantial reliance on out-of-pocket payments to sustain the health systems. In 
Bulgaria, users pay directly for private treatment, while formal and informal user 
payments have pervaded all levels of the state health system. This section will outline the 
main types of formal out-of-pocket payments, the debate surrounding them, and 
experience gained. Evidence on informal payments is still scarce and is presented in 
chapter 7 in relation to the findings of this study. 
Formal out-of pocket payments (cost-recovery) 
As mentioned earlier, cost-sharing is widely used in industrialised countries as a 
supplementary tool for cost-containment. In the 1980s it enjoyed a resurgence as a 
means for cost-recovery in less developed countries, following recommendations by 
international agencies29 • 
Introduction of cost-recovery is often triggered by major economic or political turmoil. 
The oil shocks of 1973, global recession and structural adjustment programmes affected 
dramatically the economies of many developing countries. Structural adjustment policies 
sought to deal with macro-economic imbalances and to promote long-term growth, 
leading to contraction of public spending8 • The loss of export markets, devaluation of 
currencies and a greater reliance on imported drugs and technology, undermined health 
sector expenditure, with many governments resorting to cuts in recurrent expenditure31 • 
In parallel, demand for health care rose due to HIV/AIDS, marketing of new technology, 
and changing demography. Bulgaria experienced similar pressures in the 1990s, 
especially during the 1994 and 1996 economic collapses. 
Many countries had to respond to shortages by accessing extra-budgetary resources. 
Increasing tax revenue was difficult given weak tax collection, tax evasion and general 
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poverty. It proved easier to shift part of the expenditure burden to the population by 
introducing direct payment at the point of use. The World Bank promoted the concept of 
cost-recovery as an option to channel untapped resources to underfunded public sectors, 
to finance a basic package of health services8• Charges generate revenue, directly or 
indirectly, through savings from reduced utilisation. In countries such as China and 
Hungary, reliance on out-of-pocket payments in health reflected changing economic and 
ideological paradigms in the wider society32 • 
In developed countries users mainly pay out-of-pocket for non-prescription drugs, some 
element of prescribed drugs, dental services, spectacles and some private treatment33 • 
Abel-Smith et al. 33 note that "all Member States (of EU) have, at certain stages, used 
cost-sharing to reduce demand to some extent, but it has not been by any means the most 
important mechanism for cost-containment". 
The term cost-sharing suggests a degree of participation by the consumer in the costs of 
their treatment. Even if symbolic, cost-sharing informs users about the cost of health 
services, and thus, is often used with third-party payment systems to increase cost-
consciOusness. Whether state, insurer or user bears the cost of health care has 
implications for the individual behaviour and potential moral hazard. It is important to 
consider user and provider incentives when health care is provided free of charge or 
heavily subsidised at the point of use30, which was the case for primary health care in 
most African countries following independence, and for all services in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The term cost-sharing, used intermittently with cost-recovery, 
designates another aim of out-of-pocket payments, namely to recover a proportion of 
treatment cost. User fees shift the financial burden from the general pool of taxpayers to 
health care users. Users are less able to avoid payment than taxpayers can avoid paying 
tax, so creating the potential to raise more revenue34 • 
Cost-sharing can take various forms according to the amount paid by the patient: a. fixed 
charge; b. co-payment (proportion of service cost), in excess (payment above certain 
level) or deductible (payment of the full service cost up to a specified maximum 
contribution); c. access fee (flat-rate registration or consultation fee)3517 • 
There are differences in the way cost-sharing instruments work. Basic fees aim to charge 
directly for utilisation of health care services, while referral fees seek to distribute 
efficiently patient flows across the health system by creating "correct" incentives for the 
users, e.g. for use of preventive care and restricting access to specialists. Co-payments 
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can be applied at all levels of care, with no upper ceiling. They are more responsive to 
changes in service costs and frequent increases are less sensitive politically, but they are 
problematic in the event of catastrophic illness35. Co-payments and deductibles are less 
transparent than flat-rate fees and administratively costly. The fact that users cannot 
foresee the size of payment could deter utilisation in addition to any effect caused by the 
fee itself. Fixed fees reduce uncertainty and are easier to understand, but are regressive. 
In countries where flows within the health system are less regulated, and informal 
payment is widespread, formal fees are unlikely to have a substantial impact on patient 
behaviour. 
The case for introduction of fees is based on their potential to achieve the following 
objectives36 29 32 37 3a 39: 
• Revenue raising 
• Greater efficiency 
0 discouragement of "unnecessary" demand or "frivolous" use of subsidised services 
0 prevention of bypassing first contact facilities 
0 fostering consumption of preventive and other cost-effective services (positive 
externalities) 
0 redirection of household expenditure from high-cost private or traditional services 
to the public sector 
• Improved equity and access 
0 extension of coverage through redistribution of revenue 
0 investment of revenue to subsidise services for vulnerable groups 
0 quality improvement and consumer choice 
Russell and Gilson's review of user fee policies in 26 countries showed that "raising 
revenue" and "improving quality" have been the most frequently stated objectives39. 
Across countries, these objectives have been prioritised differently and implemented by 
central or district authorities often with external (donor) support, with controversial 
results. Charges have usually failed to achieve significant cost recovery, but even where 
partial cost-recovery has been achieved, maintaining equity has proved problematic. 
Discussion is still open as to whether the alleged benefits actually occur and can be 
sustained. 
Fees and revenue raising 
The capacity of user charges to raise revenue has been challenged from different points 
of view. User fees play only a supplementary role in health care financing and are an 
unreliable instrument for revenue generation. User fees typically recover about 5% of 
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recurrent government costs30 32 39 with the exception of Ghana, where this figure is 15%38 • 
This reflects inability to pay, inefficient collection, or high formal or informal exemption 
rates. The high cost of collection is a major problem in the absence of investment in 
administrative infrastructure32 • The share of co-payments from total health expenditure is 
modest in the EU, apart from Portugal and France, and varies by income group. In 
France, 20% of the health expenditure on 'ticket moderateur' (a cost-sharing tool) is 
largely neutralised through private co-insurance (80%). 
User fees as a means of cost recovery have proved more successful in community based 
schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa38 • Smaller projects have registered a much higher cost-
recovery (about 79% in Zaire), compared to approximately 5% in national programmes40 
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• Fiedler considers fees practical at local level, citing the example of community health 
boards in El Salvador41 • In such schemes the cost of collection is lower and the 
consequences more visible, leading to greater popular support42 43 44 • 
In some cases introduction of user fees has served as justification for cuts in public 
spending, but in most countries this has not actually reduced central government 
allocation324538• According to Nolan and Turbat38, user fees can be seen as a "soft option" 
for countering pressures for changing government spending priorities, or as "pragmatic 
acceptance of political realities", as in African countries that spend far more on defence. 
Systems must incorporate mechanisms to distribute and use resources gathered. In 
Ghana, some revenue returned to the central level is wasted in non-interest bearing 
accounts, while the part retained at health facilities is often not spent due to complicated 
administrative procedures43 • In Kenya, 40% of health facilities did not spend the revenue 
they retained because their expenditure plans were not approved by the Ministry of 
Health44 • 
Cost-sharing and health policy objectives 
The explicit purpose of cost-sharing is often to raise revenue. In contrast to the private 
sector, cost-recovery is not an end in itself, but an instrument of health policy37 30, as its 
underlying policy objective is to use generated resources to improve access. However, 
Ryan and Birch46 argue that, even in the United Kingdom, the negative health 
consequences of prescription charges are likely to outweigh the benefits of additional 
revenue generated. Charges may raise revenue but only at the expense of a reduction in 
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utilisation35 • Thus, fees should recover costs, but also be affordable47 • The Netherlands 
has taken the view that the adverse impact of cost-sharing on the poor should be 
compensated for by means of social funds external to the health insurance system48 • 
Charging for health services in systems based on universality and accessibility raises 
ethical issues. The public systems are already subsidised through taxation or public 
insurance. Greater use of co-payments creates a conflict between access to health care 
based on need and on ability to pay. For example, the Canada Health Act has the power 
to apply financial penalties against user fees by withholding federal budget contributions 
to the provinces49 • 
Cost-sharing and utilisation 
Many studies report significant decreases in health services utilisation following the 
introduction of fees or increases in fee levels30 47 50 44 51 52 53 54 • De Bethune et al. give 
evidence of a sharp drop in attendance rates in Zaire after each fee increase, followed by 
slow "recovery" indicating price-elastic demand for health care47 • Fees constituted a 
large part of the users' income. The author's conclusion is that too big a reliance on cost-
sharing will further decrease utilisation and undermine equity. Waddington and 
Enyimayew registered drops in utilisation after an increase in user charges in Ghana52 • 
Rural utilisation declined by 49%, especially among men over 45, while there was a 
massive increase in the 15-44 age group suggesting that households prioritise 
breadwinners. Weaver concludes that patient behaviour is influenced by price, as there 
were significant delays in seeking out-patient care in Niger due to payment difficulties 
among the less well-of£53 • Yoder reports that after a nation-wide flat rate increase of user 
fees in Swaziland, there was 32% decline in attendance in government facilities and 10% 
increase in use of the mission facilities54 • Mwabu et al. estimate that the higher costs of 
obtaining care led to a 52% fall in the number of out-patient visits in governmental health 
establishments, which rose by 41% after the suspension of fees44 • After taking account of 
the shift to the private sector, 20-26% of those expected to attend did not seem to have 
visited any facility and were "forced out of the system". Kupor et aJ.55 present evidence 
that co-payments have exercised a small but significant negative effect on the utilisation 
of all services by subscribers to Japan's National Health Insurance System, the effect 
being greatest for in-patient care among the lowest-income group56 • Some of these 
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studies found smaller effects after introduction of fees in urban settings52, or for in-
patient services53 where demand is less elastic. 
A few studies had contradictory conclusions57 42 • It is argued that studies that register a 
fall in demand do not often take into account the scope for improvements in quality as a 
result of fee revenue, which may actually increase utilisation. When people are asked to 
pay without quality improvements, their utilisation will be deterred as they get less value 
for money. Diop et al. describe a pilot study of household responses to two models of 
payment for health services in three districts of Niger: pure fee-for-services financing; 
and a small pre-payment scheme plus lower fees, with a selectively applied package of 
quality and administrative improvements (drug supplies etc.) to accompany the changes 
in financing policy57 • The results showed that under a fee-for-service model, the number 
of initial visits declined slightly but the total number of consultations increased 
significantly. With an annual tax and lower fees, utilisation increased from 36% to 43% 
and the number of initial visits increased by 40%. Although primary health services in 
Niger have been free since 1960, quality improvements have stimulated demand and 
neutralised the negative effects of user fees, with the total demand increasing by 70%. 
The effect of quality improvement combined with payments shifted demand from the 
informal to the formal sector and illness-related expenditure declined significantly, in 
one district up to 40%. Introduction of cost-recovery did not impose greater financial 
charges on users compared to the previously "free" system. Litvack and Bodart showed 
that, in Cameroon, the probability of using a health centre increased significantly for 
people in areas with fees compared to controls, with non-monetary costs being high in 
both cases42• The authors note that it is essential that introduction of user fees is 
accompanied by quality improvements. The charges were "modest", lower than in the 
private sector, and included drugs. Due to the availability of drugs in the local health 
centre, the fee effectively reduced the price of care and boosted utilisation. The poorest 
sections benefited from fees proportionately more and had a higher rate of seeking care 
because they are more responsive to price changes and seek the cheapest option for 
treatment. In the case of Cameroon, the poor are more likely to use the local health 
centre, for a fee, if they receive adequate treatment and drugs there; and less likely to do 
so if the health care is formally free, but they have to pay higher price for drugs, and the 
time and travel costs are higher, the latter acting as a prohibitive barrier. Shepard et al. 
estimate that if higher fees are to be introduced in Rwanda, it would have only a very 
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slight effect on total utilisation (low price elasticity of demand: -0.25) and would rather 
influence the choice of provider8 • Data showed that approximately 90% of the low- and 
higher-income patients were willing to pay more for health care in order to assure 
availability of medications. Higher fees combined with higher quality deterred the 
utilisation at a health centre by only 3 percentage points. In the Dominican Republic 
outpatients were charged hospital fees at 10% of the private rate for similar services, 
according to perceived ability to pay of the patient59 • The fees considerably improved the 
public services and increased productivity and staff morale. 
On balance, there is extensive evidence that fees discourage utilisation, especially in 
poorer countries and among vulnerable groups. A review of cost-sharing literature found 
methodological weaknesses in studies suggesting a low effect of fees on utilisation40 • 
While some argue that fees improve the quality and accessibility of services, 
compensating for regressive effects30, Gilson notes that such studies are confined to 
particular circumstances of a country and do not consider the long-term effects on coping 
strategies of households, which may undermine the ability to pay45• In Niger, funds 
generated from fees were used to finance quality improvements on an "on-going basis", 
but financial sustainability requires that variable costs of "quality" (drugs, training, 
administrative improvements) are covered by other means60 • Thus, the incurred debt for 
every patient has to be covered by public budget. The potential for quality improvements 
from fees is small because the revenue in very poor areas is insufficient. 
There is contradictory and inconclusive evidence about whether reduced utilisation is due 
to user charges, to non-monetary country-specific factors, or a combination of both. The 
aforementioned studies suggest that the poorest sections of the population are the most 
affected and multiple factors deter them from seeking care. A higher elasticity of 
demand for health care in rural areas may be a consequence of either a shift in demand to 
the private sector due to high user charges or to geographical misallocation of resources. 
Waddington and Enyimayew found that the major determinants of utilisation in Ghana 
were not only the size of the fees, but quality of care, availability of drugs and 
equipment, accessibility, waiting times, staff attitude, and payment mechanisms12 • Cost-
awareness seemed to be high among even the poorest members of the public and the 
necessity of fees was not questioned as long as quality standards were maintained. 
Moreover, free care may be perceived as poor care61 • Other data show that the poor may 
be less willing to pay for preventive care, perceived as non-essential. Disadvantaged 
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groups have to cope with the inequities of access caused by non-financial barriers such as 
distance, poor quality, socio-cultural barriers, age, gende~5 . In contrast, Akin considers 
price and distance to be less important determinants of demand than usually assumed, 
and argues for a greater use of fees in full or partial financing of out-patient services30• 
Cost-sharing and equity 
It has been demonstrated that user charges are more likely to burden the poor and restrict 
their access to health services. The main argument against cost -sharing is that it 
enhances inequity. The most obvious danger from introduction of fees is a decline in 
utilisation that is not uniformly distributed across the population, but affects 
disproportionately the low-income groups. With user charges there is a trade-off between 
health gain and revenue generation: fees may generate income, but deter patients in need 
from cost-effective treatments and create socio-economic inequalities in health62 • 
According to estimates by Yoder, the decline in attendance in Swaziland was higher 
(34%) among those who previously paid the least for health care, although it is not clear 
whether this is due to unaffordability54 • Importantly, there was a fall in preventive 
practices, immunisations, diarrhoea and STD treatments during the period of fee 
increase, which contradicted the objective of user fees to promote preventive services. 
The author concludes that the introduction of fees was neither an equitable nor efficient 
solution to the financing problem, with only 2% of the recurrent Ministry of Health 
budget recovered, at the expense of increased inequity. Mwabu at al. report that 
individuals who could not afford to pay were likely to be those without wage 
employment, assets, or strong social or family connections44 • The fact that a very small 
percentage of the population sought exemptions can also be interpreted as meaning that 
people who could not afford services were excluded from the system altogether. 
Arguments for user fees based on studies of willingness to pay and actual health 
expenditure could be misleading. In a perfect market consumers pay for a service if they 
are willing to pay, but in the health sector users often have no choice. Waddington and 
Enyimayew observed that utilisation based on "willingness to pay" for indigent groups is 
rather a "necessity to pay"43 • Payment is made at considerable cost to households and 
involves borrowing, selling assets, giving large proportion of yearly income, or using 
savings. In an equitable system willingness to pay should reflect the ability to pay. 
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An economic argument against user fees is that they may be regressive (welfare loss 
relative to income is larger for the poor) and not allow all income groups equal access, as 
the poor are more price sensitive than the rich. Gertler et al. showed that the demand for 
health care in Peru becomes more elastic as income falls, showing that health care is a 
normal good and thus price is a significant determinant of demand34 • Griffin63 objected to 
this analysis, arguing that Gertler et al. relied purely on theoretical probabilities in the 
absence of user charges, and that given the government-subsidised prices, there is an 
excess demand and inadequate level of output. People are unable to use services due to 
non-price rationing through queues and poor access, and an increase in health services 
quantity will neutralise the negative effect of a price increase. The regressive effect of 
fees could be neutralised through uniform fees for consultation and price discrimination 
at a later stage of treatment, although the better-off can opt out of the public sector. In 
addition, there could be lower fees for people for whom the other costs of care are higher, 
e.g. patients in rural areas with difficult access, who are also usually poore~4 • However, 
applying fee schedules that increase with ability to pay could be administratively 
expensive. 
Sustainability of user fee systems and the trade-off with equity is a serious problem. 
Better off groups may opt for private care, thus reducing the collection base and the 
potential for cost-recovery. If only a small percentage of the population pays fees, the 
administrative cost of exemptions will be high. One strategy to retain the wealthier in a 
public sector with user fees can be to provide perceptible benefits: local treatment, 
affordability, adequate quality (availability of drugs, good staff attitude) keeping overall 
cost (sum of payment, travel and drug costs) lower than in the private sector, thus 
creating "value-for-money" incentives to use public facilities42 • 
If fixed fee schedules are set at middle-income levels, disproportionately low for the rich 
and high for the poor, the heaviest burden will fall on the low-income, non-exempted 
groups, those just above the poverty line and on the middle-income groups that could 
easily lapse into poverty. In practice, although the poorest sections of the population are 
to be exempted, any margin of error in means-testing procedures is likely to affect them 
negatively. The costs of collecting fees may exceed revenue, but may improve outcomes 
through promoting preventive services benefiting the poo~5 • Mechanisms that can 
promote equity in a fee system include3932 : 
+ appropriate fee schedules and use of revenue; accountability 
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+ effective exemption practice or protection of the poor from the full cost of serYices 
+ retention of revenue at the point of collection at central (Ministry of Health, not 
Treasury) or at district level; mechanisms for redistribution; staff incentives45 54 
+ investing revenue in service improvements benefiting the poor 45 12 51 
+ fees subsidising essential and preventive services 
+ user fees tied to a price index system or to the cost of drugs; inflation-adjusted 
+ building of management skills, capacity and financial institutions (rural banks) 
+ decrease in waste and inefficiency 
+ access cost reduced for all users37 
Such mechanisms are desirable, but rarely used in developing countries. They require 
government commitment to an equitable policy and its enforcement, and administrative 
and managerial capacity. Such capacities have often been developed on a "trial and 
error" basis, after the fees have been introduced. Fiedler suggests that user fees, 
especially if implemented and controlled at facility level, should rely on existing 
infrastructure and should not attempt to achieve radical legal, administrative or 
managerial reforms41 • 
Cost-sharing in "free" health care systems 
In theory, charges could have some positive effect m a situation of chronically 
underfunded "free" health services, where the poor have to resort to the private sector at 
a much higher cost for appropriate treatments or drugs. Even in the absence of fees, 
access is not guaranteed if the non-monetary costs are high. Abel-Smith and Rawal 
report that the costs incurred for treatment, including loss of working time, t~avel costs, 
drugs, food etc. were substantial in the formally free health system in Tanzania, with 
these factors acting to deter utilisation despite the absence of charges36• Many patients 
reported attending non-government facilities because of better drug supplies, even 
though these services were unaffordable for 42%. Respondents were more willing to pay 
for improved services and availability of drugs and less so for reduction of waiting times. 
Thus, use of "free of charge" governmental services placed a significant financial burden 
on the poor. The authors conclude that the population will be better off paying a modest 
charge for available drugs and services at the government facilities, given that fees are set 
at an optimal level to improve services while preserving equity. In the 1993 World 
Development Report, it is also noted that "free" health services can incur direct and 
indirect costs two or three times the level of small official fees8 . 
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Cost-sharing and ~~frivolous demand" 
Another objective of user fees is to discourage unnecessary demand for health care. It is 
extremely difficult to measure so-called "frivolous" demand as a proportion of total 
demand and few studies have attempted to do so. Kutzin states that charges may limit 
unnecessary utilisation in settings where non-fee access costs are low (e.g. urban areas 
with easy geographical access)37 • In areas with high non-fee costs of access, users 
potentially are already deterred from utilisation 54• Diop et al. report that the "less 
necessary use" of service may have been discouraged in Niger because, in facilities 
within one hour's walk, utilisation declined slightly after introduction of fees57 • If drugs 
are available at public health facilities, the marginal benefits of using the service are 
higher than the marginal costs of the long travel time. It is concluded that geographical 
location is a more important determinant of access than cost. The relationship between 
need for treatment and use of services is complex and user fees are only one factor 
involved36 • De Bethune et al. found that a decline in use of services after the introduction 
of charges in Zaire has not been confined to "frivolous" demand47 • 
Similarly, in the United Kingdom, Ryan and Birch estimated the effects of increases in 
patient charges on utilisation by adult non-elderly patients, using data on NHS prescribed 
drugs for 1979-8546 • Frequent and regular increases were associated with a reduction in 
utilisation that is unlikely to be limited to "unwarranted consumption". Charges acted as 
barriers to health care and had insignificant effect on suppliers' behaviour, measured by 
average prescription content. It is concluded that it is not the users' but the suppliers' 
frivolous prescribing that should be countered, through budgetary controls on GPs 
prescribing and encouragement of generic substitution. Solutions aimed at suppliers' or 
purchasers' behaviour, rather than users', are more common in developed countries as 
providers play a major role due to "agency relationship". In a study of a Canadian drug 
benefit programme, it appeared that co-payments could reduce drug utilisation but caused 
more illness and higher subsequent costs due to forgone drug therapies66 • 
Promoting equity: collection procedures, targeting and exemptions 
User fees can potentially be designed to promote equity through carefully devised 
exemption policies to alleviate the burden on the poor, and through re-distribution of tax 
revenue from the better-off to the poor, although this is complex30 • Fees should be set at 
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an affordable level and not act as a barrier to utilisation according to the principle of 
horizontal equity that "payments for health care should be related primarily to the ability 
to pay ... with distribution according to need"21 • The process of targeting includes both 
exemptions and use of fee revenue to subsidise services heavily used by the poor. 
Evidence from many countries shows that national exemption policies are often absent or 
vaguely formulated. Exemptions are often based on personal discretion44 51 43 , often 
ineffective and differ according to attitudes, social climate and culture. In Thailand, 
exemptions are based on the "subjective judgement" of the local staff, and the perception 
of poverty differs across regions61 • In El Salvador, collection was local, facility-specific, 
and with discretionary exemptions. Payments were voluntary, but all patients were 
expected and pressurised to contribute41 • 
User fees have been promoted in low and middle-income countries without clear 
strategies for protecting equity. There might be reluctance to exempt, in the absence of 
formal criteria or income data. Huber observed that staff were often required to grant 
exemptions based on intuitive judgements according to socio-economic characteristics 
such as sex, age, family size or occupation, even though they had no information on 
income, assets, or other indicators of ability to pay and did not know the person50• 
Although household size, sex and education are significant predictors of income, these 
accounted for only 10% of the actual variation in the annual cash income of the 
households. In Kenya, the system of charges collapsed after a large drop in demand 
resulting from abuse and insufficient use of exemptions. Exemptions were neither fully 
established nor readily applied, and the public was not informed of the criteria for 
exemptions. Lewis showed that proxy criteria related to income (education, housing, 
appearance, occupation) used in informal means testing, proved to be inaccurate and 
failed to protect the poor9• 
Gilson et al. review different targeting mechanisms and distinguish between direct 
targeting based on income; group geographical, demographic (age/sex) or health 
characteristics (medical condition); and self-selection (personal choice of private care I 
stigma on claiming exemption)45 • Direct targeting has the advantage of preventing 
"leakage" to the non-poor, facilitating identification of those able to pay, containing costs 
and allowing cross-subsidisation from the better-off to the poor. A study in Niger showed 
that means-testing has enhanced both fee collection (permitting collection of fees from 
those able to pay) and equity (applying safety net for the poor)67 • It can, however, 
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exclude some of the eligible low income population. Income data in less developed 
countries is often inadequate due to a large informal sector, seasonal or in-kind incomes, 
intra-household transfers, and errors in self-reported data. People engaged in subsistence 
farming may not know their precise income15. The poor may be unaware of exemptions 
or find it difficult to claim benefits. Characteristic targeting is administratively cheape~ 
and easier to apply. It better captures the poor because it relies on data that are easier to 
obtain than income data. Characteristic targeting is less stigmatising than income-related 
targeting, but can also benefit non-poor groups. Administrative problems include lack of 
management skills and capacity to monitor and adjust exemptions over time45 • In 
Thailand, budget funds are allocated according to volume of work and number of poor 
treated, but some patients do not attend due to the high cost of claiming or stigma61 and 
poor attendance has curtailed budgets in the poorest areas. There is also the question of 
whether to charge people first and treat them afterwards, thus accumulating bad debts; 
refuse treatment until charges are paid; or require a deposit15 . 
It is recognised that the exemptions should be simple, easy to apply, transparent, and 
prevent abuse. Exemptions have high administrative costs and are expensive to users so 
a trade-off is needed. 
Summary 
Fees have been promoted in the 1990s as an option in developing countries in an attempt 
to improve access to basic health care in accordance with the WHO "Health for All by 
the Year 2000" goals. Out-of-pocket payment has been employed as a practical option to 
increase revenue and improve efficiency and sustainability of services and to influence 
user and provider behaviou~. Russell and Gilson observe that user fees were introduced 
largely for pragmatic rather than for political or economic reasons39 • 
There is an argument that user fees are fundamentally flawed. Reviews of European 
health care reforms stress that interventions on the demand-side (e.g. cost sharing or 
limiting public financing) have rarely succeeded due to equity problems and their 
dependence on provider behaviour; and that incentives aimed at suppliers should be 
addressed7 68 • In Western Europe, co-payments have often been mitigated through 
additional insurance, thus reducing their impact. In contrast, in Sub-Saharan Africa user 
fees were among the few financing options perceived as feasible to support primary 
health care locally. Insurance schemes are considered expensive and complex, requiring 
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particular cultural conditions (solidarity, common language etc.) or suitable mainly 
where there is a substantial regular employment sector. Charges are relatively 
straightforward to implement compared to other finance options (e.g. rural insurance) 
through training of health staff locally, and applying discretionary exemptions. In some 
cases charges are considered a preliminary step to insurance. Nevertheless, successful 
revenue collection and distribution as well as effective exemption practices require 
investments in research, administration (especially for nation-wide schemes), local 
infrastructure, information systems, and monitoring. 
The issue of cost-sharing is politically and ethically controversial in traditionally free of 
charge health systems, as it is more visible to the public than other cost-containment 
mechanisms. The acceptance of fees depends on the particular economic, political and 
historical background and values of the country. With user fees, risk-pooling between 
population groups or regions is complex. The redistribution of revenues from fees 
requires government commitment. 
Statutory health insurance: Bismarck model 
Characteristics 
Compulsory health insurance evolved from traditional schemes for industrial workers 
and their dependants in Western Europe, with coverage progressively extended. In 
Central and Eastern Europe, it was initially introduced on a large scale69 • If part of social 
security system, and financed by a payroll tax, it could be called social health insurance. 
The 'public contract model' (OECD typology) usually involves contracting and 
commissiomng of services with negotiation between insurance funds and provider 
associations70 • 
In Bismarckian-type systems, contributions are income-related and earmarked for health 
care. Collection of revenue is usually via tax or payroll-related contributions by 
employees and employers. Generally, contribution is compulsory, being that entitlement 
is conditional on participation17 • Contribution is based on agreed principles, such as 
solidarity and collective responsibility for health, requiring risk-pooling and 
redistribution27 • The compulsory nature provides for collectively shared risk and 
maintains the premiums at an affordable level14 • Premiums of poor and disadvantaged 
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groups are typically subsidised. However, solidarity could be undermined by co-
payments, exclusion of the rich, or limited benefit packages70. 
Despite being based on egalitarian premises, social insurance systems are often 
regressive, because contributions represent a fixed percentage of income up to a certain 
ceiling, and high-income groups are allowed to opt-out; thus reducing the cross-
subsidisation7. Doorslaer and Wagstaff report evidence on the regressivity of the social 
insurance systems in France, the Nether lands and Spain, where the contributions are 
proportional to income up to a ceiling21 • Projections for the UK show that under a social 
insurance system, redistribution of post-tax income would be regressive, favouring the 
better-off'1 • 
With public health Insurance, third party insurers could be public (central or local 
governments), non-governmental "quasi-public" funding bodies (semi-independent 
sickness funds) or providers' associations. In Central and Eastern Europe, third party 
payers are commonly public insurance bodies, with some autonomy from the state. The 
funding agency could be monopolistic or multiple sickness funds based on occupation or 
geographical area. There could be choice among public insurance agencies, even if they 
are non-competing. 
A model based on insurance, private or public, is likely to suffer theoretical or actual 
weaknesses inherent in the insurance principle itself: moral hazard, supplier-induced 
demand and high administrative costs, which were discussed in relation to voluntary 
insurance. The actors involved (patients, providers and insurers) have different interests. 
The insurers have the highest interest to contain costs and the least ability to achieve this, 
as the providers competing for clients may not be willing to reduce costs. Added 
problems in social insurance systems are the tendency for cost escalation, a narrow 
contribution base, high management and transaction costs, and the political sensitivity of 
rationing of care as a cost containment instmmenf0. 
In societies in transition, compulsory health insurance models have sought to: 
• ensure universal coverage 
• guarantee access to services according to need 
• "provide a stable funding base that encourages greater emphasis on individual health 
protection"17 
• mobilise untapped sources for health financing (self-employed etc.) 
• promote equity and social cohesion in. a situation of increasing!~ p.olarised 1 ~ocieties, through redistribution of benefits favounng those who are poor and m til health 
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National insurance systems are rarely sustainable without government subsidies, as 
premiums do not match risk and costs often exceed revenue. Arguably, insurance 
contributions often supplement rather then replace general budgetary revenues7 • 
Insurance fund deficits and exemptions are often covered through budgetary subsidies or 
increased contribution rates71 • 
The compulsory health insurance model appears in several common variants depending 
on the presence of competition between intermediaries (funds or public insurance 
agencies), and degree of decentralisation in management and regulation of insurance 
funds, and the use of reimbursement in public insurance schemes. 
Payment methods under the public contract model can vary considerably, but are mainly 
prospective (contract) and retrospective. Prospective payments methods to providers 
seek to provide incentives for cost control and prevention, but may result in more 
referrals, reduced access for sicker patients, and low responsiveness to patients needs. 
Public insurance based on reimbursement is seen most clearly in the Belgian and French 
health systems18• Mixed systems containing large prospective components seem to be 
more successful in terms of micro and macro efficiency. This is a complex area, beyond 
the scope of this literature review. 
Experience with statutory insurance 
Compulsory health insurance is dominant in countries such as Germany, Ireland and the 
Netherlands. There are almost universal rights to health care in six Member States 
(about 99% coverage in Belgium, France and Luxembourg; over 90% in Germany)33• 
Commonly, coverage is limited to certain type of treatments and health risks, or to 
certain income groups. Social insurance is often supplemented by voluntary insurance 
schemes, e.g. for those excluded from the sickness funds in the Netherlands48, or by 
extensive co-payment such as 'ticket moderateur' in France. The health systems of 
Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg, although having different private I public 
mixes in service provision, are financed mainly by social insurance. Proposals for 
implementation of compulsory insurance in the UK in 198871 and in Sweden in 199416 
did not gain support. 
All Central and Eastern European countries have embarked on implementation of 
compulsory health insurance72 7 , with controversial results. In the Former Soviet Union, 
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where a universal health system is predominantly funded by central government (from 
taxes and surpluses from state enterprises), the policy agenda has been dominated by the 
choice between social insurance and funding from general taxation 17 • 
Cost increases associated with compulsory insurance often have been a consequence of 
provider payment methods and lack of incentives for cost containment. In the Czech 
Republic the use of a 'point system' for paying providers (essentially fee-for-service) in 
social insurance combined with uncapped public health insurance led to cost-escalation, 
such as 50% rise in the first two years73 • Compensation for deficits with no cash limits 
tends to escalate total health spending. Options for cost-containment are expenditure 
ceilings or capped budgets. Demand-side measures such as cost-sharing, 'no claim 
bonus' (the Netherlands), rationing of services covered by insurance, incentives for 
private spending such as tax concessions, and rights to opt-out of the statutory system 
aimed to shift part of the cost to the individual patient. In some cases these have proved 
to be politically unsustainable. Governmental institutions could seek to control the 
increase in insurance contributions or charges levied on patients, even where insurers are 
independent. 
Solidarity and competition 
Solidarity and competition are generally considered to be incompatible given that public 
as well as private insurers have an interest to compete for "good risks". At the same 
time, cross-subsidisation implies averaging the risk across society based on solidarity. 
Solidarity only exists where the quality of care between sickness funds; between different 
socio-economic groups; or public and voluntary insurance48 is similar. 
The social insurance model could involve monopoly or competition in commissioning of 
services, collection of premiums and spending. The system might involve a large 
number of funds (Germany), or one or two funds covering the majority of the population 
(France and Greece respectively). Monopoly or competition do not always directly 
reflect particular values, however, in the solidarity-based social insurance system of 
Germany, the commissioning of services is monopolistic, with statutory membership in a 
fund according to place of residence, employment or location of fund. Since 1993, 
reforms have promoted free choice leading to competition between funds74 • The Czech 
Republic has also initiated competition within its public insurance programme, allowing 
regional quasi-public insurance funds to compete with the national plan24 • 
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Traditionally, the "Bismarck" model has been based on contracts: between insurer and 
employers or individual subscribers; between insurers (regional and national associations 
of sickness funds or central bodies) and providers of care as a "bilateral monopoly"; 
between insurance funds and between insurers and central agency7 • While contracts have 
not primarily aimed to achieve price and efficiency targets, reforms have been initiated to 
introduce non-price competition in the quantity and quality of services and to enhance 
choice. Drawbacks of competitive practices within a compulsory insurance model 
include funds failing to be competitive and duplicating services, cream-skimming, and a 
need for expensive monitoring. Truly free choice of insurer is only rarely achieved. 
While promoting choice, competition often increases costs and reduces solidarityl0 • 
Saltman and von Otter argue that the benefits of insurer competition are purely 
theoretical, in practice it is almost impossible for governments to confront risk-selection 
among multiple competing insurers (risk-rating formulae proved unsuccessful in the 
Netherlands and the UK)27 • Saltman maintains that markets mechanisms in health care 
finance are rarely successful in achieving efficiency, and are more applicable in service 
delivery or allocative mechanisms (" ... no country has succeeded in structuring a 
competition-based market on the finance side of their system for their entire population 
while still maintaining a commitment to universal access to equal services and to cost-
containment")16. The existence of a single purchaser of services is associated with better 
cost controF0 • 
Coverage 
In Germany and the Netherlands, membership of funds is mandatory for people below a 
certain income level. Permitting opting-out (or excluding) of the wealthiest groups that 
are more likely to be healthy is likely to reduce cross-subsidisation from rich to poor 
within the system, reduce transparency and raise administrative costs 22 24 • In the 
Netherlands, the wealthiest take voluntary insurance, while the poor are directly 
subsidised. 
Insurance in less developed countries. Community insurance 
In developing countries, compulsory insurance schemes are considered difficult to 
implement compared to cost-sharing. Abel-Smith criticises the view that in developing 
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countries compulsory insurance plans for the regularly employed should cover only 
catastrophic costs, while low-cost curative care is to be financed through cost-sharing75 • 
Both these options might be difficult given the small proportion of regular employees, 
and insufficient administrative infrastructure required for complex means-testing. 
Shepard et al. recommend introduction of user fees in Rwanda for administrative 
simplicity and the close link between revenues and services which makes monitoring 
cash flows and book keeping easie~8 • Pre-payment schemes, which might be more 
equitable, require greater financial and management expertise and require mechanisms to 
address non-compliance. Often there are no reliable income data to inform pre-payment 
levels and exemptions. 
In the past decade, there has been significant growth in small-scale pre-payment schemes 
operated at community level offering an "unconventional" approach to insurance76 • Such 
schemes, building on existing traditional support mechanisms, emerge mainly in middle 
and low-income countries where government health budgets are low, out-of-pocket 
payments are widespread, and social insurance not feasible69 • Stinson defines community 
financing as contributions in cash, in-kind, labour, land, by individual, families or 
community groups to sustain local health services77 • It requires collective action 
undertaken by the community on behalf of a majority of people who share common 
interests. Many communities have chosen autonomous strategies to maintain their health 
facilities in response to the government's failure to maintain the public infrastructure. 
Community financing is practised in many developing countries with a varied degree of 
success. It is reported that community-based financing schemes manage to generate 
higher revenue than user fees. For non-governmental providers in Africa, the cost-
recovery rate is between 25 and 50% due to higher prices, more rigorous fee collection 
and greater willingness to pay32 • Willingness to pay might be higher because of the 
reduced insecurity for a longer time period. In a study from Niger, 85% of respondents 
regardless of socio-economic status, declared a preference for a prepaid annual fee, 
allowing for seasonal income fluctuations, rather than direct user fees57 • 
Community financing can be organised other than through pre-payment schemes. 
Households or individuals may pay at full or preferential rates for health facilities run by 
the community; pay for socially organised voluntary community insurance schemes 
linked to income and production; or donate cash, gifts, or labour in exchange for 
participation in collective benefits. 
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Arhin defines community (rural) financing as "social security defined programmes in 
which the community, through its representatives, fully or partially controls a pool of 
resources"
78
. Based on data from studies of existing rural insurance schemes in Burundi 
' 
Guinea Bissau and Ghana, it is argued that rural pre-payment schemes are financially 
viable. They raise additional funding; maintain free services at the point of use, share 
risk; and create benefits for the community as a whole. Most respondents viewed the 
system positively and thought it accessible, with some reservation regarding availability 
of drugs and quality of care. Participation was found to be almost universal, and a study 
in Ghana found that most households (98%) were willing to pay to cover dependants 
because health insurance is perceived as "solidarity to deal with the risk of illness". 
Willingness to pay was, however, conditional on proximity of the facilities and 
acceptable quality. 
According to Abel-Smith and Dua, potential benefits of community financing in 
developing countries are: to attract surplus household resources to the health sector; to 
redirect household resources from the private sector to services with greater impact on 
health; to increase utilisation; to ensure that health services are acceptable and responsive 
to the community's priorities; and to mobilise contributions from the self-employed79 • 
They have achieved good results in extending primary care at low cost to rural areas in 
China, Thailand and Indonesia. However, a recent review of 82 schemes indicated that 
improving efficiency was a secondary objective to raising revenue76 • 
One drawback of such schemes is regional inequity, since richer communities are likely 
to raise more resources and attract support from other sources. The schemes can also 
exacerbate existing inequalities within the communities, especially where contribution is 
flat-rate and unaffordable for some groups69 and the poor are insufficiently protected80 • 
In a review of developing countries' experiences it was argued that community financing 
has been successful mainly for revolving drug funds30, often promoted by development 
agencies or governments. In principle, community financing is difficult to sustain 
through community efforts because of unstable revenue flows. Mobilising the necessary 
external subsidies has proved a challenge. The essential infrastructure usually needs 
external financing. Pre-payment schemes are influenced by market prices, and are easily 
mismanaged due to lack of technical skills. Political support, investment in training, and 
technical and institutional support by government enhances the viability of such 
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schemes69 • Pre-payment schemes are difficult to implement in rural areas due to wide-
spread poverty and seasonality of income. 
Tax-based health financing: Beveridge model 
The final model of health care financing is from general taxation. Often financing and 
provision are vertically integrated ("integrated" model in the OECD classification), with 
the funding bodies owning health facilities and directly employing staff rather than 
contracting independent providers. However, the tax-based model can involve 
contracting with competing private or public providers. 
Central or local authorities collect income-related contributions and manage revenue. 
Tax-based financing, like social insurance, aims to secure universal coverage and equity 
of access, while achieving redistributional effects. Lower transaction costs translate into 
lower overall expenditure on health care compared to social insurance. Demand is 
rationed not through price, but by availability of services (non-price rationing)17 • 
Barr points that state provision in the social sector can be justified not simply by equity, 
but also on efficiency grounds as "it does things which private markets for technical 
reasons either would not do at all, or would do inefficiently"81 • However, tax-based 
public health care systems have often been maintained for ideological rather than 
economic considerations, as in Central and Eastern Europe before 198914 • 
The tax-based model depends on the willingness of governments to devote resources to 
health care and is susceptible to pressures from other sectors. Although tax-based 
systems have the advantage of covering the whole population, such systems are often 
underfunded and of poor quality because of low tax revenue and the low priority of the 
health sector in budgetary allocation. 
The main forms of the tax-based model are national health systems such as the British 
NHS and the Semashko systems in Central and Eastern Europe before 1989. 
Superficially, these two systems are similar. Both the former socialist systems and the 
West European welfare states purport to provide a comprehensive package of health care. 
However, they are underpinned by fundamentally different value systems. In Western 
Europe, universal welfare provision is based on social consensus and democratic 
representation, while in the former socialist states, collective rights to social provision 
were used as a means for social control by totalitarian regimes. 
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Experience with tax-based model 
Taxation-based health financing has a long tradition in Europe: existing in Denmark, 
Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, UK and France (for public hospitals). It is the 
principal health financing source in Denmark, PortugaP3 and, until recently, in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Government financing often co-exists with private or compulsory 
insurance funding. 
The tax-based model does not always fully integrate financing and provision. In recent 
years, West European countries with government monopolies in financing and ownership 
(UK, Finland, Sweden) have experimented with purchaser-provider split, contracting, 
and introduction of "quasi-independent but still publicly operated provider institutions"16 
to stimulate competition, and improve efficiency and quality of care82 • 
Saltman and Von Otter27 suggest a greater use of market solutions such as competition in 
Western European countries "which have traditionally relied on regulation and 
planning", simultaneously with a process of strengthening of governmental regulation in 
health sector ("planned markets"). The regulation needed in a planned market is of a 
different nature to that in a centralised public system83• 
Despite the lower overall cost of the tax-based model, most Central and Eastern 
European countries (including Bulgaria) have opted for a Bismarckian model. One 
commonly cited reason is the apparent inability to bring sufficient resources into the 
health care system. The experience of the UK is used to argue that a health system 
financed almost exclusively (80-90%) from national taxation is at risk of becoming 
underfunded83 • Another is a concern about transparency, with suspicion that tax revenues 
will be diverted to other sectors, such as defence. A separate social insurance fund is 
considered less susceptible to such treatment. 
There are, however, some doubts as to the necessity of a radical financing reform. Better 
resource allocation, mobilisation of resources from non-governmental sources37; and 
improved management could be sufficient in the short term8 . Arguably, with declining 
public budgets, growing demand, improved efficiency of the existing model could 
release adequate resources while enhancing equity. 
In the early 1990s, in Bulgaria, incremental introduction of a market based model was 
viewed as more suitable given the low tax revenues, and lack of managerial and 
regulatory skills84 • Reforms were largely on the supply side, such as contracting out 
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auxiliary services and some clinical services; granting autonomous status to some 
facilities; decentralisation of decision-making to municipalities; performance-related pay 
for providers, and free choice of "family physician". These reforms remained patchy, 
failed to bring visible improvements in access to health care, and led to intensified 
political pressure for a more radical solution, such as social insurance. Options to 
mobilise resources through strengthening of tax collection remained unexplored. 
Summary 
This chapter presented a short description of each financing model, with their specific 
strengths and weaknesses. It was emphasised that in most cases, health systems are 
mixed, containing elements from different models. 
It is now well-recognised that the choice of model for health care financing depends on a 
mixture of interacting factors, such as economic, political and historical context, 
dominant societal values (individual and collectivist),85 7 and the "weights assigned to 
different social objectives such as equity, efficiency or the merits of individual freedom 
versus collectivism"33 • In the context of Central and Eastern Europe, implementation of 
new health financing models has sought to increase revenue, ensuring a basic level of 
health services for the whole population, while improving transparency and 
accountability. 
Chapters 4 to 11 will examine, in tum, potential reform strategies, societal values, and 
ability and willingness to pay, followed by a concluding discussion of the feasibility of 
different financing models in the circumstances ofBulgaria (chapter 12). 
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CHAPTER 3. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE 
RESEARCH. METHODOLOGY 
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
Aims 
This thesis mms to examme critically potential mechanisms for sustainable and 
affordable financing of the health care system in Bulgaria, by identifying and exploring 
the financial implications of each option, its congruence with societal values, public 
preferences, the existing institutional framework, and the Bulgarian political and 
economic context. 
Objectives 
The aim will be achieved by meeting several objectives: 
I. To examine the features of several methods of health care financing and the 
experience with their implementation worldwide. To develop a theoretical 
framework for analysis of reform of health financing. 
II. To describe the main determinants of demand for health care in Bulgaria: 
+ Patterns of health and disease 
+ Patterns of illness behaviour and its determinants 
III. To assess the ability of the population to pay for health care, by measuring: 
+ Size and structure of out-of pocket expenditure on health care 
+ Size and characteristics of informal out-of pocket payments (under-the-
counter payments etc.) 
+ Determinants of the pattern of formal and informal out-of-pocket expenditure 
+ Affordability of health expenditure 
IV. Analysis of willingness of the population to pay for health care 
+ Willingness to pay, in general, under the existing model (tax plus formal and 
informal out-of-pocket payments) and its determinants 
+ Willingness to pay for a compulsory heath insurance scheme 
56 
+ Willingness to pay for voluntary insurance 
+ Willingness to pay informal payments 
V. To discuss the applicability of different options in the circumstances of Bulgaria 
and to identify key issues that need to be addressed in any future implementation 
of health financing reform. 
Hypotheses 
The approach taken in this thesis is inductive, seeking to reach conclusions through 
examination of empirical evidence. The relative absence of existing research on health 
care financing in Bulgaria makes it difficult to formulate specific hypotheses a priori. 
However, on the basis of evidence from elsewhere and knowledge of the social and 
cultural context in Bulgaria, several observations are possible. These can be used to 
generate some tentative testable hypotheses. 
+ The health needs and demands of the population will vary according to definable 
socio-demographic factors. 
+ The existing system is less equitable than is generally thought. 
+ Different models of health care financing will appeal differentially to particular 
groups. 
+ The elderly and those on low income who have been most affected by the transition 
may not welcome further change of any sort. 
+ A move to social insurance may be unpopular because of concerns about regular 
payments where incomes are irregular, and where there is potential corruption and 
unfamiliarity with the concept. 
+ If opting out is permitted, the well-off may opt for voluntary msurance and 
undermine the principle of risk pooling. 
+ The better off may prefer an occupationally linked scheme to a general public 
insurance fund. 
• 
There will be support for a policy that formalises the existing pattern of informal 
payment. 
57 
Thus, while the overall thesis is exploratory, there are certain a priori considerations that 
can be addressed specifically so as to ensure that important and relevant issues are 
included. 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter will present the methodology used in the thesis. Several methods have been 
employed, each targeting a specific aspect of the research questions and collecting a 
different type of information. The aim has been to triangulateb multifaceted data, 
allowing for a comprehensive analysis of the possible options for health care financing. 
The intention of this work is to draw conclusions from primary data obtained through a 
mix of quantitative and qualitative research methods. Official statistical sources and 
existing researchc provide little secondary data on the non-medical aspects of the health 
sector in Bulgaria. This is seen in the gaps in tables of health indicators published by 
international organisationsd after 1990. Data are often of low validity due to a lack of 
systematic collation of administrative records and policy-makers' failure to recognise the 
need for such research. Some key issues relating to health financing, such as out-of-
pocket health care expenditure or users' attitudes, are relatively unexplored in Central and 
Eastern Europe86 • Empirical studies that do exist in Bulgaria could not readily be used in 
this thesis as they have had inconsistent objectives and designs. The one exception is the 
1995/6 World Bank Bulgarian Living Standards Measurement Study87, but analysing this 
data set and using it as a reference point is beyond the scope of this thesis, due to its 
different approach to measuring health status and income. 
Stages of research and analysis 
The research was conducted at several stages, summarised in Figure 3.1. First, a 
theoretical framework was developed. Second, review of literature on the context of 
reform in Bulgaria and on the strengths and weaknesses of different financing models 
was undertaken. Third, qualitative (in-depth interviews, focus groups, and situation 
analysis) and quantitative methods (a survey) were conducted, to gather empirical data 
b Triangulation is a multi-method approach employing several techniques for data collection in 
different combinations, supplementing each other 
c Health care-related data are collected and analysed by the National Centre of Health 
Information affiliated with the Ministry of Health; and by the Central Statistical Office 
d e.g. the World Bank Development Indicators database and in the WHO Health for All database 
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relevant to the various financing options. Finally, evidence from each of these sources 
was brought together and used to explore the implications of different options for health 
care financing . Each stage relied on findings from the previous one, with the exception 
of stages B and C, which were conducted in parallel. Development of research 
instruments and planning the study design will be outlined while describing the research 
methods. Below, each stage will be described in tum. All questionnaires used are 
enclosed in the Appendix. 
Figure 3.1. Stages of research 
Stage A: DEVELOPMENT OF A 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
• Review of health financing models 
• Identifying key dimensions of 
research 
• Study design 
Stage B: QUALITATIVE COMPONENT 
• Identify & clarify topics 
• Explore stakeholders' willingness to 
pay, attitudes & values 
• Interpret meanings, relationships and 
contexts 
• Test research design and instrument 
• Generate new ideas 
Methods: in-depth interviews, focus 
groups, documentary analysis 
• 
Stage C: QUANTITATIVE COMPONENT 
• Measure users ability and 
willingness to pay for health care 
• Analyse health status, health care 
expenditure, illness behaviour. 
• Measure demographic variables . 
• Generalise findings to a larger 
population 
Methods: survey 
Stage 0 : DATA ANALYSIS Stage E: DISCUSSION 
Options for health 
financing in Bulgaria. 
Issues to be addressed 
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Stage A: Development of a theoretical framework 
This stage sought to provide the theoretical basis of the subsequent research by means of 
the following steps: 
1. Locating various options for reform within the body of research evidence on the 
effects of particular approaches worldwide. Thus, a critical overview of the 
experience with different models of health care financing was conducted, identifying 
the strengths and weaknesses of each method. A framework for analysis was 
selected, based on a literature review (chapters 2 and 3). 
2. The research objectives were operationalised to a few key dimensions. The 
suitability of each method was studied in terms of: 
Socio-economic, political and demographic profile of Bulgaria 
Health system characteristics and reform 
Patterns of illness and health services utilisation 
Ability to pay 
Cultural sensitivity: values, beliefs and attitudes 
Willingness to pay 
The socio-economic, political and demographic profile and the characteristics of the 
system were explored primarily by documentary analysis. The empirical research then 
explored patterns of illness; utilisation of care; ability to pay; willingness to pay for 
health care and a range of underlying values, thus describing the population's perspective 
of health care financing. The performance of the health care system, including its 
economic performance, is beyond the scope ofthis thesis. 
Each dimension was studied through answering a series of specific questions (Table 3.1 ), 
outlined briefly below. 
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Table 3.1. Dimensions of research, methods, and specific research questions 
METHODS RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Socio-economic, political and demographic profile of Bulgaria 
Documentary analysis Analysis of political, economic and demographic context in Literature review Bulgaria 
Compatibility with financing models 
Health system characteristics and reform 
Key informant interviews History, trends, structure, institutions, actors, reform Documentary analysis Precondition for certain financing models Literature review 
Administrative costs and institutional capacity 
Finance reform: issues, obstacles, support, consensus among 
stakeholders, priority 
Patterns of illness and health services utilisation 
Household survey Self reported health: level and determinants 
In-depth interviews Chronic limiting illness: level and determinants Focus groups 
Illness in past year: level and determinants 
Utilisation: level and determinants 
Patterns ofutilisation 
Ability to pay 
Household survey Level of health care expenditure (in primary/ secondary care) 
In-depth interviews Characteristics ofhealth care expenditure: structure (drugs, Focus groups 
treatment, food, transport, informal payments, gifts); status: 
formal /informal; public I private 
Determinants of health expenditure 
Health expenditure expressed as a % of monthly income 
Affordability of payment (last consultation) 
Coping strategies (from current income/ reserves) 
Informal payments 
Cultural sensitivity: values, beliefs and attitudes 
Household survey Values underlying the attitude towards financing schemes: role of 
In-depth interviews the state; solidarity; collective or individualistic; value of health 
Focus groups Attitude to existing and to alternative financing methods: 
transparency; implementation complexity, affordability; general 
suitability; effect on utilisation; coverage; equity; incentives; 
accountability; compatibility with traditions, values, and with 
existing institutions and health system; acceptable by the public 
Willingness to pay 
Household survey Willingness to pay: level and determinants 
In-depth interviews Willingness to pay and expenditure 
Focus groups Willingness to pay under existing or proposed arrangements 
Willingness to pay under particular circumstances (type of service, 
payment scheme, to whom/where/when/ how) 
Attitudes and preference for a financing model and determinants 
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Socio-economic, political and demographic profile of Bulgaria 
Health sector financing is intrinsically related to the state of the economy, and subject to 
economic, political and institutional pressures. Oreskovic9 argues that the health care 
system is " ... not autonomous but relies upon the society's financial, legal, administrative 
and other support". Thus, the thesis first examines the economic and political conditions 
in Bulgaria, its history, demography and health profile as preconditions for introduction 
of particular health financing options. The detailed country profile is based on 
documentary analysis (appendix 1). 
The restructuring of health care financing is a profoundly political process affecting all 
groups in Bulgarian society. It is important to assess the political feasibility of reform, 
support from stakeholders, local capacity for governance and potential strategies for 
achieving consensus. Thus, between 1989 and 1997 it proved difficult to reach 
consensus on key social sector reforms, including health financing reform, due to their 
sensitivity, politicisation, and the underdeveloped framework for political dialogue. A 
detailed analysis of political feasibility of each financing option is, however, beyond the 
scope of this work. 
Health system characteristics and reform 
The choice of any future financing system will reflect many factors, including the 
existing health sector structure, history, long-term policy trends, and views of key 
stakeholders7• For example, the Czech Republic and Poland have, in the past, had 
occupational sickness funds ("Bismarck system"), with farmers in Poland who owned 
land privately being ineligible for state-provided health care until 197288 • This is quite 
different from the situation in Bulgaria as discussed in chapter 4 and in appendix 2. 
Pre-conditions for successful implementation of any new financing mechanism include 
low administrative costs and adequate capacity for implementation, specifically the 
presence of adequate infrastructure, information systems, technical and managerial staff, 
and audit procedures. Normand and Webe~9 consider the existence of a legislative 
framework, trained administrators, and mechanisms for collecting contributions to be key 
to implementation of large-scale social insurance systems. This would require a further 
analysis. 
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Patterns of illness and health services utilisation 
Analysis of need and demand for health care and their determinants are important in 
assessing the requirements for funding the health care system, and to anticipate potential 
consequences of particular financing mechanisms on socio-economic inequalities. If 
significant numbers of people report high levels of illness and low utilisation, this would 
suggest a failure of the existing health care system that must be addressed by new 
financing mechanisms. The main data source is a population survey (chapters 5 and 6). 
Ability to pay 
A sustainable and equitable system for health care financing should reflect the 
population's ability to pay for health care. Thus, price-setting and the methods for 
revenue collection should be sensitive to local conditions, otherwise the sustainability of 
the scheme may be undermined through low revenue collection90 39 • If expenditure is 
linked to service utilisation, some users may be deterred in their use of services. 
Ability to pay is examined by means of a survey focusing on the scale of formal and 
informal health care expenditure (chapter 8). The socio-economic determinants of ability 
to pay were explored to identify which groups would lose, and which gain, under current 
and alternative financing models. Affordability of health expenditure was first examined 
'objectively' as a proportion of monthly family income then, by asking people directly 
whether it was affordable. Timing, predictability and other characteristics of informal 
payments were examined in detail (chapter 7). 
The subjective dimension of ability to pay was also addressed by qualitative methods, 
exploring the circumstances under which payments were deemed affordable and the 
strategies used for coping with unplanned expenses, in the absence of insurance. 
Cultural sensitivity: values, beliefs and attitudes 
A recent WHO analysis of European health reform7 stresses the importance of societal 
values as part of the context for health reform, "the legal, administrative, and physical 
structure of the dominant value system, defining how the power and resources are 
allocated"91 • The diversity of culture, values and traditions in Europe have led to 
adoption of many different health reform strategies in the 1990s. 
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In this thesis the methods for health care financing were assessed in terms of their 
compatibility with dominant societal values, norms, culture and ideological paradigms, 
by means of in-depth interviews, and to some extent, a survey. The main axes of analvsis 
.I 
were interrelated: values (collective-individual responsibility for health, solidarity-
competition, social risk-security); role of the state and private sphere; principles of 
operation (transparency, accountability) and broader societal values. This framework is 
based on the "core" values suggested by the above mentioned publication7 : 
• health care orientation: Is health seen as a collective, socially valued good or a private 
good? Are there traditions of solidarity? While the relationship is not absolute, the 
shape of health care financing systems tends to reflect underlying societal values. 
Preference for a national insurance system based on universal entitlement is indicative 
of solidarity and collective risk-sharing values being prevalent at societal level. In 
contrast, a system based on voluntary insurance and out-of-pocket payments is more 
consistent with a culture which places most of the responsibility for health on the 
individual. 
• role of the state, private institutions and citizens: What is seen as the appropriate 
balance between the state and the citizens' responsibility for health72 • Ideological 
pressures for reform occur in the context of broader societal movements for 
democratisation and rethinking the role of the state37 • For example, political values 
have played an important role in shaping the private insurance arrangements in the 
Netherlands48 • However, the situation in Central and Eastern Europe may be rather 
different from Western Europe, as shown by Rose and Makkai91 , in that the political 
affiliation (on left-right scale) and other specificities of the national culture have little 
power to explain welfare values (e.g. the attitudes for and against state provision of 
welfare) in nine Central and Eastern European countries. The same authors argue that 
welfare values are central to understanding Central and Eastern European societies. 
• accountability in health care: How are financial, political, legal, professional, ethical 
aspects of accountability understood? 
• broader societal values: perception of social justice, social security: There are 
indications that the decline in the welfare of the population, combined with an extreme 
income polarisation, may undermine earlier social consensus behind the reformS92 • In 
Bulgaria, the social dimension of the political transition and its impact on stability and 
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social consensus was unexplored until recently. High levels of ill health and 
premature mortality combined with diminished population resources for health care 
are likely to create a sense of social insecurity. 
Willingness to pay 
Both willingness and ability to pay characterise demand and are often studied together. 
There is debate about whether willingness and ability to pay for health care can be 
clearly distinguished93 • Willingness to pay is often measured with the ability to pay 
implying that if individuals pay user fees or informal payments, they are able to do so. 
Such an approach may overestimate the ability to pay as, for many, it is a "necessity to 
pay"43 • This does not necessarily indicate ability to pay from disposable income, and can 
involve incurring significant financial and social costs, with borrowing or sale of assets 
leading to long-term strain on household resources42 • Delcheva argues that high direct 
user spending is indicative of poverty94 rather than of higher willingness to pay. Abel-
Smith and Dua, writing about developing countries, note that the need for health care 
rarely coincides with ability to pay, reflecting vertical inequity79 • Importantly, people 
may be willing to pay for what they perceive as a need, and not for professionally 
determined needs75 • Thus, in this study, ability and willingness to pay will be examined 
separately. 
Two commonly used approaches to measuring willingness to pay are outlined by Russell 
et al93 • The first involves projecting health care utilisation and expenditure based on 
historical data. This method is inappropriate in a situation of previously free services and 
ignores the fact that willingness to pay is context-specific and influenced by non-price 
factors such as type of service. The second method ('contingent valuation) is to ask 
directly about willingness to pay for a particular service, assuming no previous 
experience of paying for health care. In this case of a "hypothetical market" respondents 
suggest prices on the basis of their individual circumstances, ability to pay and 
expectations for service rather than on past experience. 
Contingent valuation appears better suited to Bulgaria in the absence of historical data or 
a tradition of market for health services in the recent past. The survey sought to examine 
whether people are willing to pay at all for health care, its socio-economic determinants, 
and values attached to certain common types of services. The in-depth interviews and 
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focus groups aimed to add depth to the survey responses, and identify circumstances 
under which people are willing, and actually choose, to pay for health care. 
Burrows and Brown95 note that willingness to pay studies might place high demands on 
respondents. In a short interview, respondents have to evaluate complex scenarios of 
foregone current consumption at the expense of improved health status in the future, and 
comparison of the initial risk level with a level reduced by payment. In the context of 
Bulgaria, respondents' unfamiliarity with prices of public goods may preclude giving 
adequate answers. However, in this study, willingness to pay was found to vary 
intuitively with a range of socio-demographic variables so it is likely that it is a true 
reflection of personal preferences93 (chapter 1 0). 
Stage 8: Qualitative component 
Qualitative methods: overview of features 
The qualitative methods used in this research were in-depth interviews with stakeholders 
(users, physicians, key informants), focus groups, and documentary analysis. The 
interviews and focus groups aimed to identify and clarify the topics to be further 
examined in the survey, generate new ideas and test the research instrument before 
application to a large sample. Qualitative methods were essential in studying attitudes 
and values. After the survey, qualitative techniques were again used to interpret the 
observations, explain some unexpected results, explore relationships between variables, 
and place in context the survey results. In addition, documentary analysis and informal 
interviews, although not explanatory in themselves, contributed to a better understanding 
of different aspects of the research problem and supported the use of other methods. 
This section will briefly summarise the features common to qualitative methods, which 
make them suitable in this research, and each method will then be discussed in detail. 
I. Suitability for inductive research: Patton96 notes the ability of qualitative research to 
use specific observations to identify general patterns ("inductive logic"), searching 
for new patterns, categories or issues, guided by broad questions and "goal-free", 
without imposing pre-existing expectations. In contrast, a survey is deductive as its 
measures are pre-determined by the researcher. The grounded theory school 
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emphasises that qualitative analysis is data-derived and useful for studying relatively 
unexplored phenomenae 97 , which is the case here. 
II. Opportunity for in-depth analysis and generation of new directions: Through 
qualitative research, detailed data about a small number of cases could be studied in 
depth, focusing on selected issues. Data collection is a flexible, dynamic and 
interactive process, unconstrained by pre-determined standardised categories of 
analysis and enabling new ideas and directions to emerge96 • These methods can 
generate new hypotheses to be tested, while a survey could generate data to test them. 
Responses which seem automatic could be further clarified. 
III. Creating bridges to quantitative research : In qualitative research, the field work has a 
developing character and provides an input to subsequent research stages. The 
research design is not pre-determined and is gradually elaborated. In a survey, data 
are classified in previously defined categories and no change is possible. In the 
current research, feedback from the field was invaluable in modifying response 
categories in the survey and in improving the overall study design. 
IV. Suitable for understanding phenomena: Qualitative research is concerned primarily 
with understanding the meanings of events and attitudes in depth, rather than 
measuring them. It cannot establish a causal relationship between variables, but can 
clarify the nature of the relationships. In this research qualitative techniques were 
applied to little understood and sensitive issues, such as under-the-counter payments, 
where use of more structured methods could have been problematic. 
V. Providing personalised data: Qualitative research enables exploration of motivations, 
values and attitudes and provides an "impressionistic interpretation" of data98 • While 
a survey is useful in searching for common outcomes and its results can be 
generalised, qualitative data explains individual variances96 • Qualitative research 
studies the culture and behaviour of people from the point of view of those studied99 
and discloses the "real meaning" of issues for them100 • The aim is to understand the 
behaviour and motivation behind their answers (the "respondent's world") and to 
capture the interviewee's own framework of meanings and interpretations while 
trying not to impose any limiting a priori categorisation and assumptions101 102 • This 
process enables respondents to express their experience in their own terms and 
e "Grounded theory ... is a qualitative research method that uses a systematic set of procedures 
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language and gives them scope for creativity101 • It is this sensitivity towards 
'subjective' views of the stakeholders which makes the qualitative research relevant 
for this research. 
VI. Suitable for studying phenomena in transition: Qualitative methods are useful in 
times of transition and reform, to understand the dynamics of the phenomena and to 
analyse the context in which attitudes are modified. Open-ended questions can 
capture changing events96 in ways that may be more difficult for quantitative surveys. 
VII.Providing a holistic perspective: Qualitative research provides a comprehensive and 
holistic understanding99 of the social settings in which research is carried out, 
integrating actions, events, actors and context. It creates an overall picture of the 
respondent's personality in capturing non-verbal information such as gestures, facial 
expressions, physical movements, which can be invaluable for interpreting answers. 
Initial informal interviews with stakeholders 
An in-depth interview is defined as a "conversation in which the researcher encourages 
the respondent to relate, in their own terms, experience and attitudes that are relevant to 
the research problem"103• This study started with a small number of preliminary informal 
and unstructured interviews. The format of the interviews was closely monitored, 
despite the lack of a formal interview schedule. Burgess100 points out that even the 
completely unstructured interview has a controlled, if very flexible, framework. 
Respondents were selected to include physicians, frequent users, and medical 
administrators. They were approached by recommendation from colleagues, from social 
or professional networks, or from people with high professional authority. Respondents 
from a range of backgrounds and perspectives were interviewed to avoid bias. 
These interviews served as a pilot for subsequent semi-structured interviews, facilitating 
improvement of the study design. They identified key criteria for sampling for the semi-
structured interviews, tested provisional themes to be further explored through more 
structured methods and focused the research area. Apart from gaining insights on views 
of main stakeholders and collecting background information on the health care financing 
context, unstructured interviewing also elucidated new dimensions, enhancing the 
"breadth ofthe data"104• 
to develop an inductively derived grounded theory about a phenomenon." (Strauss & Corbin) 
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Unstructured interviews were especially appropriate to test sensitivity of issues such as 
informal payments, and the stigma attached to them, as well as willingness to pay for 
previously free services. The respondents' reactions to wording of questions and probes 
were observed. In order to remove the initial barriers and establish rapport, respondents 
were informed about the nature of the research and how their co-operation would help. 
In-depth semi-structured interviews 
In-depth semi-structured interviews were the main method for qualitative data collection 
in this research. The key features of the semi-structured interviews are shown in Box 3.1. 
Box 3.1 In-depth semi-structured interviews 
Interview type 
Respondents 
Sample size 
Sampling procedure 
Settings 
Topics 
Aims 
Sample 
Face-to-face, semi-structured interview 
Users who have been ill in the last 6 months 
Health personnel (physicians, a dentist and a nurse) 
58 interviews (25 health professionals, 33 patients) 
Purposeful, according to specified criteria 
Sofia-city, Varna, Bourgas and Pleven 
Views on existing and new health care financing options, values, 
beliefs, willingness and self-perceived ability to pay, health care 
expenditure and experience of services utilisation 
To collect data on prevalent attitudes among stakeholders 
(patients and physicians) towards health financing options 
To assess general atmosphere for finance reform 
To generate new ideas and directions of research 
To test and improve the accessibility of the questionnaire and to 
identify issues not covered in the survey questionnaire 
A total of 58 semi-structured interviews were held. 44 were conducted in Sofia, of which 
19 were with health professionals and 25 with patients. Seven interviews were 
conducted in Bourgas, and seven in Varna, both cities located on the Black Sea coast. In 
each city, three physicians and four patients were interviewed. 
The majority of health personnel interviewed were physicians, with the exception of one 
nurse and one dentist. A wide range of specialities were represented, including 
cardiology, paediatrics, obstetrics and gynaecology, internal medicine, general practice, 
surgery, radiology, oncology, anaesthesiology, dermatology, urology, neurology, and 
dentistry. Ten had a postgraduate degree. 
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The sample of health professionals ·was stratified according to sex and level of health 
facility {Table 3.2). 13 men and 11 women were interviewed. Of these, five males and 
four females were working at polyclinics or other primary care facilities. Seven had 
managerial functions such as head of surgery or specialised consultation room, and of 
those, one was head of a department (ward) at the leading obstetric hospital in Sofia and 
another a medical director of polyclinics. Income was not a sampling criteria. 11 
physicians determined their income as insufficient for normal existence, ten indicated 
that their income covers only basic needs, and three respondents deemed their income 
sufficient for a good standard of living. 
Table 3.2. Sample of health professionals 
Gender Facility 
Men 
Women 
Total 
Primary care 
5 
4 (3-MR)* 
9 
Secondary care 
8 (4-MR)* 
7 
15 
13 
11 
24 
Notes: One physician currently owns private company. *designates the share of those who have 
certain managerial responsibilities (MR), such as head of ward, surgery or consultation room. 
The main criteria for including patients was whether they had had contact with state 
facilities in the six months preceding the interview. All fulfilled this requirement. 20 
(61 %) respondents reported having used facilities several times, while the rest used 
services only once or twice. The majority of respondents (n=27; 82%) described their 
health status as good or rather good. 
Patients were sampled purposively using a recruitment questionnaire, to ensure a mix 
according to sex, age, income group and presence of chronic disease {Table 3.3). Eight 
(24%) patients reported to have income sufficient for a good standard of living, seven 
(21 %) reported that their income is insufficient for normal existence, 18 (55%) said that 
their income is sufficient only for basic needs. 15 respondents' income was below the 
national average, and 7 above it. Locating respondents with high income, suitable 
according to the other criteria and willing to be interviewed, proved very difficult. 
Occupations varied widely, the majority being employees. Of those working, 12 
respondents were employed in a state company and 13 in the private sector. The 
majority of respondents (25) had university education, 4 had general secondary 
education, and 4 - vocational training or secondary specialised education. Although 
those with higher education are over-represented, in Bulgaria income often is not 
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correlated with educational attainment. It was decided that income is a more important 
factor to stratify the sample. Other factors that may have caused the overrepresentation 
of those with higher education are that they were more willing to be interviewed and 
more articulate. 
Table 3.3. Sample of patients 
Men Age group Total 
Income group 18-35 36-55 56+ 
Higher 1 3 1 5 
Lower 5 5 3 13 
[incl. 1 chronic] [incl. 2 chronic] [incl. 2 chronic] 
Total 6 8 4 18 
Women 
Income group 18-35 36-55 56+ 
Higher 1 2 3 
Lower 7 3 2 12 
[incl. 1 chronic] [incl. 2 Chronic] [incl. 1 chronic] 
Total 8 5 2 15 
The interview: technique and organisation 
Semi-structured interviews share many features with unstructured interviews, such as the 
possibility for free responses and some discretion by the interviewer about the pace of the 
interview, wording and order of questions104 • They have the particular advantage of 
providing the context for the quantitative research and of identifying the topics to be 
further tested. 
"In contrast to the large sample surveys with their anonymous interview situation, small-
scale studies present better opportunities to do justice to the variety of cultural and social 
peculiarities of population segments "105 
Semi-structured interviews are generally considered more time consuming10\ but cheaper 
than surveys98 • Thus, in this study, in-depth interviewing provided an opportunity for 
relatively low-cost validation of some survey results. 
A clear, simple interview guide was developed based on earlier unstructured 
interviewing, containing a detailed list of headings, key questions, probes and standard 
instructions. The guide sought to ensure that the main topics were covered 
systematically, although in a free order, and comparable data was obtained by the 
participating interviewers. The aim was to ask mostly open-ended, neutral, sensitised 
and clear questions102 • Wording of questions dealing with sensitive issues (informal 
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payments, coping strategies) was carefully examined and advised by experts from Gallup 
and the Center for the Study of Democracy who are experienced in work commissioned 
by the World Bank and UNDP. 
The interviewers were allowed to modify the guide slightly, explain questions and vary 
the amount of time spent on each topic. Whyte106 points that although the semi-
structured (or non-directive) interview offers much freedom, it is structured in terms of 
the research problem and this structure channels the flow of the interview. As 
recommended, the direction and depth of the interview and topics covered were carefully 
monitored by the interviewer with a designated amount of"block time" for each topic100• 
Respondents were given the opportunity to express their views in an atmosphere of free 
communication relating to the respondent's experience, while ensuring that the relevant 
information was obtained. The interview guide used open-ended questions extensively 
in order to avoid imposing answers. Foddy1°7 argues that closed questions present 
respondents with arbitrarily limited alternatives, exclude important options and create a 
temptation for automatic answers. These questions served to define and test appropriate 
response categories for the survey instrument, which was structured along similar lines. 
They also revealed whether respondents avoided answering certain questions because 
they did not know the answer, did not want to share it, or misunderstood the question. 
The extensive use of open-ended questions required a detailed briefing of interviewers 
about what constitutes a sufficient answer, and involved complex and lengthy coding. 
The duration of the interviews was between an hour and an hour and a half as 
recommended for a single contact with a respondent108, although some respondents 
continued the interview for two hours, on their own initiative. The interviews were 
performed mainly at respondents' or interviewers' homes, with some, at work places. 
Different interview schedules were developed for health professionals and for patients. 
The interviews were conducted within a six week period (April-May 97) to ensure that 
changes in the environment would not affect opinions100• During this period there were 
no major events in the health sector such as enactment of new legislation, crises, 
governmental campaigns, or major media debates. 
It is recognised that interviewing skills are a decisive ingredient for in-depth interviews. 
There is an extensive literature addressing interviewing techniques and ways to create 
confidence and establish rapport where the topics are sensitive. Five researchers (three in 
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the capital, including myself; two in the countryside) all with substantial prevwus 
experience as qualitative interviewers took part. A one-day training session \\·as 
conducted prior to the interviews, involving mainly working through the questionnaires, 
discussion of potential problematic areas, rehearsing different scenarios and practising 
techniques such as probing. After the first few interviews, regular meetings to monitor 
interviewers' performance and to brief the interviewers on changes of the instruments 
were held. 
Interview data were recorded using a tape-recorder, despite some reservations that the 
formality introduced by tape-recording could provoke unnatural responses. However, the 
results of several pilot interviews showed that recording did not seem to impede answers, 
as long as there was an initial establishment of trust, and a clear explanation was given as 
to why tape-recording was important. During the actual field work there were no 
refusals to be taped. Contemporaneous notes were also taken for back-up. 
All interviews were transcribed in Bulgarian. The transcription process proved to be 
time-consuming and resources precluded its translation into English. Hence it was not 
possible, as had been intended, to use software packages for qualitative data analysis. 
However, an initial index of key themes was created to facilitate further analysis. 
Focus groups 
Focus groups were used in conjunction with the semi-structured interviews. The key 
features of the focus groups are shown in Box 3.2. 
Box 3.2 Focus group discussions: summary 
Interview type 
Respondents 
Sample size 
Sampling procedure 
Settings 
Topics 
Aims 
Focus group discussion 
Health personnel (physicians) and users 
Six groups with 6-8 participants. 4 in the capital and 2 in Pleven, 
Lovech region (3 with physicians and 3 with users) 
Purposeful, according to specified criteria 
Sofia-city and Pleven, Lovech region 
Views on existing and new health care financing options, values, 
beliefs, willingness and self-perceived ability to pay, health care 
expenditure and experience of services utilisation 
To assess the general atmosphere for finance reform 
To generate new ideas and directions of research 
To identify issues not covered in the survey questionnaire 
73 
Sample 
Six focus groups were held prior to the household survey in order to produce insight into 
users' views and attitudes, set problems into context and stimulate vision. Each group 
was defined by topic and by membership. Participants were selected according to pre-
determined criteria relevant to the topic to be discussed, such as sharing of common 
experience, similar professional background or relation to the health sector, being "good 
observers" or well informed. All participants completed a recruitment questionnaire to 
determine their suitability. The groups included individuals of varying ages and 
incomes, but were relatively homogenous in terms of education, social class and place of 
residence. 
In Sofia, two groups contained physicians and three contained members of the public 
who had recent experience as users of health services. One focus group with users and 
one with physicians was conducted in Pleven, in the Lovech region. These settings were 
selected purposefully. Sofia is the capital, containing one eighth of the population, with 
a very diverse composition due to migration from the countryside. Facilities are highly 
centralised and there are few geographical barriers to access to health care. The Lovech 
region in Northern Bulgaria is the third biggest region with very different economic 
indicators from Sofia and a smaller urban population. Pleven is the second largest town 
in the region, which has a range of health establishments, including the second biggest 
Higher Medical Institute in Bulgaria with a teaching hospital within it. Some regional 
differences in financing of the health care and public perception were expected. 
Each focus group consisted of 6-8 participants, one moderator and one person 
responsible for technical support and organisation. The composition of participants 
followed roughly similar lines to the sample used for in-depth interviews. The groups 
were composed according to sex, income status, age, and chronic illnesses (Table 3.4). 
When recruiting, priority was given to participants who had visited health professionals 
in a state or private health care facility in the past six months. 16 had visited a state 
health facility and 8 people had visited a private facility. 7 people had visited both. 5 
respondents had not visited facilities in the past six months, but 3 reported having a 
chronic illness. 
All but 4 of the participants (22) were white collar employees. A nurse participated in 
her capacity as a health services user because of her child's illness. 8 respondents had a 
74 
university degree or further qualifications, 8 had graduated from vocational or technical 
college, and 5 had secondary general education. Only three of the participants lived in a 
small town or village. 
Table 3.4. Composition of focus groups - patients 
Men I Lower/ higher Below 40 I Chronic Total~ 
women income above 40 diseases participw 
Group one (Sofia) 3 + 3 3 + 3 3 + 3 3 6 
Group two (Sofia) 3 + 5 7 + 1 4 + 4 3 8 
Group three (Pleven) 2 + 6 5 + 3 4 + 4 4 8 
Total 8 + 14 15 + 7 11 + 11 10 22 
Note: Respondents were assigned to higher income group if their income was equal or above the 
average salary for Bulgaria, and thus the distinction lower/ higher income group is relative. 
24 physicians took part in the focus group discussions, among whom two were dentists. 
The physicians' sample was stratified according to sex, age, income status, and primary 
or secondary care facility (Table 3.5). Effort was made also to ensure that some of the 
participants had managerial responsibilities, similarly to the in-depth interviews. A wide 
range of specialities was included. 
Table 3.5. Composition of focus groups - physicians 
Men/ Below 40 Lower/ Primary/ Managerial Total 
women I above 40 higher secondary- position particip, 
income level facility 
Group 1 (Sofia) 2+6 3+5 5+3 4+4 3 
[2 private] 
Group 2 (Sofia) 4+4 4+4 6+2 4+4 1 
Group 3 (Pleven) 6+2 4+4 4+4 4+4 5 
12+12 11 +13 15+9 12 +12 9 Total 
Note: Respondents were assigned to higher income group if their income was equal or above the 
average salary for Bulgaria, and thus the distinction lower! higher income group is relative. 
The focus group method: technique and organisation 
The term 'focus group' is introduced by Merton et al109, and is defined as "systematic 
questioning of several individuals simultaneously in formal and informal settings"101 • The 
unit of analysis is the group and the method allows inferences to be made only about the 
group and not about individuals99 • The focus group method was used in this research to 
stimulate discussion, in which the dynamics of issues could be explored, competing 
views and arguments expressed, and means of achieving consensus or divergence 
demonstrated. 
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8 
8 
8 
24 
Among the advantages of the method is that it is cost-effective (receiving extensive 
information within a short period of time at least cost); explores beliefs, ideas, opinions 
expressed in a community; identifies new issues; and tests questions' wording99 • Group 
discussions resemble natural communication, and some people felt more comfortable 
than when interviewed alone. Goodman et al110 suggests that in a focus group, opinions 
are most likely to be prompted through collective argument and sense of anonymity 
within the group. Potential difficulties include less control over the flow of discussion; 
no information about the frequency of distribution of opinions; results that are harder to 
analyse compared to individual interviewing; and the participants may influence each 
other inappropriately. Fontana101 notes that focus groups are stimulating for respondents, 
aid recall, and collect data over and above individual responses, but in some cases can be 
dominated by strong personalities. There was also a danger of expressing only those 
views that could be stated publicly1°0 or comply with the majority opinion. The 
moderators in this study have largely prevented such situations from happening. 
The focus group guides (for physicians and for users) were structured similarly to the in-
depth interviews, but much more concise and flexible. These sought to collect 
comparable data between groups, in terms of topics covered, and within a group, 
providing sufficient depth of discussion and equal participation. In view of the short time 
available (2-2.5 hours average length) and the need to involve all participants, only the 
most salient issues were discussed. Although some of the issues were anticipated to be 
sensitive and hamper the discussions, possibly requiring changes in wording and topics99 
101
, this was not the case in practice. 
The focus groups involved extensive planning, organisation and careful recruitment. 
Moderation and management of the group dynamics required specialised skills. Two 
moderators with a proven record were invited to run the first two sessions, while the rest 
were run by me. All discussions were tape-recorded and fully transcribed in Bulgarian. 
Documentary analysis 
The key features of the documentary analysis are shown in Box 3.3. 
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Box 3.3 Documentary analysis: summary 
Type of research 
Sources 
Sampling procedure 
Topics 
Aims 
Documentary analysis 
Official documents of Ministry of Health, labour unions, 
insurance companies etc. and media coverage in 1993-99 
Exhaustive for documents on health financing 
Selective for documents related indirectly 
Health insurance debate; views on the current health care 
financing and attitudes towards change 
To find evidence (direct or indirect) for the political feasibility 
and cultural & social sensitivity of finance schemes 
To identify issues not covered in the survey questionnaire 
Documentary analysis: sampling, procedures and analysis 
Documentary analysis, or content analysis as its variation104, is a " ... research technique 
for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context"111 • Documentary 
analysis examines the content, as well as the context of documents (written or non-
specified purpose of the documents; institutional, social and cultural aspects), their 
intended and implied audiences and the author's interest112 • Documentary analysis, as 
with observation, is indirect and non-reactive as the nature of the researched material 
does not change. 
The documentary analysis method is more descriptive and exploratory than other 
methods and has been used here as a supplementary tool. Its main purpose was to 
triangulate with other data in a multi-method approach. The method proved to be 
valuable in its own right in generating new leads, uncovering implicit themes, and thus 
enriching the research agenda. An initial documentary analysis also served to focus the 
research questions by identifying key issues on the finance reform agenda, assessing the 
importance attributed to them by the main actors, and providing insights on the impact of 
the political and economic climate, and of societal values, on shaping reform of health 
financing. It was also productive during data collection and analysis in providing 
contextual references. The method provided evidence as to which finance mechanisms 
are more likely to be accepted by different groups and institutions, and what is the 
balance of opinions between stakeholders (experts, professionals, government, media, 
companies, labour unions etc). This could be further extended to a detailed policy 
analysis of the health financing reforms in Bulgaria, exploring the inter-relationships 
between content, context and actors, which was outside the scope of this research. 
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Collection and systematic analysis of relevant documents was applied first to the period 
1993-1996113, but subsequently extended contemporaneously until1998. There were few 
relevant documents and these appeared at irregular intervals and were difficult to obtain. 
Most were written for purposes other than research. Identification of documents 
focusing on health financing issues is believed to have been almost exhaustive. Also 
included are documents referring to this issue by their implicit content. Table 3.6 
presents the two frameworks for documentary analysis used in this thesis. 
The documentary analysis proved to be relatively complex, time-consuming, with limited 
explanatory power, and potentially susceptible to bias in collection and analysis of the 
documents. Official sources often reflect distorted, politically correct positions, although 
if this distortion is captured, it could be an important observation in its own right. 
Table 3.6. Theoretical frameworks for documentary analysis 
Stages104: Analytical topics (not exhaustive listY 12: 
• Defining the research question: what How are documents written? 
data? How are they read? 
• Sampling strategy and screening Who writes them? 
Selection of a recording unit: word/ Who reads them? • 
phrase constituting a semantic unit! For what purposes? 
theme/ character/ paragraphs/ whole items On what occasions? 
With what outcomes? 
• Counting of the units and comparison What is recorded? 
• Constructing categories for analysis: What is omitted? 
exhaustive/ mutually exclusive/ What does the writer take for granted about the 
operationalised) 
reader? 
• Testing the coding in a text, reliability What do the readers need to know? 
• Analysis 
Interviews with key informants 
The key features of the interviews with key informants are shown in Box 3.4. 
Box 3.4 Key informant interviews: summary 
Interview type 
Respondents 
Sample size 
Sampling procedure 
Settings 
Topics 
Aims 
Face-to-face, short semi-structured interviews 
Policy-makers: MoH officials, MPs, administrators, experts 
23 interviews 
Purposeful, according to specified criteria 
Sofia and Pleven 
Views on health care financing reform: political climate, 
infrastructure, obstacles, opportunities, and threads 
To collect data on stakeholders and define main types of view 
on finance reform process and content and to assess political 
atmosphere for health financing reform 
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Sample 
Selection of key informants involved identifying persons possessmg specialised 
knowledge relevant to the research, who are "typical"f. This follows the approach taken 
by Tremblay1 1\ in which key informants were selected with regard to their role and 
position in society rather than randomly, in terms of age, sex, or residence. 
The key informants in this research were identified through snowball sampling, on the 
basis of information from the informal and in-depth interviewing, from documentary 
information and media accounts. Initially, a list of potential key informants was created 
based on "expert opinions"115, then, a number of respondents were selected and 
interviewed using a restricted framework of questions with highly focused objectives. 
The criteria for selection were those suggested by Tremblay1 14 : a) formal role in the 
society ensuring access to relevant information; b) knowledge of relevant information; c) 
willingness to co-operate; d) communicability; e) relative impartiality. Maier103 
emphasises that key informants should not only have a special position in the 
community, but should represent the opinions, experiences and problems of a group 
rather than of an individual. Several key respondents interviewed did not have official 
positions in government or the professional community, but were recommended as 
"informalleaders"115• 
Interviews were conducted with 23 policy-makers or stakeholders in Sofia, Pleven and 
Varna (Table 3.7). All respondents were able to provide valuable comments about issues 
concerning their communities or particular groups in society. 
Interviews were semi-structured, but shorter than the other in-depth interviews. Some of 
the respondents were "elite members of the community" and top-level policy-makers, 
who were unable to spare more than half an hour, thus focusing only on the most 
important topics. It was, however, possible to adopt a more flexible approach, leaving 
scope for respondents to introduce new topics, or to change the direction of the interview, 
according to their own interests. The interviews needed careful preparation, especially 
when establishing the first contact. Best results were achieved when the key informants 
were approached through a person of similar authority or their immediate subordinate. 
t 'typical': l.serving as a type, symbolic; 2.having o~ showing the characteristic~, qualities of a 
kind, class, or a group so fully as to be a representative example; 3 .of or belongmg to a type or 
representative example, characteristic (Webster's dictionary) 
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All interviews were tape-recorded, with only one refusal by a Ministry of Health official 
in a regional branch. 
Table 3. 7. Sample of key informants 
Position Job/ position/ other circumstances n 
Members of Parliament Commission for Health care and Sport, representing the 3 
main political parties in the Parliament, Sofia 
The Head of the Bulgarian Professional association, Sofia 1 
Physicians' Union 
Director and deputy director The Centre for Public Health, Ministry of Health, Sofia 2 
Programme manager The WB resident mission, Sofia 1 
Physicians and a nurse Actively involved in labour union activities, Sofia 2 
Physicians Involved in consultation on policy documents, Sofia 3 
Physician/ director Private insurance association, Sofia 1 
NGO Bulgarian Women's Union, Association of the Disabled 2 
Students, Sofia 
NGO (state run) Agency for International Aid, Sofia 1 
Medical director Elite state facility, Sofia 1 
Medical directors State sector and private, Varna 2 
Economic directors Polyclinic and of Higher Medical University, Pleven 2 
Deputy dean Higher Medical University, Pleven 1 
MoH official Regional office of MoH, Pleven 1 
Data from the key informants were used only as background information and were not 
integrated with the rest of the analysis, mainly because the response rate among officials 
from the Ministry of Health and other governmental institutions was extremely low (one 
interview of eight approached). Thus, many key decision makers in health care financing 
reform were not represented. The low response rate probably reflects the timing of the 
interviews (just after parliamentary elections in April 1997), when major changes in the 
previous social sector policies were in the pipeline, but not yet announced, and many 
officials were unwilling to express views that could contradict later policies. 
Paradoxically, in this post-election situation, users, physicians and key informants who 
did respond were much more willing than expected to discuss existing policies. 
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Stage C: Quantitative component 
Quantitative methods: overview of features 
The quantitative element of the research sought to collect data using a larger sample; 
generalise findings to a larger population; and identify groups that justify in-depth study. 
The method used was a representative survey supplemented, when appropriate, by 
official statistical data. This section will summarise the features of the quantitative 
methods. 
Quantitative research has the advantage of providing standardised data that can be used 
as a baseline for future comparisons. The survey collects data on the research topic 
among a larger sample and thus obtains generalisable and comparable results96 • 
In a fully-structured interview schedule, unlike semi-structured interviews, questions 
cannot be discussed, rephrased, and re-ordered. There is an unnatural communication as 
the interviewer is just posing a set of questions for the respondent to answer. The 
questions are pre-established, with a limited set of response categories. Some authors 
suggest that the respondent plays a subordinate role and the interviewer is in control of 
the situation100 • The pace of the interview is controlled and the questionnaire is followed 
in a standard manner in stimulus-response format, with no deviation from the wording 
and a neutral role for the interviewer101 • 
Among the limitations of the quantitative method are potential sampling biases and non-
sampling errors, such as response bias (misreporting due to misunderstanding of the 
questions' wording or questions having different meanings in different cultures), and 
poor recall; and contextual bias caused by the interviewer's gender or presence of 
others101 • The interpretation of variables can be distorted when operationalised in a 
survey98 and there might be difficulties in addressing sensitive topics. Slight changes in 
the wording or in the order in which questions are asked may lead to different or 
superficial responses104 , reducing reliability. 
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Survey 
The survey was the main source of comprehensive and manageable data (Box 3.5). 
Box 3.5 Survey: summary 
Interview type 
Respondents 
Sample size 
Sampling procedure 
Settings 
Topics 
Aim 
Sample 
Face-to-face, fully-structured interviews 
Population of Bulgaria 
General Universe: 8,340,900 people (31 December 1996) 
1550 main interviews and 3,204 with the rest of the household 
Double-stage randomised sampling 
The territory of Bulgaria; May 1997 
Survey questionnaire in 5 sections: 
1 Household description 
2 Health status 
3 Expenditure for health care and ability to pay 
4 Willingness to pay, values and attitudes 
5 Demography. Socio-economic status and income 
Main research instrument addressing the research objectives 
The national survey of 1,550 Bulgarian households (1,550 principal and 3,204 additional 
respondents) sought to be representative of the population of Bulgaria aged above 18. 
The sampling frame was the electoral register. A two-stage random cluster sampling 
procedure was used. The clusters are the electoral sections in Bulgaria, which are the 
primary population groupings used in elections. The number of people registered in each 
section is between 200 and 800. The sample was drawn from the Central Register 
(computer centre) from the register prepared for the Parliamentary elections of 19 April 
1997. 
In the first stage of the sampling procedure, 200 clusters (electoral sections) were 
randomly selected with probability to be selected corresponding to size. In the second 
stage, 11 respondents were randomly selected in each cluster, among whom 8 
respondents were to be interviewed (8 respondents in 200 clusters plus 600 in reserve). 
The planned sample consisted of 1,600 respondents (8 x 200). In 387 of cases (18%) 
interviewers had to use reserves within a cluster. The reasons for non-response were 
mostly respondent's long absence from home (business trip, military service, emigration 
etc), incorrect or changed address, or severe disability. Only in 48 cases was substitution 
made because the respondent refused to be interviewed. The response rate was 97% of 
the planned sample (1 ,600), due to the large reserve pool. 
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Although the survey used an existing and validated sampling frame obtained by the 
Central Statistical Office in Sofia and the overall sample was relatively large, the small 
size of certain groups reduced the power to detect significant differences. Furthermore, 
although a quite close match, the sample was not entirely representative of the Bulgarian 
population. Ethnic minorities appear to be under-represented although this is 
complicated by what is believed to be their under-registration in the census. Women and 
pensioners were over-represented as were, to a lesser extent, the divorced, although their 
numbers were likely to have risen since 1992 (Table 3.8). With these limitations, 
however, the sample is a fairly accurate representation of the Bulgarian population, as far 
as can be assessed from published data. The average of 3.1 persons per household was 
comparable to the official figure of2.8. 
Table 3.8. Characteristics of sample and of the Bulgarian population 
Characteristic Sample (1997) Population 
Male 42.7% 48.9% (1996) 
Female 57.3% 51.1% ( 1996) 
Age 20-39 32.4% 36.6% (1996) 
Age 40-59 34.3% 35.0% (1996) 
Age 60 + 31.1% 28.5% (1996) 
Married 68.5% 73.9% (1992) 
Divorced/separated/ widowed 18.1% 15.1% (1992) 
Single 13.3% 11.0% (1992) 
Pensioners 37.1% 29.1 (1996) 
Urban population 69.4% 67.6% (1996) 
Rural population (1993) 30.6% 32.4% (1996) 
Ethnic Turks/Bulgaro-Muslims 7.4% 8.3% (1992); other estimates: 9-10% 
Roma population 3.2% 2.6% (1992); other estimates: 3-5% 
Unemployment 12.8% 13.7% (1997) 
Sources: Statistical Reference Book, Bulgaria 1992 & Bulgaria 1997, Central Statistical Office, 
Sofia,· Public Health Statistics Annual, Bulgaria 1996, National Centre of Health Information, 
Ministry of Health, 1997, Sofia, Bulgaria 
Survey: design and organisation 
The survey involved face-to-face interviews using a structured questionnaire. The first 
versions of the questionnaire (1996) drew on existing instruments such as the World Bank 
Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS), the English Health Survey and several 
smaller surveys; on previous knowledge and tentative exploration of new directions. At 
the beginning of 1997, the questionnaire was constantly modified to reflect insights from 
the qualitative interviews and focus groups. The questionnaire was updated again, in line 
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with observations from pilot interviews conducted three weeks before the start of the 
fieldwork. 
Face-to-face interview is the option most commonly practised in Bulgaria, having the 
lowest refusal rate compared to self-administered and postal questionnaires. The 
interviewers read the questions and the response options to the respondents and recorded 
the answers on a standardised schedule according to a coding scheme. Maier103 maintains 
that the "survey design should ensure that the same questions are asked of all 
respondents in exactly the same way." Theoretically, it is assumed that if questions are 
phrased correctly, all respondents will understand them in the same way107 • In practice, 
more detailed explanation was required by some elderly people or those with low 
education. 
The main respondent in each household provided information at both individual level 
(health expenditure, willingness to pay, attitudes, and individual experience of treatment), 
and about the household as a whole (income, assets). The main research unit was the 
individual due to the lack of a sampling frame of households in Bulgaria, although their 
experience could be placed in the context of household circumstances. Thus, monthly 
household income was used as an explanatory variable because the household is usually 
assumed to pool resources and act as a simple decision-making unit. Household income 
is not simply a sum of its members incomes, but has added value and can offset 
expenditure by mutual help and informal exchange. As in the 1995/6 Bulgarian LSMS, 
household was defined as "all people who partake of the incomes and share the expenses 
of the household; live in the same home; and have not been absent from it in the last 
three months"87 • Several families living together permanently in the same home 
constitute a household if they have a common budget. Nevertheless, Seely et al. 116 argue 
that to understand decision-making, allocation of resources, coping strategies and power 
relations within the household, the focus should be on the individual rather than on the 
household. 
Once the main respondent was interviewed, all other household members were identified 
and interviewed using a short supplementary questionnaire focusing on individual 
experience. Interviewing all household members often required more than one, an average 
of two, visits by interviewers. In each household, up to three attempts to interview the 
main respondent were planned. If a household member was absent or unable to respond 
due to poor health, old age, or illiteracy, another was asked to supply information on their 
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behalf. In some cases, the proxy reporting improved the accuracy of data obtained117 . 
The importance of recording who reported on whom in the household was stressed 
during interviewers' training. 
Other studies use self-completion forms for individuals above 18 (the Health Survey) or 
entirely proxy reporting where one respondent provides information for the rest of the 
household, thus revealing the group's perception of the individual problem and collective 
coping strategy1°5 (1995 Bulgaria LSMS). The possibility of using such approaches to 
reduce costs and improve data accuracy was considered, but qualitative research suggested 
a risk of producing unreliable and incomplete data. 
Responses to the questionnaire were based on recall. Although the diary method 
(respondents recording daily health problems, expenditures etc.) may be more accurate117, 
infrequent events (hospital use) would be underrepresented117 • Recall bias may occur as 
severe symptoms are remembered longer than mild ones and infrequent physician 
consultations more than frequent ones105• Cannell et al. 108 report that people's ability to 
remember stays in hospital was related to the length of time since their discharge, the 
length of their stay, the level of threat of the illness and whether or not they had surgery. 
Grootaert and Cheung117 note that 'important biases can result if one derives spending 
patterns from short survey periods', due to the influence of socio-demographic 
characteristics, seasonal income and expenditure patterns, although these effects tend to 
be neutralised in larger samples. 
Although many studies use a recall period of two weeks, in order to capture a sufficient 
number of cases it was decided to use four weeks for outpatient care and one year for 
episodes of hospital care. The four week recall period was determined on the basis of a 
small telephone survey to establish the level of illness and consultations in the previous 
month ('Have you, or anybody in your household been ill in the past month? If yes, did 
you go to a doctor?'). 30 people were selected at random from the telephone directory in 
Sofia and contacted over the telephone, with one refusal. 13 respondents reported acute 
or chronic illness in the past month in their household, with 9 consulting a physician. Of 
the rest, 5 had been ill in the last three months, all of whom saw a doctor. Thus, 18 out of 
30 people had experienced illness recently, and could be further interviewed about health 
expenditure. This suggested that an illness recall period of four weeks was adequate. 
The principle of anonymity was maintained because the survey questionnaire collected 
personal data on income, assets and expenditure. Respondents were differentiated by a 
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coding system. It was essential to gain the respondent's confidence in the beginning and 
explain the need for their co-operation. This was stressed to interviewers and practised 
during training. 
The questionnaire was prepared initially in English, subsequently translated into 
Bulgarian, then independently translated back into English and compared with the 
original. It was adapted in parallel with the qualitative research. Careful wording of the 
questions was essential, given the sensitivity of the issues, and it was piloted extensively 
in the in-depth interviews. 
The survey was conducted May 10th_31th 1997, in what could be considered as a 
relatively favourable atmosphere in Bulgaria. The economic situation had stabilised after 
the crisis of January-February 1997, and a currency board had been established under the 
terms of an IMF loan. The survey was carried out in the aftermath of the Parliamentary 
elections, when the political climate had stabilised. In addition, there were no major 
health care reform debates, which could have influenced public opinion, around the time 
of the survey. However, reported past health expenditure and income, as well as 
estimates of ability to pay in relation to income and wages, should be treated with some 
caution due to the previously high level of inflation and unstable currency. 
The survey was conducted in collaboration with Vitosha Research, a leading social 
research agency in Bulgaria. Only two other agencies had the capacity and previous 
experience in undertaking large-scale household surveys (Balkan British Social Surveys -
Gallup, the Institute of Sociology). Vitosha Research, the social research wing of the 
Center for the Study of Democracy in Sofia was selected on the basis of their well 
established national network of interviewers, record for accuracy in data collection, and 
competitive rates. The responsibilities of the agency, as defined in the contract, were 
provision of the sample, printing of questionnaires, interviewing (one or more visits), 
logistics (travel expenses for interviewers etc.) and data entry. Some assistance was also 
provided with coding of open-ended questions, and with organisational aspects of the 
training, piloting, and fieldwork supervision. They were not involved in the design, 
translation or adaptation of the survey instrument, in interviewer training, or in data 
analysis. My active involvement, to address emerging issues, was required at all stages of 
the survey. 
Vitosha Research's national interviewer network consisted of 28 regional teams 
corresponding to former district centres, each headed by an experienced supervisor. The 
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supervisor was responsible for interviewing, resolving specific issues during the field work 
and providing feedback to the headquarters of Vitosha research in Sofia. All interviewers 
had significant experience in survey interviewing. In preparation for the field work, a one-
day training session for supervisors was held in May 1997, they were then responsible for 
training interviewers in their area. Although the training was intended mainly for 
supervisors, many interviewers also attended. At the training session, the survey 
methodology, specific characteristics of the questionnaire, sampling and other matters 
related to field work, were discussed. The training was conducted by myself, in 
collaboration with the field work manager from Vitosha research. All interviewers were 
provided with written instructions and show-cards. During the field work the supervisors 
were instructed to give no more than two clusters to each interviewer in order to prevent 
fatigue and hurried interviews. 
Questionnaire 
The survey collected data on a range of variables related to ability and willingness to pay 
for health care, lifestyle, health status, household income and socio-economic status, health 
services utilisation, total expenditure for health care (including informal payments), and 
attitudes to possible means of financing. The questionnaire consisted of several sections 
which will be reviewed briefly below: 
The household description ("roster", section A) employed by the Living Standards 
Measurement Studies has been simplified, as Bulgarian households are generally smaller 
and of simpler composition than, for example, households in sub-Saharan Africa90 • The 
roster included questions on identification of the respondent within the family, their sex, 
age, education, marital status, occupation and health status, and the total number of 
household members. There were also several questions regarding intra-household 
decision-making patterns. The analysis relies mainly on socio-demographic 
characteristics of the respondent, and except for income, does not incorporate household-
level data. 
The section on health status (section B) addresses the general self-reported health of the 
respondent in the past 12 months, presence of a limiting long-standing health problem, 
and number of episodes of illness in the past year. The last episode of illness was fully 
described, recording the timing of its occurrence, type of disease, and patterns of illness 
behaviour. Each consultation in the course of the last illness was described in terms of 
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type of facility or staff visited, and medication taken. This section explored whether 
some demand, for either services or drugs, has been deterred, and why. The last 
consultation was explored in detail: the user's choices (of public/private facility, of 
physician, of place); actions of the providers (interventions, time spent); and user 
satisfaction with different elements of the service. In this section, some life-style factors 
were explored (smoking and drinking), as well as some attitudes (to staff income). 
In Bulgarian, terms such as "illness", "health problem", "episode of illness", 
"consultation" and "treatment" are often synonyms or translated to the same word. Thus, 
more descriptive phrases had to be used, inevitably leading to lengthier questions. 
Section C sought to describe the expenditure for health care and ability to pay. Health 
expenditure is defined as everything spent on health care including payment for services 
(formal and informal), travel, medication, consumables, procedures, food, nursing 
services and hospital admission. Informal payments are defined as transactions (cash, 
gift, gratuity) between a patient and a health care professional for services or items that 
are officially free of charge in state health facilities. 
The survey sought to estimate the overall cost of the last illness episode involving 
contact with health professionals, in the public and private sector. This includes direct 
payments for services (both formal and informal), travel costs, loss of time, reduced 
wages, practical difficulties, stress and missed opportunities. Respondents were asked to 
give a monetary equivalent to gifts they had made, or activities they had to forgo. The 
lack of reliable statistics in Bulgaria have so far limited analyses mostly to governmental 
expenditure. Existing data from official sources and other surveys was used for 
comparison and for validation of survey results. The survey instrument alone could not 
capture all these type of costs (non-monetary gratuities, favours, exchange of services, of 
information, of contacts), requiring use of qualitative methods. 
Questions on health expenditure in the current survey are asked individually for precision 
but support between members and collective decision-making are assumed. Cumper118 
points to the difficulties in measuring health care received by the households, because a 
"household is generally a kind of social unit within which contractual relationships like 
those between buyer and seller do not apply". Cumper118 also distinguishes between 
direct expenditure on health care, and other activities indirectly benefiting health. 
Expenditure outside the health care system is not considered here. 
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Demand for private services was also explored. Given that treatment in the public sector 
is also likely to incur costs, factors such as quick access to services, choice, or perceived 
high quality may shape the decision to seek private care. However, qualitative research 
is essential to establish whether people seek private services to receive luxury extras, or 
because treatment is unavailable to them in the public sector. 
The survey also collects data on loss of wages due to the last treatment, and the 
opportunity costs of time, especially when leading to a loss of income. These 
dimensions are difficult to quantify in Bulgarian circumstances. Most employees are paid 
on a monthly basis, the procedure for calculating sick leave is complex and opaque, and 
some loss of time to illness can go unreported, meaning that the response is likely to be 
unreliable. Whether a medical certificate had been issued was used as a proxy measure 
to estimate loss of income. 
The survey also attempts to measure the scale, size and some characteristics of informal 
payments. Informal payments are examined not only in the context of other expenditure 
for health care for the last treatment, but also for any occasion in the past ('ever'). 
Measuring informal payments in a survey is complicated when gifts (home-produced in 
rural areas), in-kind gratuities or exchange of services are involved. Over-emphasising 
the monetary equivalents of payment could distort the picture, ignoring complex 
relationships between patient and physician and the social status of the medical 
profession. Qualitative techniques tended to yield more information on the nature of 
informal payments. 
Willingness to pay (section D) is broadly defined as the amount (in real terms or as a 
percentage of income) that people are prepared to spend for health care (if at all), under 
different scenarios such as fee-for-service, compulsory insurance and tax. These are 
measured through a series of direct and indirect questions. 
There were difficulties with the design of the questions on willingness to pay due to the 
novelty of the issue and its sensitivity. It was expected that this section might have a 
lower response rate, although this did not prove to be the case. Abel-Smith and RawaP6 
reported that respondents did not hesitate to answer questions about willingness to pay in 
a situation of free health services in Tanzania. Still, the questionnaire poses a 
hypothetical choice. If official charges or social insurance are implemented or more 
openly discussed, the attitudes expressed may be contrasting. The structured format of 
the interview could not capture completely the spectrum of beliefs and attitudes among 
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the public. Thus, the in-depth interviews and focus groups were intended to capture 
more subtle nuances. Open-ended questions were used as one method to measure 
willingness to pay for particular services. Respondents were asked how much they 
would pay for a range of services, including out-patient consultation, operation for 
appendicitis, a one day stay in hospital, childbirth, attendance by a physician and full 
msurance. During the preliminary data collection, it was observed that many 
respondents, having paid out-of-pocket user fees or fee-for-service private care, were 
aware of approximate prices of health services. 
In the first version of the questionnaire, respondents were presented with several 
scenarios, simplified descriptions of several financing models, followed by questions 
about that model, and, at the end, were asked to compare all of the models. After some 
in-depth interviews this was modified, when it became clear that the results would be 
unreliable, because the information was insufficient to give respondents a clear idea 
about the model93 • For example the practice of health care insurance funds, part of a 
historical tradition in the Czech Republic, is less familiar in Bulgaria. It was very 
difficult to provide short and simple, but adequate, scenarios describing financing 
arrangements. At the same time purely open-ended questions were inappropriate since 
the respondents were unfamiliar with the alternative options for health care financing. 
The final version of the questionnaire was based on defining the generic characteristics 
and principles underlying each finance method and assessing them in tum. This 
approach explores under what combination of conditions people are most willing to pay 
(type of scheme, health facility or treatment, timing of payment; institution (or person) to 
whom payment is made etc.). Further analysis will show which methods for health 
financing are close to this "ideal type". Validation with secondary data was done 
whenever possible. In order to avoid bias through respondents giving "socially 
acceptable" answers; avoiding extremes in the response scales; or simply choosing the 
last option heard; value statements to be rated were read in a different order to each 
respondent (a "rotation" technique). 
One of the main aims of the survey is to measure socio-economic status, income in 
particular (section E) and then use it as an independent variable to explain ability and 
willingness to pay. Measuring income in transitional economies is difficult and requires a 
combination of approaches. One approach recommended by the World Bank, and used in 
the LSMS, is to measure consumption and compare it with income. Abel-Smith and 
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RawaP6 found that in Tanzania questions on average weekly expenditure was a more 
valid measure than questions on annual income, which was difficult to estimate. 
Rose and Makkai91 report that due to high inflation in the CEE countries, many economic 
transactions are non-monetized, "cash-in-hand", or through use of political contracts. 
Therefore, monetary income does not give a full picture of the households' resources in 
maintaining their standard of living. 
There are many difficulties in measuring consumption, however, such as assessment of 
non-monetary assets and informal exchange of services and goods between households. 
There is a section on consumption, with detailed break-down of expenditure on food, tax, 
rents etc. Non-monetary and in-kind income, capital assets, and savings were all 
recorded. In order to provide a benchmark, the supervisors were asked to record the prices 
of the food products listed in the consumption section at two shops and one market locally. 
This direction was not further explored in the analysis. However, any charges or 
premiums for health care are likely to be paid out of cash income in a future finance 
model. 
This research seeks to determine income by several means. Firstly, income is recorded by 
directly asking respondents for the size and structure of their household income. Mcintyre 
considers household, rather than individual, income to be a better indicator of how 
individuals live "in a nearly universal two-earner culture"119• Secondly, respondents were 
asked to select the group (given 16 income brackets), in which the income of their 
household falls. Thirdly, they were asked to assess the financial situation of their 
household in the past month. The self-perceived financial status is a subjective measure, 
but it could underpin household choices and thus willingness to pay. 
The survey intended to estimate socio-economic score drawing on ESOMAR indicators120 
and the World Bank's Living Standards Measurement Studies90 techniques in order to 
include consumption, assets, lifestyle and other proxy measures. However, taking account 
of household reserves in assessing well-being is beyond the scope of this research. 
Estimating the weights for each indicator towards household resources and valuing of 
assets could be further studied. 
Thus, in this study, ability to cope financially with illness might be underestimated, as 
households often can mobilise additional resources from extended family or social 
networks. Informal support appears to be an important coping mechanism in Bulgaria. In 
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a representative survey121 , 85% of respondents stated that they, or other members of their 
household, have helped friends or relatives. Although, only a very few cases (1 %), were 
paid for it, 55% of cases received help in exchange. However, in Bulgaria, selling assets 
to add to disposable income is not always possible (as in the case of land) or easy, due to a 
small market for second-hand goods, thus overestimating the overall ability to pay. For 
this reason, although this study collects information on assets, only monetary income will 
be included in the analysis. 
There was a marked unwillingness to answer questions relating to personal income, or 
assets, especially in urban areas. When asked to assess their personal financial situation, 
there was an ambiguity as the personal standard of living was perceived as relatively good 
for Bulgaria, but not in comparison with the western standard of living. 
Quality control 
Several control procedures were applied to verify the accuracy of the questionnaires. 
During the field work, each supervisor cross-checked about 25% of interviews (total of 
300 of sample) with the respondents, verifying that the interview took place and key 
questions. Furthermore, interviews by the same and by other interviewers were 
compared. 
Most problems involved incomplete data or technical errors, many of which were 
corrected subsequently. Among the reported reasons for data gaps were difficulties in 
finding respondents at home in the villages due to seasonal agricultural work; people in 
villages or with primary education only, not understanding the questions; inability to recall 
the exact circumstances of past illness and incurred expenditure; or the interview being too 
long. 
After the interview schedules were returned to the main office of Vitosha research in Sofia, 
a detailed consistency check on all interviews was performed by a team of experienced 
supervisors and myself, before data entry. The check addressed whether the instructions in 
the questionnaire (filters etc.) were followed correctly, whether there was a logical match 
between some related questions, and checks of data accuracy when it was possible to do so 
e.g. size of settlement and coding of the open-ended questions. Consistency of answers 
was assessed by comparing answers to similar questions, or by asking different questions 
about the same event. In many cases, technical errors could be corrected, for example, 
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data on the size and type of settlement, and place of residence, could be checked and 
corrected. 
Stage D: Data analysis 
Qualitative analysis 
The qualitative data analysis relied on the grounded theory approach97 • It is applicable to 
this research for the following reasons: a) it is inductively derived from the data and does 
not rely on pre-existing theory; b) it is aimed at less known phenomena; c) it is a rigorous 
method for analysis of qualitative data. 
During transcription and the first reading, a memo was created. This listed initial 
themes, ideas, impressions, rough groups of themes and logic emerging from the text, as 
well as especially typical or key phrases. A list of preliminary broad categories and 
themes to be further explored in the analysis was compiled, based on the first memo, 
previous research evidence (from Bulgaria and elsewhere), informal interviews, 
documentary analysis and intuitive observations. The qualitative data was relatively 
structured due to the need to maintain a close link with the survey data. Some broadly 
defined categories were established in advance, but most were purely data-derived. The 
analysis sought to confirm the pre-determined categories in the data. This list was used 
as the starting point in the analysis. 
The next analytical stage involved open coding and refining the initial list of general 
categories to include more precise categories, which involved assigning conceptual labels 
to data having common characteristics and representing "a class of objects or events"122• 
The concepts describing similar phenomena were then grouped into more encompassing 
categories (Level 1) and their characteristics and dimensions developed into more 
detailed categories grouped under them (Level 2) (Table 3.9). Identification of a category 
was based on clear criteria, to distinguish from others122• Each broad category has key 
words which were used to define the second-level categories. Most categories were 
inclusive where more than one category could be assigned to one data unit. Thus the 
more general category included: attitudes to the Bulgarian health care system, and to the 
health care reforms; attitudes to the tax-based model and experience at health facility 
level; attitudes to informal payments; attitudes to alternative financial models such as 
legal user fees, voluntary insurance, and compulsory social insurance; and finally, 
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willingness to pay, in general, and under particular health financing models. The attitudes 
towards certain phenomenon (health financing) and the actual behaviour (experience at 
facility level) have been assigned to separate categories to allow comparison between 
attitudes and actions. Constant verification against primary data was needed. 
Given the large volume of collected material and the broad spectrum of topics covered, 
selective coding was applied97 • Initially a broad focus was identified, without excluding 
alternative directions of analysis. After the categorisation was complete, a core category 
(central phenomenon to be studied) was selected and placed in the centre of the analysis. 
A few key categories closely related to the core category (the preference for a financing 
option) were further refined through creation of sub-categories, their links with the core 
category explored, and secondary themes organised around them. Key relationships 
(causality, consistency, opposition, explanation) between major categories were 
explored122 • Such main themes were, for example, actual experience of payment, 
frequency of illness and use of services. Other categories were integrated around the 
core category in order to avoid data fragmentation. 
When analysing the preference for a health financing model as a core category, two 
procedures were followed (Figure 3.2). In the first (axial coding), rather than asking 
respondents to choose directly between financing models which were not entirely 
familiar to them, their views were tested on certain characteristics such as affordability, 
method of payment under a particular model, institutions involved, and administrative 
arrangements. Preferred characteristics were clustered and superimposed to establish 
preference for a model (e.g. respondents whose combination of answers suggested 
features of a national insurance scheme). A related procedure was to establish preference 
for a model in terms of particular dimensions (e.g. best model in terms of transparency). 
Once it was found that a certain feature of a model was deemed to be universally 
important (e.g. accountability), it was explored for each of the other models. Inevitably, 
certain models may be rated high on transparency but low on, for example, affordability. 
However, this made it possible to draw conclusions on awareness of, and preference for, 
each model. 
A second way to establish overall preference for a financing model is to ask directly. 
Thus, respondents had to make decisions on balance of the above assessment of the 
characteristics of each method. Therefore, the first approach compared dimensions of 
financing options, and the second, overall models. 
94 
The analysis sought to distinguish between a phenomenon, its causes, the context, 
processes, actions and events, their consequences, strategies, and relationships. 
Maintaining the link between data and their context during the analysis was seen as 
particularly important, as contexts can explain actions and their implications. The 
analysis started with a range of initially generated categories and returned to data in order 
to confirm and verify categories ("holistic" approach122). 
Figure 3.2. Analytical procedures 
existing system: 
a.tax 
b.some official fees 
c.informal payments 
d .fee for service 
Experiences 
Attitudes 
INDIRECT CHOICE : 
control, accountability, 
transparency, suitability 
--------------etc~-------------
DIRECT CHOICE 
r-----------------------~~ 
I User payments 
I Need & demand 
Willingness to pay 
new financing 
options: 
a.legal user fees 
b.social insurance 
c.voluntary insurance 
Knowledge 
I Understanding 
Ability to interact 
Attitudes 
I Expectations 
Willingness to pay 
The main axis of analysis was comparison of the perceptions of physicians and patients. 
A secondary axis was a comparison of different groups of patients (e.g. income groups, 
groups with contrasting values). Most data were collected in Sofia, not allowing for a 
meaningful comparison with the countryside. Due to the unfamiliarity (and in some 
cases, sensitivity) of the topics, there is a need for a more investigative approach, 
including analysis of logic, language, and particular circumstances. This was beyond the 
scope of this analysis. 
The data analysis followed a clear plan and the mam steps, research questions and 
techniques used were documented. The techniques used were asking questions, focusing 
on key words or "typical" interviews, free association; and comparing phenomena and 
incidents described by the respondents, as suggested in the literature97 122• The patterns of 
relationships between data were explored. Using bigger data units (events, stories rather 
than words or phrases) was more meaningful given the large size of data. In many cases, 
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frequencies of cases in each category, and of links between categories, were also 
estimated, in order to identify prevalence and variations within the data. 
Coding was first produced on hard copy, then the most typical data units within each 
category were imported into a spreadsheet, allowing for easy comparison. Each excerpt 
was indexed with the interview code to allow an easy link with the original interview 
context. In coding, simple generic abbreviations were used for the first level categories, 
more descriptive ones for the second-level categories. 
Quantitative analysis 
Survey data were analysed, firstly by exploring univariate distributions of key variables, 
and secondly by multivariate regression analysis to identify significant relationships 
(Figure 3.3). Explanatory socio-demographic variables were selected on the basis of their 
importance in other studies. Age, income, and education seem to be predictive of a wide 
range of attitudes and behaviours in Bulgaria, while the size of household is not of the 
same importance as it is in some developing countries with large household sizes. The 
dependent variables depend on the particular question being asked and include measures 
such as self-reported illness, health services utilisation, ability to pay, attitudes and 
beliefs, and willingness to pay. Such analysis seeks to describe the 'user perspective': the 
likelihood of different socio-economic groups to be ill and to receive treatment, 
affordability of services, and preference for health care financing schemes. 
Figure 3.3. Model for analysis of ability and willingness to pay 
Independent variables Dependent variables 
• Age Health 
• Income 
• Education 
,. Utilisation 
Self-perceived • I 
financial situation 
Ability to pay 
• Marital status ~.I Attitudes & beliefs 
• Type of settlement 
• 
Self-reported health -.. r Willingness to pay 
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Financing options: 
users' perspective 
Table 3.9. List of categories formulated and used in the analysis 
\1sT LEVEL CAT-S: General attitudes to the Bulgarian health care system 
2ND LEVEL CAT-S Criteria for assigning 
Strengths and weaknesses 'Objective' assessment: respondent as an observer (positive/ negative; optimistic/ pessimistic) 
User and medical staff satisfaction 'Subjective' assessment: respondent as a participant ( clienUprovider) 
Inheritance & reform Got worse/better; reform is slow/quick; changes 
Information lnteresUactual knowledge; active/passive; sources 
Physicians' motivation Factors; shift: before/ after 1989 
Physicians' social status Factors; shift: before/ after 1989 <prestige?> 
Stakeholders' contribution (politicians, experts, Trying to do their best I not enough I 
physicians, users Users: cash/gift contribution; health awareness; compliance with treatment 
Health sector in relation to other sectors (wider Relationship (linear/ consensus). Comparison of salaries/ importance (for public, policy-makers) I 
economy/ politics/ ecology/ manufacturing prestige/ user willingness to pay 
/services/ business) 
-- -
\1sT LEVEL CAT-S: General attitudes to health care reform 
2ND LEVEL CAT-S Criteria for assigning 
Awareness of reform direction lnteresU knowledge of main views; active/passive; sources 
Stakeholders in reform Who: administrators, politicians, doctors, public 
Opposition to reform By whom/ how 
Political consensus Politics & health reform; consensus (possible/not); predominant sides/views; collective action of 
physicians (positive I negative) 
Learning from experience Keep national characteristics/ lessons from EU/ other systems 
Scenario: respondent as policy maker Necessary reform steps 
-
j1sT LEVEL CAT-S: Attitudes to tax-based model (TBM) 
2ND LEVEL CAT-S Criteria for assigning 
TBM: understanding of principle Budgetary; state control and allocation of resources; payroll tax 
TBM: "Free"-"paid" health care Understanding the principle ("free" only at the point of use); state-provided/ fully private; contradictions 
(free at the point of use-conditional on UCP/fees) 
Values (should be done) /practicality (could be done) 
TBM: spending on health care Health care budget: in/sufficient; source of revenue; diversified for separate health facilities 
TBM: winners and losers Physicians/ users (disadvantaged etc.) 
-
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TBM: fairness In/equitable treatment (in polyclinics/hospitals) 
TBM: impact on quality of services Quality of services, staff incentives; supplies 
TBM: overall assessment Strengths and weakness~s; ne~d for__r-eform:_why? by whom? (un)realistic 
r 15 T LEVEL CAT-S: Experience at health facility level (HF) 
2ND LEVEL CAT-S Criteria for assigning 
Overall impressions Financing, motivation, attitude; problems in obtaining & delivering services; quality; 
Self-financing practices Extrabudgetary revenues from fees: drugs, materials, food, admission and UCP; resources to collect 
fees/ manage fees 
Financial independence of facilities: managerial savings; bigger budget 
Motivation and behaviour of physicians Actual/ideal; determinants; incentives 
Physicians' income Salary in/sufficient (in comparison) 
Options for additional income (UCP, private sector) in Sofia,small towns/villages; type of health facility; 
type of service 
Scenario: a typical visit What/how/why/when/how easy 
Health awareness Education; culture; value of health 
Discrimination between users Based on income/ network membership j 
Quality/ success of treatment Determinants: monetary/non-monetary: income/ /social status; expected service, other relation 
Patients' empowerment Options if (dis)satisfied (arguments, complaint); actions and consequences 
User expenditure for last visit Size and type (drugs/ travel, gifts) 
Affordability: from salary, savings, loans etc. 
I 1ST LEVEL CAT-S: Attitudes to informal payments (IP: user fees and under-the-counter ~ayments) 
2ND LEVEL CAT-S Criteria for assigning 
IP: understanding of principle Knowledge/understanding (how many?) 
IP: characteristics Size, type, meaning, timing, way of giving, in/voluntary, counterparts, beneficiaries 
IP: functions Gratitude, request, politeness 
IP:WTP Circumstances (for what/how), determinants 
IP: determinants Income status of users 
IP: prevalence How common? Culturally determined, tradition, economic reaction 
IP: attitudes Acceptability (in what cases?) 
IP: before and after 1989 Changes in size/ type/ meaning I timing etc. 
IP: impact For physician income I for patient 
I 
IP: actual experience Last visit/ever given; money/gifts; circumstances (for what; how); size, type; future action 
_j 
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jiP: poilcy options I Ban I legalise-fact I regulate I ignore (pros and cons) I 
\1sT LEVEL CAT-S: Attitudes to compulsory social insurance (CHI) 
2ND LEVEL CAT-S Criteria for assigning 
HIS: understanding of principle Knowledge/understanding; people/ state responsibility 
HIS: size of premium Affordable % of monthly income 
HIS: trust Dis/trust; in stability/control/ revenue management 
HIS: differentiation of contribution Un/equal for different groups 
HIS: collection and handling of funds Who? Government/ municipalities/ MoH/ NGOs/ co-operatives/ private organisations; investment of 
funds, procedures for (democratic; delegation, control) 
HIS: use of funds Health care only; social security; social benefits, etc. 
HIS: unused contributions Health care only; use for dependants, withdraw etc. 
HIS: level of funds National/ regional/ municipal/ professional/ enterprise 
HIS: single/ multiple funds Centralised, single HIF/ multiple funds; competition 
HIS: membership Compulsory/ voluntary; choice of fund; exclusion I inclusion of the rich 
HISNI: preference for a company State /private /joint ownership /co-operative; Bulgarian I foreign I joint venture/ other 
HIS: overall assessment Strengths and weaknesses I 
11 sT LEVEL CAT-S: Attitudes to legalised user fees (UF) 
2ND LEVEL CAT-S Criteria for assigning 
UF: understanding of principle Knowledge/understanding 
UF: preconditions for introduction Timing; for what? opposition/support from public I politicians/ doctors (which? why? for what?) 
UF: potential impact For patients/ health facilities/ health care 
UF: spending of revenue Bonuses for staff/ drugs/ supplying equipment 
UF: differentiation among patients Equity (vertical and horizontal); differentiation: in needs, income, education, age, ethnicity 
UF: patients' contribution Who to be covered entirely/partially by the state? Higher prices/ tax for the better-off; to pay 
percentage of their treatment, sponsorship, donations 
UF: exemption procedure Individualised (feasible I desirable ) 
UF: target groups of exemptions Higher: frequent users; wealthier 
Lower: elderly, disabled, young; with chronic conditions, children, people with merits to society 
Special cases: smokers; alcoholics, criminals etc. 
Priority treatment in state facilities Groups as above/ those paying directly/ solidarity 
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\ 15 T LEVEL CAT-S: Attitudes to private sector (PS): fee-for-service payment and voluntary health insurance (VHI) 
2ND LEVEL CAT-S Criteria for assigning 
Understanding of principle Payment for what (for specific illnesses), when, to whom (insurers/ hospitals), employer's contribution; 
other types of insurance: life or care insurance 
PS: attitudes Strengths/ weaknesses of private sector, suitability; choice state/private: price, time, attitude 
PS: differentiation among patients Equity (vertical and horizontal); different payment according to need, income, education, age, ethnicity 
Public-private mix: attitudes Attitudes, functioning in parallel 
Private sector regulation By whom (state, medical profession); to what extent? 
Patients: private sector experience Visits; level of fees; attitude; future choices; physicians: starting private practice: risks, benefits 
VHI: willingness to get insured Now/ in future; motivation 
- -
Tr~st in state/private; BulgarianLforeig_!l_insurer _____ 
\1sT LEVEL CAT-S: Willingness to pay (WTP) 
2ND LEVEL CAT-S Criteria for assigning 
Hypothetical choices: illness of respondent! Decisions on actions I type of facility (hospital)/ type (private)/ use of contacts/ fees/ gratuities/ 
child/close relative/ relative in hospital or insurance/ direct payment to physician 
chronically ill 
WTP: prioritising of factors Factors influencing WTP 
WTP in hypothetical situations Illness of respondent/relative; admission to hospital, chronic, dental 
WTP for specific treatments Projections I scenarios: spending of entitlement on: consultation/ hospital stay/ operation/ childbirth/ 
physician on call/ full insurance/ subscription. 
WTP: for child or close relative's treatment Scenarios: pharmaceuticals/ materials/ consultation/ bed/ food; pay to whom: directly to doctor, to 
administration of health facility, to intermediary; when: single/monthly/each visit!% of costs; in the end 
I beginning I during the treatment 
WTP for ecology WTP (earmarked tax, for ecologically clean products) 
!1sT LEVEL CAT-S: Preference for a health financing model 
2ND LEVEL CAT-S Criteria for assigning 
Preferred model: rating on a range of Transparency; complexity of implementation; acceptability for the public; providing guarantees, trust, 
characteristics flexibility, choice, control 
Financing options: overall suitability for Bulgaria Suitability/ reservations. Best results- users/doctors 
Preferred way of payment To physician/ administration/ HI company/ HI fund/ To state institution/ other 
Preferred model: for respondent/ frequent users/ User fee for each consultation/ monthly sum/ 3-5% from all expenses 
infrequent users/ pensioners 
- - --- -- -- -
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Methodological limitations 
This study is subject to a number ofbroad methodological limitations. 
• Existing data in Bulgaria is scarce, partial and unreliable, thus making it difficult to 
validate the results of this study. 
• Although the questionnaire draws on existing research instruments such as the World 
Bank Living Standard Measurement Survey, the UK Health survey and the GHS, it 
has been significantly modified to suit the requirements of this research and adapt it to 
Bulgarian circumstances. Thus, it is not fully standardised. 
• Difficulties in measuring income, purchasing power and expenditure are common to 
studies of transitional economies92 due to fluctuations in wages and prices, large 
informal economy, and general underreporting of income (especially among wealthier 
self-employed and private owners). Using monetary income as a predictor variable in 
the analysis may have limited the explanatory strength of the research. 
• The survey, while taking into account household characteristics, is essentially focused 
on individuals, their experience of health and illness, expenditure and attitudes. 
Although all household members were interviewed, data proved to be incomplete due to 
logistic difficulties in having to make too many visits, or being unable to obtain coherent 
answers. Thus, only data from the main respondent's interviews have been analysed. 
• Some limitations in measuring illness and utilisation may have occurred. Blaxter123 
notes that population studies can underrepresent serious illness, as those who are ill 
are less likely to be interviewed (incapacity, being in hospital). Acute, chronic illness, 
and treatment episodes were difficult to distinguish due to translation problems. 
• Data from the qualitative study indicate the scale and nature of the issues, particularly 
where the issues are sensitive or unfamiliar, but cannot be generalised. 
Despite these limitations, this study provides new essential information immediately 
relevant to health care reform in Bulgaria, which is presented in chapters 4-11. The next 
chapter will examine critically the directions, process and challenges facing the reform of 
health care financing in Bulgaria, based on primary and secondary sources. 
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CHAPTER 4. HEALTH CARE REFORM IN BULGARIA 
(1989-1999): A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
This chapter will examme critically the process of health care reform in Bulgaria, 
exploring the challenges faced and intrinsic contradictions. The main elements of reform 
were described in appendix 2, here they are analysed in the light of the data collected as 
part of the research. 
The current chapter draws on two types of sources: first, on documentary analysis of 
Bulgarian and international papers, official publications, media accounts, and press 
interviews between 1993 and 1999; and second, on in-depth interviews conducted with 
stakeholders in 1997. 
Results 
Contradictions in the Bulgarian health care system in the late 1990s 
The Bulgarian health system is still, in theory, based on the Semashko model, established 
in 1944-1989. Despite some important achievements, reform efforts have failed to 
restructure significantly provision and financing of the health sector and to dismantle the 
Soviet model of health care and its institutions. In the absence of coherent reform and 
legislation, two processes have developed. Firstly, the health system has lost many of 
the positive features of the inherited model. Secondly, under external and internal 
pressures, the health care system has adjusted to the market environment. However, 
these changes have led to a number of contradictions between the rhetoric and the reality 
(Table 4.1 ). 
The most fundamental achievement of the socialist health care system, contributing to its 
popular support, was that it provided universal coverage for the population. The 
extensive social provision, and the sense of security it created, made the system 
politically legitimate. The 1991 Bulgarian Constitution and the Law for Public Health, 
amended in 1991, reconfirmed the rights of all citizens to a comprehensive package of 
health services, free at the point of use. Legalisation of private health care enabled 
people to seek higher quality care while retaining access to the public system. 
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Despite this commitment, in reality, universal entitlement was unsustainable. There was 
a discrepancy between the entitlement to free health care and ability of the state to meet 
the expenditure. The tax-based model could not raise sufficient revenue in the 1990s 
' 
due to economic recession and inefficient tax collection related to a growing shadow 
economy. The underfunding had catastrophic consequences for the health system. 
Shortages of essential drugs, lack of basic maintenance and low salaries, led to 
substantial reliance on extra-budgetary resources to prevent the collapse of the system. 
The spontaneous introduction of user fees, legalised in 1997, and the growth of under-
the-counter payments introduced cost sharing mechanisms into the system. Although 
fees were intended to cover only elective or luxury services, in many cases they 
undermined equitable access to state-provided health care. These developments meant 
that the formal right of citizens to universal and free medical care, guaranteed in the 
Constitution, could not be exercised. 
Table 4.1. Contradictions in the health care system in Bulgaria in the late 1990s 
Official claims 
Universal access based on need 
Tax-based model, services free at the point 
of use 
Balance of supply and demand 
Reality 
Access based on ability to pay 
Use of extra-budgetary financing sources: 
user fees, under-the-counter payments 
Declining and inadequate supply 
Rising demand (high-income groups) 
Falling demand (low income groups) 
Centralised planning & control by the state => De-centralisation, but inadequate co-
ordination between center and regions 
Regions accountable to central level 
Horizontal and vertical collaboration 
between institutions; and between clinical 
practice and research 
Emphasis on primary care and prevention 
through polyclinics 
Feeling of security 
Minimal central control over standards 
=> Weakened collaboration 
=> Reduced coverage due to shortages 
=> Insecurity 
While, formally, access to health care is based on need, in reality, in the 1990s, user 
payments have undermined access to public care, which has been increasingly dependent 
on the ability of the users to pay. Safety nets for the low-income groups were greatly 
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reduced, with negative consequences for equity. The policy objective of maintaining 
equal access to free health services in an atmosphere of falling budgets led to 
deterioration in the quality of services, drug shortages and waiting lists. In effect, except 
for emergency health care, no guarantees could be given that health services would be 
received free at the point of use, causing insecurity among users. 
The Semashko system claimed to achieve a balance of supply and demand through 
centralised planning. Although health care costs have increased due to the import of 
expensive technologies, wide use of brand pharmaceuticals, and capital investments, 
supply continued to decline. Demand fell among lower income groups and rose among 
the richest sections. 
Another set of contradictions in the Bulgarian health care system related to the role of the 
state. As elsewhere in CEE, health care reform has involved a re-definition of the role of 
the state and re-thinking of the balance between collective and individual rights. 
Bulgaria, like Slovenia and Estonia, constitutionally guarantees the right to collectively 
provided health care to a larger extent than does the constitution of the Czech Republic, 
which is most notable in extending individual responsibility72 • In Poland, there has been 
a particular emphasis on maintaining equal access for the population during transition, 
through a variety of entitlements and state guarantees ('health security'Y2 88 . 
Bulgaria and the Czech Republic agree on the necessity of state functions such as 
emergency services, public health measures, a package of basic health care, registration 
of pharmaceuticals, control of medical technology, and health education124 • However, 
there are differences in the degree of intervention they justify. In the Czech Republic, 
state control is more residual, limited both through large-scale privatisation of facilities 
and privatisation of responsibility for one's health. Quality is monitored by professional 
organisations rather than the state. 
Theoretically, in Bulgaria, the state still retains a broader spectrum of inherited functions, 
including centralised financing, provision, planning, control and leadership in the health 
sector. In reality, the state monopoly in provision and financing of health services was 
curtailed under political pressure, although this process has been less radical in Bulgaria 
than in the Czech Republic72 • The resulting de-centralisation weakened state planning 
and reduced the possibilities for co-operation between units. One of the managerial 
weaknesses of the health care system in the 1990s is a lack of clear lines of 
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accountabilityll4 • Residual state control over the private sector 1s mainly through 
licensing and taxation, and much less in price setting and quality standards. 
Despite recent claims for renewed commitment to strengthening of primary health care, 
the situation worsened due to resource allocation favouring hospitals, lack of political 
support among stakeholders, and opposition from physicians' organisations. 
The feeling of security related to the health care system was eroded by cost sharing, 
corruption, shortages and the creation of a two-tiered system. In surveys of public 
perceptions before 1989 the health care system was viewed as regulated, reliable and fair. 
A 1997 survey1 1 showed widespread feelings of economic insecurity, fears of 
unemployment, crime, and political instability, and pessimistic views of the future, 60% 
being dissatisfied with their standard of living and social status. Access to health care 
was seen as determined by economic factors such as the ability to pay. Thus, 90% of 
respondents were convinced that a poor person would not receive high-quality treatment. 
43% stated that they cannot afford to buy the medicines they need and 80% thought that, 
in case of serious illness, they would not be able to pay for their treatment. Another 
source of insecurity among users is the poor information regarding health sector reform 
and lack of opportunities for involvement. 
In summary, the health care system in Bulgaria in the late 1990s, although still based on 
the Semashko model, has developed a range of negative features as a by-product of 
reform in other spheres of the economy. 
Pressure for reform and reform pre-conditions 
During the communist era, housing and health care were classified as services within the 
state budget and as such they had low priority125 • As discussed in the introduction to this 
thesis, after 1989, health sector reform was de-prioritised since it was assumed that 
revitalisation of the economy would lead to immediate improvements in the health 
system. Against a background of radical reforms in other sectors of the economy in 
1990-1997, health care reforms were less visible to the public and to health care 
professionals. This resulted in external and internal pressures to accelerate reform. 
Among the external pressures for reform were the general economic recession and the 
macroeconomic restructuring leading to declining government revenue at central and 
local level. The health care budget in 1996 was 35% and in 1997, 50% of the 1990 
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level94 • Health care budgets were inadequate in the face of the need for capital 
investments to sustain deteriorating buildings, infrastructure and equipment; demand for 
new treatments and import of advanced technologies. Shortages of consumables were 
especially acute. Although, until the collapse in 1996, the health care system appeared 
relatively stable (compared to the massive collapse in agriculture and industry), the 
subsequent crisis made more dynamic reform of health care a pressing issue. The extent 
of the demographic and health problems of the population also exerted pressure for a 
response. 
There was also pressure from users to speed the pace of reform, in the face of the 
expansion of unregulated user fees. Income fell as a result of currency devaluation, 
unemployment; falling living standards; and exhaustion of reserves; and users became 
increasingly unable to pay out-of-pocket. Thus many users came to see reform as highly 
desirable. Attention was focused by media accounts and public debate deploring the 
growth of user fees in the absence of insurance. 
The negative attitudes towards the current health care system were illustrated by a 
representative survey conducted in April 1995126 among those aged 15+. The majority 
(64%) of respondents assessed the state of the health care system as bad or very bad. The 
situation in the health sector was viewed to be better only than that of agriculture and 
manufacturing and worse than in culture and education. In the interviews undertaken for 
this thesis, virtually all respondents shared the opinion that the health care system is in an 
extremely poor state, in terms of material conditions, supply of pharmaceuticals and 
overall quality of care. 
Another set of pressures came from within the health care system. The poor motivation 
of staff reflected poor working conditions and salaries (even when compared to the rest 
of the public sector); lack of incentives for performance or opportunities to earn 
additional income; and slow reform. Support for reform among health personnel was 
generally widespread, but with some variation by type of facilities, settings, and type of 
staff (Figure 4.1). The expressed commitment to financing reform is stronger among 
physicians in the capital and in larger (teaching) hospitals and among privately practising 
physicians. The incentives for change were lower for health administrators, due to fears 
of losing their jobs, and among the auxiliary staffwho did not envisage gain from further 
reform. 
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Figure 4.1. Motivation of interest groups in the reform process (1990-1997) 
High 
motivation 
Source: In-depth interviews with stakeholders, 1997 
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Physicians, through the Bulgarian Physicians' Union and other organisations of medical 
staff, exercised strong pressure for reform and opposed the low priority given to health 
care reform compared to macro-economic policy. 
From their perspective, the major issues in reform are raising the status and income of 
medical staff, by means of the introduction of a health insurance system and further 
privatisation of in-patient health facilities. In general, health insurance is often seen as a 
tool to achieve higher living standards for medical staf:f1 5• Compulsory insurance was 
perceived as the perfect solution, achieving simultaneously higher income for 
professional staff, obligatory patient participation, more budgetary resources, and 
improved quality. The increase in physicians' income and performance-related payments 
were also seen by patients as a means to improve incentives and clinical autonomy, and 
thus, the functioning of the system. Physicians' organisations are also insistent that under 
a national health insurance system, payment to staff should be fee-for-service, or in any 
case, linked to performance. 
Aims and objectives 
Despite some important achievements, health care reform in Bulgaria failed to provide 
sustainable and affordable health care for the population. One reason is that the reform 
strategies were contradictory, with no clear logic. The objectives and priorities were not 
explicitly formulated. No strategic programme was formulated prior to December 1995. 
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In contrast, adherence to a set of clear and comprehensive policy objectives was a 
decisive factor in the ability to implement health sector reform in the Czech Republic127• 
According to Borissov and Rathwell133 the main reform objectives in Bulgaria were: 
1. Legalisation of private practice 
2. Reform of health care management and financing (decentralisation and health insurance) 
3. Incorporation of new values into the health care system: 
a) Rights and freedoms (pluralism, competition, information, choice and quality) 
b) Shared responsibility for health (accountability under a health insurance system) 
c) Priority setting 
d) Efficiency 
e) A Health for All strategy 
In practice, the focus of reform developments was on objectives 1-2 (mainly 
decentralisation), and on 3e) (two Health for All strategies were prepared: in 1995 and 
1999). The actual implementation of these objectives has faced significant political and 
administrative difficulties. Other objectives were primary care reform and hospital 
restructuring. 
Ensuring accessible health care for the population in circumstances of a reduced budget 
for health care was not seen as a priority. The reform objectives, as well as the actual 
developments, indicate a limited role for user groups (appendix 2). Most changes 
benefitted, directly or indirectly, medical staff, particularly physicians. 
Disagreement on specific policy priorities in Bulgaria and their frequent modification 
blocked the reform process. Successive governments were unwilling to engage in long-
term and potentially complex health care reform, with little continuity. Dialogue 
between institutions and stakeholders was difficult due to an underdeveloped political 
culture and inability to accommodate competing interests. There was no consensus on 
the existing system and what should be retained. Well-targeted and balanced reform 
objectives could have created a more broadly acceptable process. There are many 
possible strategies for health care reform and there is a need to negotiate policy options 
between stakeholders to create a "new social contract"128 or "social pact" 129, rather than 
one imposed by government. 
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Reform process 
The pace of health care reforms varied significantly across countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe. It was determined by state priorities, political climate, overall dynamics 
of transition, and support by stakeholders. In Bulgaria, the reforms have been slower 
than elsewhere in CEE, notably the Czech Republic and Hungary, which implemented 
radical reforms through "shock therapy"130• Poland also adhered to a strategy of gradual 
accumulation of small-scale measures before a comprehensive re-structuring. 
Health care reform began immediately after 1989, benefiting from a series of favourable 
circumstances: public enthusiasm and willingness for change of the new political leaders 
and society. It would have been easier to promote the need for health care reform before 
the consequences of the severe economic crises. However, these circumstances were not 
exploited and the opportunity missed to gain speed in the initial stages of transition. 
Health care reform in Bulgaria has been slow and incremental. Policy-making and 
introduction of legislation often lagged behind actual developments. Reform often relied 
on decrees and regulations by the government instead of primary legislation. Reform of 
financing has been particularly event-driven. This approach reflected the predominant 
gradualist strategy of the overall transition process. 
The evolutionary changes in the early transition were perceived as strengthening control 
and facilitating a gradual re-shaping of public opinion. In the absence of any continuity 
between new and pre-1944 economic mechanisms, the majority of the population found 
it difficult to accept new rules overnight, with, for example, new market-oriented 
relations in the health care system such as private or public health insurance, or large-
scale privatisation. 
More radical strategies for health care reform ("shock therapy") were not feasible in 
Bulgaria, for political reasons. Successive short-lived and politically weak governments 
were not prepared or willing to take responsibility for comprehensive and rapid change. 
The slow pace was often justified on the grounds that urgent macro-economic problems 
had to be solved first. Instead of drafting new, potentially unpopular laws, the existing 
legislation was adjusted through decrees and regulations. Reforms were also delayed due 
to lack of consensus on main policy strategies between political parties, interest groups 
and public, and due to politicisation of the reform proposals. Proposals to accelerate 
reforms failed to achieve electoral support when put forward by unpopular leaders. It 
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was also argued that too rapid or radical re-structuring might cause confusion and a sense 
of insecurity. 
In Poland, it has also been argued that reforms should be evolutionary by necessity and 
that improvements cannot be achieved through revolution4 • The rationale was that some 
positive features of the inherited system must be identified and sustained. There was also 
opposition against hasty, populist reforms compared to those based on research evidence. 
The slow pace of reform created uncertainty about the objectives of reform and 
threatened achievements. This research from Bulgaria indicates that the stakeholders' 
main disappointment with health care reform arose from the slow pace and lack of focus 
in the light of rapidly deteriorating conditions in the health sector. A more dynamic 
strategy could have gained support among the public, health professionals and 
administrators. However, high public dissatisfaction with the persisting problems of the 
health sector did not automatically lead to acceptance of radical reforms. 
Following the introduction of a currency board in 1997, the economy eventually started 
to grow. Consensus was achieved only after 1997, when three key laws were voted on 
by the Parliament (more than in 1990-1997). Conditions now appear favourable for 
reform. It is arguable that a more dynamic approach could raise health care reform on 
the public agenda. 
Reform content and implementation 
This section will analyse some of the more important reform achievements. By 1995, it 
was recognised by consultants to the PHARE health insurance project that the reform of 
health care has made little progress84 • A mission of experts from the WHO, FAO, 
UNICEF and others stated that: 
"The health sector in Bulgaria is in a state of total confusion, lack of direction, lack of 
reform and the situation will even become worse in the next months to come. "131 
The same mission noted, as a major problem, the inability of the Ministry of Health to 
provide adequate health care and drugs, exacerbated by the lower purchasing power of 
the population. 
Legalisation of the private sector in health care (1991) 
The legalisation of the private health sector in Bulgaria was promoted by professional 
organisations of medical staff, and supported by the public. As private practice was 
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prominent until 1944, and existed in some form until the 1970s, there was a feeling that 
development of the private sector built on existing traditions. In the views of users, the 
private sector introduced free choice in the system, reduced inefficiencies and 
preferential treatment observed in the state sector and ensured fair payment to physicians 
on a fee-for-service basis. The private sector was seen to provide high-quality services, or 
services unavailable in the state sector, and to ensure a better attitude by staff. In the 
context of transition, market mechanisms in health care were perceived as fully 
legitimate and reflecting the logic of macro-economic reform and privatisation in other 
spheres of society. Implementation was easy because the objectives were clear and 
easily understandable for all sections of society. 
The private out-patient sector grew rapidly, relying largely on out-of-pocket payments, 
with some companies contracting on behalf of their employees. The low purchasing 
ability of consumers and oversupply of facilities resulted in competition for customers 
and lower prices143• The generally affordable prices increased demand across the income 
spectrum. Nevertheless, the absence of insurance or other reimbursement mechanisms 
limited the potential client base. The concentration of private sector facilities in urban 
areas also limited their use. The emergence of a private in-patient sector was deterred by 
lack of insurance coverage (national insurance system or voluntary insurance) and the 
generally slow privatisation in other sectors of the economy. The potential for long-term 
private investment in infrastructure has not been fulfilled due to political instability and 
lack of credit systems. 
Some problems have resulted from duplication or shortage of certain services. The 
private market was demand-driven, with no user protection or regulation. Users have 
lacked information to make an informed choice. The lack of clear rules has created some 
tensions between staff practising in public and private facilities. In addition the 
deteriorating conditions in the public health establishments led to fears that a two-tier 
system might be established, raising concerns about equity. 
The taxation system and restrictions on trade were major barriers to expansion of the 
private pharmaceutical sector, with some enterprises paying more than 75% of their 
profits in tax. There are no tax exemptions for small private producers. On the other 
hand, state control over quality and prices of the pharmaceuticals was insufficient. 
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The role of the state 
The content of the Bulgarian reform, although not explicitly stated, was related to re-
definition of the state's responsibilities. As explained earlier, in the Czech Republic, 
state ownership was limited through large-scale privatisation and by stressing 
individuals' responsibility for their health. In Poland, state authority was extensively de-
centralised to regional level. In Bulgaria the monopoly role of the state in provision and 
financing was curtailed though privatisation, although only in the outpatient sector, and 
decentralisation of administrative powers. The introduction of user fees and other 
alternative financial sources has reduced the reliance on budgetary transfers from the 
state, increasing the autonomy of health facilities. The state regulatory functions of 
setting quality standards and planning services, were reduced by bureaucratic inertia and 
lack of leadership. 
In Bulgaria, administrative de-centralisation is a relatively new concept, in contrast to 
Poland and the Czech Republic, which retained more de-centralised economies during 
the communist era. Responsibility for health care financing and provision has, formally, 
been delegated to municipalities, but these authorities were handicapped by retention of 
central control over policies, and inadequate budgets. Despite a commitment by some 
governments, political opposition to decentralisation is strong. In 1995, de-centralisation 
was reversed and regional branches of the Ministry of Health introduced, citing a need to 
implement uniform health policies. This state involvement in management of municipal 
facilities threatened the motivation for reform among administrators and professionals in 
communities where the process of de-centralisation was already working successfully. 
De-centralisation of health care financing and provision to the municipalities, weakened 
co-operation and accountability from regional to central level. Among the problems of 
decentralisation is that, in the municipalities, there is a shortage of staff with skills in 
financing and managing health care. 
The degree of state involvement in financing reform is now under discussion. In the first 
stages of the reform, the predominant role of the state has been unchallenged. The Health 
Insurance Law envisages that the health insurance fund will be accountable directly to 
Parliament, which will lead to dismantling of the state monopoly in provision and in 
financing. The state is, however, unlikely to cover some fund deficits and contribute on 
behalf of some groups in the population, or act to alleviate possible negative effects on 
equity. 
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Sustaining the role of the state in an underdeveloped market can be justified for 
efficiency reasons81 , as it is the only provider that could secure provision of curative 
services at this stage, given the low level of privatisation. In addition, the inherited 
system, characterised by extensive state involvement, retains considerable political 
support because of its underlying egalitarian principles and paternalism. A rapid shift to 
virtually unregulated markets and large-scale private provision may cause a withdrawal 
of support by the elderly and low-income groups, and may compromise the reform 
process. Commitment to radical reform of the health care system is opposed because of 
fears that it could threaten the principle of equity, even though equity (in the Bulgarian 
context), can be seen as maintenance of comprehensive coverage and equal access at the 
expense of quality of services. 
Managerial reforms 
Another set of reform policies that were formulated later in the 1990s, aimed to address 
the issue of rational management of existing resources, with the aim of achieving self-
reliance9. In Bulgaria, an increase in budget resources was considered to be more 
important than their efficient allocation. Nevertheless, health care funding is dependent 
on economic recovery. In the absence of legislation on broader principles of reform and 
in the face of chronic underfunding, more cost-effective management of scarce resources 
emerged as a feasible option for reform in the short term84 • Furthermore, managerial 
improvement can be achieved even in the current tax-based model. 
The main sources of inefficiency in the health care system are the oversupply and 
duplication of services and facilities, and staff imbalance and misallocation. However, 
incentives for applying managerial approaches are missing. There is no formal training 
of health managers or health economists. Some medical directors of hospitals are trained 
in social medicine, but many have no managerial experience at all. The newly 
established positions of 'economic directors', subordinate to that of the medical director, 
are mostly filled by accountants who have limited authority and responsibility. In 1995, 
a decree of the Ministry of Health eliminated the position of economic director in 
facilities with less than 500 beds, and generally weakened their powers. Even when 
managers are in place, they have little discretion in the allocation of budgetary resources 
g According to an IMF assessment, the Czech Republic government was comparatively 
successful in promoting measures of self-reliance during the health reforms 
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according to needs and are legally prevented from restructuring the pattern of staffing. 
Managers cannot close beds and have limited scope to curtail costs to improve efficiency. 
At central level, the inefficient middle-level bureaucratic apparatus, inherited from before 
1989, has undermined efforts to bring about far-reaching reforms. 
Little has been done in the area of resource allocation after the collapse of the central 
planning model. The facilities' budgets are determined according to an annual 
application made by the medical director based on the number of people covered by the 
facility and, since 1995, the number of admissions, instead of number of beds84 • Recent 
measures to allocate hospital budgets according to volume of work rather than per unit of 
input have not taken into account the incentives for artificially generated activities. Also, 
facilities that achieve savings are in danger of receiving a smaller budget the next year. 
The health budgets of the municipalities do not reflect the demographic and social profile 
of the population. 
One of the first steps in establishing financial independence for health facilities was the 
introduction, in a 1994 government decree, of a system for contracting-out auxiliary 
services, such as food, pharmaceutical supplies, and utilities. Each facility (mainly 
hospitals) selects suppliers from competing providers and contracts-out at the beginning 
of each budget year. The system faced difficulties due to the fact that purchasers 
(facilities) were underfunded and budgets were often delayed and undermined by 
inflation. Most public health care institutions were left in debt with unpaid bills for 
pharmaceuticals, heating, and electricity. There was also scope for corruption. 
Two pilot projects of a "contract system", or type of internal market within the existing 
budgetary system, sought to create competition among providers and to achieve savings. 
Municipalities, acting as purchasers, would contract health care establishments to deliver 
certain volumes and types of clinical activities. These attempts were handicapped by the 
lack of expertise to supervise contracting at local levels. Another problem was 
involvement in local management of the regional offices of the Ministry of Health, which 
reduced the autonomy of purchasers. 
Primary health care reorganisation 
In 1994-95 the socialist government attempted a series of primary care reforms. A 
documentary analysis of announcements by Ministry of Health experts in early 1995 
illustrates that, although some of the policies are consistent with the existing tax-based 
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system, lack of trust and political support undermined their implementation. It is a 
typical example of mismatch between the efforts of the Ministry of Health and public 
perceptions, or in other words, between rhetoric and reality. 
In February 1995, at a press conference on the health reforms development, the Health 
Secretary Dr. Mimi Vitkova characterised the Ministry of Health as "poorly structured 
and non-working" and announced the creation of 28 district structures for health care to 
enhance management and the implementation of national policies132 • This was popularly 
seen as a backlash, following the de-centralisation of power envisaged by the Local Self-
Government and Local Administration Act of 1992, as the Ministry of Health searched 
for mechanisms to regain control over municipally owned facilities. Another initiative 
aimed to reduce the number of distributors of pharmaceuticals, to control price 
differences between pharmaceuticals, and to introduce ceiling prices for drugs. It was 
also suggested that hospital budgets should be determined on the basis of volume of 
work and not on size or other base units. These messages were interpreted in different 
ways by stakeholders outside the Ministry of Health (Table 4.2). 
Another initiative introduced in primary health care in 1994-5, was to strengthen 
prevention, health education and health promotion and most importantly, in 1995, free 
annual choice of "family physician" by patients attending state polyclinics. These 
measures aimed to empower users and create incentives for physicians and were 
implemented within the existing institutional network of primary care facilities. In 
addition, training of GPs began, with the intention to replace the extensive specialist staff 
in polyclinics with well trained generalists who could maintain close contact with their 
patients, administer preventive measures and act as gate-keepers in order to reduce 
overconsumption in secondary care. These efforts to regulate primary care have been 
perceived as actually curtailing the users' access to higher levels of care and reducing the 
clinical freedom of physicians. 
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Table 4.2. Socialist government agenda (1995) and the reaction of other stakeholders 
Official objectives of the MoH 
Establishment of 28 district MoH offices to 
implement national policies 
Selection of 'personal' physician 
User charges for voluntary referrals 
Prevention of wastage 
Control of prices of pharmaceuticals and 
retail in favour of users 
Potential ban of physicians' practice in both 
state and private sector 
Allocation of hospital budgets according to 
the volume of work 
MoH policies as perceived by other 
stakeholders 
Reversed de-centralisation 
Curtailing of user choice of secondary care; 
reducing clinical autonomy 
Reduced number of medical directors. 
Position closed in facilities with less than 
500 beds 
Suppression of the private sector and 
reintroduction of monopoly 
Suppression and possibly ban of private 
practice altogether 
Potential cuts in hospital budgets 
As mentioned in appendix 2, in an attempt to improve incentives, a performance-related 
component was added to the salaries of primary care physicians. The index took into 
account qualifications and number of patients registered, but not quality and complexity 
of the services rendered. However, the highest possible payment only marginally 
improved physicians' total incomes. In addition, few patients exercised a choice of 
physician or, if they did, chose at random. The deteriorating infrastructure and shortages 
of basic supplies in the health system lowered staff motivation and limited greatly the 
potential for professional satisfaction, leading to poorer quality services133 • 
Some actors in the reform process, not least health professionals, believed that patient 
satisfaction was a non-issue in the public sector, ridden by shortages, where ensuring any 
access was key. It was often assumed that patient choice could only exist in the private 
sector. Primary care reforms were viewed as a distraction from more important areas. 
Reform of the health care financing system: trends and expectations 
This section will examine developments in health care financing reform and influencing 
factors. 
Government spending on health care declined dramatically in the late 1980s and early 
1990s due to various factors in the wider economy associated with transition81 134 92 135• 
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Other factors were the unfavourable health situation of the population and competing 
government priorities. During the transition, new employment patterns emerged, e.g. 
growth of the informal and the illegal economy and unemployment led to a shrinking 
tax-base and decrease in official tax revenue. The fall in living standards was paralleled 
by a process of alienation of social and family networks which reduced the ability of 
households to cover basic needs with their own resources. 
In Bulgaria, as elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, the government response to 
economic crisis has been mainly to diversify sources of revenues (to include insurance 
and cost recovery techniques) and to cut recurrent and capital health expenditure135• 
Delays in health sector reform have been justified by the economic crises and the 
resulting near impossibility of increasing expenditure on health. The conventional view 
in Bulgaria designates revitalisation of the economy as a pre-requisite for reform of 
health sector funding. Contrary to expectations, the economic liberalisation programmes 
did not lead to an immediate improvement in social welfare. Policies mitigating the 
effects of restructuring had to be employed. 
"Improvements in living standards in the rich economies have often been the direct result 
of social intervention rather than of simple economic growth .... The thesis that the rich 
countries have achieved high levels of basic capabilities simply because they are rich is, 
to say the least, an oversimplification "136• 
The rapid ageing of the population and a gradually worsening health status since the 
1970s increased the burden on the health system. The pharmaceutical trade was 
liberalised and pharmaceutical prices were adjusted towards world prices22 • New, 
expensive medical technologies became available in Bulgaria. Another factor 
constraining the budget was the lack of capital investment, leaving obsolete 
infrastructure. Costs increased further due to duplication of public services, 
overtreatment and high referral rates to specialists, as well as managerial and 
administrative inefficiencies. As explained earlier, there were also considerable 
pressures for increases in the remuneration of medical staff. The use of cost sharing 
raised patients' expectations in relation to quality of care. There were also pressures for 
cost savings from donor agencies. As a result, the health care budget was overburdened 
and the system experienced shortages. 
The weaknesses of the tax-based model began to be discussed openly. The tax-based 
finance model could not raise sufficient revenue and therefore, additional extra-budgetary 
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resources (user fees, under-the-counter payments) were required to compensate for 
shortages. The state could not guarantee citizens' rights to health care because of 
inefficient tax collection and a diminishing tax base. Tax evasion is at its highest among 
the self-employed, employees of private firms, and those employed in the growing 
shadow economy. Consequently, most tax has been collected among state employees 
who generally have a lower income. The tax-based model was also considered 
inappropriate because of its centralised and unaccountable management. 
Another set of issues facing the tax-based model is that the structure and allocation of 
state spending on health is opaque. It is not clear what proportion of general income tax 
is dedicated to health and what to other parts of the public sector; or how the budget is 
allocated between different elements of the health system, with little relationship to 
health needs and utilisation at locallevel84 • Low accountability is a major reason why 
compulsory health insurance, with individual contributions earmarked for health care, 
came to be seen as a desirable alternative. 
The discrepancy between reduced budget resources for health care and upward pressure 
on expenditure, together with the problems associated with the tax-based model, made 
reform of health care financing extremely important. It became clear that a radical 
reform, and not simply cosmetic change, was required. Yet reform of funding was not 
considered a priority before 1997. A Draft Health Insurance Law, envisaging a 
compulsory social insurance system, was approved by the government, professional 
organisations, labour unions, a range of political parties, and the foreign consultants to 
the EU PHARE project8\ and submitted to the Parliament in 1993. The Draft Law was 
briefly debated, but withdrawn in 1995 by the newly-elected socialist government, which 
intended to prepare it's own proposal. For the government, creation of a health insurance 
system was not a priorityh. Work was commissioned on an alternative proposal. 
In the course of 1992-1997, a number of proposals were prepared by different groups. 
Some were submitted to the Parliamentary Commission. None succeeded in achieving 
consensus, which was symptomatic of the fragmentation of stakeholders' interests. 
Developments from 1993-1997 suggest that health financing re-structuring has not been 
a priority for successive governments. The pressure for change was coming mainly from 
h "but it is not forgotten", Anon. Team of Experts from the Ministry of Health Care Announced 
its Intentions. 24 Chasa, March 1995 
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professional representatives, labour unions, and research institutes. Particularly among 
physicians, financing reform was considered to be key1 37 • The voluntary organisations of 
users have remained aside from these discussions. In the view of foreign consultants to 
the PHARE projects, the reform of health financing was hampered mainly by political 
obstacleS84 • At the end of 1997, a Draft Law on Health Insurance was submitted to 
Parliament, passing through the first reading and, after some delay, enacted in June 1998 
by the new democratic government. 
Despite economic stabilisation and the generally favourable conditions introduced by the 
currency board, government experts recognised that implementation of health insurance, 
without adequate expertise and research, was too ambitious a task. However, some 
stakeholders pressed for rapid implementation, building administrative capacity and 
managerial skills in the process. This attitude was largely due to fear of political 
backlash. 
The timetable for implementation was adjusted, insurance contributions will start to be 
collected in 2000, full operations starting from January 2001. Although some training of 
staff and strengthening of administrative capacity began in 1998, there have been few 
preparatory information campaigns or public discussions. The full implications of a 
compulsory health insurance scheme for Bulgaria have not been systematically evaluated 
and its suitability, in many cases, taken for granted by the stakeholders, despite the 
reservations of some experts. 
Another issue was the cost of implementation of a national health insurance system and 
the need for complex administrative arrangements. It is recognised that detailed 
preparatory work is essential to build equity and efficiency into the system15 89 28 • Among 
the requirements for compulsory insurance are: adjustment of the tax-system, investment 
in infrastructure, training, information systems, establishing exemption procedures and 
criteria for estimation of fair insurance premiums in circumstances where underreporting 
is likely: farmers138, private sector employees etc. The system is unlikely to produce 
savings in its early years or to be sustainable without the state covering some of the 
deficits. 
Several issues concerning a health insurance system have not been resolved. The 
National Framework Contract will be reviewed annually by Parliament, determining the 
basic package and prices. On the basis of this contract, the National Health Insurance 
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Fund will purchase services from providers. The Contract will also provide general 
guidelines for payment of health facilities and physicians, but there will be an option for 
negotiation between purchasers and providers at locallevel139• There are no safeguards 
against cost escalation and inclusion of more services, under pressure from physicians' 
lobbies. 
Insurance contributions will run in parallel with social security and disability insurance 
and be offset by a decline in existing insurance contributions140 • Potentially, this could 
lead to duplication and an increase in administrative costs. People will also pay 
additional contributions for dependants, and it has not been made clear whether 
households where there is only one earner, or there are many dependants, will be able to 
pay. 
Although not always in the framework of a public dialogue, several major issues have 
dominated the debate in relation to health financing, which will be further outlined. 
Compulsory health insurance is the best solution for Bulgaria 
One of the assumptions commonly made is that a compulsory health insurance system is 
the only possible method for financing the Bulgarian health care system. No rational 
assessment of alternatives to the current tax-based model has been undertaken. A 
PHARE project aimed to accelerate preparation for an insurance system through research 
and capacity building, but was suspended for several years. Practically no research on 
sustainability of health insurance or on users' views was commissioned. 
A health insurance system has been recommended for Bulgaria on the basis of its 
implementation in other countries in transition. Almost all CEE countries have sought to 
obtain additional financial resources through income-related insurance premiums in a 
universal health insurance system72 • Bulgaria was among the last to embark on 
transforming its tax-based system. 
Among other reasons for advocating social insurance was the guarantee of universal 
coverage, equity, safety nets, services free at the point of use, lack of socially undesirable 
two-tier treatments and egalitarian principles. In CEE, financing schemes that have 
received most electoral support have typically been social insurance schemes (Czech 
Republic) or schemes with a spectrum of entitlements (Poland), in both cases covering 
the whole population. Public financing remained the preferred way of financing access 
to basic health care in many OECD countries, despite a more recent emphasis on 
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voluntary coverage18• Until 1945, in Bulgaria there was a strong polarisation of wealth 
and an established market for private health care, which made the equity principle very 
important for older people. There was public pressure for social insurance from social 
groups who felt insecurity most acutely. 
Problems with health insurance have not been addressed. The rapid introduction of a 
health insurance system in the Czech Republic is thought to have been facilitated by the 
strong traditions in the inter-war period. In Bulgaria, as shown earlier, there was little 
experience with sickness funds pre-1944. Little attention has been paid to the potential 
impact on a health insurance system, of a shrinking tax-base, tax evasion and other 
problems related to the growing informal economy, which have reduced the revenue of 
the existing tax based system. 
Although the Health Insurance Law has been in place smce 1998, there is still no 
agreement on the health services to be covered. Although some authors thought a "basic 
package" of services likely in Bulgaria133, it is increasingly clear that public and health 
professionals expect an almost comprehensive range of services, obvious exceptions 
being cosmetic surgery or other optional services. 
The implications for employment of a social insurance system are well known among 
experts135 141 , but rarely discussed in the mass media or at public forums. Compulsory 
insurance based on payrolls is deemed to increase the cost of labour and thus affect 
adversely the competitiveness of the economy1 35 • It may also increase evasion, if only 
because of the burden it poses on employers and employees, who will share the 
expenses: 
"Countries such as Bulgaria and Poland, for which payroll taxation without health 
insurance already tops 50% of net wages, need to seriously evaluate the benefits of 
further payroll tax increases to fund health services". 135 
Recently, it was decided to deduct health insurance premiums from the overall social 
insurance tax, but this is difficult to implement and the share of social insurance tax 
remains relatively high. 
The delays in enactment of the Health Insurance Law and its subsequent implementation 
d fr h · · 141 H reflect changing attitudes among stakehol ers, om ent us1asm to cautiOn . owever, 
according to some Bulgaria experts, it is still widely believed that the problems of the 
health care system stem largely from its tax-based financing, and thus introduction of a 
health insurance system will solve most of them141 142 • In the view of these authors, the 
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existing model offers scope for financial and managerial transformations and adjustment 
to the new economic environment. Davidov141 (a Bulgarian expert on health financing) 
provides a clear analysis of the myths surrounding health insurance, and examines the 
pros and cons of its implementation in Bulgaria (Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3. Health insurance system (IDS) in Bulgaria: myths and arguments 
Source: Davidov B. Bulgarian health insurance system: some pros and cons. Social Medicine 
1996; 3: 38-41 
MYTHS RELATED TO HIS 
It will increase substantially the existing 
resources for health care 
It will increase sharply the salaries of 
medical staff 
It will entail payment of the physicians 
work according to volume and quality 
The improved incomes of staff will lead to 
disappearance of informal payments 
More types of health services will be free 
Health facilities will have much more 
resources 
It involves innovative forms of health 
system organisation (e.g. capitation) 
PROS OF HIS 
It will increase the information available 
and responsibility of the individual 
Involves an objective procedure for 
allocation of funds to health facilities 
related to the work performed 
Physicians' work will be controlled 
The health care budget will be determined 
according to objective criteria 
There will be control of the patient's flows 
The state participation will be reduced and 
community participation increased 
COUNTER-ARGUMENTS 
May lead to tax evasion, fall in incomes, 
increase in consumer prices 
Salaries (also under HIS) are determined 
through political process 
Difficult to implement in practice 
Despite higher income, it is likely to stay to a 
certain extent 
Provision of a package of services is publicly 
agreed; higher contributions will pay for 
more comprehensive package 
Health facilities will receive resources 
according to the volume of services provided 
Certain organisational practices can exist 
under tax-based model or HIS 
CONS OF HIS 
Large volume of information: volume of 
money and health activities for each insured 
(apr. 8.5 million) 
Radical restructuring of large part of existing 
documents and its handling 
Even if the system is perfect, more time loss 
for users (paperwork etc.) 
More administrative staff in health care and 
higher administrative costs 
In this analysis, the problems associated with the introduction of health insurance are 
mainly related to its cost (high burden on income, increase in consumer prices, cost of 
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administration etc.), but low effect (similar overall resources for health; low impact on 
physicians' remuneration etc.). Lessons from Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia 
who experience cost explosions, have not been publicized135• 
As argued elsewhere135, payroll-based contributions in CEE have supplemented, rather 
than replaced, central government budgets. In Hungary, Croatia, and the Czech 
Republic, the share of general tax revenue is expanding in order to sustain the system and 
reduce the cost of labour. The intended effects, also feasible under the existing model 
(increased health care resources, new mechanisms for staff payment, organisational 
change), are compatible with the current system and can be implemented more efficiently 
under it141 • Another issue is that many necessary reform steps have yet to be taken, 
awaiting full implementation of the health insurance system, which, in reality, they could 
have facilitated. In contrast to the lack of attention to the drawbacks of social insurance, 
the benefits (transparency, contributions explicitly linked to entitlement, more 
information for users) have received considerable attention. 
Share of GDP for health should be increased 
A growing concern in the media is the steadily diminishing share of GDP spent on health 
care in the face of pressure from other sectors such as heavy industry, energy and 
defence. This figure has become highly visible and politicised. Real health care 
expenditure in Bulgaria declined between 1990-1993, but was partially restored after 
1994 in line with general economic recovery. Maintaining expenditure on health care 
was seen as evidence of state commitment to a public system, although the health system 
was systematically underfunded in the final years of the Semashko system. Increasing 
the share of GDP spent on health became an objective in its own right. What was rarely 
recognised was that transfer of additional resources would not solve the long-term 
problems of the health system. 
A comparative World Bank study found pressures to increase expenditure on health care 
before full economic recovery in all CEE countries. This may have been a result of 
public expectations of maintaining universal access and comprehensive coverage, while 
at the same time achieving Western-style standards of care, despite the income gap with 
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Payment of physicians 
A related issue that was a focus of public debate was payment of physicians. In the 
previously mentioned public opinion survey, respondents were asked also to state what 
they considered to be fair income for a range of professions. Physicians came third, after 
members of the cabinet and MPs126 • The Bulgarian Physicians' Union and other 
professional bodies pressed for an increase in remuneration and a change in the payment 
system, preferring fee-for-service or capitation rather than salaries. It has been argued 
that there is a need to introduce temporary arrangements for payments to staff to reflect 
workload differentials, prior to the establishment of an insurance system. Health 
professionals could be thus stimulated to improve their performance and participate more 
actively in the reforms. Changes in payment methods coupled with free choice of 
physician were thought to improve incentives. There was relatively little debate, 
however, on alternative performance-related payment, such as the points system in the 
Czech Republic, and physicians' bonuses in Poland. Drawbacks, such as incentives for 
overtreatment and cost-escalation, or the need for payment ceilings, reducing the list of 
procedures covered or introduction of co-payments, have not been discussed. 
Research on assessment of workload has been commissioned by the Ministry of Health 
to serve as a basis for indexation of physicians' salaries. The system was implemented in 
1995, but did not improve incomes significantly. Professional organisations' focus on 
incentive structures has been viewed negatively by other stakeholders as 
"commercialisation" of the profession. 
User fees 
Issues surrounding user fees were also discussed. In the absence of a legal basis, 
alternative financing sources, such as semi-official user-fees, started appearing in 1994 in 
separate health establishments, at different times and, often, were not announced in 
advance. In 1996-7 semi-official user-fees ("donations") for a large range of items 
existed at all levels but were not officially acknowledged before 1997. This step-wise 
implementation made it difficult to create an agenda for public discussion. 
Parallel existence of private practice 
A related issue, the cause of heated discussions in 1995-1996, was the parallel existence 
of private practice. The Ministry of Health opposed this and made proposals for 
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separating the sectors. According to some views143, parallel public and private practice is 
an "intermediary form" which does not stimulate competition and creates disincentives, 
although it can bring money to the public establishments (when a private physician pays 
rent to a state facility) and reduces the financial risk for private practitioners. Given the 
limited private sector in outpatient care and virtual lack of insurance, these plans 
involved great risks for physicians who chose to leave the public sector. It was 
equivalent to a curtailment of the private sector and made the then government extremely 
unpopular. Similarly, attempts at regulation of "after-hours practice" and other forms of 
physicians' practice were perceived as threatening to clinical autonomy. 
Major weaknesses and obstacles to health care reform: a summary 
Bulgarian health care reforms faced many obstacles, but the basic reform strategies also 
contained many weaknesses. 
Politically, promises of health care reforms often were seen as critical to the electoral 
success of governments. However, most governments were short-lived and few had the 
required widespread political support and leadership needed to begin high-risk radical 
reform. Only two governments engaged in health sector reform in the period 1989-1998 
(the Socialist Party in 1994-5 and the Democratic Party in 1997) and promoted more 
visible reform initiatives. The 1994-95 reforms in primary care failed because of 
opposition from the majority of stakeholders. Another obstacle was populism and 
politicisation of the health reform debate. For example, despite user fees already being 
familiar, the government avoided addressing the uncomfortable facts. 
A number of economic factors hampered the pace and scope of the health reforms. 
Among those were the severe economic recession, insufficient investment in reform and 
limited international aid for health care in the early 1990s. 
The reforms were also weakened by unclear aims and a lack of continuity between 
interchanging sets of objectives. Public or professional consensus had not been achieved 
prior to 1997. Legislation was inadequate. Conditions for investment in the private 
sector were adverse. The slow pace and lack of focus amidst deteriorating conditions in 
the health system led to disillusionment among stakeholders. 
There is an implicit understanding that a universal health insurance system is the way 
forward in the long-term. This is based not on research, but on the views of health 
professionals, drawing on examples from other CEE countries. There has been little 
125 
information for public health professionals on the requirements for an insurance system. 
The same was true for co-payments, which have been introduced gradually, without 
public debate. Stakeholders often sought to discuss more understandable issues such as 
the share of health expenditure in the budget. There has been an implicit understanding 
that there is a trade-off between improved efficiency and maintenance of equity. Equity 
has been seen as a state responsibility, efficiency associated mostly with the private 
sector. 
In summary, among the important achievements of the health system reform in the 1990s 
are: 1) universal access to public health care formally preserved, most services free at the 
point of use; 2) a legalised private sector; 3) re-establishment of professional bodies; 4) 
devolution to municipalities of significant responsibilities for financing and provision of 
health care; 5) weakening of ownership, control and planning by central government; 6) 
geographical access to health care largely maintained; 7) speeding up of reforms after 
1997, in particular implementation of a health insurance system. 
There are, however, some inherited or newly emerging negative characteristics 
('failings'133) of the health care system: 1) financial collapse of the system and 
dependence on foreign aid and emergency measures; 2) increased role of semi-official 
cost-sharing and informal payments; 3) increased inequity of access and treatment; 4) 
inefficiency caused by continuing orientation towards curative services; and 
overutilisation of hospital sector133; 5) poor quality of health services; 6) low formal 
remuneration of staff and low motivation leading to a 'dehumanised' relationship between 
physicians and patients133; 7) low impact of primary care and prevention; 8) bureaucratic 
management and inflexible planning; 9) low accountability and unresponsiveness to 
users133; 1 0) little collaboration between institutions. 
Future challenges for health care reform 
At the end of the 1990s, almost a decade after the democratic transition, policy-makers in 
Bulgaria face a number of challenges, some of which will be discussed briefly. 
One of the most important challenges is achievement of a transparent reform strategy and 
agreed objectives. While broad policy documents and legislation exist, detailed 
administrative guidelines are needed to support implementation. Regular monitoring is 
needed because of the rapidly changing economic circumstances. It is essential that the 
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reform direction is compatible with societal values, the national context, and traditions7• 
Given the increasing differences among CEE countries, reform strategies have to be 
country-specific or, at least, a cautious evaluation of imported reform options is required. 
Another challenge for the current government will be its ability to involve more actors in 
policy-making process. While the Bulgarian Physicians' Union has been a major 
stakeholder in the health reform process, other interest groups, NGOs and patients' 
representations have yet to participate. This would ensure a balance of interests and 
empower all parties to take part in reshaping health reform, with realistic expectations. 
The success of health care reform depends not only on the political climate, but also on 
good policy design and administrative skills144 • Preparatory work before implementation 
of the new financing system, such as information campaigns and capacity building, is 
important. It is difficult, expensive and unpopular to reverse a health finance system 
already in place. Experience from other countries in transition shows that success of 
radical reform depends very much on the preceding public discourse. Introduction of a 
health insurance system characterised by complicated rules and exemptions, in the 
absence of adequate debate, could limit understanding of the reform process and 
undermine user compliance. There is a distinct lack of information campaigns and open 
discussion among stakeholders. The media could be used more effectively both to 
publicise reform activities and as a forum for public debate. Some investment in 
information technology, trained staff and administrative infrastructure required for the 
health insurance system has already started, but in the view of some stakeholders, the 
complexity of the arrangements has been underestimated. 
Another challenge is to recognise the reform priorities and related implementation 
difficulties. The democratic government elected in 1997 and donors, such as the PHARE 
program, have focused on finance-side restructuring, specifically on the introduction of 
compulsory insurance as a key aspect of reform. The health insurance system is 
expected to supply extra-budgetary resources, be sustainable, provide accountability and 
transparency, improve quality of care and ensure broad coverage. During the process of 
economic recovery, the system is deemed able to provide equitable access to a core 
"basket of services". Complex issues, which have not been adequately addressed, 
include cost-control and sustainability of the system, definition of a basic package of 
services and ensuring compliance, given the large underground economy. Budgetary 
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funds might be needed to cover any financial deficit caused by high exemption rates and 
inadequately costed premiums; or to pay premiums for low-income groups or other 
disadvantaged groups. The professional organisations are given an important role in 
negotiating volumes and quality of health services, which might escalate costs. It is 
likely that the health insurance system will solve some existing problems and cause 
others, but there has been no public discussion of these issues, so creating unrealistic 
. 141 Th L expectatiOns . e aw for Health Insurance does not answer these questions and the 
implementation that began in 1999 is likely to face serious challenges. 
The Ministry of Health and its institutes have failed to promote discussion on a number 
of issues, considered uncomfortable until now. Despite the presence in recent years of 
under-the-counter payments and user fees, there is neither coherent policy nor public 
debate on these issues. 
Implementation of reform IS also contingent on new legislation. As shown in this 
chapter, legislation has too often lagged behind action, handicapped by political 
obstacles. 
Policy-makers face another challenge, namely that independent research should underpin 
patterns of further health reform in Bulgaria. Knowledge of important aspects of reform 
has, until recently, been scarce and anecdotal. With decentralisation since 1992, the 
reform has suffered a shortage of trained managerial and administrative staff, clearly 
some investment in this direction is required. 
Willingness of the central government to recognise these challenges, and to formulate 
respective policies, will be critical for the success of health system reform in Bulgaria. 
Conclusion: implications for a health financing system 
This analysis demonstrates that, prior to 1997, reform in Bulgaria was slow and 
inconsistent. Failure to enact essential legislation before this time was a product of 
political adversity and lack of dialogue between stakeholders. It has also been shown, in 
appendix 2 and here, that reforms have been blocked mainly by failed political 
consensus, resistance to change and lack of open debate rather than poorly designed 
policies. Other factors include pressure for universal coverage combined with high 
expectation for improved quality of care. 
An important lesson from the experience of health care reforms in Bulgaria is that public 
co-operation is essential to ensure the success of reform. Many reform initiatives (e.g. 
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choice of primary care physician) failed to achieve their objectives because many users 
simply showed no interest. The expansion of informal payments in an atmosphere of 
deteriorating quality of care and low morale indicates patients' preference to bypass 
inefficient official channels (chapter 7). 
Currently, compulsory health insurance seems the only politically feasible option for 
health financing. The expectations of public and professionals are for the reinstatement 
of universal access, and provision of a comprehensive package of high-quality services in 
exchange for payment of monthly insurance contributions. Clearly, this expectation is 
unrealistic. Some cuts seem likely in the benefits package covered by insurance as is the 
use of co-payments, at least in the short-run. Public debate on these issues prior to 1999 
has been almost non-existent. 
Since the accession to office of the Union of Democratic Forces government in 1997, 
fundamental legislation has been passed, reform strategies clarified, and the health care 
reforms gathered speed. Although agreement has been reached on the broad principles of 
reform, and the government enjoys support from the large majority of the population, it 
is notable that the policy-making process continues to fail to take account of public views 
and attitudes. In contrast with physicians' organisations, NGOs and other users groups 
have had much less impact on reform. It has been anticipated that forthcoming 
implementation of compulsory health insurance will challenge the existing infrastructure, 
administrative capacity and skills. However, there is much less recognition of the need 
to gamer public support. 
Currently, there is little systematic research into patients' needs and perspectives, such as 
levels of health, health seeking behaviour, patterns of utilisation, formal and informal 
health care expenditure, and willingness to pay. In the next chapters (5 to 11) some of 
these issues will be explored in the light of data collected in the present study, 
supplemented, where appropriate, by relevant secondary sources. 
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CHAPTER 5. PATTERNS OF HEALTH AND ILLNESS 
BEHAVIOUR IN BULGARIA 
HEALTH AND DISEASE 
Introduction 
Data on the state of health and inequalities of health are important in the context of 
health financing reform in Bulgaria for several reasons. Firstly, provision of health care 
should reflect the pattern of health needs in the population and the demand for health 
services. The need and demand for health care will also indicate the requirements to be 
met by a health financing system and the scale of government and private expenditure. 
Secondly, inequalities in health are almost universal and often there is a mismatch 
between the health needs and access to care, those in most need receiving least145• The 
design of the system can either increase or decrease the mismatch. Thirdly, if those with 
poor health are likely also to have low income and be less able to contribute financially, 
such an analysis will give an indication of the possible strategies, such as exemptions, 
that are needed. 
This chapter will explore levels of self-perceived health, long standing illness, and 
reported illness episodes in Bulgaria, in relation to a range of socio-economic variables. 
The data are derived from the household survey described in chapter 3. 
Self-reported health 
Introduction 
This section will focus on the levels of general health in Bulgaria, based on the current 
survey, international comparisons will be provided when possible. 
'Self-reported health' is used as a basic measure of general health for the population. 
There is no single, all embracing measure of overall health. However, self-reported 
health has been used widely as a method for general health assessment in several 
different contexts. Self-reported health has been justified within a broader definition of 
health not only as a physiological state, but also as a social construct123• 
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"Self-reported health reflects the person's integrated perception of health, including 
biological, psychological and social dimensions, not possible to be measured externally. 
On the contrary, self-reported chronic diseases and impairments reflect mainly medical 
dimensions of health, which could be also verified. Therefore, subjective assessments of 
global health could be even more sensitive in health monitoring than external measures 
of health. 11146. 
Subjectively reported health measures typically show larger socio-economic gradients 
than objective measures ofhealth123 • 
Collection of data on self-reported health is relatively simple and inexpensive, and can 
provide comparable data over time periods and across countries. Self-reported health is 
used extensively in comparative studies of health and its socio-economic determinants in 
developed countries147 148, although response scales are not always standardised across 
countries, thus limiting comparability. 
Self-reported health status is a 'subjective' assessment and may differ from externally 
measured health status. However, because of differences in clinical judgement and the 
meaning attributed to different symptoms such measures also can be problematic. Self-
reported health status is, however, a decisive factor for seeking health care. Thus, self-
reported health status may be better suited to measure burden of disease 149 • Self-reported 
health measures have been widely used to predict expenditure while controlling for 
demographic factors150, or to assess utilisation costs151 . 
Self-reported health has been found to predict health service utilisation in selected 
settings. In a study from Finland, self-reported health was found to be a strong predictor 
of utilisation among working age population 146 • 
Importantly, poor or fair self-reported health is predictive of mortality when standardised 
for socio-demographic variables152 153 • Self-reported health, standardised by age, sex and 
social status, has been shown to be a stronger predictor of mortality in middle-aged 
d hr . "11 146 populations than self-reporte c omc 1 ness . 
For these reasons, self-reported health is increasingly recommended as a global indicator 
of health status in clinical practice154 and for comparison of levels of health among 
specific population groups155 156• Self-reported health has also been found to be 
predictive of functional ability over 1 to 6 years153 and of cognitive abilities among the 
elderly1 57 • 
The validity and reliability of self-reported health have been examined extensively. A 
study from Finland found that self-reported health remained relatively stable over a one 
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year period, when about 60% of the respondents assessed their self-reported health using 
the same response category, or selected an adjoining category146. Self-reported health was 
also found to be a valid predictor of the number of physician contacts. Another study 
found that reports of self-reported health correlated closely with judgements based on 
medical records158. 
Conversely, it has often been argued that the concept of 'good health' is determined by 
ethnic stereotypes159, culture, traditions or psychological factors such as interpretation of 
symptoms etc. What is meant by good health may differ across social groups or sub-
cultures160, or according to age and experience123. Ethnic groups living in the same 
settings may have very different patterns of reporting general health161 162. In Sweden, 
certain foreign-born groups were significantly more likely to report limiting long-term 
illness, controlling for socio-economic and lifestyle variables162. Thus, caution is 
required in making international comparisons. 
Levels of self-reported health in Bulgaria 
In the current survey, 24% of men and 28% of women described their overall health 
status in the past year (1996-97) as less than 'good/rather good' ('good/rather good' 
being the two best states of health on the scale). About a third of the respondents 
reported either 'good' or 'rather good' health status, the proportion among men being 
slightly higher (76o/o of men and 72% of women). 
Previous data from Bulgaria 
The only recent comparable data from Bulgaria are from a national representative survey 
conducted in 1996 (sample size n=1,180)163. The questions on health status in both 
surveys are equivalent, although the response categories are slightly different (Table 5.1). 
Textual differences, overrepresentation of the 26-40 age group and underrepresentation 
of those over 50, may have contributed to higher reporting of better health status, 
compared to the current survey. 
132 
Table 5.1. Self-reported ('subjective') health status: data comparison 
Current survey (1 997) 
How would you describe 
your health status over 
the past 12 months on the 
Reference survey (1 996) 
How would you assess 
your health in general? 
WHO Health for All 
(1996;15+) 
whole? 
Scale % Scale % Scale % 
Good 47% 
Rather good 27% 
Very good I Good 55% 
Satisfactory 30% 
Very good I Good 62% 
nla 
Rather bad I Bad 26% Bad I Very bad 15% nla 
Placing Bulgaria in an international context 
In the present survey, the 'good' and 'rather good' categories were combined in order to 
estimate the share of those with 'less than good health' (74%). Although it is necessary to 
be cautious in view of the possibility of different interpretations of responses in different 
languages and difference in response scales, at 26%, the prevalence of less than good 
self-reported health in Bulgaria appears comparable to that reported for Sweden in the 
1990s (23%), Hungary (21 %), and lower than Iceland (32%), and the Czech Republic 
(39%)164. 
A comparison of industrialised countries found that several northern European countries 
had lower prevalence (about 20%) of reporting 'less than good' general health, while 
Finland, Canada, UK, and US had prevalence ranging between 32% and 40%160. A 1988 
survey across all EU countries found that 65% reported good/very good general health 
(74% respectively for Bulgaria in current survey). However, there are significant 
fluctuations in self-perceived health across Europe (the percentage reporting health as 
very good/good was lowest in Portugal- 44%, and highest in Denmark and Ireland)148. 
The Health Survey for England (1996) provides cross-sectional population data on self-
reported health status165 (Table 5.2). As in the Bulgarian survey, it did not cover 
individuals living in an institution, many of whom are disabled. Despite the slightly 
different response categories, it is clear that more people in the UK sample assess their 
own health positively (any of the positive categories). 76% assessed their health as 'very 
good' or 'good', which is about the same as in the Bulgarian data if the 'good' and 'rather 
good' categories are combined (74%). Similarly, 71% of respondents in the UK Health 
and Lifestyle Survey (1984-5), defined their health as at least good123. 26% of the 
Bulgarian sample assess their health as rather bad or bad, compared to only 5% of the 
Health Survey for England sample, who stated that their health was 'bad' or 'very bad'. 
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These differences could be a result of the lack of intermediate response category such as 
'fair' in the current survey and inclusion of the 16-18 age group in the UK sample. In 
both surveys, men reported slightly better general health than women (Bulgaria: 'good/ 
rather good' health: 76% of men and 72% ofwomen; UK: 'very good/ good': 77% ofmen 
and 76% ofwomen). 
Table 5.2. Measures of general health in the Health Survey For England 1996 and current 
survey in Bulgaria 
Current survey (1997) Health Survey For England 1996 
Scale % (18+) Scale % (16+) 
BUL:How would you describe your health status over the past 12 months on the 
whole? HSE: How is your health in general? 
Good 47% Very good I Good 76% 
Rather good 27% Fair 18% 
Rather bad I Bad 26% Bad I Very bad 5% 
BUUHSE: Do you have any long-standing (chronic) illness, disability, or infirmity? By 
long standing I mean anything that has troubled you over a period of time or that is likely 
to affect you over a period of time? 
Yes 51% Yes 43% 
BUL: Does this illness or disability (illnesses of disabilities) bother you in any way in 
your day-to-day life? (Limiting long-standing illness) 
HSE: Does this illness or disability limit your activities in any way? 
Yes 42% Yes 26% 
BUL: When was the last time that you have experienced illness? (recent illness) 
HSE: During those two weeks (ending yesterday) did you have to cut down on any of 
the things you usually do ... because of illness or injury? (acute illness) 
Last 4 weeks 26% Last 2 weeks 17% 
According to the WHO Health for All database166, 62% of those over 15 (68% of men 
and 56% of women) in a representative health interview survey in Bulgaria (1996) 
assessed their own health as 'good or very good' (74% respectively for Bulgaria: current 
survey). This is the highest value of those data available for countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe and comparable to Western European levels. In the Czech Republic this 
figure was 46% (1996), in Russia- 21% (1996) (31% in 1996167), 55% in Romania 
(1994) and in Poland (1990) (60% 'very good' in 1994168). Comparison of these data with 
the current survey is difficult because the full response scale is not known. Also, the 
current survey covers only people above 18, if the 15-18 age-group (3.8% of population 
in 1996) is taken into account, the share of those reporting very good or good health is 
likely to grow. 
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Inequalities in self-reported health in Bulgaria 
The second step in analysing health care needs and demand is to understand how levels 
of health vary within the population. 
The distribution of those reporting less than good health by various socio-economic 
variables is similar for men and women (Figure 5.1). There is an almost linear 
relationship between reporting 'poor' I 'very poor' health and age. There is also a strong 
relationship with income. In the lowest income quartile, the proportion of those 
reporting 'poor' or 'very poor' health is 2.5 to 3 times higher than the highest income 
quartile. A similar association is apparent for 'poor'/'very poor' self-reported health and 
subjectively-assessed financial situation, but for women there is a larger differential 
between reporting health in the lower and higher levels of the scale. Three times more 
respondents who completed only primary education reported less than good health 
compared to the other educational levels, but the increment between secondary and 
higher education is small. Married men and divorced or separated women reported 
worse health status than others. 
Analysis was done by means of logistic regression. It is necessary to adjust for age when 
examining other variables, because of the very strong association between self-reported 
health and age. For both men and women, self-reported health status was significantly 
associated with age (Table 5.3). The odds of reporting poor health increased 
progressively with age. Men above 70 were 15 times and women above 70, 16 times 
more likely to report ill health than those below 40. There is an apparent trend with 
income, but this did not reach statistical significance, however, financial hardship is 
strongly predictive of self-reported health, especially among women. Those describing 
their financial situation as very poor being 11 times more likely to report less than good 
health (for men the odds ratio is significant, but much lower at 2.91). Education was a 
significant predictor of self-reported health in the age-adjusted model among men and 
women, those with primary education being more than twice more likely to report poor 
health. Women living in rural areas had significantly higher odds of reporting poor 
health. 
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Figure 5.1. Percentage reported poor/rather poor health 
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Table 5.3. Predictor of poor/ very poor self-reported health 
Variable Category % (n) reported Odds ratio (95% Cl) 
poor health status (Age-adjusted) 
MEN 
Age group <39 7.6% (18) 1.00 
40-49 14.5% (18) 2.08 (1.04-4.15) 
50-59 22.4% (22) 3.54 (1.80-6.95) 
60-69 43.7% (45) 9.48 (5.11-17.60) 
>70 55.7% (54) 15.35 (8.21-28.69) 
Income quartile I (> 160,000) 11.9% (19) 1.00 
(Leva) II (1 00,000-160,000) 20.6% (27) 1.43 (0.73-2.80) 
III (60,000-99,000) 29.4% (47) 1.40 (0.73-2.68) 
IV ( <60,000) 36.9% (59) 1.86 (0.97-3.58) 
Education Higher 13.6% (12) 1.00 
Secondary 14.6% (48) 1.25 (0.61-2.56) 
Primary 40.0% (98) 2.19 (1.08-4.48) 
Financial situation Very good/ good 14.5% (8) 1.00 
Neither good nor bad 14.6% (27) 0.93 (0.37-2.34) 
Rather poor 20.2% (43) 1.09 (0.45-2.65) 
Very poor 39.0% (76) 2.91 (1.22-6.95) 
Marital status Married 26.5% (129) 1.00 
Single 10.2% (11) 1.20 (0.50-2.88) 
Divorced/separated 27.7% (18) 0.70 (0.37-1.34) 
Settlement City 19.6% (53) 1.00 
Rural 27.0% (105) 1.00 (0.65-1.52) 
WOMEN 
Age group <39 8.5% (25) 1.00 
40-49 17.4% (27) 2.27 (1.27-4.07) 
50-59 29.9% (46) 4.58 (2.68-7.83) 
60-69 45.3% (62) 8.89 (5.23-15.11) 
>70 60% (87) 16.14 (9.52-27.35) 
Income quartile I(> 160,000) 16.5% (30) 1.00 
(Leva) II (100,000-160,000) 15.6% (26) 0.71 (0.39-1.30) 
III (60,000-99,000) 28.8% (60) 1.22 (0.71-2.10) 
IV ( <60,000) 42.6% (112) 1.50 (0.88-2.55) 
Education Higher 12.7% (22) 1.00 
Secondary 16.7% (58) 1.39 (0.80-2.42) 
Primary 46% (168) 2.84 (1.65-4.88) 
Financial situation Very good/ good 5.2% (3) 1.00 
Neither good nor bad 18.3% (46) 4.17 (1.21-14.40) 
Rather poor 29.1% (90) 5.45 (1.61-18.49) 
Very poor 42% (103) 10.96 (3.22-37.23) 
Marital status Married 25.3% (145) 1.00 
Single 8.2% (8) 0.69 (0.30-1.58) 
Divorced/ separated 44.2% (95) 1.06 (0.72-1.56) 
Settlement City 21.1%(81) 1.00 
Rural 33.2% (167) 1.37 (0.97-1.92) 
Note: significant values will be indicated in bold throughout the thesis 
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Previous data from Bulgaria 
The general determinants of self-reported health are consistent with other work in 
Bulgaria. The earlier Bulgarian survey from 1996 examined a slightly different measure, 
self-assessed health outlook (categorised as "optimistic" or "pessimistic"). This was 
associated with sex, age, education and place of settlement. Men, those with higher 
education, younger (under 50), working, and living in the cities, tended to report a better 
health outlook than the others. Smokers reported a more positive outlook but this could 
be explained by confounding other measures. Lower-educated, the unemployed, and 
pensioners were more likely to be 'pessimistic' about their health. There was some 
relationship between health outlook and income, but it was less direct. Although the 
question was slightly different, these findings are generally in line with the current 
survey. However, it also raises the issue of psychosocial conditions, which were not 
examined in the present survey. Personal insecurity, social exclusion and socio-
economic distress lead to low self-confidence and self-esteem, with implications for self-
reported health. 
Inequalities in self-assessed general health in Bulgaria were found in a representative 
survey from 1985169, although those data were recorded by medical staff. Although those 
data were not adjusted for age, there is an apparent association of self-reported health 
with education, income and occupation. Better educated and wealthy respondents 
reporting better health than others. Other commentators on those results noted that the 
correlations of health status with income and education are complex, and hold only for 
the lowest social categories170 • 
Placing Bulgaria in an international context 
Most research has found differences in self-reported health between different sociO-
economic groups, although both the nature and scale of the relationship varies. In the 
present survey in Bulgaria, self-reported health is significantly associated with age, self-
assessed financial situation and educational attainment, differentials being much steeper 
among women. 
As in the current study, evidence from many countries shows that women report worse 
general health than men166• A comparative study of the United States, Jamaica, Malaysia, 
and Bangladesh shows inequalities in self-reported health between men and women in all 
age groups, persisting when adjusted for socio-demographic status171 • There are some 
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important exceptions. A study from the Czech Republic compares the self-reported 
health of a sample of wives and husbands living together181 • Although the post-
communist transition placed relatively greater strain on women (higher unemployment, 
lower earnings, more domestic tasks etc.), no significant difference between genders was 
observed in terms of self-reported health. This may be a result of matching of men and 
women, but it is likely that the gender inequality in the Czech Republic is still lower than 
in the US, where a similar study was carried out172 • Similarly, the prevalence of poor 
self-rated health was higher among women in a Russian study, but not when fully 
adjusted for other covariates167 • 
The Bulgarian data suggest a significant relationship between self-reported health and 
education. Similarly, a comparative study of a range of industrialised countries shows 
that reporting of 'less than good' general health is more common among those with lower 
education, taken as an indicator of socio-economic status, in all countries included. 
Variations in self-reported health, and a range of other health problems according to 
socio-economic status, have been found to be larger in the US, Italy, and Canada, 
particularly among men, and smaller in the UK, Norway, and Sweden160 • Elsewhere, 
having low education was associated with worse health167, often exacerbated in old age173• 
Higher education was positively associated with self-reported health, but other mediating 
variables were household income, parents' education, smoking behaviour, and social 
relations174 • An American study of people over 50 found that the probability of reporting 
less than good health was associated with education, morbidity, and health care 
utilisation175• 
Mackenbach et al. report that in most countries in their study (Norway, Netherlands, 
Sweden, Italy, France, UK, Denmark and Finland), those with lower secondary or less 
education had odds ratio of almost two or higher for reporting less-than-good general 
health176• In Bulgaria the odds ratios for men reporting ill health were 2.19 for men and 
2.84 for women with only primary education compared to those with higher education. 
Differences in the education scale and problems of definition make comparison 
problematic, but essentially, the trend was confirmed that those at the bottom of the 
educational scale report significantly worse health than others. 
The current study found no impact of marital status on the probability of reporting poor 
health. Marital status has been found to have an impact on self-reported health in Russia, 
with the widowed more likely to report poor general health167 • Lone mothers have 
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reported worse health status than those parents living as couples, adjusted for socio-
economic status177 • 
This study also confirms the finding that self-reported health is associated with income, 
broadly understood as command over financial resources. Thus, Doorslaer at al. 
demonstrated inequalities in self-reported health in relation to income in nine developed 
countries, the lowest income groups consistently most likely to report poor health. 
Income related inequalities were lowest in Sweden and East Germany and highest in the 
United States and Britain, although the differences were not statistically significanf1• 
Similarly, a study from the two parts of formerly divided Germany reports significant 
differences in the social pattern of self-reported health. Inequalities in self-reported 
health were much greater in the western part, where the poorest income groups were 
about twice as likely to report 'less than good' health status than those in high income 
groups. In the eastern part, the difference was not significant178• A similar study, but 
only in the western part of Germany, found that respondents below the poverty line 
reported significantly more poor self-assessed health than those in the high income 
groups, the association being stronger among men178 • 
In contrast to the above, a review of self-reported health in the LSMS and other World 
Bank-supported studies149, showed that, paradoxically, in most low income countries 
covered, the richest population quintile report worse health than the poorest, despite 
being likely to score better on objective measures. The most favoured explanation is that 
the poor have lower expectations. In this context, Bulgaria falls in the same category as 
developed countries. 
The importance of education and financial situation (indicating living standards) in 
explaining self-reported health in Bulgaria is also confirmed in the Health Survey for 
England (1996). There, age-adjusted self-reported general health is strongly predicted by 
Social Classi of the head of household, with 87%> of men and of women in Social Class I 
reporting 'good' or 'very good' health, compared to 67% of men and 65% of women in 
Class V165• The odds of people in Social Class V reporting less than good health were 
3.33 times those in Social Class I. As in the Bulgarian survey, there is a negative 
association between self-reported health and age. 
i Social class is commonly used as a summary measure of standard of living and command over 
resources. It is based on occupation (or previous occupation) or on husband's occupation in the 
case of married women. 
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In the UK Health and Lifestyle Survey, respondents with lower income were more likely 
to report fair or poor health at all ages123• For example, 36% of men in social class V 
reported less than good health, compared with 12% of men in class I. Among men aged 
40-59, those in social classes 1/11 were 1.73 times as likely to be in good overall health as 
men in classes IV /V. 
Analysis of the British General Household Survey for 1991-2, found that occupational 
class is the strongest predictor of ill-health for men and long-term illness for women, 
even for those retired and regardless of current employment status179 • 
Although self-rated financial status is the strongest socio-economic determinant of self-
reported health in Bulgaria, as in other economies in transition, monetary income alone 
proves to be a poor measure. Thus, in the Czech Republic, apart from individual income, 
economic hardship, occupation status, some psycho-social factors, consumption and 
lifestyle were also found to be significantly associated with self-reported health181 • In 
Russia, a recent national cross-sectional study reports that material deprivation, 
education, control over life and a lack of informal support networks were strongly 
associated with poor, or worse than average, self-rated health167 • Similarly, a US study 
shows that those living in states with lowest levels of social capital are significantly more 
likely to report "fair" or "poor" health180 • In agreement with these findings, in the 
Bulgarian study, the odds of women with poor financial status (subjective measure 
including access to informal resources) having poor health were much higher. 
Some explanations for these inequalities in self-reported health will be suggested in the 
discussion, later in this chapter. 
Validity 
Self-reported health status is used extensively throughout the analysis as an independent 
variable and therefore it is important to ensure its validity. The main question ('How 
would you describe your overall health status over the past 12 months?') was located at 
the start of the section on health status (Section B: B1). A control question was placed in 
the introductory description of household characteristics (A2-71, 'household roster'). 
When reaching the main question during the interview, the interviewers were instructed 
to go back and check whether the response was consistent with the control question, and 
if not, to establish the 'real answer'. In 4% of cases (n=61), there was discrepancy in 
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responses to the two questions, but only 1% (n=l8), gave answers at the opposite 
extremes of the scale. More importantly, in each response category the discrepancy is 
only less than 1%. The second question on self-reported health status was taken as the 
"true result" due to the fact that it is more distinctive within the questionnaire, more time 
was spent on it and less automatic responses could be expected. 
Summary 
In summary, self-reported health is strongly influenced by age, financial hardship and 
education. Financial hardship has been used as a proxy measure for income due to the 
large informal economy, reliance on non-monetary financial resources and exchanges 
with social networks, and underreporting of self-stated income in Bulgaria and 
transitional economies in general. As Table 5.4 shows, self-reported financial situation 
only partially correlates with reported income. This result is consistent with studies from 
Russia and the Czech Republic167 181 which used subjective measures of financial 
resources such as material deprivation, and in both cases found them to be significant 
predictors of self-reported health. 
Table 5.4. Matrix of correlation between selected socio-economic variables 
Age group Education Marital Income Financial Settlement 
status quartile situation 
MEN 
Age group 1.00 
Education 0.38 1.00 
Marital status -0.10 0.01 1.00 
Income quartile 0.37 0.44 0.16 1.00 
Financial situation 0.16 0.27 0.01 0.49 1.00 
Settlement 0.19 0.33 -0.03 0.19 0.02 1.00 
WOMEN 
Age group 1.00 
Education 0.45 1.00 
Marital status 0.32 0.17 1.00 
Income quartile 0.41 0.46 0.30 1.00 
Financial situation 0.17 0.29 0.17 0.40 1.00 
Settlement 0.17 0.40 0.05 0.26 0.09 1.00 
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Long-standing illness in Bulgaria 
Introduction 
The following analysis will focus on the scale and socio-economic determinants of 
limiting long standing illness. Limiting long-standing illness has been used in the 
General Household Survey and, was introduced in the Health Survey For England in 
1996. Here, it will be used because it is a more sensitive measure of ill health and 
individual discomfort in everyday life compared to long standing illness. The latter may 
involve health problems that are less serious, and thus overestimate the prevalence of 
illness (see section on relationship between different measures of general health). 
Levels of long-standing illness in Bulgaria 
About half of the sample in the Bulgarian survey had at least one long-standing illness or 
disability (49% of men and 53% ofwomen). Of those who reported a long-term illness, 
80% of men and 82% of women were restricted by it in their everyday life. Therefore, 
39% of men and 43% of women from the whole sample reported a limiting long-standing 
illness. 
In comparison, in the Health Survey for England (1996), 43% of men and of women 
reported having any long-standing illness (the wording of the question being the same). 
25% of men and 27% of women reported having a limiting long-standing illness. The 
corresponding figures for limiting long-standing illness in the Bulgarian survey were 
much higher: 39% of men and 43% of women. 
Data on experience of long-standing illness, disease or disability from 5 countries 
showed that the prevalence (as a percentage in total population) ranged between 28% (the 
Netherlands) and 41% (Finland) with the highest rates in Bulgaria (Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2. Prevalence of long-standing health problems in total populations 
. Source: International variation in socio-economic inequalities in self-reported health. A 
companson of the Netherlands with other industrialised countries. Netherlands Central Bureau of 
Statistics, Erasmus University, The Hague: sdu/publishers/ cbs-publications, 1992 
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Inequalities in limiting long-standing illness in Bulgaria 
The social determinants of illness were assessed using limiting long-standing illness as a 
dependent variable, due to its larger impact on the respondents' activities. The 
determinants of limiting long-standing illness were similar to those for self-reported 
health. It was significantly predicted by age in both sexes (Table 5.5). For both men and 
women, primary education and poor self-assessed financial situations were significant 
predictors of reporting of limiting long-standing illness in the age adjusted model. For 
women, the relationship with financial situation was more marked. For men, those in the 
lowest income group were almost twice as likely to report illness compared to the highest 
mcome group. Single women were significantly less likely to report long-standing 
illness. As with self-reported health, perceived financial hardship was a stronger 
determinant of illness. The relationship was especially strong among women. 
The association between economic variables and long standing illness is likely to be bi-
directional, with poverty predisposing to ill health as well as long standing illness and 
disability predisposing to poverty. This must be borne in mind when interpreting the 
results. 
As in the current survey, in the Health Survey for England (1996) limiting long-standing 
illness had a marked association with age. The probability of reporting a long-standing 
illness was one and a halftimes higher in Social Class V, compared to Social Class 1165• 
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Table 5.5. Predictor of limiting long-standing illness 
Variable Category % (n) reported Odds ratio (95% Cl) 
limiting chronic (Age-adjusted) 
illness 
MEN 
Age group <39 18.5% (44) 1.00 
40-49 36.3% (45) 2.51 (1.54-4.10) 
50-59 42.9% (42) 3.31 (1.97-5.54) 
60-69 56.3% (58) 5.68 (3.42-9.45) 
>70 71.1% (69) 10.86 (6.28-18.79) 
Income quartile I(> 160,000) 27.7% (44) 1.00 
(Leva) II ( 1 00,000-160,000) 33.6% (44) 1.07 (0.63-1.83) 
III (60,000-99,000) 46.9% (75) 1.37 (0.82-2.29) 
IV ( <60,000) 54.4% (87) 1.82 (1.08-3.08) 
Education Higher 29.5% (26) 1.00 
Secondary 29.9% (98) 1.16 (0.67-1.99) 
Primary 55.1% (135) 1.79 (1.01-3.17) 
Financial situation Very good/ good 25.5% (14) 1.00 
Neither good nor bad 27.0% (50) 1.01 (0.48-2.09) 
Rather poor 41.8% (89) 1.74 (0.85-3.55) 
Very poor 52.3% (102) 2.65 (1.29-5.42) 
Marital status Married 43.1%(210) 1.00 
Single 19.4% (21) 0.86 (0.46-1.61) 
Divorced/ separated 43.1% (28) 0.72 (0.40-1.28) 
Settlement City 32.8% (89) 1.00 
Rural 43.7% (170) 1.22 (0.85-1.73) 
WOMEN 
Age group <39 20.4% (60) 1.00 
40-49 35.5% (55) 2.15 (1.39-3.31) 
50-59 50.0% (77) 3.90 (2.55-5.96) 
60-69 65.7% (90) 7.47 (4.75-11.74) 
>70 69.7% (101) 8.95 (5.69-14.09) 
Income quartile I (> 160,000) 34.1% (62) 1.00 
(Leva) II (1 00,000-160,000) 36.5% (61) 0.92 (0.57-1.46) 
III (60,000-99,000) 43.8% (91) 0.97 (0.62-1.53) 
IV ( <60,000) 54.8% (144) 1.06 (0.67-1.67) 
Education Higher 32.9% (57) 1.00 
Secondary 31.6% (110) 0.92 (0.61-1.40) 
Primary 59.5% (217) 1.55 (1.00-2.39) 
Financial situation Very good/ good 20.7% (12) 1.00 
Neither good nor bad 35.3% (89) 2.17 (1.05-4.48) 
Rather poor 46.6% (144) 2.60 (1.28-5.31) 
Very poor 52.7% (129) 3.51 (1. 70-7 .23) 
Marital status Married 42.2% (242) 1.00 
Single 13.3% (13) 0.42 (0.22-0.80) 
Divorced/separated 60.0% (129) 1.11 (0.77-1.60) 
Settlement City 40.2% (154) 1.00 
Rural 45.7% (230) 0.95 (0.70-1.28) 
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In the UK, low income has been consistently associated with poorer health, particularly 
for chronic illness and limiting illness in middle age170 • The odds ratio were similar to 
those found in the current survey for self-reported health and income, and education. 
In data from Western Europe, there were small cross-country differences in the odds of 
reporting long-standing illness by educational group, but in general, people with lower 
education reported more long-term disabilities160 • 
Comparison with two reviews of developed countries in Western Europe160 176 shows that, 
in Bulgaria, the scale of variation in long-standing illness by education, is high. 
Especially among men, the odds ratios of reporting a long-standing health problem by 
education were among the highest values in the West (in Sweden and Italy). The odds 
ratios for women in Bulgaria were among the lowest. 
Limiting chronic illness used in the Bulgarian survey corresponds closely with a measure 
used in a study from Germany looking at the proportions of respondents who were 
'considerably' hindered in their everyday routines due to health178• In general, men and 
women in the eastern part of Germany reported that they were less restricted by health 
problems than those in the western part. In the eastern part, men in the lowest income 
groups ('below or near the poverty line'), were significantly more (OR=2.35) likely to be 
restricted in their daily life than those in the higher income quartiles. In the western part, 
poorer men and women were significantly more likely to be restricted than richer ones, 
but the relationship is stronger for men (men: OR=3.23; women: OR=l.83). In the 
current study, among men, the gradient is steeper for age, income, education; and for 
women, it is steeper for financial hardship. 
A study limited to western Germany found that both men and women below the poverty 
line were hindered in daily activities compared to wealthier groups178, with men reporting 
higher levels of disability. 
Summary 
The levels of long standing illness and limiting long standing illness in Bulgaria appear 
very high compared to the West. Some definitional and textual variations may have 
contributed to this difference. The old, poor, less educated, and single (women only) are 
significantly more likely to report limiting long-standing illness. 
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The socio-economic determinants of limiting long-standing illness are similar to the 
West, but with generally higher odds ratios. As with self-reported health, financial 
hardship appears to be a better predictor of limiting long standing illness than income. 
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Episodes of illness in Bulgaria 
Results 
51% of men and 61% of women reported at least one episode of illness in the past year 
(May 1996-May 1997). 
The most recent episode of illness was identified in order to estimate the expenditure 
incurred for this particular episode, as well as the ability of the individual to pay (chapter 
8). 17% of men and 24% of women had been ill in the 4 weeks prior to the survey 
(April/May 1997). 61% of men and 60% of women reported an illness occurring more 
than four weeks earlier. 23% of men and 16% of women could not recall an illness or 
did not respond to the question and these respondents were excluded from subsequent 
analysis of utilisation patterns and health expenditure. As expected, most illnesses 
recalled had occurred since 1996. 
The pattern of reporting illness is different from other health measures, and among men 
and women (Figure 5.3). There is much less variation between socio-economic 
categories than is the case with self-reported health. The probability of reporting at least 
one illness in the past year generally increased with age, although the increase among 
women was less dramatic. Rather more women than men under 39 reported an illness in 
the preceding year, although this can be explained partly by the additional burden of 
gynaecological or obstetric causes. Higher income is associated with fewer episodes of 
illness among men, but for women there is no apparent relationship with income. As in 
the case of self-reported health, financial hardship shows a clearer association with 
reporting illness than with income. Reporting illness is more common among people 
with higher education. 
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Figure 5.3. Percentage reporting at least one illness in previous year 
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Once agam, it was necessary to adjust for age when examining the impact of other 
variables, due to the strongly significant association of age and illness reporting (Table 
5.6). The generally weaker relationship with socio-economic variables is confirmed. 
There is a tendency for the least well educated to report fewer illnesses, despite their 
rather worse self-reported health, although this is significant only for women. Women 
with higher education were twice as likely to report at least one illness. In the univariate 
analysis, fewer single men reported episodes of illness, but there was no difference 
among women. However, any differences disappear after adjusting for age in the 
multivariate analysis. Although income is not significant, financial deprivation is a 
significant predictor, among women, for reporting illness in the past year. 
The levels of illness in the current survey (17% of men and 24% of women, 1997) are 
higher than those registered by the World Bank 1995 Bulgaria Integrated Household 
Survey (BIHS) where 12% of men and 8% of women reported an illness over a four 
week recall period. Given the similarity of the samples and research instruments, it 
seems that there is an increase in levels of reporting of illness between 1995 and 1997, 
when the current survey was conducted. The BIHS also found a link between illness 
reporting and income, especially for the lowest income quintile, which is similar to the 
1997 study1 82 • 
The rate of sickness in the past four weeks can also be compared to the 'acute sickness' 
measure in the Health Survey for England, where 15o/o of men and 19o/o of women had 
acute sickness in the past two weeks165 . Thus, the figures reported in Bulgaria appear 
lower than could be expected, given the longer recall period of four weeks. 
The level of illness reporting (in past four weeks) seems somewhat high compared to 
previous data from Bulgaria. It is also higher than, for example, the rate in Kyrgyzstan 
where in a 1994 survey1 83, only 12% reported illness in the past four weeks; but lower 
than in the Health Survey for England (1996). Again, differences in terminology and 
recall periods make comparisons problematic. 
Summary 
For men, only age is significantly associated with illness reporting, while for women, 
age, education and financial situation are significant. The distribution of illness among 
socio-economic groups is more uniform compared to the other health measures. 
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Table 5.6. Predictor of reporting of illness (at least one illness in past year) 
Variable Category %reported at least Odds ratio (9 5% CI) 
one illness (Age-adjusted) 
MEN 
Age group <39 41.2% (98) 1.00 
40-49 53.2% (66) 1.63 (1.05-2.52) 
50-59 52% (51) 1.55 (0.97-2.49) 
60-69 58.3% (60) 1.99 (1.25-3.19) 
>70 60.8% (59) 2.22 (1.37-3.59) 
Income quartile I (> 160,000) 50.3% (80) 1.00 
(Leva) II (100,000-160,000) 44.3% (58) 0.73 (0.45-1.17) 
III (60,000-99,000) 50% (80) 0.81 (0.50-1.29) 
IV (<60,000) 61.9% (99) 1.34 (0.83-2.17) 
Education Higher 56.8% (50) 1.00 
Secondary 47.6% (156) 0.72 (0.44-1.16) 
Primary 52.2% (128) 0.66 (0.39-1.11) 
Financial situation Very good/ good 41.8% (23) 1.00 
Neither good nor bad 44.3% (82) 1.06 (0.57-1.96) 
Rather poor 54.5% (116) 1.54 (0.84-2.84) 
Very poor 55.4 (108) 1.57 (0.85-2.90) 
Marital status Married 52% (253) 1.00 
Single 42.6% (46) 1.07 (0.65-1.77) 
Divorced/ separated 53.8% (35) 0.98 (0.58-1.67) 
Settlement City 49.4% (134) 1.00 
Rural 51.4% (200) 0.99 (0.72-1.37) 
WOMEN 
Age group <39 57.1% (168) 1.00 
40-49 58.7% (91) 1.07 (0.72-1.58) 
50-59 59.7% (92) 1.11 (0.75-1.65) 
60-69 65.7% (90) 1.44 (0.94-2.19) 
>70 66.9% (97) 1.52 (1.00-2.30) 
Income quartile I (> 160,000) 61.5% (112) 1.00 
(Leva) II (100,000-160,000) 57.5% (96) 0.82 (0.53-1.26) 
III (60,000-99,000) 63% (131) 0.97 (0.63-1.47) 
IV ( <60,000) 60.8% (160) 0.81 (0.53-1.24) 
Education Higher 66.5% (115) 1.00 
Secondary 60.9% (212) 0.76 (0.52-1.12) 
Primary 58.1% (212) 0.49 (0.32-0.76) 
Financial situation Very good/ good 51.7% (30) 1.00 
Neither good nor bad 56% (141) 1.17 (0.66-2.08) 
Rather poor 69.9% (216) 2.04 (1.15-3.63) 
Very poor 57.6% (141) 1.19 (0.67-2.12) 
Marital status Married 59.5% (341) 1.00 
Single 61.2% (60) 1.24 (0.77-2.00) 
Divorced/separated 64.2% (138) 1.03 (0.72-1.47) 
Settlement City 65.0% (249) 1.00 
Rural 57.7% (290) 0.67 (0 .51-0 .89) 
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Relationship between different measures of general health 
This section will examine briefly the relationships between the health measures 
employed in this survey. These measures will be compared with each other and their 
further use in the analysis will be clarified. 
As described earlier, in the current survey several measures were used to examine the 
health status of the sample: 'self-reported health status', 'chronic illness', 'chronic 
limiting illness', 'number of illnesses in past year' and 'last episode of illness'. 'Self-
reported health status' referred to a general assessment of overall health status, 'number 
of illnesses in past year' specified a time frame of 12 months prior to the survey, and 
'last episode of illness' shortened the recall period to the last 4 weeks. 
Most health measures are closely interrelated. As self-reported health is central to the 
subsequent analysis, only its relationship with the other health measures will be explored. 
There is a clear relationship between reporting of poor health status and having a limiting 
chronic illness, and between poor health status and number of illnesses in the past year 
(Table 5.7). Of those reporting poor/ rather poor health, 94% have a chronic illness, 88% 
have a long-standing illness limiting their activities, and 77% had at least one illness in 
the preceding year. Having limiting long-standing illness had the strongest impact on 
reporting of poor or very poor health (56%), and reporting illness, the least (36%). 
This result is comparable to the Health Survey for England (1996) finding that adults 
with limiting long-standing illness tend to report bad/very bad health at a much higher 
rate then those who have non-limiting longstanding illness or no longstanding illness at 
all165• Limiting illness has more impact on daily activities and is potentially more 
serious. In a survey from Finland, 96% of men and 95% of women with poor or fairly 
poor self-reported health reported a chronic illness146• 
'Last episode of illness' was also related to reporting poor health, with the proportion of 
respondents reporting poor health being twice as high among those who were ill in the 
past 4 weeks as for those who were ill more than 4 weeks ago (53%). 
The health measures were also compared in terms of their variance by selected socio-
economic variables (Table 5.7). All three variables behave in a similar way. Among men 
and women older age is significantly predictive of worse self-reported health, reporting 
of chronic limiting illness and illness in past year. For women, self-perceived financial 
situation is a significant predictor of all health measures. Another factor significantly 
152 
related to all health measures for both sexes is education. In the Health Survey for 
England (1996) the determinants of the general health measures were also very similar, 
with women, older people, and people in the lowest social classes having a higher 
probability of reporting poor health. 
It is notable that reported illness has a slightly different pattern. This could be explained 
partly by the longer recall period (one year), while the other measures reflect current 
health. Blaxter emphasises that self-reported health and illness reflect a different aspect 
ofhealth123• Many respondents define their own health as generally good, yet at the same 
time report having illness symptoms. 
The overall assessment of health status ('self-reported health status') will be used mainly 
as an explanatory variable in the subsequent analysis. Firstly, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter, self-reported health is used widely in other studies and its use here will allow for 
international comparisons. Secondly, it is more clearly and consistently associated with 
socio-demographic characteristics than the other two measures. Limiting long-standing 
illness will be used as an explanatory variable in some specific cases estimating the 
burden of disease and expenditure. Reported illness will be used mainly in exploring 
incurred health care expenditure. 
Table 5.7. Relationship between self-reported health and other health measures 
Self-reported health 
Good/Rather good Bad/Rather bad 
Count Row % Column % Count Row% Column% 
Chronic illness No 732 97.0 64.2 23 3.0 5.7 
Yes 409 51.6 35.8 383 48.4 94.3 
Limiting chronic illness No 857 94.8 75.1 47 5.2 11.6 
Yes 284 44.2 24.9 359 55.8 88.4 
At least one illness in past year No 582 86.4 51.0 92 13.6 22.7 
Yes 559 64.0 49.0 314 36.0 77.3 
Last ill in past 4 weeks 150 47.0 17.2 169 53.0 44.2 
Last ill more than 4 weeks ago 721 77.2 82.8 213 22.8 55.8 
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Table 5.8. Predictor of probability of reporting poor health status (comparison of 
measures) 
Variable Category Odds ratio (95% CI; Age adjusted rates) 
Self reported Limiting Illness episodes 
health chronic illness 
-past year 
MEN 
Age group <39 1.00 1.00 1.00 
40-49 2.08 2.51 1.63 
50-59 3.54 3.31 1.55 
60-69 9.48 5.68 1.99 
>70 15.35 10.86 2.22 
Income quartile I(> 160,000) 1.00 1.00 1.00 
(Leva) II (1 00,000-160,000) 1.43 1.07 0.73 
III (60,000-99,000) 1.40 1.37 0.81 
IV (<60,000) 1.86 1.82 1.34 
Education Higher 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Secondary 1.25 1.16 0.72 
Primary 2.19 1.79 0.66 
Financial situation Very good/good 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Neither good nor bad 0.93 1.01 1.06 
Rather poor 1.09 1.74 1.54 
Very poor 2.91 2.65 1.57 
Marital status Married 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Single 1.20 0.86 1.07 
Divorced/ widowed 0.70 0.72 0.98 
Settlement City 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Rural 1.00 1.22 0.99 
WOMEN 
Age group <39 1.00 1.00 1.00 
40-49 2.27 2.15 1.07 
50-59 4.58 3.90 1.11 
60-69 8.89 7.47 1.44 
>70 16.14 8.95 1.52 
Income quartile I (> 160,000) 1.00 1.00 1.00 
(Leva) II (100,000-160,000) 0.71 0.92 0.82 
III (60,000-99,000) 1.22 0.97 0.97 
IV (<60,000) 1.50 1.06 0.81 
Education Higher 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Secondary 1.39 0.92 0.76 
Primary 2.84 1.55 0.49 
Financial situation Very good/good 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Neither good nor bad 4.17 2.17 1.17 
Rather poor 5.45 2.60 2.04 
Very poor 10.96 3.51 1.19 
Marital status Married 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Single 0.69 0.42 1.24 
Divorced/ widowed 1.06 1.11 1.03 
Settlement City 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Rural 1.37 0.95 0.67 
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Figure 5.4a. Measures of health in relation to some socio-demographic variables (men) 
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Figure 5.4b. Measures of health in relation to some socio-demographic variables (women) 
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Discussion 
This section looked at the levels of self-reported health, limiting long standing illness and 
occurrence of illness in the past year, and the associations of those measures with some 
socio-economic characteristics. The implications of these results for the health financing 
reform will be discussed, but first it is necessary to recall the survey's methodological 
limitations. 
As noted above, self-reported health may be criticised as being subjective, but it has been 
shown to be a good predictor of mortality1 84 : those reporting poor health having a death 
rate 2-3 times higher than those reporting their health as poor over a nine year period. It 
is also more closely associated with subsequent use of medical services than are variables 
based on defined medical conditions185• The non-response bias could elevate the overall 
prevalence of poor self-reported health if those in good health or with no chronic 
illnesses are more difficult to contact. Conversely, as the survey excluded those in 
institutional care; severely disabled; very poor; or without a permanent address; 
prevalence data may under-estimate poor health, although the extent of institutional care 
for adults in Bulgaria is very small. 
Despite difficulties in comparing levels of self-reported health across countries, the 
overall levels of self-reported health appear, surprisingly, to be somewhat similar to 
those in Western Europe148 • The share of those who reported 'less than good health' in 
the Bulgarian sample was closer to northern European levels, although lower than those 
of Finland, Canada, UK, and US160 164 • The proportion reporting 'good/rather good 
health', in the Bulgarian survey comes close to the corresponding figure in the Health 
Survey for England (1996), and to the UK Health and Lifestyle Survey (1984-5)123 • 
Evidence from elsewhere shows that women report worse general health than men 166 171 . 
In the Bulgarian study, the gap between the self-reported health of men and women is 
very small. Similarly, studies from the Czech Republic and from Russia report no 
significant difference between men and women in self-reported health181 167• 
Although the levels of poor self-reported health seem generally lower than expected, it is 
not uniformly distributed in the population. The main importance of this study is the 
information that it provides on the social stratification of health in Bulgaria. Financial 
hardship stands out as a particularly strong predictor of less than good health among 
women. Women who describe themselves as very poor are eleven times more likely than 
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those who are in a good or very good position, to report poor or very poor health 
Education is significantly associated with reporting less than good health among men, 
and especially among women. The observation that women who completed only primary 
education have worse self-reported health status may be because those completing only 
primary education contain a relatively high proportion with physical disabilities or who 
had chronic illnesses in childhood. Girls with such disabilities may have been 
disproportionately disadvantaged in educational terms. The odds of reporting poor health 
increase as income falls, but do not reach significance. 
As indicated earlier, in contrast to the situation in developed countries, monetary income 
appears to be less consistent a predictor of health in Bulgaria than self-assessed financial 
situation. The link between self-reported health and income is recognised to be more 
complex in developing and middle-income countries149 • Apart from potential 
misreporting of income, the specificity of the post-communist social structure may play a 
role. In the communist society, access to scarce goods (including high-quality health 
care), was determined by affiliation to the structures of power186• After 1989, access to 
luxury goods (including health care) started increasingly to be based on individual merit 
and earned income, similar to the West. This process has been slow, and in 1997, when 
the survey was carried out, inherited privileges, membership of particular social 
networks, or possession of particular assets remain much more indicative of social status. 
This shows that socio-economic indicators used in the West, such as income or social 
class, are not readily applicable. In the case of Bulgaria, the use of self-rated financial 
situation (used as a proxy for income) proves to have a discriminating power, and is 
strongly correlated with self-reported health. An additional problem is that income has 
not been adjusted for the size of household. Studies from Russia and from the Czech 
Republic167 181 also emphasised the predictive strength of subjective assessment of 
financial status, such as 'material deprivation' and 'economic hardship'. Given the 
importance of financial hardship in explaining socio-economic health inequalities, it will 
be used in conjunction with income and other measures of wealth, in the subsequent 
analysis of affordability. 
The strong socio-economic gradient of self-reported health in Bulgaria is consistent with 
patterns of health inequalities observed in Western Europe160 21 170 • Education seems to 
have an independent strong relationship with health173 174 175 which is found also in this 
survey. The odds ratio of people with only primary education to report less-than-good 
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health compared to those in the higher educational groups 1s comparable to that m 
Western Europe176• 
In other countries, age-adjusted self-reported general health is found to be strongly 
associated with the social class of the head of household (Health Survey for England, 
Health and Lifestyle Survey, British General Household Survey for 1991-2). Social class 
is a construct based on occupation and indicative of income and overall resources of the 
household. For comparative purposes it could be operationalised in Bulgaria to include 
education and financial situation which, in combination, largely determined the social 
position of individuals in Bulgaria. These tend to be strong predictors of poor/very poor 
health in the current survey. According to Blaxter, not just income, but also the ability to 
command resources is a very important predictor of health. This is confirmed in this 
survey, with the link between financial hardship and self-reported health123• 
The findings for Bulgaria suggest that the aggregate determinants of self-reported health 
are more evenly distributed across socio-economic groups among men than women. This 
result contradicts the findings from other surveys from industrialised countries, which 
show that inequalities in health among women are greater than among men160 178, 
although the Health Survey for England (1996) showed that the odds of poor general 
health were higher for women for several health measures165• 
In contrast to the situation with self-reported health, the overall prevalence of limiting 
long-standing illness and disability in Bulgaria is much higher than that in the West160 165• 
The social pattern of limiting long-standing illness is similar to self-reported health, but 
the gradient is less steep. When adjusted for age, measures relating to socio-economic 
status (education, income - for men, financial hardship) are strongly significant 
predictors of limiting illness. Among women, socio-economic inequalities are larger 
than among men, but income is not a significant determinant of health. Comparison with 
an international review shows that the differences in long-standing health problems by 
education among men in the Bulgarian survey are very high compared with Western 
Europe 160 176 • Again the Bulgarian data show that, although income does appear to 
explain variations among men, financial situation is a more powerful explanatory 
variable. 
The association of illness reporting with age is weaker than for the other measures, which 
is consistent with findings from other surveys187 • Education and financial situation are 
significant only among women. There is a tendency for the least well educated to report 
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fewer illnesses despite their rather worse self-reported health, although this is only 
significant for women. The UK finding that women tend to report more illness 
symptoms in the past month is also found in this study, but the relationship with income 
is not explicit123• Among men, higher income is associated with less illness but the 
converse is true among women. The latter would be consistent with findings from 
elsewhere that better educated respondents, and those with greater experience of using 
services, are more likely to report illnesses188• 189•190• 
All three measures used: self-reported health, limiting long-standing illness and reported 
illness episodes, are interrelated. Those reporting poor/ rather poor health are also likely 
to have a limiting chronic illness or to report illness occurring in the preceding year. 
Such close relationship between measures of general health is found elsewhere146 165• 
Both self-reported health and limiting long-standing illness show similar socio-economic 
gradients. However, socio-economic status correlates poorly with what the individual 
defines as an illness. This last measure reflects the occurrence of an illness and triggers 
the decision to seek care and shows much less age and socio-economic variability. The 
large variations in self-reported health are translated into relatively small differences in 
reporting an illness, e.g. those over 70+ were 16 times more likely to report poor health, 
but only twice as likely to report illness. Reporting good health, but also having suffered 
an illness, is not an uncommon scenario123, because self-reported health is a subjective 
experience of health, while illness implies objective symptoms, which can be subjected 
to health care intervention. Thus, reported illness is a much less sensitive reflection of 
socio-economic differences than is self-reported health and the latter will be used as an 
explanatory variable in the subsequent analysis of willingness and ability to pay. 
The scale of the inequalities in health, especially among women, is surprising given the 
efforts of the state in the recent past (pre-1989) to equalise social conditions and access 
to health care. Explanations could be sought in the widening socio-economic inequalities 
in the decade after the political transition of 1989, with wealth polarisation and 
marginalisation of people with low educational attainment and resources as a 
consequence of the decline in living standards. Unfortunately, with a few exceptions 
such as Hungary there is little historical data with which to compare Bulgaria in terms of 
present inequalities in health191 and, in most countries, there is almost no information on 
the current situation that could be used to monitor future trends. Interestingly, in 1997, 
the socio-economic variations in self-reported health and long-standing illness were 
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larger in the western rather than in the eastern part of Germany178• The presence of a 
steep socio-economic gradient in health in Bulgaria is contrary to the assumption that 
equality enforced by the state during communism still holds. 
The situation with regard to major risk factors is conflicting192•193 • Until relatively 
recently, smoking has been uncommon among women and few women drink heavily. 
Smoking among men varies little according to socio-economic variables and heavy 
drinking is most common among the better off. With the exception of the present survey, 
there is almost no data on health attitudes and health-related behaviour by socio-
economic groups. 
There is growing evidence pointing to psychosocial factors to explain variations in 
health167 181 . Among the factors contributing to a worse perception of health status are the 
breakdown of universal social provision systems during the transition, expansion of the 
private sector in services previously guaranteed by the state, and weakening informal 
support mechanisms. 
Another factor suggested by Mackenbach et al. is that higher social mobility might 
contribute to higher inequalities in health. Bulgaria has had relatively low social 
mobility, almost universal property ownership and inherited resources. The accelerated 
social and labour mobility in the 1990s, may have contributed to the rise in social 
inequalities in general. 
The higher differential of health among women is difficult to explain. Women suffered 
disproportionately more from the break down of state support mechanisms, especially 
those related to child rearing. Unemployment among women is higher, they are 
generally poorer and usually are significantly more involved in housework. These 
problems have been exacerbated during the transition. 
However, there are several issues which require further attention. Identifying differences 
in levels of health need in population is highly sensitive to the measure used. It is also 
likely that in some poorer sections of society, poorer people may feel that their health is 
not good, but are unwilling to define themselves as ill and seek care. The characteristics 
of this group will be explored further in the following section. 
Data on health status have important implications for health system financing and should 
be taken into account when assessing the applicability of health financing options from 
elsewhere. Several conclusions can be drawn. First, the current demographic and health 
161 
status of the population poses serious challenges for the design of a sustainable and 
equitable health financing scheme. 
Second, the levels of self-reported health in Bulgaria are generally comparable to those in 
the West, but the levels of limiting long standing illness are significantly higher. This is 
likely to indicate a greater need for health care and prevention, and thus more financial 
resources are needed to sustain the system at a time when health care spending has 
contracted dramatically. 
Third, the results presented above also suggest that significant social inequalities in 
health are present in Bulgaria, the pattern of health inequalities being similar to those 
observed in the West. Moreover, the scale of the inequalities in health in Bulgaria is 
comparable to the highest values observed in the West, and may be even higher for 
women. The odds ratios for inequalities among women are above what is observed in 
other CEE studies and, especially for financial hardship, seem extremely high. The 
groups who are most likely to suffer ill health are the old, those experiencing financial 
hardship or deprivation (especially women), and those with only primary education. 
These groups are also likely to be disadvantaged in terms of their position in the labour 
market, to rely on less support from informal networks, and therefore their ability to cope 
with ill health will be lower92 • 
Fourth, the weaker correlation between ill health and income requires rethinking of the 
financing structure of the health care system. A possible introduction of co-payments in 
conjunction with compulsory insurance, with exemptions based on income only, means 
that those who are both less healthy and less able to contribute to a scheme, will be at 
particular disadvantage. This may deter some of the 'necessary utilisation' and 
ultimately, increase the burden of disease. 
ILLNESS BEHAVIOUR 
Introduction 
Having established differences in levels of need within the population, this section will 
seek to examine how they translate into utilisation. Firstly, it will explore current levels 
and patterns of illness behaviour among those using health care. Then it will look at the 
characteristics of groups who report low or no use of services. Finally, the reasons for 
this behaviour will be discussed. 
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In the context of the present study, it is essential to establish levels of health care 
utilisation and their socio-economic determinants. Identifying barriers to receivino 
~ 
health care in general, and among specific population groups who are likely to be 
constrained in their access to health care, is essential for the design of an equitable health 
financing scheme. Such data could facilitate understanding the need and demand for 
health services and the financing arrangements required to meet this demand. 
Results 
Characteristics of health services users 
The first step is to establish who are the 'users' of health services, specifically how 
consultation rates vary within population. 
The most recent consultation with a health professional was identified. Overall 17% of 
men and 24% of women visited a health professional in the preceding four weeks, and 
59% of men and 53% of women had their consultation between January and April 1997. 
Table 5.9 presents the variation in consulting rates among those who reported using 
health services in the four weeks preceding the survey. 
There are few differentials between groups (especially among women) in the rate of 
consulting. The exception is the oldest, who reported more consultations. Men in the 
lowest income quartile or in a very poor financial situation reported about twice as many 
consultations as those in the top two quartiles or with a very good financial situation. 
Among women, there is much less variation by income. Also, quite expectedly, 
respondents reporting poor health status, chronic illness, or those who had at least one 
illness in the past year consulted a health professional much more than the others. The 
utilisation rate among men who are divorced, separated or widowed was much higher 
than among single or married men. In general, apart from age, there was much less 
variation in relation to socio-economic characteristics among women. 
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Table 5.9. Characteristics of people consulting a health professional in 1997 
Variable 
Age group <39 
40-49 
50-59 
60-69 
>70 
Income quartile I (> 160,000) 
(Leva) II (1 00,000-160,000) 
III (60,000-99,000) 
IV ( <60,000) 
Education Higher 
Secondary 
Primary 
Financial situation Very good/ good 
Neither good nor bad 
Rather poor 
Very poor 
Marital status Married 
Single 
Divorced/separated 
Settlement City 
Rural 
Self-reported health Good/Rather good 
Bad/Rather bad 
Chronic illness No 
Yes 
At least one illness No 
Yes 
Consulted in previous 4 weeks (April-
May 1997) 
MEN WOMEN 
10.9% 14.6% 
16.1% 20.6% 
19.4% 30.5% 
23.3% 35.8% 
32.0% 26.2% 
12.6% 23.1% 
16.0% 21.6% 
17.5% 22.1% 
28.8% 26.6% 
14.8% 20.2% 
16.2% 22.1% 
22.0% 26.6% 
18.2% 6.9% 
13.0% 26.6% 
16.0% 25.9% 
26.7% 21.6% 
17.5% 25.0% 
13.0% 11.2% 
32.3% 25.6% 
19.2% 21.4% 
17.5% 25.2% 
9.3% 15.5% 
46.2% 44.4% 
8.0% 13.7% 
34.0% 36.5% 
5.5% 11.2% 
30.5% 31.5% 
Probability of consulting in case of illness 
This section will first examine how probability of consulting a health professional, given 
that one feels ill, varies within the population, i.e. are there inequalities in seeking care 
after adjustment for illness? 
The subsequent analysis centres only on those who reported ever being ill. Those who 
reported visiting a health professional in the preceding 4 weeks (18% of men and 24% of 
women), in April/May 1997, give rise to numbers too small for a reliable analysis of 
determinants of utilisation. One possibility is maximise the recall period, i.e. to include 
also those whose consultation was more than 4 weeks ago (56% of men and 58% of 
women), but this introduces the possibility of recall bias. To accommodate such issues, 
the subsequent analysis will focus on those reporting illness and visiting health 
professionals in January-May 1997. A composite variable (taking into account two 
control questions on timing of utilisation) was created, comprising all those who have 
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been ill and visited a doctor in the period January-May 1997. This provided sufficient 
numbers and minimised recall bias. 
The probability of consulting with a health professional can be examined by means of 
multivariate regression (Table 5.10). Consultation during a recent illness (in past 4 
weeks) and in the period January-May 1997 were used as dependent variables. 
Older age was strongly associated with higher consultation rates in the past 4 weeks for 
men and women. When adjusted for age, men in the lowest income quartile were twice 
as likely as those in the top income quartile to consult. Women in 'less than very good' 
financial situations were significantly more likely to visit a physician. Divorced or 
separated men were 2.5 times more likely to consult a physician than those who are 
married. For both men and women, poor self-reported health was a strongly significant 
predictor of consulting with a health professional in past 4 weeks. Men in rural areas 
were less likely to have consulted in that period. 
The analysis was repeated, focusing on the probability of consulting during an illness 
occurring in January-April 1997 (last illness). Here, the variations are even smaller, with 
only age and self-reported health having significant impact on probability of consulting. 
However, financial hardship remained a significant predictor of consulting. Although 
more people reported visiting health professionals, the potential for response bias is 
slightly higher, thus making conclusions difficult. This suggests that the distribution of 
utilisation rates is relatively equal. However, the best educated and the wealthiest are 
more likely to report an illness and this seems to mean that they are also more likely to 
use services. 
It should be noted that 23% of respondents described their health as poor/very poor, yet 
did not report any illness in the preceding year. This might mean that those respondents 
do not define themselves as ill and therefore do not seek medical care. It could be 
hypothesised that this group is consciously restricting their access to health care. It is 
interesting to see how this group compares to the overall sample. Compared to the 
general sample, people reporting poor health and no illness are mostly in the older age 
groups, in the lower income quartiles, with only primary education, assess themselves as 
financially constrained, and live in rural areas. The small numbers (n=92; 6% of all 
sample) prevent a meaningful analysis of the variations of utilisation by socio-economic 
status specifically for this group. 
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Non-users of health services 
This section will look closely at the socio-economic characteristics of those who did not 
consult a health professional in different circumstances. These could be people who 
were ill but nevertheless did not consult a doctor (at any time or in the past 4 weeks), and 
those who stated that they have never been ill or have never visited a doctor. 
Of those who reported ever being ill, overall 26% of men and 28% of women did not 
consult a doctor. When looking at the consultation rates of those who reported ever been 
ill, it appears that men in the age groups 40-70 consulted less than those over 70. For 
women, the exact opposite pattern emerges, women over 70 being less likely to consult. 
Of those over 70, 20% more women than men did not consult a health professional. 
There is no discernible variation of non-utilisation rates by income, financial hardship 
and education in both men and women. 
Among the respondents who were ill in the preceding 4 weeks, 29% of men and 33% of 
women reported not seeing a health professional regarding their illness. Due to the 
smaller numbers in this group, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions, but non-utilisation 
rates are similar. The difference is that here, a higher proportion of men and women 
below 40, with only primary education, in the lowest income quartile, with worse 
financial situations, married, or living in rural areas (for men), or with good/very good 
health, refrained from consulting when ill in the last 4 weeks. 
The distribution of those who reported illness (no time-period specified) but did not 
consult, by socio-economic status, appears more equal than the distribution of those with 
illness in the past 4 weeks. One reason could be that inequality of utilisation is rising. 
Some utilisation might have also reduced in recent years, with the non-utilisation rate 
between 1996 and 1997 increasing from 21% to 33% for men and from 17% to 33% for 
women. However, a fall in utilisation cannot be established conclusively on the basis of 
the current cross-sectional survey and further research is needed. 
Those who reported illness (in the past 4 weeks or earlier) could be compared to the 
general socio-economic distribution in the sample in order to establish the profile of 
those who were ill, but did not seek medical help. Men of working age (18-70) and 
women over 70 consult less (if ill) than expected. There is not an explicit relationship of 
utilisation with income, financial hardship, education. Men and women with good/very 
good health utilise health services much less, which is intuitive. It should not be 
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overlooked that 34o/o of men and 41 o/o of women experiencing illness in the past 4 weeks 
(15o/o and 22o/o respectively among those 'ever ill') and reporting poor/very poor health, 
did not consult a health professional. The reasons will be explored later in this chapter. 
The characteristics of those stating that they have never had illness (23% of men, 16% of 
women) or visited a physician on any occasion (26% of men, 18% of women) are shown 
in (Table S.lla/b ). 
167 
Table 5.10. Predictor of probability of consulting a health professional for last illness 
Variable Category Odds ratio (95% CI), Age-adjusted 
Probability of consulting Probability of consulting 
in last 4 weeks in Jan-May 1997 
MEN 
Age group <39 1.00 1.00 
40-49 1.63 0.85-3.12 1.20 0.71-2.02 
50-59 2.02 1.03-3.96 1.40 0.80-2.45 
60-69 2.61 1.37-4.94 1.49 0.87-2.54 
>70 3.24 1.76-5.95 2.40 1.42-4.07 
Income quartile I (> 160,000) 1.00 1.00 
(Leva) II ( 1 00,000-160,000) 1.31 0.65-2.64 0.93 0.54-1.62 
III (60,000-99,000) 1.21 0.61-2.42 0.72 0.41-1.27 
IV (<60,000) 2.23 1.15-4.32 1.06 0.62-1.83 
Education Higher 1.00 1.00 
Secondary 1.48 0.75-2.95 0.94 0.55-1.60 
Primary 1.25 0.60-2.58 0.75 0.42-1.36 
Financial situation Very good/ good 1.00 1.00 
Neither good nor bad 0.59 0.25-1.41 1.08 0.52-2.23 
Rather poor 0.61 0.26-1.40 0.93 0.46-1.89 
Very poor 1.28 0.57-2.91 1.07 0.52-2.20 
Marital status Married 1.00 1.00 
Single 1.55 0.71-3.40 0.69 0.3 7-1.28 
Divorced/ separated 2.49 1.29-4.79 1.44 0.79-2.64 
Settlement City 1.00 1.00 
Rural 0.64 0.41-0.99 0.95 0.66-1.39 
Self-reported health Good/Rather good 1.00 1.00 
Bad/Rather bad 6.72 4.05-11.15 5.24 3.27-8.40 
WOMEN 
Age group <39 1.00 1.00 
40-49 1.50 0.89-2.53 1.46 0.95-2.25 
50-59 2.47 1.52-4.02 1.68 1.09-2.59 
60-69 3.18 1.94-5.22 1.89 1.21-2.95 
>70 2.10 1.26-3.49 1.14 0.74-1.76 
Income quartile I(> 160,000) 1.00 1.00 
(Leva) II (100,000-160,000) 0.91 0.54-1.55 0.80 0.50-1.28 
III (60,000-99,000) 0.80 0.48-1.35 0.98 0.63-1.53 
IV ( <60,000) 1.01 0.60-1.70 1.31 0.83-2.09 
Education Higher 1.00 1.00 
Secondary 1.14 0.71-1.84 0.97 0.65-1.44 
Primary 1.29 0.77-2.15 0.85 0.55-1.34 
Financial situation Very good/ good 1.00 1.00 
Neither good nor bad 5.65 1.93-16.52 2.11 1.08-4.11 
Rather poor 4.64 1.59-13.50 2.51 1.30-4.83 
Very poor 3.89 1.32-11.47 1.97 1.01-3.87 
Marital status Married 1.00 1.00 
Single 0.61 0.30-1.25 0.97 0.57-1.65 
Divorced/ separated 0.78 0.51-1.18 1.00 0.69-1.46 
Settlement City 1.00 1.00 
Rural 1.25 0.89-1.76 1.17 0.87-1.58 
Self-reported health Good/Rather good 1.00 1.00 
Bad/Rather bad 3.44 2.35-5.04 2.40 1.68-3.43 
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Table S.lla. Socio-demographic profile of people not using health services (men) 
Variable %ill (any time), % ill (past 4 weeks), % - no illness I %no 
not consulted not consulted ever consultation 
ever 
MEN count row% count row% count row% count row% 
Age group <39 52 29.9 13 41.9 64 26.9 68 28.6 
40-49 28 30.1 4 12.9 31 25.0 36 29.0 
50-59 18 24.7 2 6.5 25 25.5 27 27.6 
60-69 22 26.8 8 25.8 21 20.4 28 27.2 
>70 13 15.1 4 12.9 11 11.3 13 13.4 
Income quartile I (highest) 34 27.2 6 19.4 34 21.4 38 23.9 
(Leva) II 26 26.8 9 29.0 34 26.0 37 28.2 
III 34 29.1 8 25.8 43 26.9 46 28.8 
IV (lowest) 31 22.8 8 25.8 24 15.0 33 20.6 
Education Higher 18 23.7 4 12.5 12 13.6 16 18.2 
Secondary 72 29.8 14 43.8 86 26.2 98 29.9 
Primary 44 23.0 14 43.8 54 22.0 58 23 .7 
Financial Very good/ good 10 24.4 4 12.5 14 25.5 16 29.1 
situation 
Intermediary 30 22.7 7 21.9 53 28.6 54 29.2 ,J85 28.5 
Rather poor 53 30.8 11 34.4 41 19.2 46 21.6 213 32.9 
Very poor 39 25.2 10 31.3 40 20.5 50 25.6 195 30.1 
Marital status Married 102 26.6 23 71.9 104 21.4 119 24.4 487 73.8 
Single 23 30.3 6 18.8 32 29.6 33 30.6 108 16.4 
Divorced/ 9 18.0 3 9.4 15 23.1 20 30.8 65 9.8 
separated 
Settlement City 54 26.5 12 37.5 67 24.7 81 29.9 271 41.1 
Rural 80 26.2 20 62.5 84 21.6 90 23 .1 389 58.9 
Self-reported Good/Rather 112 30.8 21 65.6 139 27.6 155 30.8 503 76.1 
hea lth good 
Bad/Rather bad I 22 15.2 I 11 34.4 I 13 8.2 17 10.8 I 158 23.9 
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Table S.llb. Socio-demographic profile of people not using health services (women) 
Variable I %ill (any time), % ill (past 4 weeks), % - no illness %no :~~in .samp1iJ'.' :,H~':{< ''-'' ,,) 
not consulted not consulted ever consultation 
ever 
WOMEN I count row% I count row% I count row% I count row% 
Age group <39 66 27.4 17 24.6 53 18.0 61 20.7 
40-49 33 25.8 12 17.4 27 17.4 29 18.7 
50-59 34 26.4 12 17.4 25 16.2 23 14.9 
60-69 29 24.8 10 14.5 20 14.6 20 14.6 
>70 45 35.2 18 26.1 17 11.7 27 18.6 
Income quartile I (highest) 45 27.8 15 22.4 20 11.0 24 13.2 
(Leva) II 38 28.4 14 20.9 33 19.8 34 20.4 167 20.4 
III 47 26.3 16 23.9 29 13.9 33 15 .9 208 25.4 
IV (lowest) 62 29.0 22 32.8 49 18.6 55 20.9 263 32.1 
Education Higher 48 31.6 19 27.5 21 12.1 23 13 .3 173 19.5 
Secondary 77 25.8 18 26.1 50 14.4 56 16.1 . 348 39.3 
Primary 82 27.9 32 46.4 71 19.5 81 22.2 365 41.2 
Financial Very good/ good 13 25.5 5 7.2 7 12.1 8 13.8 58 6.7 
situation 
Intermediary 59 28.4 21 30.4 44 17.5 42 16.7 252 29.2 
Rather poor 76 28.1 25 36.2 39 12.6 53 17.2 309 35.8 
Very poor 56 28.4 18 26.1 48 19.6 52 21.2 245 28.4 
Marital status Married 132 27.6 39 56.5 95 16.6 103 18.0 573 64.7 
Single 20 26.0 5 7.2 21 21.4 24 24.5 98 11.1 
Divorced/ 55 29.1 25 36.2 26 12.1 33 15.3 215 24.3 
separated 
Settlement City 100 30.2 31 44.9 52 13 .6 64 16.7 383 43.2 
Rural 107 25.9 38 55.1 90 17.9 96 19.1 503 56.8 
Self-reported Good/Rather 154 30.4 41 59.4 131 20.5 142 22.3 638 72.0 
health good 
Bad/Rather bad I 53 22.4 I 28 40 .6 11 4.4 I 18 7.3 I 248 28.0 
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Reasons for non-utilisation 
Of the respondents who did not consult a health professional during their most recent 
illness, a quarter (26% of men and 28% of women) felt that they should have done so and 
another quarter (25% of men and 26% ofwomen) were unsure (Figure 5.5). 
Furthermore, respondents who were ill but did not consult a health professional (men: 
n= 134; women: n=207), were asked what was the main reason, among several listed 
reasons, not to do so. The main reasons for not seeking medical help despite being ill 
were: illness not perceived as serious (46% of men and 39% of women), self-treatment 
(27% of men and women), followed by unaffordability of treatment (9% of men and 10% 
of women). Nevetheless, self-treatment may be a cheaper substitute for formal medical 
treatment and thus represent a more affordable option than the formal treatment. 
Figure 5.5. Scheme of decisions for consulting a health professional for last illness 
Been ill ever: 
100%, n=1253 
(81% of sample) 
Consulted: 
---+ 73%, n=912 (59% o.s.) 
Consultation not seen Not perceived as 
.... 
as necessary: 47%, 
...... 
serious: 55%, n=88 
Not consulted: ... n=161 (10% o.s.) ..... (6% o.s.) 
---+ 22%, n=341 (27% o.s.) t--
Self treatment: 
~ 27%, n=48 (3% o.s.) 
Consultation seen as 
~ necessary (yes/DK): Unaffordable: 16%, 53%,n=180 (12% o.s.) t--_. 
n=28 (2% o.s.) 
r--+ 
Access problems: 8%, 
n=14 (1% o.s.) 
r--+ Ineffective tr-t: 4%, n=7 (1% o.s.) 
No time: 6%, n=11 
r--+ (1% o.s.) 
~ Other reasons, 10%, 
n=18 (1% of o.s.) 
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As shown in the above scheme, those who did not consult because of affordability 
include 16% of those who thought they should have consulted, or were unsure. This 
share grows when estimated only among those who were positive that they should have 
consulted, with 20% of men and 24% of women feeling they should have sought help but 
could not afford it (second and first most important reason respectively). Among those 
who could not afford to consult a physician, 58% of men and 70% of women stated that 
they should have done so. Conversely, people who did not consult a health professional 
for other reasons, such as lack of time, were less inclined to think that they should have 
done so. This analysis is limited by the small number of people in each category, but 
there are indications that unaffordability is a factor that deters some necessary demand 
and creates obstacles to access (Table 5.12). 
Table 5.12. Characteristics of those who did not consult because of affordability 
Variable % not consulting Sample 
because of cost 
Age group <49 38% (12) 53% 
>50 63% (20) 48% 
Income quartile I, II (> 1 00,000) 23% (7) 45% 
(Leva) III, IV (<100,000) 77% (24) 55% 
Education Higher/ Secondary 41 % (13) 61% 
Primary 59% (19) 39% 
Financial situation Very good/ Interm. 9% (3) 36% 
Rather/very poor 91 % (29) 64% 
Comparison with other data 
In a survey from Bulgaria (1995) 69% of respondents reported to have consulted a 
physician in the state sector and 22% in the private sector, at least once over the past year 
(1994)126 • A previously mentioned 1996 survey in Bulgaria found that 22% of the 
sample had an outpatient consultation in the past two months163 • Given these findings, 
the level of utilisation in the current study appears high (21% consulted in past 4 weeks 
and 55% consulted between January and April 1997). However, comparison should be 
cautious because of different recall periods and level of health services consulted. 
In the 1995 survey, 19% of the sample felt that they needed a consultation in the three 
months preceding the survey, but had to refrain from it126 • The three main reasons given 
for not consulting were self-treatment (28%), no time (9%), lack of money (8%). These 
results are in line with the findings of this survey. 
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In contrast to the current survey, the World Bank 1995 Bulgaria Integrated Household 
Survey found a steeper income gradient among those who did not consult a physician for 
an illness occurring in the preceding four weeks182 • This may have resulted from a 
difference in the income categories and it was not indicated whether these results are 
significant. The overall proportion of those seeking care in case of illness was similar in 
both surveys (61% in the BIHS and 68% in the current survey). 
The utilisation rates in the current survey are lower than in some Western countries. A 
survey from Germany in 1991-92 (representative of the population aged 25-69) covering 
both eastern and western parts, found that 43% of men and 54% of women consulted a 
physician in private practice in the past 4 weeks194 • These are twice the Bulgarian rates in 
the past four weeks (18% of men and 24% of women). However, the utilisation rates in 
the current study are comparable to those in Finland where 24% of men and 29% of 
women consulted a physician in the past four weeks146• 
A recent review of data from the World Bank Living Standards Measurement Surveys 
and UNDP Demographic and Health surveys in a range of developing countries shows, 
predictably, that the poor were less likely than the rich to report health problems or 
receive health services if ill149• In Bulgaria, socio-economic differentials in utilisation 
appear comparatively less pronounced, despite the high social cost of transition. 
Patterns of deterred utilisation in this study are similar to those found by a 1995 survey 
from Bulgaria, in which 40% needed a consultation but decided to forgo it mainly 
because of preference for self-treatment, and 8% because of financial difficulties126• 
However, qualitative data on utilisation patterns presented in the next chapter suggest 
that in many cases, self-treatment is used as a coping strategy where formal treatment is 
perceived to be unaffordable. 
Discussion 
The overall impression is that health care utilisation remained relatively egalitarian at the 
time of the survey, although this is less so for women. The probability of consulting a 
health professional is determined largely by age and self-reported health. However, 
some inequalities exist among women, where economic hardship is an important 
determinant of utilisation, with women in a less than very good financial situation being 
more likely to consult then the others. 
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Different socio-economic groups display similar utilisation rates, although those with 
higher education and more resources are more likely to report illness. Once a person has 
reported an illness, then all groups are equally likely to consult, except the very old. The 
net effect is that the wealthier and better educated consult slightly more. 
The finding of the current survey that utilisation (in past 4 weeks) is relatively equally 
distributed or only slightly higher among more disadvantaged groups, is surprising given 
that access to the health system has been increasingly associated with significant out-of-
pocket payments and less available support from social security institutions and social 
networks. This could be explained by the poor and less educated having generally worse 
health than the rich and thus being forced to use services at whatever cost. These groups 
may also seek treatment in low-cost and low-quality care state facilities requiring 
minimal or no user payments. The strategies for obtaining treatment of different groups 
will be explored in the next chapter. 
Summary 
In this chapter it has been shown that the oldest, the poorest and the least well educated 
are most likely to report poor health and long standing limiting illness, but less likely to 
report illness. The socio-economic gradients in utilisation are less steep. 
Significantly, there were more inequalities among women, both in health and in 
consulting a health professional. In both cases, financial hardship is a strongly 
significant predictor. As explained earlier, this may be due to the more vulnerable 
position of women during the transition, having disproportionately more responsibilities 
for child-rearing, household maintenance, and at the same time fewer financial resources 
than men. It is likely that in the next years of macro-economic stabilisation and before 
the re-design of the health financing system in 2000-01, the socio-economic inequalities 
in health and utilisation will widen, and more people will be facing financial barriers to 
health service utilisation. 
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CHAPTER 6. PATTERNS OF HEALTH CARE UTILISATION 
AND PATIENTS' PERSPECTIVE OF CARE 
Introduction 
In reforming the health care financing system in Bulgaria, it is important to understand 
patterns and determinants of health services utilisation, as well as the public perception 
of the health care provided. Such data are essential if funding is to be allocated equitably 
and appropriate incentives are to be introduced. So far these issues have rarely been 
addressed in research in Bulgaria. 
This chapter will first examine health care utilisation strategies and access to health 
services in relation to socio-demographic characteristics. Levels and determinants of 
utilisation of primary care and state hospitals, as well as the private sector, will be 
considered in tum. Finally, users' experiences, motivation to seek health care, and 
satisfaction with services will be explored. The analysis will focus mainly on 
respondents who recalled an illness. 
As described in appendix 2, primary health care level in Bulgaria is provided mainly 
through polyclinics and health posts. In polyclinics, services are provided by district 
physicians, who under the older system had broadly similar functions to GPs, and by a 
small range of narrow specialists, usually internists, gynaecologists, and paediatricians. 
Secondary care is in hospitals, categorised as university, emergency, city, district, and 
occupational hospitals. 
Patterns of utilisation 
Data from the population survey 
Patterns of utilisation at first point of contact 
When looking at the patterns of utilisation, it is important to include people who recall a 
contact with a health facility, in relation to their last illness or previously. Thus in this 
section the analysis is limited to two types of respondents: first, to those who reported 
having been ill and who sought medical help during their last illness; and second, to 
those who consulted for a previous illness. The latter group was included to provide 
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sufficient numbers for the analysis. Illness is self-reported by the respondent. The 
number of consultations in the last illness, by gender, is shown on Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1. Number of consultations reported in relation to the last illness by sex 
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As shown in chapter 5, respondents with less than good self-reported health were more 
likely to consult a health professional during their last illness. Similarly, those with good 
self-reported health had usually made one or two visits (mean number of visits: 2 for 
men; 2.1 for women), while those with poor health had one to three visits (mean: 2.8 for 
men; 2.4 for women). The impact of limiting chronic illness on the number of 
consultations is more apparent (ill: mean 1.3 visits for men and 1.4 for women; healthy: 
2.4 and 2.3 respectively). 
Utilisation patterns by men and women in the course of their last illness appear generally 
similar (Figure 6.2a/b ). Most typically, the first point of contact was at primary care 
level, such as district physicians (broadly equivalent to GPs) or polyclinic specialists. 
Women visited GPs slightly more often than men (37% of men and 45% of women), 
while attendance of polyclinic specialists was equal (23%). Less than a fifth (18% of 
men and 14% of women) initially consulted a hospital specialist. Men tended to call 
emergency services slightly more often than women (13% of men, 8% of women). 
Following the first contact, the utilisation patterns of men and women appeared 
somewhat different. Men tended to be referred (or chose to consult) more quickly from 
primary to secondary health care, with 49% of men and 61% of women having a second 
consultation at primary care level. At their second visit, men consulted mostly hospital 
specialists, while women typically turned to polyclinic specialists. 
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Following the second visit the same utilisation pattern was displayed, with more women 
than men staying at primary care level. At the third visit, for example, about a half of 
men were contacting hospital specialists compared to less than a third of women. 
Among those who reported more than three visits (maximum of six), consulting at 
primary care facilities or not consulting at all was more common among women than 
men. 
In summary, the direction of patient flows is, as expected, from primary to secondary 
care, although women made the transition to secondary care more slowly than men. A 
very small percentage of respondents visited nurses, pharmacists or midwives during the 
course of their illness. 
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Figure 6.2a. Scheme of utilisation patterns for last illness (men) 
FIRST VISIT SECOND VISIT 
Ill ever: GP- GP-
100% (n=509) __. polyclinics: .. polyclinics: ... 
37% (n=173) 39% (n=29) 
Specialist -Specialist - Specialist -r--. z 1 visits: _.. polyclinics 1--~ polyclinics __., polyclinics r 92% (n=468) II"' 35% (n=26) 23% (n=106) 65% (n=35) 
Hospital: 
Hospital: _ .. ~ 0 visits: __., r 20% (n=15) 8% (n=41) r--. Hospital: .. Hospital: Ill' 30% (n=16) 18% {n=81) ... 87% (n=41) 
Other: _.. 
_... Other: .... 6% (n=4) 
.. GP- II"' 6% (n=3) Call ... polyclinics: ~ emergency: .. Hospital: .... 40% (n=15) 9% (n=4) 13% (n=59) 
Other: .. 
Other: GP-
II"' 
4% (n=2) ~ ... polyclinics: 10% (n=45) Ill' 29% (n=11) 
Specialist -
.. polyclinics .... 
26% (n=10) 
.. Other: 
.... 5% (n=2) 
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Figure 6.2b. Scheme of utilisation patterns for last illness (women) 
FIRST VISIT SECOND VISIT 
Ill ever: GP- GP-
100% (n=744) ~ polyclinics: .. polyclinics: ... 
45% (n=300) 59% (n=85) 
Specialist -21 visits: Specialist - Specialist -__. ... polyclinics t--- ..... 90% (n=672) r-. polyclinics ... polyclinics ..... 29% (n=41) 23% (n=155) 79% (n=63) 
Hospital: 0 visits: Hospital: ... ~ .. ..... 10% (n=15) 10% (n=72) ~ Hospital: ... Hospital: .... 21% (n=17) J 14% (n=94) .... 90% (n=47) 
... Other: 
.... 
2% (n=3) 
.. Specialist -Call .... polyclinics: r--. emergency: .. Hospital: ... 39% (n=15) 6% (n=3} 8% (n=51) 
Other: .. Specialist- .. 4% (n=2) ~ Other: _ .. polyclinics 10% (n=39) .... 28% (n=11) 
GP-
.. polyclinics: .... 
18% (n=7) 
.. Other: 
... 15% (n=6) 
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Urban - rural difference in access 
The utilisation patterns in urban and rural areas were explored separately to identify 
different patterns of access. As shown in the previous chapter, overall, the probability of 
consulting a health profession did not vary between urban and rural areas when the 
longer period of analysis was used. This could, however, conceal differences in the 
pathways to care. The situation in Sofia, the cities and towns is relatively similar, but 
very different to that in villages. For people living in villages, health centres were 
usually the first point of contact with the health care system ( 41% of men and 51% of 
women), while in larger settlements, people tended to go initially to the state polyclinics 
(Figure 6.3). 
Respondents living in Sofia, compared to those living in smaller settlements, appeared to 
have better access to teaching hospitals or other prestigious facilities providing highly 
specialised tertiary care; to the private sector; or to home visits by physicians. Home 
visits are defined as those taking place in the home of either the patient or the physician. 
Women living in Sofia reported three times fewer home visits than those in the villages. 
Among men the opposite pattern is observed, with a limited use of emergency services 
outside Sofia. Potential explanations for this pattern may be that women in villages are 
generally more proactive in obtaining health care (chapter 5), or as shown in qualitative 
research, lack trust in emergency services in Sofia. 
The differences in patterns of use are much less than could be expected from official 
statistics based on medical records. These indicate significant and long-term urban-rural 
disparity in utilisation at all levels of health service. Thus, ambulatory consultations in 
villages represent only 16% of the total in 1996195 • The official data also suggest that 
rural population uses hospital in-patient care (all types of hospitals) disproportionately 
less relative to its size. The present findings are, however, broadly consistent with the 
direction, if not the magnitude, of the official statistics. 
180 
Figure 6.3. Utilisation patterns by type of settlement (first contact) 
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There is a reason to believe that, contrary to official claims, urban-rural disparities in 
pathways to care have existed since the 1970s169 • After 1967, the number of medical 
auxiliary posts in villages headed by feldschers increased, while other forms of service 
provision declined, and almost half of village residents received treatment from a 
feldscher. Efforts by the communist government to close the gap included development 
of village polyclinics, subsidised public transportation, and compulsory service in 
villages for newly graduating physicians. Other factors generally facilitating access to 
health care are the generally short distances to towns and good availability of 
transportation before 1990. The authors conclude that, despite these policies, inequalities 
have persisted. Inadequate organisational structure of the health care system and low 
quality of health services in the villages burdened out-patient facilities and hospitals in 
the district and regional centres, while the use of rural facilities and home visits declined. 
Similarly, a study by Gallup, commissioned by the World Bank, found that in many 
smaller communities, there was not only lack of choice of specialist services, but also of 
basic facilities, and in many cases rural residents had to travel to the nearest town to 
obtain even an out-patient consultation196 • 
Cross-country comparisons in utilisation patterns are difficult because they are ultimately 
dependent on the specifics of the health care system. A national study from Kyrgyzstan 
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found that, in urban settings, visits to polyclinics and dispensaries were the most 
common option (70%), while in rural areas visits to the doctors' office and to rural 
hospitals were equally important (26% - polyclinics; 23% - doctors' office; 17% rural 
hospital)183• 
In the current survey, more than two-thirds of consultations during the last illness took 
place in the settlement where the respondent lived (73% of men and 80% of women). 
18% of men and 15% of women visited a facility up to 50 km away from their home. 
Only a small proportion of the visits took place more than 50 km away, or even abroad 
(7% of men and 4% of women). This might suggest that geographical access is not a 
huge barrier to access. However, while in the 1970s and 1980s, rural residents' use of 
higher quality health services (usually in urban settings) was associated mainly with 
inconvenience and loss of time, in the 1990s problems are increasingly related to high 
cost of transportation and accommodation. This needs to be explored in further research. 
Socio-economic differences in access 
The current study shows that, in Bulgaria, there are no explicit socio-economic 
disparities in primary and secondary level utilisation for a first contact during the last 
illness (Figure 6.4). Some inequalities between men and women in access to facilities 
other than state polyclinics, and city and district hospitals were recorded. Women were 
less likely to use university hospitals, occupational health facilities and the private sector 
than men. 
This is confirmed by the World Bank 1995 Bulgaria Integrated Household Survey, where 
the pattern of service use is very similar across income groups, despite the difference in 
overall level of utilisation182• Primary health care in the public sector is most commonly 
used, followed by public hospitals, and the private sector. However, given the higher 
level of illness of the poorest groups demonstrated in chapter 5, they may have a 
disproportionately low access to secondary care, compared to their need. 
Similarly, an analysis of data from the World Bank Living Standards Measurement 
Studies and the USAID-funded Demographic and Health Surveys in less developed 
countries concludes that in the public sector there is no uniform pattern of utilisation of 
different levels of care by the rich and the poor149• Thus, while in Mongolia the poorest 
section tended to use to a larger extent primary level facilities, the rich prefer higher-
level facilities. In Madagascar and elsewhere, the opposite pattern was observed. The 
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pattern of utilisation was thus dependent on the existing country-specific "institutional 
configuration". 
Figure 6.4. Utilisation patterns by self-perceived financial situation (first contact) 
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Regarding their last consultation, 39% of men and 45% of women chose to consult a 
physician at their local polyclinic or health centre. This is the physician who acts as an 
equivalent of a GP, with whom they are registered and where they are meant to go first. 
19% of men and 15% of women consulted a physician in an emergency situation or were 
not able to exercise choice. The third most common response for men was referral from 
a health professional (13%), while for women it was the choice of a known or trusted 
physician who is familiar with the health needs of the household (14%). Clearly, the 
majority (71% of men and 70% of women) used the formal referral procedures. Still 
slightly below a third (29% of men and 30% of women) preferred to consult a physician 
they know well; one recommended by family and social networks; or found through 
other unofficial channels, suggesting lack of trust in the official system. 
Description of last contact 
The last consultation most commonly included physical examination (71% of men and 
69%) of women). More than half of the respondents had an interview with the physician 
(54% of men and 60% of women); or were prescribed medication (53% of men and 55% 
183 
of women). 33% of men and of women reported having their blood pressure measured, 
and 23% of men and 19% of women had post-treatment check-ups. 18% of men and 
women had a blood, or other laboratory test. 16% of men and 14% of women reported 
having a preventive check-up. 
Typically, at the last consultation with physician up to four types of service were 
obtained. The most common combinations of services were physical examination and 
interview (44%); physical examination and prescribing of medication (43%); and 
interview and prescribing of medication (37%). Men reported receiving more types of 
service during their last consultation than women, except those of older age. 
A 1995 national representative survey also registered what procedures were performed 
during a visit to a health facility. Similar to the current study, physical examination is 
most common (34%), followed by some form of treatment or procedures (20%); and 
tests (9%). Issuing a medical certificate was reported by only 2%126• 
Hospital utilisation 
Data from the population survey 
Levels of hospital utilisation 
For hospital utilisation a slightly longer recall period (past 12 months) was used to ensure 
a sufficient number of hospital users. 
9% of men and women have stayed at least overnight in hospital in the year preceding 
the survey (13% and 10% respectively of those who reported ever being ill). On average, 
after three extreme and thus less credible scores were removed, men reported spending a 
mean of 14 days and women, 15 days in hospital. The modal value for both men and 
women was 10 days and the median, 10 days for men and 11 days for women. In 
comparison, the average length of hospital stay for Bulgaria from official data in 1997 
was 12.9 days166• 
Characteristics of hospital users 
It is important to see who was actually admitted to hospital regardless of whether they 
reported an illness (Table 6.1). Men who are reportedly unhealthy, poor, only primary 
educated, married, or living in villages; and women in poor health reported higher 
hospital utilisation than others. 
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A similar pattern is evident among those who recalled an illness. Men aged 50-59 and 
women under 39 reported more hospital stays than other age groups {Figure 6.5). In all 
age groups, with the exception of those under 39, women reported fewer hospital stays 
than men. Generally better self-perceived financial situation or income are indicative of 
lower utilisation of the hospital sector, although among women the relationship is less 
explicit. Men with only primary education and women with higher education reported 
more hospital stays. Divorced and separated men reported fewer hospital stays. A 
relationship between hospital attendance and place of settlement is less clear, men in 
villages reported the highest percentage of hospital stays, women in villages reported the 
least. 
Table 6.1. Characteristics of people reporting hospital attendance in May 1996-97 (whole 
sample) 
Variable Category % been in hospital in previous one year 
(May 1996-97) (n) 
MEN WOMEN 
Age group <39 5.5% (13) 10.5% (31) 
40-49 10.5% (13) 7.1% (11) 
50-59 13.3% (13) 6.5% (10) 
60-69 10.7% (11) 9.5% (13) 
>70 12.4% (12) 6.9% (10) 
Income quartile I (> 160,000) 7.5% (12) 9.9% (18) 
(Leva) II (1 00,000-160,000) 9.9% (13) 5.4% (9) 
III (60,000-99,000) 9.4% (15) 8.7% (18) 
IV (<60,000) 12.5% (20) 9.5% (25) 
Education Higher 8.0% (7) 10.4% (18) 
Secondary 8.8% (29) 7.8% (27) 
Primary 10.6% (26) 8.2% (30) 
Financial situation Very good/ good 5.5% (3) 8.6% (5) 
Neither good nor bad 8.6% (16) 4.8% (12) 
Rather poor 9.4% (20) 10.4% (32) 
Very poor 11.8% (23) 9.8% (24) 
Marital status Married 10.1% (49) 8.4% (48) 
Single 8.3% (9) 9.2% (9) 
Divorced/ separated 6.2% (4) 8.4% (18) 
Settlement Sofia 7.1% (5) 9.5% (13) 
City 9.5% (19) 7.7% (19) 
Town 7.7% (14) 11.4% (27) 
Village 11.6% (24) 6.0% (16) 
Self-reported health Good/Rather good 5.8% (29) 6.9% (44) 
Bad/Rather bad 20.9% (33) 12.5% (31) 
185 
Figure 6.5. Percentage reporting hospital stay by selected socio-demographic variables 
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Private sector utilisation 
Data from the population survey 
Levels and determinants of private sector utilisation 
Of those who have ever been ill, 13% of men and 19% of women have ever attended a 
private physician (respectively 10% and 16% of whole sample). 23% of men and 28% of 
women have visited a private dentist. This difference reflects a rapid privatisation of 
dental services and acute shortages of materials in the state sector. Results from this and 
other studieS196 show that consulting a private physician is often perceived as luxury, 
while a visit to a private dentist is viewed as a necessity. 
The state sector still has a predominant role in the provision of health services. However, 
6% of men and 7% of women reported that their last consultation was in the private 
sector. 
Analysis of socio-demographic determinants of private sector use is limited by the very 
few cases. In addition, reporting may have been complicated by difficulty in 
distinguishing between private and state services due to the common juxtaposition of 
private and state services (arrangements for sharing consultation rooms, equipment). 
There was a higher proportion of private services users among those under 50, with 
higher income, better self-perceived financial status, and more advanced educational 
attainment than in the other categories. Being married seems to be inversely associated 
with private care, while type of settlement and self-reported health does not seem to 
make a difference. 
Other studies from Bulgaria confirm a relatively low use of the private sector126 94 • In a 
national study conducted in 1995, 22% of respondents (or members of their households) 
reported a visit to a private medical facility in the preceding year (12% once or twice and 
10% more than three times). 78% sought free consultation in a state facility1 26 • Delcheva 
estimates the share of official payments for private services to be in the range of 4-6% of 
overall health expenditure in 1993-97, and may even fall to 1-3% if informal payments 
are deducted94 • 
The link between private sector utilisation and socio-economic status observed in studies 
from developing countries is not clear cut149• Although the richest sections use the 
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private sector most, they often make extensive use of certain elements of the public 
sector. This appears to be the case in Bulgaria. The World Bank 1995 Bulgaria 
Integrated Household Survey shows that the poorest quintile rarely uses the private 
sector (less than 5% of all consultations), unlike the wealthiest (13% of all consultations 
in the richest quintile)182 • At the same time, the rich also use public health care more 
extensively than the poorest. 
Reasons for seeking health care 
By placing these findings in the context of the qualitative data, it is possible to explore 
the motivation behind decisions on utilisation. 
An overwhelming majority of respondents (over two-thirds) thought that people consult 
when they already have medical problems ("when something is wrong with their health" 
[user]). It was a widely shared opinion that people decide to seek care from a health 
professional only after they have exhausted self-treatment strategies and these have failed 
("when they can't cope using home treatment only" [user]). Self-treatment most often 
includes use of traditional remedies (herbs, potions), drugs recommended by friends and 
relatives or in publications; alternative medicine; faith-healers, etc. Most are used at 
home. 
Another motive to seek health care is an emergency (persistent complaints, severe 
physical discomfort, or appearance of new symptoms indicating complications). 
Decision to use services can also be motivated by subjectively perceived (and not actual) 
health problems. A strong theme is that qualified medical help is sought too late ("when 
the condition becomes critical" [physician]). 
" ... usually in Bulgaria we consult a physician, when we really feel seriously ill, and see 
that we can't heal ourselves with traditional or ordinary medicines. " [user] 
Thus, from the point of view of respondents, timely utilisation is deterred because they 
try to cope using their own resources, do not trust the system, or lack awareness of what 
is important. Values and beliefs can also affect the utilisation decisions and will be 
further explored in chapters 9 and 10. 
The value of health promotion is clearly recognised by most respondents, but virtually all 
perceived that the extent of health promotion activities had deteriorated (especially 
during transition), although a few respondents also expected improvement in the future. 
Two respondents noted, however, that preventive services for children are an exception, 
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as they are still functioning, and achieving good coverage. One physician pointed to 
peoples' active interest in prevention against re-emerging diseases such as tuberculosis, 
sexually transmitted diseases, or "new" diseases such as HIV/AIDS. 
Many people attributed this decline to the state's failure to place an emphasis on such 
activities as well as low awareness among the population. Thus, several respondents 
argued that, in the absence of expression of popular demand, the state should take a lead. 
"Until recently, we called patients for preventive check-ups, there were dispensaries, and 
yearly examinations-all this was dropped 6-7 years ago when the reforms started. 
Prophylaxis does not exist because.. it is not about the immediate survival of the system. 
There should be a national or state organisation to set strategic aims." [physician] 
The issue of overutilisation was raised spontaneously. Several respondents thought older 
people, in particular pensioners, overused the public sector. In contrast people of 
working age, in regular employment, with families dependent on them, were seen as least 
likely to consult. 
"Some people like check-ups and go to health facilities without having a particular 
illness ... Others -not children and pensioners-people who work, ignore their symptoms ... 
in order to survive. They come late, when they can 't work anymore ... " [physician] 
In general, many people felt that utilisation has decreased in recent years. The main 
reasons are perceived to be deterioration of the system, low health awareness and 
financial barriers to access to health services. This is further discussed in chapter 10 in 
relation to the willingness to pay for heath care. 
"The problem is that the Bulgarian is either afraid of the outcome, ignores his health, 
lacks health culture, lacks means, and thus, comes later and later. In the 4 years I have 
worked in oncology, the advanced cancers have increased by 50%." [physician] 
Patterns of health services utilisation: scenarios 
Respondents were presented with several scenarios and asked to describe their probable 
actions. The scenarios included illness of the respondent; illness of their child or a close 
relative; hospital admission; and dental treatment. 
There appear to be three alternative strategies commonly used for initial contact with the 
health care system in the case of illness of the respondent: a visit to the state sector 
through regular channels (half of users, 4 physicians), visit to a private facility (slightly 
below half of users, no physicians), or a visit to either sector facilitated by a "connection" 
(most physicians) (Figure 6.6). 
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The situation is rather different for first contact in relation to a child or relative's illness. 
Patients were more likely to use private sector or public emergency services. More users 
were willing to try and find a connection before accessing the formal system. Almost all 
physicians would tum directly to a colleague. 
Although most users first access the formal state sector, typically their local polyclinics, 
for a subsequent visit a connection is most often sought to help find a suitable physician 
or facility in either the public or private sector. 
Figure 6.6. Typical utilisation patterns (qualitative data) 
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Almost all respondents preferred to use connections at certain points in their treatment. 
Fewer people seek a connection to enter the system, while many more declare a 
willingness to resort to one if they subsequently face difficulties. It was a widely shared 
view that seeking connections is normal practice. A connection is usually used to: 
a. collect information (identify the best or most suitable physician, facility, or type of 
treatment in the public or private sector); 
b. ensure access to it; 
c. ensure high quality of care, quick service, or a good attitude; 
d. provide information on availability and price of drugs. 
For example, word of mouth is still the main route to certain private physicians. Illness 
of a child or family members, or a more serious illness, is more likely to trigger the 
decision to seek connections, in both the public and private sector. Clearly, the purpose 
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of connections is very similar to that of informal payments (chapter 7), and in effect is 
often an alternative strategy to obtain high quality care at a reasonable cost. A less 
commonly mentioned reason to use connections is to obtain a free service. 
"I would use connections because an acquaintance will always pay more attention and 
will give everything from themselves. It has happened to me. " [user] 
"What we face daily is: an acquaintance of an acquaintance of an acquaintance- simply 
nepotism.... Or since the relations are not always so strong, something like a word of 
mouth. This is the usual system in 80% of the cases, 10% use the standard way, and 
another 10% , I am not sure. " [physician] 
The main distinction seems to be between people who first attend the health facilities in 
their area, and those who seek contacts and friends' recommendations to visit other 
levels or the private sector. The perception is that there is no need for connections at the 
primary care level, as access is relatively straightforward. Lack of trust in the system 
appears to be the central issue and main reason for using informal referral procedures. 
This applies equally to the private sector. 
"Nobody searches for connections for the polyclinics, but mostly for hospitals, for 
admission, finding a bed, for some specific medical tests involving waiting. " [physician] 
"If you want to receive a decent service you have to go to a private consultation room, 
but even this is not enough. From my experience, you have to be recommended by a 
friend or relative. A large part of the private physicians and dentists ... don't work well. " 
[user] 
It is important to establish that the patients understand the official procedures in the 
health care system and do not face information barriers. The principles of access to 
primary health care and referral channels seem relatively clear for most patients and 
physicians, although several physicians thought that the system is overbureaucratic and 
confusing for patients. However, in many cases, despite familiarity with the system, 
patients prefer to skip formal channels (''people decide that they have to be seen by a 
professor, regardless of his workload ... " [physician] ). One area that raises particular 
concern, especially among physicians, is a perceived misuse of home visits, thus 
diverting resources from more urgent cases. 
" ... there is a huge confusion as to whether to call a physician at home and when to go 
directly to the facility. " [physician] 
These findings are strongly supported by a 1996 qualitative study commissioned by the 
World Bank on utilisation patterns in smaller communities, which were not well 
represented in the current qualitative research196• Its findings are very similar: 
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predominant use of polyclinics rather than hospitals and a preference for home treatment 
(half of respondents, particularly women) because of poor conditions in health facilities 
and loss of time. The older generation used traditional medicine extensively, and went to 
health facilities only if no improvement was achieved, while for children, qualified 
medical help was sought from the start (as in the current study). A quarter of all 
respondents were willing to consult a health professional only "as a last resort". Only 
births, abortions and prenatal check-ups always took place in health facilities. 
Patient satisfaction 
Data from the population survey 
Satisfaction with the last contact 
The satisfaction with the health care received during the last consultation was relatively 
high. The highest possible rating was the modal value for all indicators: waiting time, 
length of consultation, attitude of staff, outcome of treatment, confidentiality, cost of 
treatment, overall level of service, hygiene, availability of equipment and 
pharmaceuticals. 
Among those respondents who reported consulting a health professional during their last 
illness, the overall satisfaction with the last visit has been estimated, taking all indicators 
into account. About half were satisfied ( 49% of men and 48% of women) and 40% of 
men and 37% of women were 'rather satisfied' with the visit. 8% of men and 12% of 
women were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied and 3% of men and of women were 
dissatisfied. 
Virtually all respondents who had their last consultation in the private sector were 
satisfied (73%), or rather satisfied (25%), the corresponding figure in the public sector 
being 47% and 39%. Patients' trust in physicians also appears to be strongly associated 
with their satisfaction with treatment197 • Those who consulted health professionals they 
knew well, or ones recommended through family and social networks, indicated a higher 
level of satisfaction with the service received. 
Although dissatisfaction with care appears relatively low, the aggregated assessment 
conceals the weight of each indicator. For 17% of men and 21% of women, the costs 
accompanying their last consultation caused some dissatisfaction. This is by far the most 
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important factor causing dissati"s.{:".acti"on, fiollowed b · · · 1• y wmtlng times, perceived as a 
problem by 10% of men and of women (Figure 6.7). 
Figure 6. 7. Satisfaction with last contact 
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The overall high level of satisfaction could be explained by the fact that most visits were 
at primary care facilities where the costs are generally lower, and the treatment process 
more straightforward. 
The results of the current survey can be compared to a 1996 survey from Bulgaria 
targeting specifically newly introduced "family physicians", previously district 
physicians. Despite the slightly different response scale, the results appear similar (Table 
6.2). 88% of the 1997 sample and 91% of the 1996 sample were satisfied to a certain 
degree with the service received at primary care level. The level of dissatisfaction was 
very low. 
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Table 6.2. Patients' satisfaction: health status: data comparison 
Current surve~ {1997} Reference surve~ {1996} 
Overall satisfaction from last As a whole, are you satisfied with your 
consultation: primary health personal doctor (GP)? 
care (estimate) 
Scale % Scale %* % ** 
Satisfied 49% Very satisfied 27% 41% 
Rather satisfied 38% Rather satisfied 46% 50% 
Neither yes, nor not 11% Neither yes, nor not 19% -
Rather dissatisfied 3% Rather dissatisfied 7% 7% 
Dissatisfied 0.3% Dissatisfied 1% 1% 
*two s~age random national sample (n=1180) **two stage random sample of 25 municipalities 
( excludmg Sofia) covered by a primary health care project (n= 1966) 
Data from the qualitative research 
Patient satisfaction with health care system 
A dramatically different picture emerges when satisfaction with the overall health care 
system in Bulgaria, rather than with the last consultation only, is explored. In the 
qualitative study all respondents shared the opinion that the health care system is in a 
very poor state. Among the expressions used were: "very poor", "tragic", "collapse", "in 
a miserable state", "critical", "desperate", "unsatisfactory", "underfunded''. The 
widely-shared view was that the decline was a direct result of the socio-economic crisis 
during transition, exacerbated by a lack of health care reform. The state of the health 
care system was thought to reflect the circumstances in the wider economy. Several 
users thought that health care is virtually unchanged since the transition, with current 
conditions just as bad as they were before. Only one physician thought that the situation 
in the health sector has improved. 
''After the start of reforms, Bulgarian health care resembles the health care from the last 
century. It is in a highly unfavourable situation .. .for the patients. " [user] 
"There is no guarantee that you will be treated, that a correct diagnosis will be given, 
that this will really happen for free ... " [user] 
"!don't know whether in the new history of Bulgaria health care has ever been in a 
worse state than now. And this is logical because the economy is in a collapse, but a 
health care is always a reflection of the economic situation ... it's natural. " [physician] 
The main problems are thought to be financial deficiencies; shortages and low quality of 
pharmaceuticals; careless attitudes by staff ("an icy attitude" [physician]); outdated 
equipment and technologies; dilapidated buildings and infrastructure; poor in-patient 
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living conditions; poor hygiene and hospital food. One physician viewed the procedures 
in the health facilities as another problem. Most of those negative characteristics 
worsened during the 1990s transition, with deterioration in overall quality of care and 
high cost of essential pharmaceuticals seen as especially problematic. 
"The health care is in a collapse and it is very difficult to provide qualified treatment. 
Use of connections, relatives is a necessity. Before 1989 there was also a lot to be 
improved, but there weren't shortages of pharmaceuticals and equipment. " [physician] 
"Unfortunately, year after year, it is getting worse. We are simply shocked by the prices 
of pharmaceuticals which are unaffordable for a large part of the patients ... " [user] 
Several patients and slightly fewer physicians noted problematic issues around lack of 
training and the inattentive attitude of physicians. The failure adequately to reward staff 
was seen as having an impact on the ethical relationship between patients and physicians. 
However, some users felt that the physicians do what they can, given the scarce 
resources. 
''After the economic reforms... most physicians are not interested to pay the necessary 
attention to their patients, especially if they are above 50-60 years old .. " [user] 
The grave state of health care and the lack of reform visible to the public may have 
contributed to a general sense of confusion and insecurity among users, and pessimism 
among health professionals. A failure to reform the health sector is perceived to be a 
major cause of these problems. 
"It is definitely worse than before because the synchronisation, discipline, the social 
provision, are disrupted. The resources are not sufficient. " [physician] 
"The state policy is not focused, no health care initiatives are undertaken, no clearly 
determined budgetary resources are allocated as before. Because of the changes a 
misbalance and total confusion occurred." [user] 
"I'm not sure whether the question is only about money. A structure is destroyed, new is 
created without building on the advantages of the old one ... " [user] 
Most difficulties reported by respondents are financial, affecting the conditions in health 
facilities. All patients shared the view that, in health facilities, the situation is very poor, 
extremely difficult, "disastrous", "it's a miracle the system survives", "scarcity", 
"enormous problems", "disgrace", "horrible", "total destruction". The main perceived 
reasons were the lack of reform and insufficient public spending. This is equally true for 
urban "key" tertiary hospitals that are considered elite in term of highly-specialised care 
provided (the National Centre for Oncology, the Higher Medical Institute, 'Pirogov', 
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'Tsaritsa Joanna', Hospital for Infectious Diseases, and National Gynaecological 
Obstetrics Centre; in Sofia). The 'Governmental Hospital' is the only exception 
mentioned. Although all patients assessed the situation at health facilities as very poor, 
five physicians found the financial status of their facilities to be relatively acceptable ("at 
least the salaries are not delayed"; "thanks to the director ... we haven't had to ask 
patients to pay for food or beds''). 
The other aspect of the reduced budget is the expansiOn of user fees, especially in 
relation to hospital stay. Several patients felt that this is not right because the state 
claims to provide free health care, but in effect the resources allocated are minimal. 
Many people felt that the situation is extremely bad if patients are asked to pay for 
everything, even for the most basic things, such as syringes, aspirin, surgical gloves, 
cotton, gauze, bandage, oxygen, and even anaesthetics or urgent medication at hospitals. 
Several physicians stated that they have tried to find supplies themselves, using sponsors 
or connections in order to treat patients. 
''At present the situation in Bulgaria is desperate, people are forced to pay for each 
service. We say we have free health care, but in practice it is not free, because even if 
you ask for clean sheets in the hospital, you have to pay the hospital attendants" [user] 
"It is already required from the patients when admitted to a health facility, to bring any 
medicines, materials, food ... This is a tragedy for our health care" [user] 
"The budget provided by the state is sufficient for about 30-40 operations per year, and 
we perform over 150. We find external money through donations, private patients" 
[physician] 
"The hospital management is forced to ask patients to buy some pharmaceuticals, gloves 
in order to operate. But sometimes unplanned medicines are needed and we discuss 
financial matters with the patient - this gives opportunity for corruption. " [physician] 
Respondents were asked to outline the difficulties faced by patients and physicians when 
using health services. In relation to problems of access, three predominant sets of 
problems were equally common. The first type of problems related to bureaucracy, 
confusing referral channels, chaotic procedures, administrative difficulties, and a lack of 
real choice of physician. A second was waiting times at clinics, although people with 
more time to spare (pensioners, unemployed) were thought to be less affected by this. A 
third set of issues relate to affordability. Half of physicians stressed affordability of 
pharmaceuticals as a main deterrent. These factors are interrelated. From the patient's 
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perspective, the problems faced by physicians were similar to the problems in the health 
care system in general. 
"Total disorganisation in medical facilities. There are no personal physicians, no one 
knows your health status ... Everywhere there are enormous crowds of people. " [user] 
"In the state hospital too much time is lost. For people who work, it is impossible to wait 
4-5 hours for their turn. The second thing is that unfortunately there are few good 
doctors, and they are the most burdened with patients. Of course, it is even more difficult 
to find the prescribed medicines, and to pay for them ... " [user] 
"First the thought that they have to pay. If one goes to the polyclinic he would not be 
paid attention, definitely, but sent from room to room. If he goes to hospital, will wait for 
hours, and if he wants to consult a specialist, has to go to a paid consultation." [user] 
Several respondents (mainly physicians) thought that primary care at polyclinics is still 
relatively easily accessible, and users do not face serious difficulties in consulting a 
physician there. 
These results are in line with other quantitative data on satisfaction in Bulgaria. As 
mentioned in chapter 4, a representative survey (15+) conducted in 1995 registered high 
levels of dissatisfaction with the health care system126 • In that survey two-thirds of 
respondents (64%) described the situation in the health care system as bad or very bad, 
and worse than other sectors. The most acutely felt problems were loss of time (69%), 
shortage of pharmaceuticals and supplies ( 66% ), nepotism ( 66% ), indifferent attitude 
(62%), bureaucracy (60%), poor hygiene (60%), and corruption (54%). 
In the earlier mentioned World Bank study covering several small towns and villages, 
most respondents also assessed the quality of health care to have deteriorated in recent 
years. The symptoms were the unfriendly attitude of physicians towards patients, very 
poor conditions in health facilities, and a reduction in preventive services. Hospitals 
lacked clean bed linen, adequate heating, food, and supplies of pharmaceuticals, forcing 
patients to supply them themselves196 • Explanations for the poor financial situation in 
health facilities were sought in the general poverty of the population and the country. 
User satisfaction was not considered an issue before 1989 and thus research is scarce. 
Still, a public opinion survey from 1988 shows surprisingly low satisfaction with the 
system. Only 4% of respondents living in Sofia; 5% in the cities (district centers), 7% in 
towns and 14% of village dwellers thought polyclinic health services to be very good169• 
In earlier research, the health care system and the social sector provision as a whole, were 
viewed as reliable, although not of high quality1 98 • 
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These results also can be compared to recent data from a 1996 Eurobarometer survey 
across EU Member States (15+; about 1,000 per country)199, which addresses the overall 
level of satisfaction with the health care system. The level of satisfaction with the last 
treatment episode in Bulgaria appears higher than the EU average (Table 6.3). Although 
the results are not directly comparable, qualitative research showed that satisfaction with 
the overall health care system in Bulgaria is much lower than in the EU. 
Table 6.3. Patients' satisfaction: health status: data comparison with the West 
Current surve~ {1997} EU average {1996 Eurobarometer) 
Overall satisfaction (from last In general, would you say you were 
consultation) very satisfied ... with the way health 
care runs in (your country)? 
Scale % % Scale % 
Satisfied 49% 58% Very satisfied 9% 
Rather satisfied 38% 30% Fairly satisfied 42% 
Neither yes, nor not 11% 7% Neither yes, nor not 20% 
Rather dissatisfied 3% 3% Fairly dissatisfied 19% 
Dissatisfied 0.3% % Very dissatisfied 10% 
* Estimate based on 7 indicators of quality ** Direct question on overall level of service 
Discussion 
This chapter provides extensive information on the pathways to care followed by 
Bulgarians who fall ill, charting not just where, but how, they move through the system. 
It showed that, while there are few socio-demographic differences in overall access to 
care, the nature of that care does differ. Somewhat intuitively, those living in villages are 
more likely to access health centres and less likely to access hospitals than their 
counterparts in cities. This is consistent with extensive research on patient flows in other 
countries. 
There are also variations in the use of health care by age and gender but, in general, the 
differences are also intuitive, reflecting the common illnesses at each age. Differences 
according to financial situation are small. 
Following the initial consultation, there are, however, differences in subsequent referral. 
It is not clear whether this reflects the conditions involved and this would require further 
exploration. 
Use of health care emerges as very much a last resort for many people, happening only 
after they have exhausted other options (self-treatment, alternative therapies). Once the 
decision to enter the system is made, behaviour is determined by the nature of the 
condition and circumstances of the patient. For what could be described as "ordinary" 
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situations, the formal system is commonly used. There is, however, a range of "special" 
situations, in which other strategies, in particular "connections", giving informal 
payments, or use of emergency care are used. 
In part, these strategies reflect concerns about the quality of the system and its referral 
channels. Two quite divergent views emerge, depending on whether respondents are 
considering their most recent contact with the system, or were judging the overall 
system. In the former case, satisfaction is high. In the latter it is not. 
In summary, the system for accessing care in Bulgaria appears to be functioning 
tolerably well at a superficial level but under the surface there are some major 
weaknesses. 
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CHAPTER 7. INFORMAL PAYMENTS FOR HEALTH 
CARE IN BULGARIA 
Introduction 
In the decade following the political changes in 1989, Bulgaria retained a state owned 
health system funded from general government revenue, based on the Soviet 
"Semashko" model. Throughout this period, the mismatch between the level of 
government spending on health and the demands on the health care system have been 
among the largest in Central and Eastern Europe92 • The funding deficit has been covered 
through a combination of one-off financial inputs by the government, foreign aid, and an 
increased reliance on extra-budgetary sources, mainly out-of-pocket payments by users. 
These payments were mainly of two types: semi-official user fees and "under the 
counter" payments. 
Before 1989, informal payments were officially banned by the communist authorities, 
although this was not strictly enforced. During the transition, successive governments 
have avoided taking a view on informal payments, leading to a situation where a variety 
of user payments ("donations") have acquired semi-legal status. Selected user fees 
collected at health facility level were formalised with the Decree for the Conditions and 
Routine for Payment for Health Care of Patient's Choice in December 1997. No official 
policy regarding under-the-counter payments has been formulated, although the 
prevailing attitude appears to be one of tolerance as long as the size of the "gift" does not 
distort attitudes of staff or lead to abuse. 
Formulation of an explicit and coherent policy towards informal payment is essential for 
further implementation of financial reform, but this should be based on research of the 
scale and nature of informal user payments. In the context of the current thesis, 
understanding of informal payments is important for several reasons. Firstly, private 
health expenditure often has a large informal component which is rarely taken into 
account by official bodies in less developed countries200 • Measuring informal payments 
will reveal the extent of private expenditure and the true funding requirements to sustain 
the health care system without posing a large burden on users. Secondly, knowledge of 
socio-economic variation in these payments will provide data on potential inequities 
which have to be addressed in reform. Thirdly, informal payments are likely to affect the 
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clinical behaviour of medical staff, creating perverse incentives and, potentially, low 
motivation for reform. Finally, informal payments are indicative of the size of the 
informal economy with implications for the shrinking tax base and the funding required 
to sustain the health care system134• 
Economic literature in this general area has addressed mainly informal transactions in the 
private sector or corruption in the state sector. Research on informal exchanges in the 
health sector, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, is scarce. Consequently, the 
concept of informal payments and methodological approaches for their investigation are 
less developed. 
This chapter will attempt to define the scale of informal payments in the health sector in 
Bulgaria in the context of other research from Bulgaria, and elsewhere. It draws on both 
quantitative data on informal payments, derived from the survey, and an in-depth 
perspective based on qualitative research. To conclude, implications for policy will be 
discussed. 
Informal payments: definitions 
To begin with, it is necessary to define a range of terms that will be used in the remainder 
of the thesis. These include corruption, formal and informal economy; and user fees and 
under the counter payments. As will be shown, the superficially attractive linkage 
between, on the one hand, the formal economy and user fees and, on the other, the 
informal economy and under-the-counter payments, is not straightforward. 
The OECD defines the informal economy as "all activities which occur outside the 
normal administrative and regulatory framework" or "output of production units not 
registered with fiscal or social security authorities"201 • These definitions thus include the 
informal income of physicians and informal expenditure by patients in the Bulgarian 
health sector, as neither is recorded. 
The informal sector in health care, as in the wider economy, is not tied to formal 
premises, does not rely on easily measurable inputs, and often involves collaboration 
within the family or social network. Among factors recognised to facilitate an informal 
economy are a heavy tax burden, restrictive state regulation and weak enforcemenf02 • In 
the case of Bulgarian health care, lack of incentives, low working hours in the state 
sector, and permissive public attitudes are also likely to stimulate involvement in 
informal exchanges. 
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The issue of informal payments is linked to that of corruption. This has been defined in 
a series of studies in public hospitals across several Latin American countries 
' 
commissioned by the Inter American Development Bank203 • There, corruption is defined 
as "use of public office for private gains", including large- and small-scale managerial 
mismanagement and self-benefit, as well as "user corruption, in which staff solicit 
payments which are formally unnecessary or alter decisions to favour specific clients". 
The current work will focus on the concept of "user corruption". 
The pilot study undertaken during development of the survey instrument showed that the 
pattern of informal spending in Bulgaria is complex. Under-the-counter payments 
coexist with a range of semi-official user fees for pharmaceuticals, materials, food, 
nursing services etc. Several criteria are used here to distinguish between the two types 
of payment. The first criteria is 'who benefits from the payments?' suggested by Ensor 
and Savelyeva204 • In the case of under-the counter payments, individual medical staff 
mostly benefit, whereas in the case of user fees, it is the health facility, and ultimately the 
patient who receives treatment that is otherwise unavailable. The second criteria is 'what 
is the payment made for?' While under-the-counter payments buy a service, user fees 
cover expenses related to treatment. Thirdly, under-the-counter payments are illicit and a 
clear-cut case of corruption. In contrast, user fees can be viewed more positively as a 
result of shortages and as a disguised cost-sharing instrument necessary to sustain 
services during transition. However, in some situations, under-the-counter payments 
may be formalised sufficiently to blur the divisions204 • 
In practice, in Bulgaria, both types of payment fall in the category of informal payments. 
At the time of the survey (ApriVMay 1997) user fees were semi-official, implemented 
chaotically in some health facilities, with no uniform policies. In practice it proved 
difficult to distinguish between under-the-counter payments and user fees. Users may be 
unaware of what the payment is for or who benefits from it. They may not get a receipt. 
Also, under-the-counter payments, especially when in-kind, may be motivated by a 
genuine desire to express gratitude to staff. 
In the subsequent analysis these two types of payment will be distinguished as far as 
possible. Under-the-counter payments have received much less attention than user fees 
and therefore the former will be examined in more detail in the analysis. 
In previous research in Bulgaria, under-the-counter payments were defined as "monetary 
transactions between a patient and a health care professional for services that are 
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officially free of charge in state health facilities" 205 . In the current study this definition 
was extended to include in-kind as well as cash payments. 
Under-the-counter payments can also be differentiated on the basis of their timing. 
According to guidelines from the Bulgarian Physician's Union, ex ante payments are 
considered to be under-the-counter and thus unethical; while ex post payments or gifts 
are viewed as a legitimate way to express gratitude. In practice, however, such a 
distinction is artificial, because, as the current study shows, one episode of illness often 
requires a series of encounters with medical staff and payment may be given at any time 
during treatment. Even if given after the completion of the treatment, the under-the-
counter payment may reflect an expectation of future benefits, or be requested by staff. 
The size of payment and whether it has been requested by the physician are factors useful 
in distinguishing between those informal payments that have negative connotations and 
those that reflect true patient gratitude. Thus, some authors have defined under-the table 
payments as "payments made to medical staff or institutions that are not officially 
required, but are either expected or demanded by providers"204 • 
The picture is further complicated by an existing "after-hours practice": informal private 
consultations with state-employed physicians paid on mutually agreed terms, often 
taking place outside health facilities. Although less common since the legalisation of the 
private sector, these are motivated by opportunities to earn untaxed income and by 
convenience for both the patient and physician. 
This chapter will examine the scale and characteristics of informal payments in the health 
sector, the situations where they occur, their determinants and other underlying issues. 
As in previous chapters, data are derived from two sources: a representative household 
survey of 1547 people, semi-structured interviews with 58 respondents (25 physicians, 
33 patients); and 6 focus groups, all conducted in 1997. The following sections will first 
describe the results from the household survey and then explore these findings in more 
detail by reference to the responses of those interviewed in the qualitative component of 
the research. Not all topics have been addressed to the same extent in both the 
quantitative and qualitative research and thus some sections are based only on one type 
of data. The views of the users and physicians will be examined in parallel. 
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The scale and nature of informal payments in Bulgaria 
Data from the population survey 
The scale of informal payments in Bulgaria 
Respondents were asked whether they have ever paid, or given a gift, for a range of 
services at a state health facility. Informal payments appeared to be a relatively familiar 
phenomenon, 19% of men and 22% ofwomen having paid or given a gift for at least one 
of a list of services at a state health facility. Gifts were more common than cash 
payments, 15% of men and 19% of women reporting they have ever given a gift for at 
least one type of service compared to 8% of men and of women who reported ever 
making a cash payment. 
The survey also asked about informal payments made in relation to the last consultation. 
Overall, of those who have ever been ill, 14% of men and of women paid informally for 
their last consultation. However, many consultations took place in primary health care 
facilities where, in general, informal payments are less common. 
Given the sensitivity of asking direct questions on informal payments, a control question 
was also used. Respondents were asked whether they have ever paid in a set of 
circumstances identified through preliminary research as most associated with payment. 
21% of men and 27% of women have paid for at least one of the listed reasons, which is 
comparable to the response to the direct question (19% of men and 22% of women). A 
Kappa test indicated significant concordance, with values of 0.54 for men and 0.52 for 
women. 
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Monetary value of informal payments 
Figure 7.1 shows the distribution of cash payments and the monetary value of gifts. Cash 
payments typically have a higher monetary value, with a median of 3,000 Leva ($1= 
1,538 Leva, May 1997) for men and 4,000 Leva for women. Gifts appear to be of lower 
value, with a median value of 1,000 Leva. However, the values were highly skewed. 
The effects of rapid inflation make a meaningful comparison of payments with income 
difficult. To minimise the problem, comparison was confined to the period March to 
May 1997. This coincided with both the survey and a period of unusual financial 
stability. As a result of previous inflation, these figures are therefore higher than those 
reported in the previous paragraph, which relate mainly to payments between 1995 and 
1997. 
The median for cash payments in March-May 1997 is 5,500 for men and 10,000 for 
women; and for gifts, 2,000 and 2,750. Median cash payments represent 4% and 8% of 
the average monthly salary (March-May 1997) for men and women respectively; and 
19o/o and 34% of the minimum monthly salary for the same period. Gifts appear more 
affordable, being 2% of the average monthly salary and 7% and 9% of the minimum 
salary (March-May 1997) for men and women respectively. 
Of those who have paid in cash, the highest proportion of respondents thought that the 
sum was about right ( 40% of men and 36% of women) while about a third thought that it 
was high in relation to the service (33% of men and 27% of women). Among those who 
gave gifts, the situation was very different. Again, the majority ( 42% of men and 60% of 
women) thought that the gift corresponded to the service, but 33% of men and 14°/o of 
women thought that it was low, only a very small percentage thinking that it was high. 
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i'igure 7.1. Type of informal payments made (in Leva) 
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'he types of service paid for, by means of cash or gift, are listed below (Table 7.1). Most 
f the payments were made for physical examinations, operations and pharmaceuticals. 
lfen were most likely to pay, or give a gift, for operations, while women were most 
[kely to pay for examinations. This probably reflects different utilisation patterns. 
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Table 7.1. Informal payment I gift by type of service/ item (ever) 
Type of service paid for: 
Operation (to physician) 
Examination (to physician) 
Pharmaceuticals 
Other 
Nursing services 
Tests (to physician) 
Medical certificate (to physician) 
Hospital admission 
Cash payment for at least one of the above 
Gift for at least one of the above 
Cash payment or gift for at least one of the above 
% selected this option 
men women 
6.7% 6.7% 
6.4% 9.0% 
3.6% 5.1% 
3.2% 3.0% 
2.7% 4.1% 
2.3% 2.9% 
1.7% 1.1% 
1.4% 2.0% 
7.6% 8.0% 
15.3% 18.6% 
18.6% 22.0% 
In relation to the last consultation, the largest single item of payment was a gift for staff 
services, followed by expenses for tests and procedures and cash payments to staff (Table 
7.2). It is clear that under-the-counter payments to staff represent a large part of the 
overall spending related to the last consultation (14% of men and ofwomen), but slightly 
less when excluding those visits in the private sector (11% of men and of women). As 
will be shown later in this chapter, a private consultation does not exclude the giving of 
additional gifts or payments personally to the physician. 
Table 7.2. Informal payment I gift by type of service/ item (last consultation) 
Paid informally for: 
Staff service: Gifts, donations 
Tests, procedures 
Staff service: Cash payment 
F oodlbed linen 
Nursing services 
Hospital admission 
Staff service: Services, gratuities 
At least one payment for staff service (state) 
At least one payment for staff service (private) 
At least one of the above payments 
% selected this option 
men women 
9.4% 8.4% 
6.1% 5.0% 
4.9% 5.2% 
1.2% 0.1% 
1.0% 0.4% 
1.0% 0.6% 
0.8% 1.7% 
14.1% 13.8% 
11.1% 10.6% 
17.6% 16.4% 
Expenditure for drugs (68% of men and 72% of women) is not considered here due to 
difficulties in distinguishing payments made appropriately at a pharmacy for items not 
covered by the official health system. 
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'iming of payment 
'igure 7.2 shows that gifts and cash payments are given at different points during the 
ourse of treatment. While two-thirds of gifts are given after the treatment, cash 
'ayments are most commonly given before or during treatment. Although a link 
'etween type of payment (cash or in-kind) and timing of payment (before, during or after 
reatment) clearly emerges, the use of ex-post and ex-ante, recommended by the 
~ulgarian Physician's Union to define under-the-counter payments, is not unambiguously 
.pplicable. 
~igure 7.2. Timing of informal payments 
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iiven the sensitivity of the subject, several strategies were employed to assess the scale 
f informal payments. Three types of questions have been asked. The first was whether 
tate facilities receive some income in addition to the budget allocated from the state or 
1unicipality. This sought to capture the unprompted reaction of respondents to 
xtrabudgetary income, either formal or informal. The second directly asked respondents 
thether they have ever given a gift at a health facility. Thirdly, they were asked to give 
n overall assessment of the scale of informal transactions in the health care system. 
'hese questions will be considered in tum. 
'otential for extra-budgetary income for health facilities was thought to range from 
xtemal aid, through user fees to under-the-counter payments. For the majority of users, 
1e most visible additional income was foreign aid, sponsorship and donations made by 
1dividuals, charities and private businesses in Bulgaria. Such sources were considered 
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to benefit only a few facilities. Several respondents pointed to inputs from the 
commercial sector, for example commissions on contracts with pharmaceutical 
compames; revenue from renting rooms and equipment in state facilities for private 
practices; or municipal subsidies. 
It was generally felt, however, that the additional revenue to the health facilities is 
insignificant. Although it might be providing some emergency help to specific facilities, 
such financing was seen as insufficient ("a drop in the sea", "miserable", "does not play 
an essential role"). 
Six respondents stated, without being prompted, that informal payments are a source of 
additional resources for the health facilities. Among those mentioned were payments for 
pharmaceuticals; payments related to hospital stay ("payment as if in a hotel"): for bed 
linen, food, drugs; for elective surgery, and examinations. However, at this stage many 
respondents used the word "donation", which may assume three different meanings in 
Bulgarian. These are foreign aid, or informal payments to staff, or more recently, to 
designate user fees ("compulsory donation" [user]) after this term was used in an 
amendment to a decree generally aimed at commercial activities, but which thus 
provided a partial basis for "donations" in the health sector. 
At this point respondents began to distinguish spontaneously between under-the-counter 
payment and user fees on the basis of who benefits from them ("income of a health 
facility and income of professionals are two different things"[ user]). Then attention was 
focused only on informal payments with clear distinction between user fees and under-
the-counter payments. 
The interview then sought to underline the personal experience of respondents. Given 
that, in Bulgaria, as in other economies in transition, many economic transactions during 
the early transition period were in-kind91 or as barters, it is predictable that many 
informal payments will be non-cash. Indeed, informal payments appeared to be much 
more common than appeared from the survey, almost all respondents (including 
physicians) having given presents in recent years. About a quarter of patients reported 
paying informally in cash at state health facilities, although in some cases in what 
appears to be quasi-private circumstances. A similarly high level of reporting in-kind 
payments was observed among physicians, who despite using "contacts" to obtain 
services for themselves, often felt obliged to give something after the treatment. All 
physicians recall receiving in-kind presents, but all denied receiving monetary payments. 
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Monetary payments to staff appeared sensitive elsewhere, and their existence tends to be 
admitted only in private204 • However, the physicians were relatively more confident than 
users in discussing informal payments. 
Users were asked to give an overall assessment of the situation and, specifically, their 
perception of the extent of informal payments in the health sector as a whole. This 
question allowed respondents to express opinions, without having to refer directly to 
their personal experience. Physicians were not asked this question because pilot 
interviews showed that discussion of informal payments was too problematic and 
complex. 
Twenty-two patients acknowledged the existence of informal payments in the health 
sector, with ten strongly in favour. Another nine respondents had heard about such 
payments, or suspected that they existed. Only two respondents denied knowing about 
such payments. 
Six respondents stated that informal payments were universal practice and an "unwritten 
law", while eight said that, although they are not yet universal, they have increased 
recently. Nine viewed informal payments as common practice in well-defined cases: 
among those who can afford it; for certain services (operations, childbirth); among 
certain specialities; and in isolated facilities or areas of the country. In only six cases, 
respondents stated that informal payments are isolated and insignificant. 
This suggests that informal payments are familiar to most people. Even at this stage, 
with almost no prompting, respondents were able to identify some characteristics of 
informal payments and their components (user fees and under-the-counter payments). 
Under-the-counter payments can be in any form and secondly, they benefit staff directly. 
Giving gifts appeared to be universal. 
Type of informal payments 
As informal payments, especially non-monetary ones, are widespread, it is important to 
examine the type and size of presents that are given. 
Table 7.3 summarises which presents are viewed as typical, unusual, or especially large, 
as well as the types of presents given or received personally by users and physicians. It 
is immediately obvious that virtually the same types of gifts are perceived as typical by 
both users and health professionals. Typical informal payments fell into four categories: 
first, chocolates, flowers, bottles of cheap alcohol and coffee or a combination (usually 
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two items); second, food products (eggs, meat, fruits etc); third, treats or consumer goods 
and finally, monetary payments. 'Treat' means a one-off provision of food or drinks, an 
invitation to the patient's village or small town; stays in hotels; dinner parties etc. It was 
reported that more home-made food products (raw or processed) are offered in the 
countryside. Gifts such as raw pork or lamb or calf's head and home made grape brandy 
(rakia) were reported to have been more common before 1989. There was some 
mismatch regarding the cash payments, with patients more inclined to believe that 
payment of large sums is common, while physicians reported that any cash payments are 
typically small. The table also shows that the cash payment in convertible currency that 
is typically requested for in-patient care, is regarded as very large. 
Unusual gifts were asked about in order to probe the limits of what is acceptable as an 
informal payment. They included home grown fruits, cheap kitsch objects, or expensive 
but inappropriate gifts. A case was recalled where a surgical team was invited by a 
cancer patient, on the eve of her operation, to a dinner party at which a lamb was roasted 
(the respondent found out about this case when sharing a hospital room with the patient). 
The presents that are reported as given or received by respondents coincide with what 
presents are viewed as typical. This is consistent with data from the population survey. 
Evidence for larger gifts and cash payments was mainly indirect, i.e. not related to the 
personal experience of the respondent, but to that of a close relative, friend or colleague. 
Such circumstantial data, although less precise, is likely to indicate the occurrence of 
some larger payments. 
In some cases, the informal payment implied a continuous relationship between patient 
and physician beyond the particular episode of illness. This may be an informal 
exchange of services, where the patient offers, at some point in the future, to provide 
access to high-demand goods or services, such as car repairs, to facilitate sponsorship for 
attendance of the physician at a conference , or to recommend the physician to other 
patients. 
"For me, it is offensive for a physician to receive such 'presents', rather than one great 
gratitude. In the future if he, in his turn, needs something, he will be helped" [user] 
There were also several cases where physicians whose main job is in the state sector 
redirected patients from the state facility to their private practice, where they have to pay 
for the treatment. In practice, this means that services to which the patients are entitled, 
for the provision of which the physicians are paid salaries, might be delayed or refused, 
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to the disadvantage of the patient. Patients who nevertheless complied viewed this as a 
form of inappropriate payment. This a more subtle form of corruption. 
Respondents were more willing to respond to impersonal questions rather than those 
concerning personal experience. It is notable that respondents with higher income were 
more likely and more willing to report monetary payments, suggesting greater familiarity 
with them. 
These results set the boundaries of informal payments, showing what is viewed as 
typical. Although common, informal payments are small and large gifts are relatively 
rare. The next step, reported later in this chapter, is to see whether these gifts are 
affordable and what is their impact on treatment. 
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Table 7.3. Type of informal payments made by patients and received by physiciansl 
PATIENTS 
Typical Unusual Especially large Given personally 
Chocolates (box) Dinner party with roasted lamb $100-200 asked for childbirth Chocolates I cake 
Flowers Large sums (before 1989) Flowers 
Alcohol (locally produced) Wine set made of crystal 100-200,000 Lv for operations Alcohol: cognac, whisky 
Coffee $1,000 requested Consumer goods, decorative items, 
Whisky Night dress (to surgeon) Dinner party with roasted lamb souvemrs 
Cigarettes Sums several times patients' salary for Money: from 5,000 Leva- to 200 
Cakes, biscuits Artificial flowers a single service DM 
Food products: from eggs to whole In currency and in leva (in thousands) 
roasted lamb/pig Knitted a tea cloth Sums requested before operation, In survey: given for the last 
Small sums as a "treat" childbirth: requested: ($ 500 for consultation (by freguency) 
Luxury goods: perfumes etc. Caesarian section) 
Large sums of money $10,000 for operation Goods: Chocolates, cake 
Sums requested in USD or DM Alcohol (purchased) 
Redirection to the physician's private 40 DM and $20 paid for operation Coffee 
practice 500-1,000$ Flowers 
100-200,000 Lv Eggs,milk,cheese 
Willingness to provide equivalent 40,000 Lv for operation of gall-bladder Meat&meat products 
service to physician when needed 1,000 for operation of a mole, in a Alcohol (home produced) 
teaching hospital Fruits, vegetables, home-
100,000 Lv paid made jars/ tins with food 
100,000 and above paid 
Car Services: carpentry, car-repair, 
plumbing, electrical, intem1ediary 
I This classification is determined by the respondents themselves, when asked to name the most typical, unusual etc. present they have given or received 
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DOCTORS 
Typically Unusual Especially large Received personally 
Chocolates Pumpkin Several thousand (some time ago) Chocolates 
Alcohol (brand and local) Bag of almost decayed pears $100 or 200 DM - for childbirth Alcohol 
Coffee Kitsch objects 100,000 Lv for operation at a teaching Coffee 
Flowers TV set hospital Flowers 
Cigarettes Set of clothing pegs IVF- 200-300,000 Lv Perfumes 
Luxury goods: perfumes, high-quality Comelian cherry Objects: Golden necklace, a lamb, a golden 3, 000 L v last year (from a 
pens Slippers statue of a child, a car Greek) 
Small monetary: 5,000-20,000 lv Vase bought at street stalls 100,000 Lv for operation I 
(generally for the whole team) 5 apples More than 2,000-3,000 DM 
Food products: raw pork I lamb, Calfs head 
home made grape brandy 
(rakia) 
Cake 
Treats: dinner parties, trips to the 
patient's village, stays in hotels 
Exchange of services 
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Settings for informal payments 
Informal payments appear much more common in some settings rather than others. 
There is a widely shared view that cash or gifts were almost ubiquitous for operations 
and childbirth, thus benefiting the specialities involved. The general rule seems to be 
that more and larger payments, especially in cash, are made for interventions, easily 
definable procedures, more complex types of treatments or those giving immediate 
relief. In "dramatic" cases, patients were more likely to resort to presents. 
"For the more craftsmanship specialities - surgery, urology, ophthalmology, 
obstetrics and gynaecology... the patient is more inclined to think about financial 
reimbursement, and the doctors themselves are accustomed to set a price on their 
labour ... " [physician] 
"In order the operation to be performed, one has to pay in advance. I know that they 
would not operate if they know you can 't pay" [user] 
Informal payments appear more common in hospitals and specialist or elite facilities, 
although in several cases user fees were requested at primary care facilities. Some 
groups of doctors were viewed as more prone to being involved in informal 
transactions, especially cash payments. The users were viewed as more willing to pay 
informally to be treated by physicians with higher formal qualifications (e.g. a 
professor) or by well-known specialists: "old sharks with titles" [physician]; "the 
"superstars", "those well-known in their area" [user]. Also, physicians with longer 
experience are likely to benefit more. Similarly, in Poland, informal payments benefit 
senior physicians to a larger extent, who, as a result, are less motivated to accept 
reform168 . In Hungary, specialists, such as obstetricians and surgeons, were reported to 
be paid more often206 • 
"It is also very important where you work. For example, in ISUL {teaching hospital) I 
was younger and less experienced. Now I am more experienced, but I work at a 
primary care unit - here nobody would ever leave ... (payment) " [physician] 
"For the best doctors, yes ... (it is common), but not for the doctors in the polyclinics, 
nor in villages or small towns or health district doctors. " [physician] 
Payments also appear to benefit physicians who are team leaders (e.g. of a surgical 
team), and not others who have "support" functions, such as anaesthesiologists. 
Surprisingly, despite the formal payments involved, gifts are often given in the private 
sector. 
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" ... at the moment I go exclusively to the private sector. I have a friendly relationship 
with the majority of the doctors whom I visit, but this does not exclude presents. " 
[user] 
Timing of informal payments 
The type of informal payments 1s, 1n many cases, closely linked to the timing of 
payment, with gifts usually given after, and monetary sums before or during treatment. 
Although not always the case, in general the timing of payment (cash or non-cash) 
was viewed as essential to distinguish between informal payments as a bribe or 
gratitude. The type of payment (cash or kind) appears to be less important. 
Under-the-counter payments, in kind, are typically given at the end of treatment, while 
monetary payments are given mostly before or during the treatment. The majority of 
physicians indicated that informal payments are mostly gifts given after treatment, but 
this view was shared by only a quarter of users. In both groups, a gift after the 
treatment, especially if successful, was thought to be motivated by a legitimate 
expression of gratitude. The "success" of the treatment was as judged by the patient 
or their family. 
"Of course, these (gifts) are given after a successfully performed operation or after 
the successful treatment of the patient ... as a kind of gratitude ". [user] 
Monetary payments given at the commencement of treatment were perceived as an 
exception by the physicians, but about half of patients thought that such payments are 
given before the treatment. Payment (gift or cash) is motivated mainly by two 
reasons: to ensure a high standard of treatment and a better attitude by staff. 
" ... if you don 't give money, you would not be treated properly. They are given before 
the treatment, so that the physician will pay you a greater attention". [user] 
In many cases, a monetary payment given prior to treatment does not exlude giving a 
gift after successful completion of treatment. 
"Very often, both before and after. Before, as a guarantee that the treatment will be 
carried out successfully,· and after, then already as a gratitude. " [user] 
Both physicians and users viewed the timing of payment and the presence of 
compulsion among the key factors in distinguishing between a bribe and a sign of 
gratitude. 
"There is a difference between a present, when you are grateful for being cured, and 
give something from the heart ',just to recognise the effort. The other case is when 
they (physicians) force you, i.e. for them to take any action, you have to pay. For 
216 
example, an abortion now costs 100,000 Leva, paid in advance, otherwise nobody 
would do it" [user] 
"If given after the treatment, they are within the normal, as a gratitude, but if given 
before the treatment, this is a bribe" [physician] 
"Depends. If it is like gratitude, it is given after completion of the treatment. When it is 
required, it is given in advance" [physician] 
It is more difficult to distinguish between under-the-counter payments and user fees. 
User fees can be either monetary (where patients pay at the facility, such as for 
admission) or in-kind payment (where patients bring their own pharmaceuticals etc). 
They could be paid at any time of treatment, with the exception of hospital admission 
charges. 
"If their operation is forthcoming, the patient is being informed that he has to pay ... 
he is told: 'this money are for consumables. " [user] 
In some cases, respondents are unaware of whether they have paid a formal user fee or 
an under-the-counter payment. For example, the situation where an abortion costs 
100,000 Leva can be interpreted as either that it is common to pay user fees for 
abortion, or, as the context suggests, that the respondent has in mind an under-the-
counter payment to physician. This distinction should be emphasised in future 
studies. 
Reconciling the results from different methods 
The findings of the qualitative research are important as a guide to interpreting the 
results of the survey as they suggest that, despite great care to elicit honest responses, 
it may have significantly under-estimated the scale of informal payments. The most 
likely explanation is the difference in the two samples. The survey was conducted 
among a general population sample with many respondents not reporting a recent 
illness or consultation. In contrast, all respondents in the qualitative research had had 
a contact with a health facility in the six months preceding the research and thus were 
more likely to have knowledge or experience of informal payments. The two different 
samples were chosen explicitly to be complementary. The survey, with its population 
base, provides data on the overall burden on the population of informal payments, 
taking into account the diverse pattern of utilisation of services among different socio-
demographic groups. In contrast, the qualitative study enables a much more detailed 
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examination of those who have used services and, with the data from the survey, can 
be placed in a population context. 
It is also necessary to take into account the different characteristics of the research 
methods employed (chapter 3). The qualitative research provides in-depth 
understanding of the nature, meaning and context of informal payments, some of 
which dimensions may not have been captured by the pre-defined response categories 
of the survey instrument. 
While the data collected by the two types of methods supplement each other, given 
that the scale of informal payments registered by the survey is lower than those in the 
in-depth interviews and in other comparable research, the survey data should be 
considered a lower boundary for the frequency of informal payments. 
Comparisons with research related to informal payments in Bulgaria 
There are few other data on informal payments in Bulgaria. A nationally 
representative survey conducted in Bulgaria in 1996 gave results on the scale of 
informal payments similar to the current one, for most types of services163 (Table 7.4). 
Table 7.4. Informal payments made in health facilities: comparison of results 
Current data (1997) Reference data (1996) 
Service paid for: Service paid for: 
Recall period: unspecified Recall period: unspecified 
Examination 7.8% Examinations 4.3% 
Operation 6.7% Procedures & operations 6.2% 
Pharmaceuticals 4.5% Free pharmaceuticals 7.6% 
Nursing services 3.5% 
Other 3.1% Other 3.4% 
Tests 2.7% Tests 4.3% 
Hospital admission 1.7% 
Medical certificate 1.4% Medical certificates 3.4% 
That survey also found that, in most service categories, it was the elderly, pensioners, 
frequent users, and consumers of private care who most often pay under-the-counter163 • 
The current data largely supports these findings, with the exception of pensioners who 
were found to be less likely than other groups to pay. Similarly, those who have ever 
attended a private facility reported twice as many occurrences of under-the-counter 
payments in state facilities; and those with long-standing illness or illness in the past 
year, who could be defined as frequent users, reported more such payments. 
218 
Further data come from a 1994 survey205 targeting specifically under-the-counter 
payments. In this survey 43% of respondents (18+) receiving officially free treatment 
in state facilities in the previous two years paid a cash sum for some part of it. This is 
much higher than in the current study (21% in the direct question and 25% in the 
control question). However, the 1994 sample was pseudo-random and administered 
only in cities, which might have contributed to the higher recorded rate. In the current 
survey, significantly fewer payments were recorded in smaller settlements, and the 
fact that this survey is nationally representative may have produced a more realistic 
picture. 
It is important to see these results within the context of corruption in the public sector 
in Bulgaria. In a survey by the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD), 86% of 
respondents thought it impossible to obtain an adequate health service without giving 
bribes207 • A study conducted by MBMD (a Bulgarian research agency) in 1998 found 
that 51% of respondents viewed corruption as widespread in the health sector, 
exceeded only by the customs, legal system, and police94 • 68% of people were willing 
to pay a bribe to receive officially free health services. According to a study by 
Vitosha Research (part of CSD) in 1999, physicians are ranked immediately after 
customs officers in terms of corruption94 • Need for "connections" was the third most 
common problem related to health care (66% of respondents over 15 in a nationally 
representative survey in April 1995), with corruption being further down the scale 
(54% ofrespondents)126• 
A paper reviewing evidence on out-of-pocket payments in Bulgaria, showed that the 
share of out-of-pocket payments increased from 9% to 21% between 1992 and 1997, 
of these, the highest share is for medication, followed by informal payments, and 
charges in public and private facilities94 • The paper demonstrated that the revenue 
from user fees was very low (under 1% in 1998), while 51% of respondents have paid 
without a receipt for a doctor or dentist, a quarter paying often (1999 survey). Of 
those who used the private sector, 74o/o paid informally, compared to 54% of users of 
public services. The latter finding, which is also confirmed by the current research, 
contradicts the view that informal payments are associated mainly with the public 
sector. The scale and value of informal payments reported by that survey is likely to 
be an overestimation, because it was carried out only in Sofia, where the payments are 
higher. 
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A study from 199212\ used a proxy measure to give a general idea of the size of the 
phenomenon of informal payments in Bulgaria. 34% of the respondents have used a 
"connection"k (40% in urban and 17% in rural areas). 14% have used a connection to 
obtain consumer goods, 12% for medicines and 8% for contact with a doctor. That the 
use of a connection in relation to health care is ranked immediately after the very 
broad category of consumer goods suggests that it is a widespread practice. 
Respondents have most often asked a favour from a friend (55°/o) or relative (29%). 
When asked whether it was expensive to use this connection, 66% answered that it 
was "not at all" expensive, 24% stated "not too much" and 9% - "fairly/ very" 
expensive. There are no data on the nature or size of such payments (cash or in-kind). 
Unregulated relationships between doctors and patients existed before the beginning 
of the democratic changes, as one among many results of the declining quality of 
health care system, reduced access, and other "internal dysfunctions". A survey from 
1988 found that the patient is likely to receive a better service if he or she is not "just 
anybody"169• 
Determinants of informal payments 
Data from the population survey 
Relationship with income 
It is important to know whether payment for services is related to income (Figure 7.3). 
More men and women in the highest income quartile pay for almost all services than 
those with a lower income. At each level of income the pattern of informal spending 
is similar, with payments most often made for examination, operation and 
pharmaceuticals. At all levels of income, women were more likely than men to report 
making informal payments. For men, income differences in the rate of payment for 
most services are generally small, apart from those for examinations and operations. 
Among women the contrast is more apparent. 
k The wording of the question is: "In the last year or two, have you or anyone in your 
household gone to someone to get things you couldn't get in the ordinary way?" 
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~igure 7.3. Payments for a range of services/ items by income quartile 
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ocio-economic determinants of informal payments 
1 the following analysis, respondents who could not recall an illness or reportedly 
ever consulted a health professional were excluded. In a univariate analysis, women 
~ported more under-the counter payments than men in most socio-economic groups 
:;'igure 7.4). Among men, age did not appear to be a strong determinant of paying 
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informally although, among women, payments are much more common among those 
under 50. Men and women over 70 reported the fewest informal payments. 
Under-the counter payments were related to income, with people in the highest 
income quartile paying twice as often as those in the lowest income quartile. Among 
women, informal payments were more common among those who perceived their 
financial situation as good or very good, although among men, the link between 
subjective financial status and informal payments was less clear-cut. Education 
appeared to be associated with informal payments for both men and women, those 
with higher education more than twice as likely as those with only primary education, 
to report such payments. Single men and divorced or widowed women reported fewer 
informal payments than others. People living in villages paid least frequently. 
No explicit relationship emerged between making informal payments and self-
reported health, chronic illness or timing of last illness/ consultation. People who 
reported illness in the preceding 12 months, or consulted a physician in the course of 
their last illness, reported twice as many occurrences of informal payments as the 
others. 
As age was a determinant of paying informally, at least for women, the sociO-
economic determinants of informal payments were studied using multiple regression 
(Table 7.5), with adjustment for age. Income appeared to be a significant predictor for 
both sexes, although surprisingly, the self-assessed financial situation appears less 
important. Those in the highest income quartile were 2.5 times as likely to report 
informal payments, compared to those in the lowest income quartile. For both men 
and women, higher educational attainment was associated with higher reporting of 
informal payments. Women who were divorced, widowed or separated were 
significantly more likely than those who were married, to report informal payment, 
and single women were significantly less likely to pay. For women, living in a village 
reduced the probability of informal payment although this was just short of statistical 
significance. 
In summary, the rich, young, better educated, and urban dwellers were the group most 
likely to make informal payments. Whether in cash, or as a gift, the majority of 
people paid from their current income. For cash payments, slightly more respondents 
used sources other than their current income, such as savings. Women were more 
likely than men to use savings (cash: 26% of men, 31% of women; gift: 11% of men 
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and 19% of women) suggesting more difficulties when paymg informally. Few 
respondents used other strategies, such as sale of assets, or borrowing. 
Figure 7.4. Percentage reported paying informally in state facilities for at least one 
service 
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Table 7 .5. Socio-demographic determinants of probability of making informal 
payments for health care (reference population: those who recalled an illness) 
Variable Category % (n) paid Odds ratio (95% Cl) 
(Age-adjusted) 
MEN 
Age group <39 18.9% (45) 1.00 
40-49 20.2% (25) 1.08 (0.63-1.87) 
50-59 19.4% (19) 1.03 (0.57-1.87) 
60-69 18.4% (19) 0.97 (0.54-1.76) 
>70 14.4% (14) 0.72 (0.38-1.39) 
Income quartile I (> 160,000) 28.3% (45) 1.00 
(Leva) II (1 00,000-160,000) 14.5% (19) 0.42 (0.23-0. 77) 
III (60,000-99,000) 17.5% (28) 1.52 (0.29-0.92) 
IV (<60,000) 14.4% (23) 0.39 (0.21-0.73) 
Education Higher 30.7% (27) 1.00 
Secondary 17.7% (58) 0.48 (0.28-0.83) 
Primary 15.5% (38) 0.42 (0.23-0. 77) 
Financial situation Very good/ good 23.6% (13) 1.00 
Neither good nor bad 18.9% (35) 0.75 (0.36-1.54) 
Rather poor 23% (49) 0.95 (0.47-1.93) 
Very poor 11.8% (23) 0.44 (0.21-0.95) 
Marital status Married 19.1% (93) 1.00 
Single 19.4% (21) 0.94 (0.50-1.77) 
Divorced/ separated 12.3% (8) 0.62 (0.29-1.36) 
Settlement City 20.7% (56) 1.00 
Rural 17.2% (67) 0.82 (0.55-1.23) 
Consulted No 14.2% (19) 1.00 
(last illness) Yes 27.2% (102) 2.54 (1.47-4.41) 
WOMEN 
Age group <39 25.6% (75) 1.00 
40-49 28.4% (44) 1.15 (0.74-1.78) 
50-59 16.9% (26) 0.59 (0.36-0.97) 
60-69 22.6% (31) 0.85 (0.53-1.37) 
>70 12.4% (18) 0.41 (0.24-0. 72) 
Income quartile I(> 160,000) 34.6% (63) 1.00 
(Leva) II (100,000-160,000) 22.2% (37) 0.55 (0.34-0.89) 
III (60,000-99,000) 21.2% (44) 1.52 (0.32-0.83) 
IV (<60,000) 14.8% (39) 0.37 (0.22-0.61) 
Education Higher 32.4% (56) 1.00 
Secondary 25.6% (89) 0.70 (0.46-1.05) 
Primary 13.7% (50) 0.35 (0.21-0.57) 
Financial situation Very good/ good 28.1% (16) 1.00 
Neither good nor bad 26.2% (66) 0.88 (0.46-1.69) 
Rather poor 23.3% (72) 0.81 (0.42-1.54) 
Very poor 15.5% (38) 0.51 (0.26-1.01) 
Marital status Married 22.6% (129) 1.00 
Single 15.3% (15) 0.46 (0.25-0.85) 
Divorced/ separated 23.7% (51) 1.59 (1.04-2.42) 
Settlement City 25.9% (99) 1.00 
Rural 19.1% (96) 0.73 (0.52-1.01) 
Consulted No 19.3% (40) 1.00 
(last illness) Yes 28.5% (153) 1.61 (1.08-2.39) 
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Data from the qualitative research 
Relationship with income 
The link between informal payments and income was further explored in the qualitative 
research. One way to examine the link between informal payments and income is to 
analyse the personal experience of high income users. This group was formed on the 
basis of reported income and subjective assessment of financial status. The relationship 
was also explored indirectly, through assessment of all respondents' experiences of 
discrimination in the health care system. 
Although the survey data showed an association between informal payments and income, 
the qualitative data suggested that the link may not be so clear-cut. All high-income 
users (8) have paid (cash or gift) for health services at the point of use, apart from one 
who used only private services. Most gave presents after the treatment and two gave 
significant sums of money (e.g. DM 200). In another case, the patient was directed to a 
private facility where he paid for a private consultation: 
" ... it was in a different form. I went to a paid consultation which was not very necessary, 
and in this way I paid .. .I think that the sum I was asked to pay was unjustified" [user] 
"A rich man goes to a physician, gets on well with the physician, and probably will pay a 
lot, regardless of whether the doctor has asked for it or not". [user] 
Higher income physicians (with private practice or from elite facilities), when in need of 
services, tend to give gifts rather than cash payments, or rely on exchanges of services ("/ 
don't pay anything- barter deals"). 
"Even if I go in private, they would not take money from me. Simply we, the doctors, do 
not take money from each other. " [physician] 
The next step was to see whether there is discrimination among patients on the basis of 
income, social status or ability to give informal payments. In the opinion of the 
physicians, a higher position in society is not always associated with a greater 
willingness to give informal payment. 
"Among my patients there are prominent people, academics, but they would not 
consider ... The ordinary people are more grateful usually. For example, a gypsy or a 
driver will leave a much nicer present, will pay respect to your work, while the others 
will say only 'thanks'" [physician] 
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Almost all patients (29 out of 33), and the majority of physicians (17 out of 25), believed 
there to be certain sections of the population which receive better health services than 
others, in some cases amounting to discrimination. The main reasons for these perceived 
inequalities fall into several categories: access to private services; access to elite or urban 
state facilities; ability to pay; or opportunity to use a 'connection'. The first two reasons 
are related to privileges inherited from the old system or to formal purchasing of private 
care. These are less important because they occur only in a few elite facilities. 
Advantage on the basis of ability to pay and use of a 'connection' has substituted for the 
privileges previously enjoyed by people with high positions in the communist hierarchy. 
This opinion is held by half of users and a larger proportion of physicians. These will be 
examined in more detail. 
"At the time, people who were high in the hierarchy were treated better. After 1990, this 
hasn't changed much, but also people with a lot of money appeared. For a good 
payment, they are treated better in practice" [user] 
A widely shared view is that the quality, and ultimately the success, of treatment depends 
on the individuals' willingness and ability to pay under-the-counter. For people who 
cannot afford to pay, things can be "critical" (user). 
"Definitely there are groups receiving a better service. It's a public secret that although 
the health care is free at this stage, for each health service, significant money are given 
under-the-table, in order to motivate the physician to be more responsive, more attentive, 
more caring, and thus, to achieve better results of the treatment. " [user] 
"This was the case before 1989 and today: those who have more financial means and 
give 'under-the-table' payments to doctors, are then treated much better." [user] 
Treatment of richer patients, even when they do not pay the physician, is generally better. 
This is due firstly, to their ability to buy drugs and supplies and pay all treatment-related 
costs; their access to better specialists and facilities; and more attention by staff. The 
poor are more likely to self-treat or to be offered lower quality substitutes in the 
pharmacy. The rich benefit from "higher quality service, medicines, and medicine as a 
whole" [physician]. Secondly, their ability to pay, or expectation of a future service or 
other benefits for the physician, are deemed essential to receive better treatment. 
"The quality depends on the patient's material status regardless of whether the treatment 
is paid or not. It determines what medicines will be prescribed. Often it is asked: 'how 
are you financially, in order to know what medicines to prescribe' " [user] 
"People paying more are treated better and the physicians cannot be blamed for that. " 
[user] 
226 
"··.you are sitting in the dental surgery, waiting patiently for your turn and then 
somebody arrives, who is a mechanic in the auto service, where the physician repairs his 
car, and naturally, the mechanic will be let in, and you will continue to wait. " [user J 
"Of course, those who are better-off, able and ready to pay are always welcomed." 
[physician] 
"It is not true that no effort at all is made for people who cannot pay anything. Efforts are 
made, but not the same as for those who pay. " [physician] 
Apart from income, under-the-counter payments are also influenced by a range of other 
factors such as the social status of the patient, their access to key resources, or the 
physician being recommended through a social network. In many cases, an alternative 
scenario, when the patient is unable to pay, is to seek 'connections'. Physicians often 
find it unacceptable to take money from colleagues, relatives or people recommended by 
them. 
"All things are connected: the financial side, also whether in the future the specialist will 
need you, and of course, your social status. " [user] 
"I'm not sure whether even if you are full of money and wait for your turn outside the 
consultation room and say 'I'm paying, call the doctor' .. .I think that you will be served 
better only if you telephone in advance and a friend sends you. " [user] 
Despite the importance of 'connections', financial status sometimes proves more 
important. Several cases were reported by physicians where close relatives of well-
known physicians were not diagnosed in a timely manner, and where a family 
relationship had no impact. It has become increasingly difficult to obtain treatment 
through strategies other than informal payment. 
"It depends how close the relatives are, it is possible to a certain extent, but I think that 
one already asks even relatives to pay. " [user] 
"It is also difficult for me. My brother had a transplantation, there are problems, and 
certain things are delayed for months. Because I am a physician, they can't tell me 
concretely what they want, and for this reason they redirect me. " [physician] 
Informal payments and the transition 
Data from qualitative research 
It could be suggested that informal payments have undergone a change in the 1990s. 
Although this is a cross sectional study undertaken in 1997, it also provides some data on 
informal payments in the years preceding the transition. 
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Before 1989, the communist authorities considered informal payments incompatible with 
free and equitable health care provision, deflecting resources from the system, and 
creating a private relationship between the medical profession and users. Although 
considered ethically wrong and implying commercialisation of the medical profession, 
informal payments were not considered a criminal offence. Although presents were 
common, no sanctions were enforced, probably because they were considered to be an 
additional inexpensive incentive for low-paid medical staff. Similarly, in the 1970s, 
informal payments started to appear in Poland and Hungary, and were exacerbated in the 
1980s as a result of worsening conditions in the health care system168 • Sanctions by the 
authorities were nominal and, in Hungary, payments were even considered part of 
salaries, subject to taxation after 1989. 
In Bulgaria, after the transition, there were some spontaneous changes, with user fees 
based on adapted legislation introduced in some facilities No consistent policy was 
formulated in relation to under-the-counter payments . 
There is a widespread perception that, since 1989, presents have been given and received 
more openly, as "something usual". Before 1989 such presents were more understated 
due to fear of sanctions by authority, even though this did not seem to be based on 
experience of enforcement. 
" ... then everything was happening secretly and behind the scenes, but now it is already 
openly, and nobody forbids nobody anything" [user] 
"it was quite strict then". [physician] 
In the 1990s, several parallel trends emerged in the type and size of informal payments. 
The first is that cash payments are viewed as increasingly more frequent, about half of 
patients and of physicians sharing this view. 
"I think that before there was not so much payment under the table. i.e. what was given 
was some perfumes, chocolates, expensive alcohol- because these were unavailable, but 
I think that no payment was given as it is done now. " [user] 
" ... what was given were chocolates, drinks or you are invited for dinner at their home ... 
Now I know that significant sums are given, especially for operation or for something 
serious" [physician] 
The second trend was of a perceived increase in the size of both cash payments and the 
monetary value of gifts. It is possible that the size of the informal payments is not much 
larger than in the 1980s, but accounts for a higher proportion of the household budget. 
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Before 1989 presents were thought to be more uniform and with little value, because 
authorities tended to tolerate affordable 'standard presents'. 
"While before doctors were also taking such presents, but they were more modest -
boxes of chocolates, something smaller. " [user] 
In another post-1989 development, in parallel with the increase in the value of gifts and 
cash payments, an opposing trend was observed, in which there was a reduction in the 
ability of the population to pay out-of-pocket. Factors suppressing out-of-pocket 
payments were declining purchasing power of the population; escalating pharmaceutical 
prices; and a perceived expansion of the informal health sectm·94 • For many, even small 
traditional gifts (flowers, alcohol, chocolate etc.) appear to have become less affordable 
due to falling living standards. Physicians considered these gifts "trivial", "ordinary" 
and with only a "symbolic" value, "affordable for the average Bulgarian". Giving bottles 
of alcohol, for example, was valued less given recent increases in sale of bootlegged 
alcohol potentially containing harmful substances (a physician reported using donated 
alcohol as antifreeze in his car). In effect, such gifts did not achieve the intended 
objective having a low impact on service, and larger gifts were increasingly expected by 
physicians. 
Although these gifts are perceived as tokens of gratitude, in contrast to cash payments, 
the monetary value of such gifts can be substantial. For some patients, even these 
common gifts are unaffordable, despite their desire to provide them. Others felt that such 
presents are quite adequate for the service received. The context is important in that the 
cost of flowers in urban areas, luxury chocolates and alcohol (mainly imported) have 
grown disproportionately to incomes. If such gifts are considered as only very basic and 
almost obligatory expressions of respect by health professionals, their impact on the 
service is likely to be small. This poses a substantial burden on users, especially when 
the treatment is prolonged and complex, thus putting pressure on the relationship 
between patients and physicians. Some physicians considered such payments inadequate 
both for the patients' and doctors' financial situation: 
"They (presents/payments) are definitely large in view of the income of the population 
and the real value of money at the moment". [user] 
" ... in the current economic situation, not everybody can afford to buy a bunch of flowers 
for 2, 000 Leva " [user] 
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"The usual in the past box of chocolates and a bunch or flowers ... is now too much for a 
patient to give. Also, I don't know whether a physician with 20-30$ salary would not 
prefer a kilogram of cucumbers for example, rather than the flowers ... " [physician J 
This contradictory evidence could be partly explained by the socio-economic effects of 
transition. While gifts became less affordable and thus what was given was less 
attractive, cash payments increasingly were used to achieve a higher impact. 
"Simply now the presents are cheaper, smaller, but on the other hand money are given, 
i.e. there is a differentiation: large sums are paid, plus separately, presents" [user J 
After 1989, income polarisation ("social contrasts" [user]) affected the ability of 
different groups to make informal payments. The resulting discrimination by staff 
according to ability to pay, led to the creation of two tiers of service. 
"Now the means of the different patients are very contrasting compared to a decade ago, 
when the difference was not so great. Now it is almost a luxury to buy a box of instant 
coffee and a box of chocolates. " [user] 
"I think that people were a little bit more attentive before, a little kinder. Now as if the 
economic crisis has sharpened the aggressive mood in people" [physician] 
In the view of patients, an important characteristic of informal payments in the 1990s is 
the fact that they have become a ubiquitous fact of life. 
"Before one could rely on personal contacts, acquaintances, social status etc. while now 
payments are simply necessary everywhere. " [user] 
Another important change is that while in the previous system payments were viewed as 
discretionary, in the 1990s treatment can often be conditional on a preliminary payment. 
Giving a monetary payment before treatment, especially when requested by the staff as a 
condition of treatment, constituted the worst possible scenario in the perception of both 
patients and physicians. 
"Once upon a time they were paid in-kind ... At the moment I don't think they receive 
presents, but are offered money. There are doctors who request them themselves" [user] 
"At the time money were not given, but now they are. Among some corrupted colleagues, 
unfortunately it is negotiated in advance" [physician] 
According to interviewees, the patient is rarely asked directly to pay for the service. 
Instead, there is innuendo, labelling with a more serious diagnosis to scare the patient, 
inadequate or slow service, or other unethical techniques. A respondent recalled a case 
where she was diagnosed with bronchopneumonia: 
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" ... and the doctor said that she is going to treat me and I have to thank her for the 
successful treatment ... so I felt obliged to bring her a present the next time. " [user] 
"The mechanism is simple: you are late for work, you have gone to have coffee ... and if 
you had to see 20-30 patients today, you can't. Therefore they will have to pay in order to 
get to you. The dentists did it ... in the state polyclinics there are no appointments for two 
months ahead, although there is nobody in the waiting room, while the dentists are in 
their private consultation rooms ... This is not a nice way. " [physician] 
Cash payments or gifts are often expected. Many doctors admitted expecting gifts if the 
treatment concluded successfully ("many people say only one thanks" [physician]), 
although only symbolic. 
Placing Bulgaria in an international context 
Evidence on the prevalence and characteristics of informal payments elsewhere is largely 
anecdotaF. Systematically collected data are extremely scarce. Governments have often 
chosen to ignore the problem due to shortage of health care funds, or because it is 
"politically problematic"203 • Informal payments have filled some gaps in budget funding, 
thus reducing the need for official rationing204 • When addressing issues of corruption, 
government and donors in many countries have focused on large-scale corruption in the 
public sector, involving large sums and high-level players, while small-scale corruption, 
involving small payments made by ordinary people, has often been ignored208 • The lack 
of attention to informal payments has been a major obstacle to developing policies in this 
area. Hungary has been the only former socialist country where informal payments have 
been officially recognised as a problem and research commissioned. 
What evidence exists suggests that informal payments are a not insignificant source of 
private health care financing (Table 7.6). The World Bank, while emphasising their 
illegal character, suggests that such payments should be measured, with a view to 
incorporating them into a system of regulated cost sharing8 • The World Bank estimated 
informal payments (for pharmaceuticals and provider services) at 25% of total health 
costs in Romania, and 20% in Hungary8• 
The WHO Health Care in Transition reports have examined informal payments in several 
countries. With the demise of the Semashko system, the reliance on extra-budgetary 
sources at state health facilities in CEE/ FSU has increased, out of pocket user payments 
varying between 10% (Croatia and the Czech Republic) and 17% of total health 
expenditure in Hungary. 
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The reasons why some countries have more informal payments than others have not been 
systematically explored. The available studies have concentrated on a very few 
countries204 • 
Generally, the resurgence in informal payments has been explained by shortage of funds 
in the system, resulting in inadequate salaries and low quality of care. According to the 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office, gratuities alone were estimated at 11% of total 
health expenditure (1997). In Poland, informal payments to staff ("envelope payment") 
constituted 46% of all patient expenditure at hospital168• These payments increased 
physicians' net salaries by 15% and thus constitute a significant source of income. 
Annually, these payments accounted for more than double the annual salary bill. The 
introduction of universal health insurance systems, supplemented by private insurance, 
has offset informal payments in Croatia and the Czech Republic. These estimates 
should, however, be treated with caution because of problems of definition of informal 
payments and unclear methodology limiting comparability. 
Evidence indicates a wider use of informal payments as a supplementary source of 
financing in Central Asia. In Kyrgyzstan, the scale of informal payments has increased 
in recent years, 11% of those consulting a physician reporting payment in 1993, while in 
1996, half of patients made such a paymenf09 • An earlier survey in Kyrgyzstan from 
1994 showed that 8% of those who consulted in the out-patient setting and 25% of all at 
in-patient facilities have given gifts to staff1 83 • 24% of inpatients paid a formal charge for 
admission, but of those, 62% did not get a receipt. Although most gifts appeared 
unsolicited, their value can be significant (mean: $13.5). 80% of mothers gave a gift 
after delivery. 72% of gifts in relation to in-patient care were given before or during the 
treatment, with only 28% after the treatment, which contrasts with the current study. 
Informal payments constituted 18% of total payments for hospital inpatient stay. 
In Kazakhstan, out of pocket payments are officially only 5% of health expenditure, 
although other sources suggest that they may have reached 30% in 1996, with significant 
co-payments for officially free pharmaceuticals, services and hospital admission204 • 
Qualitative research has suggested a higher level of informal payments. 
In the former socialist countries, informal exchanges were encouraged by the falling 
prestige and incomes of physicians, widespread corruption in the wider economy and the 
lack of sanctions. Preliminary results from a survey conducted by the World Bank and 
the Albanian Center for Economic Research in 1998 showed that, of those who have paid 
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a bribe, the highest proportion ( 40%) paid for medical services, to state medical staff. 
State hospitals were viewed by public officials as the most corrupt institutions after the 
judiciary, customs and the privatisation agency210 • 
A study from India in 1993 showed that most users of publicly run maternity homes 
(89°/o) and a quarter of those who used private hospitals (24%) paid a bribe. Bribes 
constituted from 6o/o to 38% of total hospital expenses208 • 
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Table 7 .6. Out of pocket payments/ informal payments in selected countries 
Sources: HiT (Health Systems in Transition). World Health Organisation, Regional Office for 
Europe, Copenhagen: 1999 (in press); World Development Report 1993. Investing in Health. The 
IBRD I The World Bank. Oxford University Press, 1993; Chawla M, Berman P, Kawiorska D. 
Financing health services in Poland: new evidence on private expenditure. Health Econ 1998; 7: 
337-346; Ensor T, Savelyeva L. Informal payments for health care in the Former Soviet Union: 
some evidence from Kazakstan. Health Policy and Planning 1998; 13(1): 41-4; Falkingham J. 
Barriers to Access? The growth of private payments for health care in Kyrgyzstan. 
EuroHealth, Special Issue Winter 1998/99; 4(6): 68-71; Abel-Smith B, Falkingham J. Financing 
Health Services in Kyrgyzstan: the extent of private payments. Mimeo LSE Health, London: 
London School of Economics, 1995 
Country Out-of-pocket/ Informal payments Source 
Albania 16% of total health financing- out-of-pocket (1996) HiT 1999 
Croatia 10% of direct service costs - co-payments HiT, 1999 
Czech Republic 10% of health financing before health insurance - HiT 1994 
gratuities and under-the-counter payments 
Hungary 17% of total health expenditure - out-of-pocket HiT, 1999 
payments (1996) 
11% of total health expenditure - gratuities (1997) HiT 1999 
20% of total health costs - informal payments The World Bank, 1993 
Kazakhstan • 30% of total health expenditure - out-pocket for Ensor, 1998 
drugs, food, nursing services( 1996) 
• A survey by local newspaper, almost all 500 
patients paid UCP for service 
• 1 0% of financing in Almaty was covered by user 
charges (1996) 
5% of total expenditure - out of pocket payment HiT, 1999 
(officially) 
Kyrgyzstan • 10-15% to 20-30% of total health expenditure - HiT, 1999 
out-of-pocket payments (1996) 
• a half of those consulted made informal payment Falkingham, 1998/9 
for consultation ( 1996) 
Abel-Smith and 
• 8% of outpatients and 25% of in-patients gave 
gifts to the staff Falkingham, 1995 
• 24% paid formally for admission, but of those 
62% did not get a receipt (informal payment) 
• 18% of total cost of hospital stay - informal 
Poland • 46% of expenditure per episode of hospital Chawla et al, 1998 
treatment ("envelope payment") (national household 
• 
Reported "envelope payments" more than double survey 1994) 
the average gross salary of a physician 
The World Bank, 1993 Romania 25% of total health costs - informal payments 
Data on size of under-the-table payments in Albania were published in a popular weekly 
magazine211 (Table 7.7). It is evident that the total cost of delivery may equal the average 
monthly wage in the public sector, while more complex surgical treatments may exceed 
it by several times. Clearly, for people on low salaries, and pensioners, particularly in 
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the rural areas, these payments are unaffordable. This may put them at risk of receiving 
poor quality or delayed services. Doctors justified these rates by their very low 
remuneration. 
Table 7.7. Under-the-counter payments in Albania by setting/ type of service 
Source : Data published by the "Klan" magazine in June 1998 (in Albanian ) 
Setting/ type of procedure Payments $equivalent 
(Lek) 
District hospital 
Delivery (payment to the obstetrician) 
Caesarean section 
Delivery (to each of the nurses attending) 
Delivery (to the cleaning lady) 
Delivery (to the gate-keeper) 
Total per delivery 
Tirana University Hospital Centre 
Operation for appendicitis 
Operation for prostate enlargement 
Operation for cholecystectomy 
Operation for nephrolithiasis 
Operation on stomach 
Cardiac valve replacement 
A valve replacement 
Official minimt!fp vvrage (1997) 
Average,monthlyvvrageein the public sector (1997) 
Maxi:rnu:rp'urban pension (1997) 
Maximum ruralpensioh (1997) 
Pro~essg~'s ~al .. ~:i~ ~he Vniversity Hospital, 
Tirarl~ / · · · · · · 
Rationale for informal payments 
Data from the population survey 
Reasons for informal payments 
3,000 
5,000 
500 
200 
200 
2,000 
4,000 
15 ,000 
10,000 
100-150,000 
25 ,000 
100,000 
4,400 
9,559 
6,500 
1,248 
20 000 
20 
55 
3.5 
1.5 
1.5 
30-60 
15 
25 
100 
70 
100 
170 
650-700 
30 
63 
43 
8.5 
135 
Women and men tended to pay in similar situations, with the largest percentage reporting 
payment because of serious illness (10% of men and 12% of women) or to obtain a 
consultation with a well-known specialist or at an elite clinic (9% of men and 12% of 
women) (Table 7.8). Other reasons for rendering payment were gratitude for successful 
treatment (8% of men, 9% of women), to receive special attention (8% of men, 10% of 
women), or for services of high standard (8% of men, 11 % of women). 
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Table 7 .8. Reasons for payment at state health facilities 
Type of service paid for: 
In case of serious illness 
For consultation with a prominent specialist /clinic 
Because I was satisfied with the successful treatment 
Because the physician paid me special attention 
To receive a high-quality service 
Because my child/person very close to me was ill 
Because the attitude of staff was very good 
Because I knew that I would be treated immediately 
To have access to better equipment I medication 
Because I had enough money 
Because the price was affordable 
To be treated close to my home 
At least one of the above cases 
Data from the qualitative research 
Reasons for informal payments 
% selected this option 
men women 
10% 12% 
9% 12% 
8% 9% 
8% 10% 
8% 11% 
7% 9% 
6% 7% 
6% 7% 
6% 8% 
3% 4% 
3% 6% 
2% 4% 
21.1 °/o 27.3 °/o 
Respondents suggested three different sets of issues underlying informal payments: 
related to the physician; to the patient; and to the health system organisation. 
In relation to physicians, a predominant explanation for the existence of informal 
payments is the low salaries of medical staff in the state sector, leading to a growing 
demand for extra payments84 • 
"Due to the impossibility of doctors to live with these salaries, which are given to them by 
the state". [user] 
Physicians' incomes are considered inadequate, thus creating a justification for informal 
payments. Some respondents thought that physicians receive an inappropriately low 
salary compared to other occupations, with fees paid even for private treatment. 
"A doctor, who is an extremely good specialist, even by western standards, performs 
complex operations, but is not paid adequately... It is quite normal for him to expect 
somebody to pay for his work and it is normal for the patient to want to pay, because 
nobody else could provide the service" [user] 
"Complete chaos: poor medical staff, to whom it is unspoken rule to pay in order to 
receive any service at all, and that is a service of unknown quality. " [user] 
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The payments were sometimes seem as "enforced'', or "demanded'' by the doctors. 
Abuse of the dependency relationship between doctor and patient promotes informal 
payments. In this model, the doctor bears all the responsibility for the payment. 
Surprisingly, in many cases the payment is instigated by the patients. In a positive sense, 
payment may be motivated by "hope for successful treatment", or may seek high-quality 
service, a better attitude or convenience. Payment is perceived as unproblematic when it 
is made in good faith, on the patient's own initiative and if it does not cause them 
financial difficulties ("spontaneous" [user]), but not when users are forced to pay in order 
to receive adequate treatment. In some cases, they are perceived as low in view of the 
expected benefit. This was seen as a mechanism for the patient to gain control over their 
treatment. Payment may also serve to reduce the cost to patients from waiting or 
suffering204 • In other cases, the decision to pay may reflect compliance with traditions 
and expectation rather than a rational choice. 
"People feel more confident sure in their treatment when they pay ... " [user] 
In this context, respondents thought that such payments are made by wealthier people 
who can afford it anyway and therefore it is not a problem. The idea that such payments 
may create expectations for all to pay something and thus exacerbate inequality, was not 
considered. 
"Some people have a lot of money... and think that the attitude (of staff) towards them 
will be far better if they pay" [user] 
The negative side of this could be a patient feeling that payment is necessary to receive 
adequate treatment. 
"These are payments made not so much from good heart, but from fear and ignorance, 
especially if their illness is a more serious or chronic. " [user] 
Another set of factors underlying informal payments, perceived by many respondents, 
stemmed from shortages caused by underfunding, expressed as "poor system of health 
financing", "ineffective administrative system" [user], "lack of regulation of payment", 
"disorganised way of financing" [user]; and "unequal access to certain services by 
patients" [user]. 
Informal payments for health care are perceived to reflect a pervasive culture of 
corruption in the wider economy, aggravated by a "lack of law and order in the country" 
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[user], " ... because such things are tolerated" [user]. Use of informal strategies shows 
lack of trust in the official procedures in the health care system. 
Two-thirds of users thought that informal payments are a reaction to economic 
difficulties rather than a product of culture or tradition. The common view that 
corruption is culturally determined recently has been challenged elsewhere203 and is 
supported in this study. 
"Unti/1989 it wasn't a tradition. This informal payment appeared as a consequence of 
the overall collapse of the economy. " [user] 
"I think that the current financial situation of the state degenerate the relationship 
between patient and physician. " [user] 
Despite that, a third of users still viewed informal payments as a deeply rooted tradition, 
which limit the possibilities of control. It is important to distinguish between giving a 
gift, which is considered traditional behaviour, and paying cash, which is associated 
more with present-day corruption. 
"It is a tradition to pay respect to a physician (i.e. with a gift), because he is looking 
after the most precious thing- health. But these additional informal payments, this is not 
a tradition, they are just imposed by life. " [user] 
Winners and losers 
The majority of respondents felt that the medical staff (the doctor who is responsible for 
the treatment, the team who operate, auxiliary staff) benefit exclusively from informal 
payments as a direct supplement to their salaries. In an insecure environment, such 
payments are a "direct" supplement to staff remuneration. 
"Of course it benefits the physicians, but we should not be angry with them, because still 
they are highly qualified specialists, and given that the state cannot pay them, they have 
to search for other sources" [user] 
The personality of the physician and their position are viewed as important determinants 
as to whether they succumb to participation in such relationships. Doctors who have an 
opportunity to do so ("have wealthy patients" [user] or are well-known "stars''), are more 
likely to receive an informal payment. 
"Unscrupulous, there are some who take advantage of the situation" "Physicians with the 
'right' way of thinking" [user] "Unfortunately physicians are only human ... " [user] 
"A person who is not well-off very easily could be bought... to do their job better. " 
[physician] 
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Some respondents recognised that informal payments may benefit both physician and 
patient. The patient shows attention and respect and receives the same. 
"The benefit is for the both sides, there is no argument about that. Nobody would pay, if 
doesn't know that will receive something back. " [user J 
A few people also felt that such payments are indirectly beneficial to the health care 
system as a whole by attracting extra-budgetary funds. 
"Such payments are an additional income for the health facility as a whole and I think 
that it is an input into the overall treatment of the patient" [user J 
The role of informal payments 
Several important functions of informal payments emerged from the study, derived 
mainly from patients' perspectives. The most common is as an expression of gratitude 
for a successful outcome. Traditionally it involves gifts, services or other non-monetary 
goods given after completion of treatment and to acknowledge the physicians' efforts 
(the word "attention" is used by a patient as synonymous to gift). Even small tokens 
(''for memory" [user]) could serve this purpose. Gratitude may be for the attention and 
responsiveness of the physician ("met with understanding from a physician" [user]). 
Thus, in Kyrgyzstan, according to tradition, small unsolicited gifts are made after 
delivery (66% in urban; 85% in rural areas)183. 
" ... there are such cases, the patient from gratitude leaves you some money at the end -
for the work, or simply, for the sake of their health". [physician] 
"something that would please them, show them they are respected, honoured .... " [user] 
Another function, typically involving cash payments, but also gifts, given before or 
during the treatment, is to ensure respect from staff and high quality of care in the 
forthcoming treatment. The first step is to establish communication and attract the 
attention of apparently unmotivated staff towards the patient's medical problem by means 
of an informal payment or the promise of one in the future ("getting the physician to 
remember you"). The next step is to ensure that higher than average quality of care is 
provided, waiting is avoided and preferential treatment secured. Payment to obtain quick 
service, to improve the standard of treatment, or secure a good attitude of staff, are 
common reasons for informal payments elsewhere204 208 • Payments by users have been 
found to be a significant determinant of the type ofhealth care and attention from staff 68 • 
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In contrast to functions relating to the past or present, informal payments also have an 
insurance role, guaranteeing a degree of security in case of future illness. This involves 
gaining the confidence of staff and establishing a long-term relationship. Such a strategy 
was considered essential in a situation of rapid and unpredictable change in a health 
sector facing chronic shortages and low standards of care. 
"In case of future illness, future problems, to have somebody to contact, somebody to 
provide a normal treatment" [user] 
"Usually the patients are trying to insure themselves, offering them before, and not after 
the work is done. We are talking about the more serious things ... " [physician] 
" ... some patients have tried to give gifts also before the treatment, but I am a bit 
superstitious, insist for them to be given at the end, if any. " [physician] 
Informal payments also demonstrated the patient's willingness to contribute to their own 
treatment, but attitudes to contributions to a formally free health system are discussed 
further in chapters 9-11. 
Attitudes to informal payments 
Attitudes to informal payments (qualitative research) 
In general, there are several types of reaction to informal payments. Firstly, many 
patients and physicians considered this practice to be unethical and "not right", 
especially concerning cash. In the view of many physicians, under-the-counter payments 
are often humiliating due to the circumstances surrounding the payment and its often 
small size or curious nature. The under-the-counter payments, when in cash ("envelopes 
with money"), tend to be viewed negatively by the majority of respondents, taking such 
payments is seen as improper behaviour. 
"Bulgaria should become a modern country, where all those presents and services do not 
exist in the health care, and in our life, in general. Everybody to earn their living 
honestly, and this to determine their attitude to the patient" [user] 
"It is ugly when a physician asks for money" [survey sample] 
Some patients have even found them distasteful, "shocking" and "inexplicable from a 
human point of view" (e.g. the previously mentioned story about the dinner party before 
an operation for cancer). A recurring theme among physicians is that payments or gifts 
could restrict clinical autonomy, while giving more control to the patient through the 
creation of a binding relationship. 
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"Sometimes the patient gives 100-200 Leva, 'to treat yourself', and the physician 
refuses... because these money are not enough, but are binding. Later he could say he 
gave money to the doctor, yet 200 Leva could only buy a coffee. " [physician] 
"Often the price of these under-the-counter services is not set ... It diminishes the self-
esteem of the physician: to have money slipped into the pocket ... he feels bad about it 
because the sum does not always corresponds to he did, but in many case this is the only 
way of increasing income. In general, it is unpleasant for both sides. " [physician] 
Another group of physicians and patients were tolerant, and viewed under-the-counter 
payments as a matter of fact and even as a positive gesture towards underpaid, but 
deserving, medical staff. The fact that physicians are disadvantaged means that they 
deserve an additional payment. In this respect, payments are often seen as indicative of 
good manners and politeness. Often the payments were considered "normal", or 
"understandable" in the light of the current economic situation. 
For some, such practices even amounted to "social justice" in the face of the failure of 
the state to finance adequately the health care system. Physicians also thought that 
presents, as a sign of respect, could improve the morale of the profession. 
"I think that it is not undignified for neither sides, it is hard work after all ... " [physician] 
"For the physician to have done his job well is a satisfaction and naturally, he is pleased 
also to receive a present- this is a sign of respect." [physician] 
A third view is that patients have the right to show their respect by giving presents, as 
long as they are voluntary and not requested by staff. This is deemed part of the private 
sphere of human behaviour and not appropriate to regulate. 
"If the patient is satisfied I think that he has the right ... to buy the physician a Mercedes 
if he wants " [user] 
Small presents and cash sums are deemed acceptable in state facilities but, over a certain 
threshold, going directly to the private sector is preferred. Patients reported that informal 
payments have a definite impact on treatment. 
Opinions are divided on whether informal payments pose a serious problem (13-no; 19-
yes). Some respondents thought that informal payments must not be an important 
problem, because of the lack of open discussion on the subject. Others viewed informal 
payments for health care as no more serious than similar unregulated activities in other 
spheres of society. They were also perceived as a manifestation of the expansion of the 
private health care sector and an inevitable expansion of cost-sharing. 
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"It is not a problem, this is the situation at the moment. As profiteering is a temporary 
problem in the state, this is the same ... Even not so serious problem. " [user] 
"I don't think that it is a serious problem, because in practice an unofficial system for 
paid health care is functioning. Hardly anybody has illusions that health care in Bulgaria 
is currently free. " [user] 
Of those seeing informal payments as problematic, several types of problems were 
perceived. One is to do with the inequalities it creates, and affordability. 
" ... not everyone receives the same medical service ... actually people who cannot pay, 
cannot obtain sometimes even the most necessary health care. " [user] 
"It is becoming a problem, with even the poor starting to feel obliged". [user] 
"Of course, in some cases this leads to abuse, and at certain point they may refuse to do 
something vitally important, if payment is not guaranteed beforehand. " [user] 
Informal payments also place physicians in a difficult situation, because of the stigma 
attached (''It is a problem for the doctors as well, because they have to hide" [user]). 
Finally, many respondents saw informal payments as reflecting problems inherent in the 
health care system and posing challenges for it ("the way health care operates 
currently... is a problem" [user] " ... everything should be evaluated, and patients 
required to pay formally". [user]). 
Acceptability of payments in state facilities (survey) 
Data from the survey on acceptability of informal payments provide a useful parallel. 
Respondents were asked to evaluate a series of statements relating to the acceptability of 
such payment in the state sector. 
61% of men and 63% of women felt strongly (highest degree on the scale) that it is 
unacceptable for physicians in state facilities to receive money from their patients. In 
marked contrast, a situation in which a patient gives money to a physician in a state 
health facility following a successful outcome of treatment was unacceptable to only 
21% of men and 22% of women, while 38% of men and 36% of women found it 
perfectly acceptable, and another 28% of men and 30% of women thought it acceptable 
only sometimes. It is interesting that there is disapproval of the physician who accepts 
money, but approval of the patient who gives it. 
The predominant view was that it is acceptable for patients who are satisfied with their 
treatment to leave without expressing their gratitude to the physician through payments, 
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presents, or favours (81% of man and 82% of women). Only 9% of men and of women 
thought it is unacceptable for a patient, if satisfied, not to give a gift. Similarly, in the in-
depth interviews, only a few users and no physicians thought a patient impolite if they 
leave the facility without giving anything. 
The negative reaction to informal payment is stronger where they are requested by the 
health professional. 58% of men and of women stated that in no circumstance is this 
acceptable and a further 22% of men and 23% of women deemed it rather unacceptable. 
15% of men and 13% of women considered that it is acceptable for a state-employed 
physician to ask for payment in specific circumstances: shortage of basic resources at 
health facility (5% of men and women); low salaries of physicians (4% of men and 3% of 
women). Only 2o/o of men and 3% of women thought it right to pay for service in a state 
facility. 
These findings indicate that cash or in-kind payments in the state sector, in general, are 
acceptable, when initiated by the patient, rather than medical staff. There is a strong 
opposition to requests for payments or other pressures on users to pay. 
Potential responses to informal payments 
Potential responses to informal payments (qualitative research) 
A set of solutions emerged in relation to informal payments. Many respondents, 
predominantly physicians felt that informal payments exist because of deficiencies in the 
health care system in general. In this case, large-scale reform of health care financing is 
seen as a necessary solution. It was thought that a social insurance system in which, it 
was assumed, the patient would be provided for and the physician adequately paid, 
would cause such payments to disappear. Those physicians who benefit most from 
informal payments are perceived not to have an interest in financing reform and to be an 
obstacle to it. 
"Whoever does reform, should do it quickly, not to complain of obstacles, because this 
thing (IP) corrupts the health care. Health care was a moral category once. " [user] 
"This problem could be resolved if the doctor becomes financially independent, i.e. is 
sufficiently well paid not to succumb to such 'gestures'" [physician] 
Another alternative to eliminate payments is to rely on user fees, or other forms of 
expansion of the private sector, but with part of the payment benefiting the physician 
directly. 
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It was also suggested that, as informal payments exist because of the lack of official 
channels for patients' contributions, voluntary contributions could be channelled through 
a range of quasi-private pathways: sponsorship, advertising, contracts with private firms, 
or donations. Direct community participation has roots in the national culture suppressed 
by the Semashko system, and more innovative forms should be sought. 
"Each hospital has to use non-conventional methods of raising additional resources, 
which to be collected in a special fund and used for the poor. " [physician J 
Another preference was for the informal payments to be collected for the whole facility 
or within teams, and then distributed among medical staff, thus eliminating inequality 
among specialities. 
In another, less common, view expressed by physicians, inequalities in treatment are 
normal in a market economy and this is not considered a problem: 
"Those who pay are served better, as in the whole world - nothing new. Everywhere 
there are hospitals for rich and for poor. I don 't recommend you go in a hospital for 
poor abroad. Here, the difference is even smaller. " [physician] 
Discussion 
This chapter presented the results from a 1997 study on the scale and characteristics of 
the informal economy in the health sector in Bulgaria. This topic has not been 
previously explored by means of representative surveys in Bulgaria, limiting the scope to 
validate the results. 
The level of reporting informal payments is somewhat lower than expected from 
previous work in Bulgaria205 • In particular, it is possible that responses were influenced 
by perceptions of the semi-illicit nature of the informal transactions. Some 
underreporting may have occurred due to sensitivity of the issues or people being unable 
to recall how much they have paid in a situation of rapidly changing prices and wages, 
caused by inflation in the 1990s. Some of the characteristics of informal payments were 
found in the process of research, which if known at the start would have potentially 
increased the ability of the questionnaire to distinguish the types of payments made. 
Although the study of informal payments in a population sample gives an impression of 
the overall distribution, those who have made informal payments should then be targeted 
specifically. Despite these limitations the methodology has provided a starting point for 
further investigation of the informal exchanges in the health care system in Bulgaria. 
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Informal payments, especially as gifts, are relatively familiar phenomena in Bulgaria. 
Although in the survey less than a quarter of the sample reported having paid informally 
in cash or in-kind, the in-depth interviews showed that all respondents had experience 
with in-kind payments and, for many, cash payments. 
Considered in an international context, it is evident that informal payments in Bulgaria 
appear to be on a smaller scale than those in Hungary206, Poland168, and Central Asia204 2o9 
where research has shown a large informal sector. For many types of services, such as 
hospital admission, payments are negligible, while in Kyrgyzstan about three quarters 
paid for hospital admission in 1996209, in Kazakhstan these are reported to be twice the 
monthly salary212 • 
In Bulgaria two parallel layers of informal payments were identified (Figure 7.7). The 
first layer comprises traditional gifts given, on the patients' initiative, as a sign of 
gratitude after a successful outcome of treatment. These were deemed part of the private 
sphere of human behaviour and not appropriate to regulate. The second layer are 
payments (increasingly in cash) for physicians' services, given before or during 
treatment, often requested by staff, and fees covering treatment-related expenses. While 
the first type is considered a culturally determined phenomenon, the latter is seen as a 
product of financial imperfections in the health care system and an economic necessity, 
rather than tradition. This second group, which are closer to corruption, were opposed by 
both users and physicians. Cash or in-kind payments in the state sector are considered 
acceptable only when initiated by the patient, not staff. 
Figure 7.5. Layers of informal payments in Bulgaria (1997) 
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The most common reason for making an informal payment is in case of serious illness, 
for access to well-known specialists or clinics, or as a guarantee of high quality service. 
Under-the-counter payments, as well as user fees for pharmaceuticals, food, or nursing 
services, occur more often in in-patient facilities and for more complex treatments, thus 
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posing a burden to users. This is consistent with the view that corruption is more likely 
to occur in the public sector, where there are more obstacles to individual choice2°3 . 
People are least likely to have paid for convenient access to services, which reflects a still 
existing infrastructure. In contrast to the former Soviet Union, where payments in rural 
areas are predominantly in-kind20\ in Bulgaria the divide is less pronounced. 
The current research demonstrated that the richer and more educated sections are more 
likely to pay informally. This may suggest that informal payments are flexible and 
discretionary, reflecting closely the patient's financial status, thus not affecting equity. 
This could be viewed as an argument for some kind of formalisation and establishing 
exemption practices. Official user charges have been regressive, however, as patients are 
required to pay the market cost of drugs and consumables, without taking account of 
income. Charges for surgical materials and hospital admission, for example, are often at 
the discretion of the medical staff and, except for the very poor, are not related to 
income, thereby reinforcing inequity. 
There is evidence of the existence of a two-tier system, advantaging people able and 
willing to pay staff informally, or contribute towards the cost of their treatment. From 
another perspective, however, informal payments by the wealthy raised the overall 
expectation of staff, and ultimately may increase the cost for all patients. 
Patients' and physicians' attitudes towards gifts are an important barometer. As in other 
studies203, informal payments were perceived to be rooted in socio-economic and 
institutional factors in the health care system, rather than peculiar to certain personalities. 
Among these factors are low salaries, with no performance related component, 
disillusionment with slow health reform, poor organisation of the system, and severe 
funding shortages. 
The qualitative research suggests a possible shift in the size, form and meaning of under-
the-counter payments and user fees in the 1990s. Payments are more significant now, 
increasingly in cash and more often requested, or expected, in the initial stages of the 
treatment. Under-the-counter payments, however, often take the form of pragmatic gifts, 
rather than presents serving only aesthetic purposes (flowers, souvenirs). Although gifts 
may have been common before 1989, inflation and falling living standards have reduced 
their real value and made even traditional gifts unaffordable for many users. 
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While increased informal cost-sharing may be seen as a necessary response to the 
economic crisis in the public sector, the same conditions also affect the individual 
' 
lowering standards of living and diminishing their willingness and ability to pay. 
Although a high proportion of respondents in the survey paid from current income, 
suggesting affordability, in interviews some patients and physicians expressed the view 
that even "standard" gifts have become unaffordable. 
Several strategies are employed to obtain high quality treatment. Offering payment is 
one, another is use of a "connection" to ensure preferential access. The effect of personal 
contact may be enhanced by a gift. Thus, when physicians themselves are ill, typically 
they rely on professional contacts to obtain health services, perhaps in combination with 
a gift, but rarely pay in cash. 
Despite its relatively limited scope, this evidence on informal payments shows that the 
principle of comprehensive free coverage, on which the health care system in Bulgaria 
was based until 1989, has been undermined in the face of growing economic pressures. 
Informal payments are perceived to be rooted mainly in the lack of incentives for staff 
and severe shortages in the health care system. Other research suggests that private 
expenditure has been a growing source of health sector financing, with a large informal 
component94 • A widely shared view is that the quality, and ultimately the success, of 
treatment depends on the individual's willingness and ability to pay under-the-counter. 
Informal payments are viewed as creating a two-tier system and have potential for abuse. 
This picture of informal payments is likely to influence future health sector financing in 
several ways. Since December 1997, user fees for certain services such as hotel services, 
hospital admission charges and consulting directly a specialist, were legalised. The 
revenue constituted less than 1% of expenditure of municipal health facilities94 • 
Although the Decree sets clear rules for exemptions, no evidence that such procedures 
were implemented was detected in this study. More importantly, this research suggested 
that sporadic introduction of user fees has not eliminated under-the-counter payments as 
suggested by some205 • For example, childbirth is formally exempted from user charges, 
but is commonly the subject of under-the-counter payment. User fees were often charged 
not only for luxurious or elective services, but also for basic services. 
Contrary to the common western perception, a model based on corruption IS over-
simplistic. The evidence that informal payments are a sign of gratitude indicates a 
"culture of gifts", rooted in values and traditions across all income strata in society. 
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Adopting the framework of contextual factors relating to implementation devised by 
Leichter-2
13
, such factors can be considered cultural, and thus not easily amenable to 
change in the short-term. Instead, strategies are required that take account of them and 
tum them to advantage. 
Informal payments also create numerous perverse incentives. It has been argued that 
they reduce the efficiency of the system, leading to overspecialisation and use of over-
complex procedures. It is argued that they supply revenue for the health sector that the 
state fails to raise through taxation204 • Informal payments also encourage health 
personnel to seek employment in both the private and public sector168, creating an 
incentive to neglect their poorly monitored public commitments for more lucrative 
private ones. They also inhibit reform: "in a system where both physicians and patients 
have come to understand the advantages of informal payments, any change therein may 
require many attitudinal adjustments"168• On the positive side, unregulated payments in 
the health care system might have made patients more familiar with the costs of health 
care30 • 
Informal payments may pose a threat to further reform if payment continues to be made 
on top of insurance claims. Thus, there is a need to convey the message that it is possible 
to obtain high-quality service without informal paymenf04 206 • 
In view of the planned radical transformation of financing, policy makers face dilemmas 
in relation to informal payments. Should specific action be taken or will the new 
financing system make it unnecessary? Despite the existence of a formal private sector 
and user fees, under-the-counter payments appear to be increasing. Until now the 
government has chosen to ignore the problem. It is assumed simply that the 
implementation of a health insurance system will eliminate informal payments. 
However, implementation of health insurance is unlikely to provide the funds needed to 
improve salaries to a level adequate to drive out informal payments. 
An alternative route is to set some broad rules regarding informal payments, particularly 
when 'involuntary' or in cash, during the transition to health insurance. Solutions 
suggested by respondents include introduction of a compulsory health insurance system; 
or at least a form of insurance; formal redirection of part of the revenue from user fees to 
staff; and establishment of official, but flexible, channels for voluntary contributions by 
patients such as sponsorship, advertising, or subscription contracts. Banning informal 
payments or imposing prohibitive measures is not considered a productive strategy. The 
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scale of informal payments and whether they are initiated voluntarily by patients are seen 
as essential in deciding whether to regulate them. If gifts are small and purely symbolic, 
they should be unregulated as they are an expression of societal values and practices. 
The scale of, and trends in, informal payments demonstrated in this study suggest the 
need to devise an explicit and coherent policy towards informal payment as an essential 
element for effective implementation of financing reform. 
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CHAPTER 8. HEALTH EXPENDITURE AND ABILITY 
TO PAY IN BULGARIA 
Introduction 
Information on current out-of-pocket expenditure for health care and its affordability is 
essential to design a sustainable and equitable health sector financing system. 
This chapter focuses mainly on the individual's last consultation with a health 
professional. It asks how much they paid for the consultation and what form the 
payments took. It explores how payments vary according to the socio-economic 
characteristics of the patient. Finally, it moves from what was paid, to whether it was 
affordable, assessing ability to pay for both the last visit and, with caution, the last 
episode of illness, by means of self-reports and by comparing actual payments to income. 
The chapter draws on both the population survey and the qualitative study. The analysis 
of the survey data includes only those who have ever consulted a health professional 
(men n=489 and women n=726). The expenditure analysis focuses only on those who 
consulted a health professional in the past four weeks (n=329). 
Ideally, the cost of an entire episode of illness would be estimated. This is intrinsically 
problematic. A hospitalisation for elective surgery will involve an initial consultation, 
referral to hospital, out-patients hospitalisation, and post-discharge follow-up. Although, 
in this case, the treatment episode can be defined, it may be difficult for the respondent to 
recall what was involved at each stage. In other cases, the beginning and end of the 
episode may be much more difficult to define, as is the case for many chronic diseases 
requiring long-term review. For these reasons, the cost of the last health care contact is 
the main subject of this chapter. 
Health expenditure 
Data from the population survey 
Level of health expenditure (last contact) 
The overall expenditure incurred during the last visit to a health care professional was 
calculated for those who reported consulting a health professional in the past four weeks 
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(n=329). The median expenditure in primary health care facilities (n=207) was 2,000 
Leva ($1.3 in May 1997), and in the hospital sector (n=78) it was 1,950 Leva. The 
distributions were highly skewed, so that the means are respectively 4,072 Leva and 
4,496 Leva ($3 in May 1997). The median health expenditure constituted 1.4% of the 
average salary and 5-6% of the average pension in May 1997214 • Expressed in terms of 
the legal minimum, rather than average figures, the median expenditure was 5% of 
minimum salary and 12% of minimum pension in May 1997. 
As previously noted, these figures are an under-estimate of the total cost of an episode of 
illness and only capture a single (last) attendance. In addition, in-patient episodes, which 
are relatively infrequently recorded because of the focus on the last attendance, were only 
rarely captured. 
Type of health expenditure (last contact) 
All respondents who reported ever being ill were asked to describe all expenses related to 
their last contact with a health professional and the subsequent treatment. The expenses 
could be divided into several broad groups: travel expenses; expenses for 
pharmaceuticals (drugs, consumables, herbs); payment for diagnostic tests and other 
procedures; hospital expenses (including payments for food, bed linen, laundry; 
nursing/hospital attendant services; hospital admission fee); formal and informal 
payment to health personnel (monetary payments, gifts, gratuities); as well as loss of 
income due to absence and other inconvenience. 
The most common item of expenditure was medication or herbs (83% of men and 78% 
of women) (Table 8.1 ). The second most common payment category was travel expenses 
( 40% of men and women). Payments, gifts and gratuities given to medical staff came 
third (11% of men and 10% of women). Among the latter, non-monetary gifts were most 
commonly reported by women (8%) and monetary payments to physicians by men (7% 
of men). 13% of men and 7% ofwomen reported loss of income due to absence or other 
inconvenience in relation to the consultation. 5% of men and 9% of women reported 
paying in relation to hospital stay, and 9% and 4% respectively for tests or other 
procedures. 
13% ofmen and 15% ofwomen (of those in employment) reported absence from work 
during their last illness in the past four weeks. The majority of those who were absent 
from work (87% of men and 84% of women) had been given a medical certificate. 
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According to the still functioning Code of Labour from 195 1 (last amended in 1992), 
employees absent from work through illness, whose absence has been certified by 
designated health providers, are paid between 70% and 90% of their regular salary 
according to the length of their work experience. If the absence exceeds 15 days, the 
compensation increases by 10% for most groups. In practice, payment is not always 
made due to shrinking public budgets, forcing people who are ill to take unpaid leave. In 
general, people in the private sector are reluctant to claim sick leave, due to fears of 
losing their job. For these reasons, issuing of medical certificates has declined 
significantly since before 1989. 
A central question is whether expenditure vanes between different socio-economic 
groups. Again, self-perceived financial situation was used as it is a more sensitive 
indicator of well-being than income where under-reporting of income is common. 
There was no consistent pattern, with those whose financial situation was either good or 
bad equally likely to pay in a particular category. The exceptions were for tests and 
payments and gifts to staff where the wealthy were more likely than the poor to pay 
(Figure 8.1). 
Table 8.1. Health care expenditure by type (last consultation) 
Valid cases: men 120; women 209 
Paid for: 
Pharmaceuticals 
Travel expenses 
Herbs 
Tests 
Other inconvenience 
Payment to physician 
Loss of income 
Gifts, donations to staff 
Other expenditure 
Food/ bed linen 
Nursing services 
Hospital admission charge 
Services, gratuities for staff 
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Men% (n) 
73.3% (88) 
40% (48) 
9.2% ( 11) 
9.2% (11) 
8.3 % (10) 
6.7% (8) 
4.2% (5) 
4.2% (5) 
2.5% (3) 
1.7% (2) 
1.7% (2) 
1.7% (2) 
85.8% (103) 
14.2% (17) 
Women% (n) 
70.3 % (147) 
39.7 % (83) 
7.2 % (15) 
3.8 % (8) 
4.3 % (9) 
2.9 % (6) 
8.1 % (17) 
1.0 % (2) 
5.3 % (11 ) 
1.9 % (4) 
82.8 % (173) 
17.2 % (36) 
Figure 8.1. Percentage of respondents paying at their last consultation for each type of 
health care expenditure in relation to self-perceived financial situation 
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The previous section examined the probability of paying but it is equally important to 
examine the amount paid and how it varies within the population. 
The median health expenditure for the last contact, where this had taken place in the 
previous 4 weeks, was examined in relation to socio-demographic characteristics (Table 
8.2). Primary and secondary care services were examined separately. 
Those of working age (below 60) appear to pay more than those in other age groups at a 
primary health care consultation. Women tend to spend slightly more than men for 
primary care consultation, while men paid more than women in hospital. In both primary 
and secondary care, those with poor self-reported health are likely to pay twice as much 
as those with good health. 
Respondents in the lowest income quartile paid the smallest sums for a primary health 
consultation and the largest sums in hospital settings. Similarly, those assessing 
themselves as very poor seem to pay much more than the others for secondary health 
care, but comparable amounts in primary health care. Given the relatively simi lar 
patterns of utilisation across income groups described in chapter 6, this suggests an 
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unequally distributed burden of expenditure. Another explanation might be that the poor 
access hospital care later in the course of their illness, when complications might have 
occurred, possibly requiring higher expenditure. 
Those with only primary education tended to pay less for both primary and secondary 
care. 
The ability to discern meaningful patterns in the data on payment for secondary care is, 
however, greatly constrained by the small numbers involved. Statistical tests for 
significance are performed later in this chapter, in relation to affordability (the share of 
health expenditure from income). 
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Table 8.2. Median and interquartile health expenditure (last contact) by socio-economic 
characteristics 
Variable/ Category Expenditure for primary health Expenditure for secondary lzealtlt 
care (n=211) care (n=80) 
Median 25 %ile 75 %ile Valid Median 25 %ile 75 %ile Valid (Leva) n (Leva) ll SEX 
Men 1,600 0 5,250 (69) 2,660 0 8,3 15 (36) Women 2,009 0 5,000 (141) 1,100 0 5,320 (44) AGE GROUP 
<39 2,000 0 4,950 (40) 2,660 1000 9,800 (14) 40-49 3,000 0 6,000 (30) 5,000 0 6,000 (15) 50-59 2,000 357 5,075 (37) 800 0 4,300 (2 1) 
60-69 1,800 0 5,000 (53) 2,350 38 12,250 (1 6) 
>70 1,950 0 5,000 (50) 1,255 0 4,100 ( 14) 
INCOME QUARTILE 
I highest 2,000 0 3,723 (33) 1,400 0 7,490 (16) 
II 3,505 729 10,000 (34) 2,000 825 9,850 (13) 
III 2,100 300 5,000 (46) 1,750 0 5,850 (24) 
IV lowest 1,900 0 5,250 (85) 2,320 0 5,400 (23) 
EDUCATION 
Higher 3,500 1,250 9,550 (24) 900 0 12,500 (13) 
Secondary 2,000 0 6,000 (79) 3,000 1000 6,500 (31 ) 
Primary 1,200 0 4,000 (107) 500 0 5,400 (36) 
FINANCIAL SITUATION 
Very good/ good 15 0 4,375 (9) 0 0 0 (1) 
Neither good nor bad 1,900 0 4,375 (52) 2,000 0 5,080 (23 ) 
Rather poor 2,500 75 6,000 (77) 900 0 7,200 (29) 
Very poor 1,850 0 6,000 (68) 3,300 300 6,000 (26) 
MARITAL STATUS 
Married 2,400 0 5,300 (139) 1,500 0 5550 (61 ) 
Single 1,809 0 8,770 (13) 1,500 850 5400 (5) 
Divorced/ separated 1,750 0 4,009 (58) 2,760 600 6500 (14) 
SETTLEMENT 
Sofia 2,000 0 10,000 (19) 2,000 400 6425 (13) 
City 2,000 300 6,000 (62) 1,500 0 5020 (21 ) 
Town 3,300 0 5,588 (49) 1,450 0 10000 (24) 
Village 1,200 0 3,763 (80) 3,050 300 5400 (22) 
SELF -REPORTED HEALTH 
Good/ Rather good 1,300 0 4,000 (91) 950 0 3900 (28) 
Bad/ Rather bad 2,560 15 6,000 (119) 2,166 188 8225 (52) 
TOTAL 2,000 .0 5,000 (210) 1,950 .0 6,300 (80) 
Qualitative data 
Health expenditure related to the last illness was also addressed in the qualitative 
research. As in the survey, most users (25) reported making at least one type of payment 
in the course of their last treatment. In contrast, physicians rarely pay for health services 
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and are generally treated free by colleagues, friends, or other contacts, often in the same 
facility in which they work. About half of the physicians interviewed stated that their 
last consultation did not involve expenses, while the others reported some expenses for 
pharmaceuticals or related to illness of other household members or close relatives. 
"I am a physician, I have daily contact with physicians and obtain as a colleague free 
consultation if I need to. " [physician] 
"The private dentist where I went did not take money ... The treatment was very good, but 
despite that he refused payment. Thus, my expenses were only for materials. " [physician] 
Consistent with the survey results, payment for drugs is by far the most common and 
most expensive component within the overall treatment cost. Patients tend to recall more 
easily very large one-off expenditures ranging from 18,000 Leva to 50-60,000 Leva 
($12-$39) for an episode of illness, rather than small or seasonal expenditure, such as 
medication for flu in the winter. Direct payment to a health professional was relatively 
common unlike that found in the survey, although the sums appeared to be much smaller 
(up to 5,000 Leva- $3 for physician's services). Dental services are a particular case as 
the cost of services and medical materials is combined, and thus reported expenditure 
tended to be higher (between 3,000 and 13,000 Leva, $2-8). Reporting of any treatment-
related payments, apart from pharmaceutical expenses, was uncommon among the 
physicians. 
Ability to pay for health care 
Ability to pay was examined in two ways. First, the ratios of health expenditure to 
income for both last consultation and last illness were calculated. Second, expenditure as 
a share of monthly household income was compared between socio-economic groups. 
Given the difficulties of measuring income in Bulgaria, the survey used three approaches. 
Respondents were asked directly about different sources of income and these were 
summed; respondents were asked to select an income category; these two reports of 
income were compared with expenditure. Self-reported income (in income categories) 
appeared to be more robust, less sensitive, and with a higher response rate. This measure 
was used in the subsequent analysis. 
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Data from the population survey 
Ability to pay: estimates 
Those in the lowest income brackets pay similar or slightly higher amounts than those 
with higher incomes (Figure 8.2alb ). 
The regressive nature of the payments becomes apparent when health expenditure for the 
last consultation is expressed as a percentage of household income (Figure 8.3alb). 
Poorer groups tended to pay a somewhat higher proportion of their income. 
This pattern appears less pronounced where the overall cost of the most recent episode of 
illness as a share of monthly income is considered (Figure 8.4). However, these data are 
somewhat problematic as respondents had to estimate the share of health expenses to 
income during the interview, this may have posed difficulties for some. Thus, a 
considerably large percentage were unsure of what expenses for the last illness were as a 
proportion of disposable income of their household ( 48% of men and 45% of women), 
and 18% of men and 17% of women reported that expenses were very low or there were 
no expenses at all. 
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Figure 8.2alb. Total health expenditure for last consultation (in Leva) by monthly 
household income 
No. of cases=211 
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Figure 8.3alb. Total health expenditure for last consultation (as a percentage of monthly 
household income) by monthly income 
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Figure 8.4. Total health expenditure for last episode of illness (as a percentage of monthly 
household income) by income: self-reported 
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The proportion of income spent on the last contact (past 4 weeks) varied considerably 
among socio-demographic groups (Table 8.3). Inequalities by sex, age, and income 
status, appeared more significant than those observed for median expenditure measured 
in absolute values. For example the median proportion of health expenditure in relation 
to income among the better off is five times lower (1 %) than that for the poorest quartile 
(5%) for primary and secondary care expenditure. Half of those above 70 spent over 4% 
of their income at a primary health care consultation, compared to 1% of those below 39, 
but exactly the opposite was observed for secondary health care. 
The self-assessed expenditure as proportion of income for the last episode of illness 
shows a broadly similar pattern, although the figures tend to be rounded highlighting the 
limitations of these data noted earlier. Most often reported were payments of 5% or less 
of the monthly household income during the last episode of illness (11% of men and 
12% of women). 8% of men and 9% of women paid 6-10% of the monthly household 
budget. However, there were some for whom this was higher: 6% of men and of women 
reported paying 11-20% of their income; 5% of men and 7% of women reported paying 
21-50%; and 3% of men and 4% of women reported paying larger percentages (above 
50%, including several cases of payments exceeding 100% of income). 
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Table 8.3. Health expenditure as percentage of income by socio-economic characteristics 
Variable/ Category % of income spent for last visit % of income spent fo r last 
illness 
Primary Secondary 
Median Valid Median Valid n Median Valid n 
(estimate) n (estimate) (self-reported) 
SEX 
Men 2.6 (68) 2.8 (36) 10 (50) 
Women 2.3 (139) 1.4 (42) 10 (113 ) 
NS NS p<0.001 
-
-
AGE GROUP 
<39 1.1 (39) 4.7 (14) 5 (28) 
40-49 1.7 (30) 2.2 (15) 10 (38) 
50-59 3.3 (36) 0.9 (20) 15 (30) 
60-69 2.3 (52) 3.5 (16) 10 (38) 
>70 4.4 (50) 0.9 (13) 15 (29) 
NS NS p<0.05 
-
-
INCOME QUARTILE 
I highest 1.0 (33) 0.7 (16) 8.5 (32) 
II 2.7 (34) 1.8 (13 10 (31 ) 
III 2.6 (46) 2.2 (24) 10 (39) 
IV lowest 5.2 (85) 5.0 (23) 11 (56) 
p<O.OOl NS p<0.05 
-
EDUCATION 
Higher 4.0 (23) 2.0 (13) 10 (36) 
Secondary 2.4 (79) 2.2 (31) 8 (59) 
Primary 2.0 (105) 0.8 (34) 11 (68) 
NS NS p<0.05 
-
-
FINANCIAL SITUATION 
Very good/ good 0.0 (9) 0.0 (1) 2.5 (4) 
Neither good nor bad 1.1 (51) 2.0 (22) 10 (44) 
Rather poor 2.7 (76) 0.9 (28) 10 (60) 
Very poor 4.0 (67) 5.1 (26) 10 (54) 
p<0.05 NS p<0.05 
-
MARITAL STATUS 
Married 1.9 (136) 1.2 (59) 10 (117) 
Single 1.1 (13) 2.1 (5) 4.5 (10) 
Divorced/separated 3.9 (58) 5.2 (14) 10 (36) 
NS NS p<O.OOl 
- -
SETTLEMENT 
Sofia 1.1 (19) 2.0 (13) 10 (21 ) 
City 2.6 (61) 1.7 (20) 10 (52) 
Town 4.0 (49) 1.0 (24) 10 (40) 
Village 1.8 (78) 4.7 (21) 11 (50) 
NS NS p<0.05 
-
-
SELF-REPORTED HEALTH 
Good/ Rather good 1.1 (90) 0.9 (28) 7 (65) 
Bad/ Rather bad 4.0 (117) 2.8 (50) 17 (98) 
p<0.001 NS p<0.001 
TOTAL '·. 2.38 207 1.92 78 10 163 
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Ability to pay: self-perceived 
Another indicator of affordability is self-perceived ability to pay. All respondents who 
contacted a health professional were asked to assess the impact, on their household 
budget, of total expenditure arising from their last consultation and subsequent treatment. 
About a third (28% of men and 33% ofwomen) thought that the expenses related to the 
last visit were too high or rather high. While 24% of those with very poor self-assessed 
financial situations found the expenses unaffordable, only 6% of those whose situation 
was very good thought the expenses high. 
A similar percentage assessed the expenditure as moderate (31% of men and 32% of 
women); and 33% of men and 27% of women indicated that expenditure was rather low, 
insignificant, or there were no expenses involved. 9% of men and 8% of women were 
unsure how to assess expenses. Again, as mentioned earlier, qualitative research showed 
that expenses incurred at hospital are seen as most burdensome, although as relatively 
few respondents (11 %) had been to the hospital in the preceding year, the survey 
provides little information on this expenditure. 
Affordability can also be examined from the point of view of trade-offs made in the 
household, or what was given up to obtain medical treatment. Respondents who reported 
higher than the median health expenditure tended to spend slightly less on subsistence 
(food, travel, household maintenance) and leisure (eating out) than those with health 
expenditure lower than the median. A more detailed analysis in this direction 1s, 
however, beyond the scope of this work. 
Coping strategies 
Respondents were asked how they provided the funds related to their last consultation. 
In about a half of cases, respondents covered all treatment-related expenses themselves 
( 44% of men and 45% of women). The second most common situation was when other 
household members made the whole payment (3% of men and 9% of women). Among 
those who covered about half of the expenses personally, more then two-thirds had the 
other half covered by members of their household. 4% of men and 3% of women had 
some part of their expenses covered by the state or municipality, and 2% of men and 1% 
of women had all their expenses covered this way. It is less common for some of the 
expenses to be covered by relatives or friends outside the immediate household (1% of 
men and 3% of women - some expenses; 1% of men and 2% of women - 100% of 
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expenses). There were only a few cases in which expenses were covered by an employer 
or other source, none by an insurance company, although 7% of men and 5% of women 
reported having medical insurance. 
When asked in more detail about their last contact, a slightly higher percentage (8% of 
men and 6% of women) said that they had been reimbursed fully or partially by the state, 
municipality or employer. 6% of men and 5% ofwomen reported reimbursement of their 
pharmaceutical bills. 3% of men and 1% of women had some of their expenses covered 
for medical tests or procedures. 
Expenses for the last consultation were paid predominantly from recurrent household 
income ( 67% of men and 66% of women). 5% of men and 6% of women made recourse 
to savings to cover their expenses. Loans (2% of men and of women) or sale of assets 
(2% of men and 4% of women) were rare. 24% of men and 21% of women said the 
expenses were insignificant or there were no expenses at all. 
Unsurprisingly, there appears to be a relationship between the source of funds for 
payment and perception of the size of the payment. Respondents who drew on savings 
tended more often to perceive expenses as being too high or rather high (72%) compared 
to those who reported paying from their recurrent income (35%). 
Expenditure in relation to service 
Respondents were asked to assess the quality of health service in relation to expenditure 
incurred. 37% of men and 38% of women thought expenditure was about right in view 
of the quality of the service. 12% of men and 13% of women thought that expenditure 
was high in relation to the service provided, and a lower percentage (8% of men and 7% 
of women) stated that the expenditure was low in relation to the level of service. 26% of 
men and 21% of women did not incur significant expenses, and 17% of men and 20% of 
women were unsure. This shows that at least half of the sample felt they obtained value 
for money. 
Examples of a service being delayed or refused due to lack of payment are rare. 92% of 
men and 88% of women reported that they did not have such an experience during their 
last treatment. Only 2% of men and 3% ofwomen were certain or suspected that this has 
happened. In several other cases (2%) treatment was delayed or refused for other 
reasons. In contrast, the qualitative study showed that ability to pay was considered an 
important obstacle to access to in-patient health services or reasonable quality of 
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treatment. This discrepancy between survey results and qualitative data may have 
stemmed from the composition of the sample in the qualitative study. All respondents in 
that sample had an illness in the preceding six months, many had chronic complaints 
requiring recent hospital use and thus were more likely to face problems with access. 
Affordability of drugs 
As shown earlier in this chapter, pharmaceuticals constitute the largest component of 
health care expenditure related to the last visit. The in-depth interviews demonstrated 
that expenditure on medication was also deemed the most unaffordable. This section 
will explore the pattern of drug use and affordability. Prescribed and non-prescribed 
pharmaceuticals are distinguished in order to trace provider influence and personal 
decisions. 
64% of men and 68% of women reported starting a course of prescribed pharmaceuticals, 
herbs or other treatment, or undergoing procedures at a health facility; in the initial stages 
of their last illness. More than a third also practised self-treatment, 35% of men and 41% 
of women taking at least one type of non-prescribed treatment. Of the total sample, 40% 
took prescribed medicines while a quarter took both prescribed and non-prescribed drugs. 
Taking non-prescribed drugs only was less common (12%). 
Of those who reported taking prescribed treatment, a large majority took only one 
prescribed preparation (92% of men and 94% of women); of those who had a non-
prescribed treatment, 98% of men and 96% of women used only one type. Taking 
prescribed medicines was the most common course of action for both men and women 
(Table 8.4). Herbs were the most common non-prescribed type of treatment. Often, 
prescribed and non-prescribed medication were taken in combination. 
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Table 8.4. Numbers taking prescribed and non-prescribed treatment in the beginning of 
the last illness 
Started prescribed treatment Men% (n) Women % (n) 
Prescribed medicines 54 % (355) 58% (515) 
Prescribed procedures 11 % (75) 10 % (84) 
Prescribed other treatment 3% (19) 3 % (22) 
Prescribed herbs 2% (16) 2 % (20) 
Started non-prescribed treatment Men% (n) Women% (n) 
Non-prescribed herbs 16% (108) 20 % (180) 
Non-prescribed medicines 12% (80) 15 % (129) 
Non-prescribed procedures 4% (23) 6 % (50) 
Non-prescribed other 3% (21) 2 % (19) 
At least one of the above (prescribed/non-prescribed) 74.9% 495 81.4% 721 
None of the above 25.1% (166) 18.6% (165) 
It is important to see the socio-demographic characteristics of those who took prescribed 
treatment at their last illness (Table 8.5). Clearly there is little difference between men 
and women, or between other groups, in use of prescribed or non prescribed drugs. This 
contrasts with the Health Survey for England 1996, where in all age groups more women 
report taking prescribed medicines165 • 
A failure to complete a course of treatment due to inability to afford continued 
medication is an indication of affordability. 16% of men and 19% of women did not 
remember well the circumstances of their treatment. Of those who could recall it, 79% 
of men and 77% of women reported completing the prescribed treatment, another 13% of 
men and 14% of women continuing treatment at the time of the survey. 71% of men and 
72% of women finished the recommended course of non-prescribed treatment; and 11% 
of men and of women were in the process of treatment. 8% of men (n=33) and 9% of 
women (n=55) stopped their prescribed treatment; and 17% of men (34 cases) and 16% 
of women (56 cases) stopped the non-prescribed treatment. Of those who stopped 
prescribed treatment, less than a third did so because they could not afford the prescribed 
pharmaceuticals. For non-prescribed treatment, unaffordability is insignificant as a 
reason to stop treatment. 
Unaffordability can also be expressed by switching to a less expensive treatment. 
However, of those who did not complete their first treatment, only a very small 
percentage started a new treatment in the course of their last illness (prescribed 
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treatment: 2% of men and 3% of women; non-prescribed treatment: 3% of men and of 
women). 
Table 8.5. Respondents' utilisation of prescribed and non-prescribed treatments by socio-
demographic status 
Variable/ Category 
SEX 
Men 
Women 
AGE GROUP 
<39 
40-49 
50-59 
60-69 
>70 
INCOME QUARTILE 
I (>160,000 Leva) 
II (100,000-160,000 Leva) 
III (60,000-99,000 Leva) 
IV ( <60, 000 Leva) 
EDUCATION 
Higher 
Secondary 
Primary 
FINANCIAL SITUATION 
Very good/ good 
Neither good nor bad 
Rather poor 
Very poor 
MARITAL STATUS 
Married 
Single 
Divorced/ separated 
SETTLEMENT 
Sofia 
City 
Town 
Village 
Qualitative data 
Started n 
prescribed 
medicines 
64.4% (426~ 
67.6% (599' 
62.2% (331 
65.2% (182 
64.7% (163 
68.8% (165) 
75.6% (183~ 
66.9% (228 
63.1% (188' 
66.6% (245 
69.3% (293 
66.7% (174~ 
65.4% (442~ 
67% (409' 
67.3% (76 
63.6% (278 
70.3% (367 
63.9% (281) 
66.4% (704 
58.7% (121) 
71.4% (200 
67.1 % (139 
63.5% (284 
70.4% (295) 
64.9% (307' 
Started non- n 
prescribed 
medicines 
34.5% (228) 
41.2% (365) 
36.8% (196) 
41.2% (115) 
37.7% (95) 
37.1% (89) 
40.1 % (97) 
42.5% (145) 
34.6% (103) 
37.2% (137) 
38.8% (164) 
44.1 % (115) 
37.3% (252) 
37% (226) 
36.3% (41) 
35% (153) 
40.8% (213) 
39.5% (174) 
39.2% (416) 
30.1% (62) 
41.1% (115) 
33.8% (70) 
39.4% (176) 
42.5% (178) 
35.7% (169) 
Started 11 
prescribed or 
non-prescribed 
74.9% (495) 
81.4% (721) 
75.6% (402) 
77.8% (217) 
77.4% (195) 
81.7% (196) 
84.7% (205) 
82.7% (282) 
74.5% (222) 
78.8% (290) 
79.2% (335) 
85.4% (223) 
78.1% (528) 
76.2% (465) 
79.6% (90) 
75.7% (331) 
83.1% (434) 
75.9% (334) 
79.1 % (838) 
70.9% (146) 
82.9% (232) 
85.5% (177) 
77.6% (347) 
81.9% (343) 
73.8% (349) 
The affordability of expenditure during the last illness was also examined usmg 
qualitative methods. 
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A third of all patients stated that expenditure during their last illness posed considerable 
problems, another third thought it somewhat difficult to pay, the rest thought it was not a 
problem. Among physicians who reported expenditure in their household, half thought it 
was a serious problem and half a moderate problem, with only one respondent thinking 
payment was not a problem. Of those 16 users for whom payment was problematic, five 
had to use savings, or borrow. Most respondents felt they had no choice but to find the 
money ("unavoidable expenses" [user]). 
"It was a problem since two months ago the salaries were not inflation-adjusted" [user] 
"It was definitely a problem. I borrowed from friends because ... you could earn money 
but not health. " [user] ''!had to find the money and actually took from savings. " [user] 
"My mother had recently a trivial viral infection and the treatment cos ted about 10,000 
Leva, using Bulgarian antibiotics, nothing expensive. These were catastrophic expenses 
for her, because she is a state employee and her salary is insignificant. " [physician] 
Six users paid from recurrent income (salary), but nevertheless indicated that this posed a 
considerable strain on their household budget. 
" ... it meant diverting part of our income, because from my salary I also buy 
pharmaceuticals for my mother who is a pensioner and cannot afford it. " [user] 
"The last time I was ill, I tried to get on with the cheapest pharmaceuticals for flu. I paid 
from my salary, but afterwards had to limit any other expenses. " [user] 
"Additional expenses are always a problem ... we all pay tax after all. " [physician] 
Another group of users reported having no problems paying at the time of the illness, but 
anticipated problems if they were to pay now (at the time of the survey in 1997). Several 
respondents had relatively high expenses (for minor surgery, dental work, physician's 
services), typically several months to one year ago, but felt that their circumstances then 
were better and expenses were more affordable ("I was not unemployed then and could 
afford it" [user]). Recent rises in the price of pharmaceuticals were perceived as 
reducing the ability to pay ("now a simple treatment would be about 50% of my income" 
[user]). A few respondents also felt that, had their illness been serious or chronic 
requiring continuous treatment or use of antibiotics over a period of time, payment would 
have been much higher and thus, problematic. 
''It was a problem, but I paid from my salary, which is now impossible. Now if I have to 
have 6 teeth treated, I would prefer to take them out. " [physician] 
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Given that physicians rarely pay for services, they were asked their impressions of 
affordability of treatment for patients, particularly those from lower socio-economic 
groups, and their coping strategies. 
" ... still using reserves, from savings mainly, sometimes borrowing." [physician] 
"Some rely on their relatives to help them in case of very serious illnesses, such as 
cancer; some people sell property, valuables, to find the money. " [physician] 
"One borrows from relatives and acquaintances when in need. I haven't heard people to 
sell property to pay for health care as in other countries. Here people think that they 
have to search for sponsors on TV, before trying to pay themselves. " [physician] 
"Not sure. It is a well known rule that the Bulgarian spends more than receives. Mostly 
from saving. Not from salary, which in the state sector are miserable ... " [physician] 
Although not borne out by the survey, there was a common perception that some 
'necessary demand' has been deterred in more serious cases. 
"There are many cases, where they can't find the means and are not treated. " [physician] 
"Unfortunately people do not seek treatment because they don't have money. Most of my 
patients are pensioners, who have exhausted their savings long time ago, and don't go to 
facilities, are not admitted to hospital, don't buy the prescribed drugs... tragedy. " 
[physician] 
In summary, payments for services of health professionals or for basic lower cost drugs, 
are perceived as more affordable and usually are covered from recurrent income. 
Payment for in-patient care; long-term, complex treatment; and imported 
pharmaceuticals; were commonly deemed unaffordable and difficult to cover even when 
saving and borrowing strategies are used. 
Discussion 
The aggregate expenditure for the last visit appears not very high in relation to average 
income as reported in official statistics. It should be noted that official average wage 
estimates suffer from underreporting of income, and reflect mainly salaries in the state 
sector. However, expenditure appears more significant when compared to the minimum 
income, which is less likely to be biased. 
Given that more than a third of those using the health care system in their last illness 
reported two or more visits, as well as the potentially conservative estimates of payment, 
expenditure may be more burdensome than it appears. 
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Some inequality is clear, with the poorest sections, those with higher education, and 
below 70, reporting higher expenditure for health care. This is even though utilisation 
rates appear relatively equal across socio-economic groups (chapters 5 and 6). Caution is 
needed when interpreting these results, since the direction of the relationship is not clear. 
Health expenditure may have been influenced by utilisation patterns, and conversely, the 
expectation of payment may have influenced decisions whether and where to seek 
medical care. 
There is little comparable data on household spending on health care from representative 
sampling in Bulgaria, most of the analyses concentrating on public health spending, and 
estimation of unit cost182 • Given the dynamics of economic change between 1995 and 
1997, other available data on income and health expenditure from 1995 are not 
comparable126 182• 
The main source of data on health expenditure is the household budget panel carried out 
by the National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria every three months215 . Based on these 
data, Delcheva94 estimates the mean spending for health care per capita in 1992-1997 to 
be 3,209 Leva. This figure is comparable to the mean of 3,930 Leva in this study. The 
monetary component of health care expenditure accounts for between 1.2% and 2. 7% of 
total household expenses in the 1990s. An escalating trend is apparent due to economic 
liberalisation, increased formal and informal direct cost-sharing in health care, and a 
decline in the public budget. It is also suggested by the authors that low health 
expenditure, combined with a high percentage of income spent on food, are indicative of 
poverty94 • 
A third of respondents considered payment to be too high, but most managed to pay from 
their current income. Compared to elsewhere, direct user payments in Bulgaria appear 
more affordable and less restricting to access. A study from Kyrgyzstan183 209 found the 
average cost of hospital stay to be higher than the monthly monetary income of the whole 
household for most respondents. More than two-thirds of respondents, particularly those 
in rural areas, reported significant difficulty in covering out- or in-patient expenses and 
had borrowed money or sold assets to pay for health care. 
As well as measuring health care expenditure in absolute terms, it is important to see 
expenditure as a proportion of income. This demonstrates its regressive nature. The 
results of the current study corroborate a World Bank estimate of household expenditure 
for health care in Bulgaria, which found that the poor spend less in absolute amounts, but 
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the share of non-food expenditure is twice that among the richest sections, suggesting 
unaffordabili ty1 82 • 
Another key issue from the above analysis is that there are very few official mechanisms 
in place for reimbursement of health expenditure, either by state, municipalities, or 
employers. Support is provided mainly through the immediate household. This may 
place a significant burden on single-person households, people living alone, families with 
more than one person unemployed or other socially disadvantaged groups. A World 
Bank commissioned survey in rural areas of Bulgaria showed that the official entitlement 
of some groups to full or partial reimbursement of pharmaceutical bills did not work in 
practice, due to shortages of allocated funds196• 
This chapter also demonstrated that pharmaceuticals are the most common item of 
expenditure. Qualitative research, in particular, showed that these are by far the most 
unaffordable components of health expenditure. Pharmaceutical and travel expenses are 
also the most regressive components. This is due to the largely unregulated expansion of 
private pharmaceutical markets, collapse of manufacturing of cheap local drugs, and lack 
of strict enforcement of the essential drugs list. In comparison, in a representative 1995 
survey, 47% of respondents identified prescribing of excessively expensive drugs as a 
commonly encountered problem126• 
The data collected do not allow conclusive interpretation of drug utilisation patterns. 
Clearly more women, people with only primary education, and the elderly, practice self-
medication with herbal and other traditional remedies, which are most often locally 
produced and cheaper than prescribed drugs, a large proportion of which are imported. It 
appears that people often use prescribed and non-prescribed drugs simultaneously rather 
than as substitutes for each other. 
A 1996 qualitative study (by Balkan British Social Surveys Gallup for the World Bank) 
in rural communities found affordability to be a considerable issue due to the sharp fall in 
living standards, and also identified an increase of out-of-pocket user payments, even for 
basic health care196• This, combined with a decline in quality of state free health care and 
high prices in the private sector, affected the access of the poor. Unaffordability derives 
from increased prices of drugs, shortages of locally produced drugs, and cuts in drug 
subsidies for children, the elderly and other low-income users. For people living in 
villages, access to adequate quality health care has been deterred, due to the combined 
cost of travel expenses and treatment-related costs. 
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These results can also be compared with a national representative survey conducted in 
Bulgaria in April 1995126 • In this 1995 survey, 20% of all respondents refrained from 
using their prescribed drugs because of their higher price. 32% of the respondents 
reported using herbs or other traditional methods, 3% alternative medicine, and 6% 
consulted faith healers. Such wide use of alternative therapies indicates that people 
increasingly tum away from conventional medicine, and seek cheaper and more 
affordable solutions, sometimes after other coping strategies fail. 
As discussed in this chapter, there is a contradiction between results from the survey and 
qualitative findings. In the survey, direct payment to the physician appears less common 
than in the qualitative research. This apparent contradiction may be due to the specificity 
of research methods employed. All respondents in the qualitative sample are recent 
users, many are chronic users familiar with in-patient settings where spending is typically 
higher. In contrast, hospital users are a relatively small share of the survey sample. 
This chapter examined health expenditure and its affordability. However, willingness to 
pay can be also influenced by a range of other factors, such as values, beliefs and 
attitudes. These will be considered in more detail in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 9. VALUE SYSTEMS IN RELATION TO THE 
HEALTH CARE IN BULGARIA 
Introduction 
As described in chapter 4 and appendix 2, the process of health care financing reform has 
begun already in Bulgaria. New financial arrangements will include the establishment of 
a mandatory health insurance scheme, possibly supplemented by co-payments at the 
point of use, and expansion of voluntary insurance. These methods involve a radical 
shift from non-transparent budget financing to more explicit methods, based on 
contributions. This reform must address the challenges arising from the long tradition of 
budgetary health care financing controlled entirely by the state. 
This chapter will explore a range of common values and beliefs, such as perceptions of 
the state's role, the value of health, and solidarity. These are likely to have an impact on 
willingness to pay for health care in Bulgaria. The chapter will draw on data from the 
survey and the qualitative research. The discussion will assess the evidence and 
summarise implications for research. Throughout the chapter, the analysis includes all 
respondents, regardless of whether they have reported illness. 
Belief systems 
Values, beliefs and attitudes are likely to have significant impact on choices that people 
make and their willingness to pay for health care. It is recognised that a new financing 
system will have to be compatible with existing values in societyl. The Semashko 
model, with universal financing and provision of health care free at the point of use, 
reflected the prevailing collectivist value system of the time. The concept that people 
should share the costs of their treatment or provide for themselves, which underlines the 
current financing reform, is also related to redefinition of the role of the state, with an 
emphasis on individual responsibility. Here, because of the role of the state as both 
provider and financier of health services, provision and financing are often essentially 
interchangeable. 
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Health as a value 
Data from the qualitative research 
Traditionally health has been viewed as the highest priority for an individual or family. 
This is reflected in numerous proverbs ("health is the most precious asset", "you can buy 
anything, but health", "illness is the biggest poverty", greeting: "with health"; etc). Many 
respondents use proverbs or old-fashioned language to describe the value of health to 
them. Before 1989, the Semashko system emphasised health, encouraging health 
promotion and health education initiatives, although there are no concrete data on 
individual perceptions of the value of health at that time. 
In a representative survey in Bulgaria conducted in 1995, in which respondents were 
asked to rate a range of attributes, health came top (89%), far ahead of money (58%), 
luck (42%), peace of mind (33%), or success (17%). The distance between health and 
other values increased when respondents had to prioritise (adding to 100% ), with health 
by far the most important value (68% health, 11% money and below 6% for the rest). 
The current study attempted to examine the value placed on health. Not all physicians 
were asked this question because of time constraints. Given the traditionally high value 
attributed to health it was expected that this would be an introductory, rather than 
informative question. From those who responded, half thought health a very important 
value with a deep rooted tradition. It was also viewed as a universal human right. Very 
few thought otherwise ("No, I think education is proverbial for the Bulgarian" [user]). 
Health was, however, less commonly perceived as an aim in itself, but rather as a means 
to earn a living or self-fulfilment. 
"It is something very valuable for every Bulgarian, because he/she relies only on 
themselves, ... on their health, to survive ... This has been ingrained for centuries. " [user] 
Only a few respondents linked the idea of good health to the ability to contribute to 
society ("a healthy society has better productivity" [user]). 
It is important to reflect on the meanings behind these statements, many of which are 
almost automatic, as these may provide clues as to how such values translate into actual 
behaviour. While many respondents stressed the value placed on health in the abstract, 
others noted the contrast with the reality, as indicated by people's behaviour. Almost all 
respondents pointed to economic factors related to transition as causing neglect of health. 
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"I think that every Bulgarian is aware that their health is very important, because when a 
person is ill, especially now, in these difficult economic conditions, can't work and look 
after themselves and relatives. Thus a vicious circle occurs - many people don't pay 
attention to their health in order to work as much as possible. " [user] 
"Low standards of living combined with low health education lead to higher morbidity in 
our country. " [user] 
"(not looking after health) is related to health care and the payment already required, 
expensive medicines etc. " [user] 
Economic factors were superimposed on what some thought was already a less than 
satisfactory model of illness behaviour shaped by cultural attitudes, individual 
preferences and lack of concept of investment in health through health promotion or life-
style change. 
"Yes health is valued, but people don't know how to preserve it ... " [user] 
"From what I observe ... health education is low, care for oneself is minimal" [user] 
Severe illness did, however, act as a trigger to seek care. Several respondents thought 
that health is perceived to be more valuable when endangered by serious illness. 
"I think in Bulgaria, a person begins to value their health when they become ill, and then 
remembers how precious it is to be healthy. " [user] 
When asked to compare the value placed on health in Bulgaria compared with other 
countries, most users felt that, in the West, people look after their health much more. 
The most commonly cited reasons fall into three groups: the health system in the West 
focused on health prevention, health education, and timely treatment of health problems; 
high living standards and wealth; national characteristics ("elsewhere a person 
immediately runs to the doctor even for the smallest complaint", "they are overly 
concerned with their health. I have witnessed an American wasting several days 
checking whether he's got measles. " [users]). Several respondents noted that the 
situation was better in Bulgaria than in developing countries, or Russia. Some 
physicians felt there were no difference between Bulgarians and other nationalities. 
Whether one values one's health sufficiently was spontaneously linked to the level of 
health awareness of the Bulgarian population. Most respondents who had a view on this 
thought health awareness to be average or low. This conclusion was reached on the basis 
of indicators such as people delaying utilisation, rarely requesting check-ups, leading an 
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unhealthy life-style, but most of all consulting alternative and potentially harmful 
practitioners. 
"There is a pseudo-culture... The majority of people don't trust the physicians, but 
crooks, faith healers etc. or start using self-treatment or alternative therapies. 
Unfortunately, this harms the health of some patients ... " [physician] 
''As a whole, the Bulgarian has low health awareness - knowledge about illness, healthy 
lifestyles, rational nutrition, sport, and stress ... " [physician] 
"the Bulgarian prefers not to deal with physicians until absolutely necessary." [user] 
In many cases, this was thought to be a product of institutional failure to implement 
health promotion policies, and lack of trust or poor communication between patients and 
physicians. 
"Physicians have some fault in not urging the population to seek prevention before an 
illness has developed ... It is also a fault of mass media, the family, the school. " [user] 
"Bulgaria has one of the highest cardio-vascular mortality rates, the typical patient 
visiting my surgery is a pensioner suffering from hypertonia... but often people don't 
have the habit of checking their blood pressure or can't afford to buy drugs. " [physician] 
"I think that elsewhere illnesses are discovered earlier and the patients receives better 
medical care, not because of a better health awareness, but a better organisation, 
obligatory yearly check-ups. " [physician] 
Insufficient health awareness, along with financial difficulties were main reasons for 
people delaying consulting in a medical facility (chapter 6). 
The role of the state 
Data from the population survey 
There was wide-spread support for the current tax-based model, more than half of 
respondents (57% of men and 59% ofwomen) agreeing that the state should finance and 
provide universal, free, health care. Another 39% of men and 38% of women thought 
that the state should guarantee health care only for people who cannot pay themselves, or 
for some clearly defined groups such as the disabled or elderly. Only 2% of men and 1% 
of women thought that the state should not finance free health services, regardless of 
personal circumstances. 
Regardless of socio-demographic circumstances, men and women held the same views 
about responsibility for financing health care (Figure 9.1 ). Universal state financing and 
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provision for all regardless of income status was more popular among the elderly. 70% 
of men and 69% of women above 70 supported universal state provision, compared to 
54% of men and women under 30. The poor are also more supportive of state 
involvement. However, the relationship with material circumstances is clearer when 
self-perceived financial status is considered. Support for a state role decreases with 
increasing education- those with only primary education are 50% more likely to support 
it than those with higher education. Marital status has little impact. Those living in 
small towns and villages and those with poor or rather poor health were more likely to 
support a strong state role. 
As many of these variables are mutually correlated, they were explored further through 
multiple regression (Table 9.1 ). In the following analysis, the dependent variable is 
whether or not they felt that the state should offer universal free health care for all. 
Responses to this question assess a broad value judgement related to collective versus 
individual responsibility, so they can be expected to be influenced by a range of factors. 
The factors associated with support for universal free state provision were broadly 
similar among men and women. In the age-adjusted model, those in the oldest category, 
over 70 years of age, were twice as likely to support universal care as those aged under 
40. Those in the higher income quartiles were half as likely to support it as were those in 
the lowest income quartile. Those whose financial status was reported as very poor were 
about two and a half times as likely to support universal free care as those whose 
situation was good, as were those living in villages compared with those in Sofia. 
Education was a particularly strong predictor of preference for state involvement, those 
with only primary education being three and a half times more likely to support this 
view. Poor health was also associated with support for free health care. 
In all categories, the percentage of people stating that the state should not offer free 
health care at all was below 4%, with the exception of men with higher education (6%), 
or living in Sofia (7%). 
In summary, there is very wide agreement that the state should provide free health care, 
although there are divergent views about whether state coverage should be universal (as 
in the old Semashko system) or limited to those who cannot afford to pay. As shown in 
Table 9.2, support for full coverage increases with increasing age, and support for 
selective coverage decreases. Similar shifts are seen in relation to education, financial 
status, income and self-perceived health. 64% of men and 65% of women agreed 
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strongly, and 18% of men and women agreed to a certain extent with the related 
statement that state funded and provided health care is the most suitable option for 
Bulgaria in the present circumstances. 12% of men and 11% of men disagreed with this 
statement to some degree. 
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Figure 9.1. Percentage agreeing that state should finance and provide free universal 
health care for all by a range of variables 
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Table 9.1. Predictor of probability of stating that the state should provide free health care for all 
Variable Category % (n) paid Odds ratio (95% CI) 
(Age-adjusted) 
MEN 
Age group <39 53.7% (124) 1.00 
40-49 53.2% (66) 0.98 (0.63-1.52) 
50-59 61.5% (59) 1.38 (0.85-2.24) 
60-69 61.2% (63) 1.36 (0.85-2.18) 
>70 70.2% (66) 2.03 (1.22-3.39) 
Income quartile I (> 160,000) 49.4% (77) 1.00 
(Leva) II (100,000-160,000) 49.6% (64) 0.94 (0.59-1.52) 
III (60,000-99,000) 61.8% (97) 1.52 (0.94-2.45) 
IV ( <60,000) 69.6% (110) 2.12 (1.29-3.49) 
Education Higher 44.3% (39) 1.00 
Secondary 51.1% (165) 1.33 (0.83-2.14) 
Primary 73.5% (175) 3.46 (2.01-5.93) 
Financial situation Very good/good 46.3% (25) 1.00 
Neither good nor bad 54.9% (100) 1.41 (0.76-2.60) 
Rather poor 55.7% (117) 1.37 (0.75-2.52) 
Very poor 69.1% (132) 2.40 (1.29-4.49) 
Marital status Married 59.6% (286) 1.00 
Single 54.8% (57) 1.01 (0.61-1.68) 
Divorced/separated 56.3% (36) 0.78 (0.45-1.34) 
Settlement Sofia 47.8% (33) 1.00 
City 59.0% (118) 1.61 (0.93-2.80) 
Town 45.8% (81) 0.92 (0.53-1.61) 
Village 72.3% (146) 2.62 (1.48-4.66) 
Self-reported health Good/Rather good 54.2% (267) 1.00 
Bad/Rather bad 71.8% (112) 1.89 (1.23-2.90) 
WOMEN 
Age group <39 54.2 155 1.00 
40-49 60.5 92 1.30 (0.87-1.93) 
50-59 61 94 1.32 (0.89-1.97) 
60-69 61 83 1.32 (0.87-2.01) 
>70 68.8 97 1.86 (1.22-2.85) 
Income quartile I (>160,000) 48 85 1.00 
(Leva) II (100,000-160,000) 59.5 97 1.57 1.02-2.42 
III (60,000-99,000) 57.5 119 1.46 0.96-2.22 
IV ( <60,000) 68.7 178 2.24 1.45-3.46 
Education Higher 50.3 86 1.00 
Secondary 51.8 176 1.11 0.77-1.62 
Primary 72.1 259 2.90 1.89-4.44 
Financial situation Very good/ good 41.4 24 1.00 
Neither good nor bad 54.8 136 1.72 (0.96-3.08) 
Rather poor 62.8 191 2.29 (1.28-4.08) 
Very poor 65.8 158 2.59 (1.43-4.68) 
Marital status Married 61.5 345 1.00 
Single 47.9 46 0.66 (0.41-1.06) 
Divorced/separated 61 130 0.82 (0.57-1.18) 
Settlement Sofia 44.8 60 1.00 
City 49.4 120 1.18 (0.77-1.80) 
Town 66.2 153 2.43 (1.56-3.77) 
Village 71.8 188 3.02 (1.93-4.72) 
Self-reported health Good/Rather good 56.3 352 1.00 
Bad/Rather bad 69 169 1.59 (1.12-2.24) 
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Table 9.2. Views on full and selective state coverage by the state 
Variable/ Category MEN WOMEN 
Free for Free only for Free for Free only for 
everybody% those who everybody% those who cannot 
AGE GROUP 
cannot pay% pay% 
<39 52.1 40.3 52.7 38.1 
40-49 53.2 38.7 59.4 34.8 50-59 60.2 30.6 61.0 34.4 
60-69 61.2 37.9 60.6 35.0 
>70 68.0 24.7 66.9 29.0 
INCOME QUARTILE 
I (>160,000 Leva) 48.4 40.9 46.7 42.9 
II (100,000-160,000 Leva) 48.9 42.7 58.1 35.9 
III (60,000-99,000 Leva) 60.6 32.5 57.2 34.6 
IV ( <60, 000 Leva) 68.8 29.4 67.7 30.0 
EDUCATION 
Higher 44.3 46.6 49.7 39.9 
Secondary 50.3 42.4 50.6 42.5 
Primary 71.4 23.3 71.0 25.5 
FINANCIAL 
SITUATION 
Very good/ good 45.5 45.5 41.4 55.2 
Neither good nor bad 54.1 39.5 54.0 38.1 
Rather poor 54.9 37.1 61.8 32.4 
Very poor 67.7 28.2 64.5 30.2 
SETTLEMENT 
Sofia 47.1 41.4 43.8 48.2 
City 58.7 35.3 48.8 43.9 
Town 44.5 47.8 64.6 27.8 
Village 70.5 24.2 70.7 26.3 
HEALTH STATUS 
Good/Rather good 53.1 39.0 55.2 37.6 
Bad/Rather bad 70.9 25.9 68.1 28.2 
Data from qualitative research 
Attitudes to free state health care were explored by means of qualitative research. The 
wording of the question was identical in both the survey and the interview guide, but the 
in-depth interview responses were open-ended in order to allow for more flexible 
interpretation. 
The views expressed in the survey re-emerged in the qualitative research. There was, 
however, some divergence of views between physicians and patients. A large majority 
of patients (19 out of 33) expressed the view that the state should at least guarantee free 
health care for specific sections of the population (the poorest, socially disadvantaged, 
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those suffering from life-threatening or chronic illnesses); certain types of services (basic 
or too expensive); or levels of care (hospital care). A few respondents thought that 
selective coverage should be retained during the transition as a temporary measure. In 
contrast, fewer physicians (8 out of 25) recommended state coverage for particular 
population groups. 
"Yes, particularly for the average and disadvantaged Bulgarians ... who are unable to 
pay even for a treatment in polyclinics, let alone in hospitals". [user J 
"The state can provide free medical care only for particular type of diseases, whose 
treatment is extremely expensive, such as cancers, tumours,· for patients who can't pay 
and for socially disadvantaged. Otherwise, the majority of people, working, with 
reasonable incomes, they should pay themselves for at least some part ... " [user] 
"The state should provide a minimum volume of health care for people who are socially 
marginalised, poor, and cannot pay from their own resources, savings, salary ... As far as 
I know in the West, nobody is refused medical care, regardless of their social status. This 
should be the role of the state- to provide what is needed, without luxury ... " [physician] 
Universal free health care was not widely supported among physicians and users (3 
physicians in countryside; 6 users). 
" ... the state is obliged ... especially for pensioners, because at the time when we were 
working, we were paying for insurance, but we are not getting anything now. " [user] 
"In the current situation, during this crisis ... the state should look after the health care. 
The majority of the population are unable to obtain health care by themselves. " [user] 
However, while supporting the concept, some respondents were cautious about the 
feasibility of free provision (3 physicians; 4 users). 
"It wouldn't be good if 'free' health care is at expense of quality. .. " [user] 
"This would be ideal, and is normal for a well developed country, but Bulgaria, in its 
current situation is far from it ... " [user] 
The idea of a public-private combination received some support, with the private 
component thought to improve incentives and quality of care. ("a happy medium" [user]). 
"Still the state is obliged to provide some free medical care for all citizens ... to a certain 
minimum. If the limit is exceeded, then something should be paid. " [user] 
"In my opinion, for a start it can be partially paid by the patient, because de facto now 
nobody receives what they need, we simply deceive ourselves that it is free. " [physician] 
"It depends, if people pay a lot for social insurance ... the state should provide for them. 
But if lower tax is collected, then the state will have no extensive obligations. " [user] 
281 
One of the underlying purposes of this question was to test reaction to the phrase "free 
health care", which has long been part of the official vocabulary in the Soviet-style health 
sector. Physicians were sensitive to this, about half (1 0) disagreeing with the way the 
question was posed, or raising different issues. Such views were expressed, without 
prompting, by only four patients. 
"For me nothing 'free' exists, including in medicine. Payment has to be through health 
insurance system as in the civilised world. 'Free' simply scares me." [user] 
"Free health care is very vague concept", "controversial", "an illusion, with which 
politicians have long been speculating and elections have been won" [physicians] 
"Health care isn't free and it has never been because the employees have always been 
taxed, pharmaceuticals have always been paid. 'Free' is fabricated notion ... " [physician] 
For some, maintenance of free health care was seen as a non-issue, because "health care 
as such can never be free" and is not free at present in Bulgaria. Others spontaneously 
distinguished between free health care and health care provided free at the point of use. 
Some respondents saw the familiar free state health care (tax based model) as currently 
unsustainable, as economic recession has undermined the state's resources. 
"The state is very weak at present, and it is impossible to have free health care as we 
know it. " [physician] 
The idea of free health care was seen to be feasible only if a different system of health 
care financing was adopted, with the state assuming a new role. Patients and physicians 
often compared the role of the state in Bulgaria with the role of the state in the West. 
The latter was perceived as a gold standard, the provision of a basic package of health 
care benefiting all groups ("as in the West"; "in the normal countries"). 
"In my view a sort of free health care could be preserved, but in a different form: as in 
Western Europe amounts are deducted from the employees' payment, contributions are 
collected by funds, and people do not pay out-of-pocket during their treatment. " [user] 
"The state can provide free health care in state facilities where the patients will pay 
through their medical insurance. This is by no means 'free', because money are deducted 
at source or the employer pays. " [physician] 
The semi-structured interviews seemed to indicate slightly less support than the survey 
for universal state coverage. There are several possible explanations. First, the open-
ended format of the question may have permitted greater reflection and, in particular, 
encouraged respondents to consider the economic reality facing Bulgaria. Second, it 
could reflect sample differences, as the qualitative research included more people with 
282 
higher education and socio-economic status. The survey data shows that such people are 
more likely to support more limited state provision. 
Solidarity 
Data from the population survey 
There is little recent evidence about attitudes to solidarity and collectivist values in 
Bulgaria. In this study, the focus has been mostly on equity, as a dimension of solidarity. 
Attitudes to equity (horizontal and vertical) were assessed by asking respondents if they 
agree with a range of statements. Horizontal equity is defined as "people ... of the same 
ability to pay make the same contribution ... regardless of, for example, gender, marital 
status ... ", while vertical equity was defined as those "of unequal ability to pay made 
appropriately dissimilar payments for health care"21 • 
More than half of respondents (53% men and 52% women) disagreed with the statement 
that all patients should pay the same sum for a particular health service, in effect 
supporting the principle of vertical equity. However, 33% of men and 31% of women 
thought that everybody should pay equally for a particular health service, regardless of 
their ability to pay. 14% of men and 17% of women were not sure. The qualitative 
research suggested that some respondents might have misinterpreted this question as 
meaning everybody paying an equal percentage of income rather than a fixed sum. 
The interpretation of these results can be better understood using qualitative data. As in 
the survey, two-thirds of patients and a third of the physicians thought that payment for 
particular services should be differentiated according to ability to pay, the rest supporting 
equal payment regardless of other characteristics. The latter group envisaged 
administrative complexity and additional workload on staff as main problems. This view 
was common among physicians, who thought that every service has a fixed price and 
differentiation has to be made through redirection of patients to facilities of different 
standard (luxurious or more basic). Some people were against differentiation of payment 
at facility level, but supported differentiation in contributions, use of reimbursement by 
the state, insurance funds, or charities. The views on equity in relation to exemption 
from direct out-of-pocket payments, will be considered in more detail in the next chapter. 
There are some existing analyses of solidarity in Bulgaria. Rose and Makkai91 analysed 
the New Democracies Barometer Survey (NDB) data set covering nine Central and 
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Eastern European countries. The predominance of individual or collective values is 
measured through questions about individual versus state responsibility for distribution 
of income, ownership of enterprises, job security, social expenditure etc. There is no 
conclusive evidence in favour of individualistic or collective provision of welfare, with 
two-thirds of the respondents choosing an individualistic alternative such as payment 
based on individual achievement rather than egalitarian intervention (24% support 
making incomes more equal); and private rather than state ownership. At the same time, 
there is also support for job security, state provision of "basic security for everyone", and 
willingness to pay higher taxes to increase spending levels for health, education and 
pensions (67% of respondents across the countries), which reflect a more egalitarian 
perspective. Surprisingly, respondents who approve of higher tax and benefits, are more 
likely to reject equality of incomes. Estimation of a score on the basis of 'collectivist' 
answers shows that Bulgaria and Poland were slightly more collectivist than the other 
countries, with the Czech Republic the least (1 maximum; Bulgaria: 0.54, Poland: 0.52, 
Czech Republic: 0.30). 
The reasons for this division in opinion among respondents in this survey may be that 
while income determined by individual achievement and privatisation are essential 
elements of the new market economies, there are wide-spread fears of unemployment and 
loss of income. People may be willing to pay higher taxes to reduce the insecurity 
through collective (state) provision. 
Respondents who were most likely to have individualistic values are those below 30, 
university educated, satisfied with their economic status, optimistic about general 
economic recovery, holding a positive attitude to the government (democratic at that 
time), and having more assets. Regression analysis shows that in Bulgaria socio-
economic factors explain 33% of the variation and political values 6%, with further 
analysis showing that only in Bulgaria does national culture influence values. 
These results can be compared to a similar survey for Bulgaria, conducted in 1991 by the 
National Public Opinion Centre (NAPOC)121 (Table 9.3). Both surveys were performed 
by the same agency, using standard methods and have a similar sample size. It appears 
that between 1991 and 1993, individualistic values have been eroded, while collectivist 
values became more prominent. The first years of transition brought severe 
impoverishment and insecurity, causing idealisation of the past among many groups, and 
a resurgence of collectivist values, culminating in election of the ex-communist party. 
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Table 9.3. Solidarity versus individualism in Bulgaria: comparison of results 
Individualistic Individualistic Collectivist Collectivist 
Year Agency Sample Individual Individuals Secure but Willing to 
SIZe: achievement should provide low paid job pay more 
Bulgaria as a basis of for themselves preferred taxes 
earnmgs 
1991 NAPOC 1' 153 63% 51 % 50% 61 % 
1992/3 NAPOC 1,127 59% 37% 65% 65% 
forNDB 
In the present survey, the relationship between egalitarian v1ews and income was 
explored (Figure 9.2). Among those with very good or good self-assessed financial 
situations, 36% of men and 52% of women disagreed to a certain extent that everyone 
should have the right to free health care. Support for equal rights regardless of income 
was higher among those who perceived themselves as poor, or had lower income. 
Figure 9.2. Support for right to universal free health care by financial situation 
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Attitudes to a right to free health care, this time in relation to age and income, were also 
explored. About half of respondents strongly agreed that everybody, regardless of age, 
has the right to free treatment (51% of men and 52°/o of women), with 19% of men and 
20o/o of women agreeing to a certain degree. Only 13°/o of men and women disagreed. 
59% of men and of women agreed strongly, or with some reservation, with the statement 
that both the rich and the poor have the right to be treated free of charge, although it is a 
widely shared view that it is fair that wealthier people should pay at higher prices (67% 
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of men and 66% of women). There is a certain ambiguity as both statements appear 
opposite, but achieve very similar response. Therefore some inherited, explicit and easy 
to identify and measure personal characteristics (age, chronic illness etc .) deserve 
exemptions or reduction in prices. 
The majority of the respondents disagree that people using health services more often 
should pay higher contributions for health care (men: 41% disagree strongly, 23% rather 
disagree; women: 36% disagree strongly, 22% rather disagree). There is an implicit 
understanding that treatment of certain more common diseases must be free for 
everybody, with 81% of men and 85% of women agreeing to a certain extent. 
More respondents with self-assessed poor financial status or low income agreed with the 
view that wealthier people should pay progressively more for health care. Among 
women the support for this view was less explicitly related to financial situation or 
income (Figure 9.3). 
Figure 9.3. Wealthier people should pay at higher prices by financial situation 
Men t~Agree 
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D D1sagree 
Very Neither Rather poor Very poor 
good/good good/nor bad 
In order to test further egalitarian values, people were asked whether certain groups 
should make a higher contribution to health care (in tax, user fees, or health insurance). 
While more than half of men disagreed with higher contributions by smokers (55 % 
disagree; 31 %> agree), among women opinions were split ( 42°/o disagree; 41 % agree). 
Support for monetary sanctions against smokers was analysed in relation to reported 
smoking rates (Figure 9.4) . As expected, more than half of the smokers strongly 
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disagreed with such policies, although the attitude of non-smokers was relatively 
tolerant, with almost an equal percentage being for or against higher contributions 
associated with smoking. 
Figure 9.4. Attitudes towards higher prices for smokers by smoking habits 
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On the question of whether heavy alcohol drinkers should pay higher contributions (or 
share health care costs), the situation was different. Equal percentages of men agree or 
disagreed to a certain degree with the statement (44% agree; 40% disagree), while the 
majority of women agreed with the policy (55% agree; 29% disagree). 
32% of men and 41% of women agreed strongly with the statement that people who 
endanger the health of other people through traffic accidents or other criminal offences 
should pay higher contributions for health care, a further 22% of men and 23% of women 
agreeing to a certain extent. 27% of men and 18% disagreed. 
Attitudes to the private sector 
Data from the population survey 
This section explores attitudes to the private sector which are likely to have an impact on 
the public-private mix of services. 
The predominant view (more common among women) was that fees paid for private 
physicians' services were adequate, in view of the service provided. Thus, of those who 
reported being ill or consulting a doctor, 13% of men and 19% of women reported a visit 
to a private physician, and 23% and 28% respectively to a private dentist. Among those 
who consulted a private physician, 34% of men and 50% of women thought the fees 
corresponded to the level of service, and less than a quarter (22% and 21 %) thought they 
were too high. In contrast, fees for dental services were perceived as less affordable and 
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too high in relation to the services provided ( 49% of men and 48% of women). It should 
be noted that in the case of private dental services, prices have increased steadily due to 
periodic rises in the price of mostly imported materials reflecting changes in exchange 
rates. 
Private service users were then asked whether they would again visit a private 
consultation room. 20% of men and 25% of women stated that they would again use the 
private sector, while 50% of men and 55% of women stated that they would do so if 
some things changed, such as an improvement in service or more affordable fees. 
Among those who stated they would definitely visit private physicians again, 62% of 
men and 66% thought the fees to be about right or low for the service. The majority of 
those who were willing to visit the private sector under certain conditions also thought 
private fees affordable, which seems to suggest that changes sought are not entirely 
related to price. Of those who did not wish to visit the private sector again, about half 
thought that the fees were too high, showing that at least some private utilisation has 
been discouraged. 
For dental services the pattern is similar, but willingness to use the private sector is more 
clearly related to affordability of fees. 68% of men and 58% of women who were 
inclined to visit the private sector again viewed the price as about right, only a small 
percentage viewing the fees as low. Of those willing to visit a private dentist under 
certain conditions, the majority stated that dental services are too expensive (54% and 
55% of women), suggesting price may be one such condition. 
When asked to assess the level of fees in the private health sector in general, half were 
unsure (59% of men and 56% ofwomen). This could be explained by low private sector 
utilisation, lack of advertising or other information sources. An insignificant percentage 
considered private payments low for the service, while a quarter thought them high. 
In response to a question about whether private health care is a positive phenomenon, the 
majority of respondents agreed (53% of men and 50% of women), although 'rather 
agree' response was more common than 'strongly agree'. However, 30% of men and 
32% of women disagreed to some extent. This result seem to be in accordance with a 
1989 study where 52% of survey respondents advocated legalisation of private practice 
as an important step in a strategy for radical reorganisation of the health care system in 
Bulgaria169• 
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Although it has been often assumed (especially in the early transition), that privately 
practising health professionals are more responsible that the state-employed due to better 
financial incentives, a majority of 43% of men and of women disagreed to a certain 
extent with this statement. 32% of men and 31% ofwomen agreed to a certain extent.. 
There have been some doubts regarding the qualifications of private sector staff. A large 
majority disagreed with the statement that private practitioners are better qualified than 
those working in the public sector, 60% of men and 55% of women expressing 
disagreement with the statement. Opinions were split on the issue of whether privately 
practising physicians have better equipment than state physicians ( 41% of men and 3 9% 
of women agreed; 29% of men and 30% of women disagreed to a certain extent). 
Although, in terms of qualification, resources, and sense of responsibility, private and 
state-employed physicians are seen as relatively similar, there seems to be a view that 
private physicians have better attitudes to patients. A large majority agreed with the 
statement that in the private sector more attention is paid to the patient (54% of men and 
56% ofwomen agreeing to some extent; 23% of men and 19% ofwomen disagreeing). 
Data from the qualitative research 
These results are comparable with the qualitative data. Attracting more attention to their 
medical problem was one of the main reasons for patients to seek private services. On 
the whole, the private sector ensures a more attentive, quicker and possibly more 
luxurious service. As the private sector is in its infancy, most physicians work also at the 
state facilities. In many cases, the most sophisticated equipment and well-known and 
best qualified physicians work in the state teaching hospitals. For emergency or hospital 
care, the state sector was still seen as the only alternative. 
There were also some negative perceptions about the private sector. This is supported by 
other research196, in which privately practising physicians in some cases neglect their 
patients in the state sector, with bribes or 'connections' a prerequisite to obtain treatment 
in the private sector. For this reason some stakeholders were against physicians being 
allowed to work in the private and public sector at the same time. 
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Attitudes to income of health professionals 
Data from the population survey 
Understanding the attitudes to physicians' financial status may be important, as most 
reform strategies have aimed to raise the status of physicians. 
In the survey, attitudes to incomes of health professionals (physicians, nurses and 
dentists) differ according to whether they work in public facilities or in the private sector. 
The predominant view is that salaries of physicians in the state sector are low ( 44% of 
men and 46% of women). This is true also for nurses and dentists in the state sector 
(nurses: 45% of men 48% of women; dentists: 41% of women and of men). 
In contrast, a majority of respondents had no view about the size of income from private 
practice (physicians: 43% of men and 44% ofwomen; nurses: 54% of men and 56% of 
women; dentists: 42% of men and 44% of women). Of those who expressed an opinion 
about private practitioners' incomes, most thought they were high. Overall, dentists' 
incomes from private practice were rated the highest (74% of men and 71% of women), 
followed by physicians (67% of men and 64% of women) and somewhat lower for nurses 
( 46% of men and 48% of women). This reflects the more advanced privatisation of 
dental services compared to other health services. 
Summary 
The evidence set out in this chapter indicates that the Bulgarian population places a high 
level of importance on the concept of health and sees it as a fundamental human right. 
There was, however, a widespread view that neither individuals nor the state, in their 
actions, reflected this importance. There was some evidence that a greater emphasis on 
health was seen as a manifestation of modernisation or "westemisation", and thus 
something to aspire to. 
A majority supported a strong state role in health care financing, over 50% advocating 
universal provision, free at the point of use, and nearly 100% believing that the state 
should, as a minimum, cover vulnerable groups. This reflects a continued reliance on the 
state to finance and provide health care, despite its weakened role during transition. It has 
been argued that such a reliance on the state and preference for free services in Bulgaria 
may be obstructive to economic liberalisation216 • Support for universal coverage varied 
little within the population, other than the intuitive finding that it was stronger in the 
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most old, poor, least well educated and those in rural areas. Physicians seem rather less 
supportive of universal coverage and were more concerned with unveiling the myth of 
'free health care', and arguing that the state could not, and should not, be asked to provide 
it. This broad support for collectivist values is confirmed in other research that places 
Bulgaria in the context of its more individualistic neighbours. 
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CHAPTER 10. WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR HEALTH 
CARE IN BULGARIA 
Given the large informal sector and inefficient tax system in Bulgaria, the population's 
willingness to pay under a particular financing scheme is likely to have a strong impact 
on its sustainability. Implementation of financial reform has focused predominantly on 
building administrative capacity through technical assistance, with much less attention to 
the population's attitudes to reform. An essential component of a PHARE project on 
restructuring of health financing was conducting a population survey on users' views, but 
this was later sidelined84 • It is unclear whether people are willing to contribute explicitly 
for health services which were previously financed from general taxation, and thus 
perceived to be "free of charge". Similarly, although willingness to pay (particularly 
user fees) has been extensively studied in the context of developing countries, virtually 
no work on Central and Eastern Europe is available from international sources. 
It has been argued that, in health care systems where services have been free at the point 
of use, people are generally less willing to pay for health care than in systems requiring 
some direct and visible participation217 44 • This section will explore the levels and 
determinants of willingness to pay for health care, preferred circumstances of payment, 
and factors influencing decisions to pay by means of analysis of data from the survey and 
qualitative research. 
Willingness to pay for health care: levels 
Data from the population survey 
When asked directly about any form of payment (cash, present, donation) for health 
services 19% of men and 15% of women indicated definite and unconditional 
' 
willingness to pay. About half of the respondents ( 46% of men, 48% women) stated that 
they were willing to pay under certain conditions, such as having sufficient resources; if 
they were especially satisfied with the outcome of the treatment; or in an emergency 
situation. Although the majority of respondents were not averse to the idea of some form 
of payment for previously free services, 35% of men and 37% of women were not 
willing to pay under any circumstance. 
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A more detailed analysis showed that only about 3% of men and 5% of women would 
consistently refuse to pay for health care for any of a range of specified services that 
were listed throughout the questionnaire, which shows that the responses may depend on 
wording of the questions, and specific circumstances of payments, rather than a general 
unwillingness to pay for health care. 
Willingness to pay for health care: determinants 
Data from the population survey 
In the univariate analysis, willingness to pay for health services falls with increasing age, 
decreasing education, decreasing income, worsening self-assessed financial status and 
poor self-reported health status (Figure 10.1). Those living in villages were less likely to 
be willing to pay than those in Sofia, and those who believed in universal state provision 
were less willing to pay than those who favoured a more selective state provision. 
As many of these variables are correlated with age, the relationships were explored in a 
multivariate analysis, adjusting for age (Table 10.1). In general, the univariate 
relationships remained significant in the age adjusted model. Income and self-assessed 
financial situation are highly significant predictors of willingness to pay for health care, 
as is educational attainment. Respondents in the highest income quartile are three times 
as likely as those in the lowest, to be willing to pay for health care. Those with only 
primary education are several times less likely than those with higher education, to 
favour payment for health care . Living in Sofia is associated with higher willingness to 
pay. 
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Figure 10.1. Percentage willing to pay for health services by range of variables 
-----
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
Age 
> 39 40-49 50-59 60-69 > 70 
Education 
Higher Secondary R"imary 
Settlement 
Sofia city town village 
View on the state role 
State should not 
provide for all 
State should provide 
for all 29 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
Income quartile 
2 3 
Highest 
Financial situation 
4 
Lowest 
Very Neither Rather Very poor 
good/ good/nor poor 
good bad 
Health status 
Good/ Rather good Bad/ Rather bad 
j •Men o Wome_/1] 

Willingness to pay for health care: factors 
Data from the population survey 
As shown earlier, for half of respondents, willingness to pay for health care was tied to 
certain conditions, such as purpose of payment. Factors affecting willingness to pay 
were identified through qualitative research, and then incorporated in the survey 
questionnaire. Respondents were asked whether they would pay under each scenario 
(Table 10.2). It is clear that burden of illness and affordability significantly increased 
willingness to pay. Factors related to quality of service, for example: access to a facility 
with higher standards, a highly qualified specialist, better staff attitude, quick or 
convenient service, or service provided nearby, were considered of less importance. 
Table 10.2. Willingness to pay for health care under different scenarios 
Scenarios Men(%) Women(%) 
In case of serious illness 75% 74% 
If my child/person very close to me is ill 70% 68% 
If I have enough money 70% 68% 
If the price is affordable 58% 57% 
If I am satisfied with the successful treatment 55% 51% 
For consultation with a well known specialist /clinic 51% 50% 
If I know that I will receive a high quality service 49% 48% 
If there is good equipment/ medication 48% 46% 
If the physician pays me special attention 41% 43% 
If the attitude of staff is very good 37% 37% 
If I know that I will be treated immediately 32% 29% 
If I could be treated close to my home 24% 24% 
87% of men and 85% of women were willing to pay in at least one scenario; 16% of men 
and 15% ofwomen were willing to pay in all12 cases. 13% of men and 15% ofwomen 
were unwilling to pay in any scenario. 
Those who were willing to pay in at least one scenario were then asked to rate the three 
most important reasons why they would pay for health care. The scenarios were then 
ranked using a composite score (Table 10.3) followed by treatment of a child or other 
close relative, and affordability. 
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Table 10.3. Willingness to pay for health care under different scenarios: rating 
Men(%) Women(%) 
]Sf 2nd 3rd composite ]Sf 2nd 3rd composite 
score score 
If serious illness 53.4 16.5 10.0 2.03 52.5 19.6 8.0 2.05 
If for child/relative is ill 14.5 22.7 20.2 1.09 15.4 22.6 19.0 1.10 
If I have enough money 14.7 19.4 13.4 0.96 14.6 17.1 16.0 0.94 
If well known specialist /clinic 5.6 14.0 7.2 0.52 5.0 15 .6 7.7 0.54 
If high-quality service 3.8 8.3 9.8 0.38 5.6 5.9 12.3 0.41 
If successful treatment 2.5 7.0 9.8 0.31 1.9 5.0 7.0 0.23 
If affordable price 1.8 6.4 11.7 0.30 1.6 6.1 12 .1 0.29 
If good equipment/ medication 1.1 1.9 10.4 0.18 1.0 3.1 8.2 0.17 
If special attention 0.7 1.9 3.2 0.09 1.9 3.0 5.2 0.17 
If quick service 1.4 0.4 1.9 0.07 0.3 1.2 1.1 0.04 
If good staff attitude 0.2 0.8 1.5 0.04 0.3 0.3 2.3 0.04 
If close to home 0.4 0.6 1.1 0.03 
-
0.6 1.1 0.02 
Data from the qualitative research 
Willingness to pay for health care was explored further in qualitative research. First, 
respondents were asked whether the patient can contribute personally to receiving good 
health care. This question aimed to capture spontaneous reactions without explicitly 
suggesting financial contribution. Almost all respondents stated that the patient should 
contribute to their health care in a more active way. Half interpreted 'contribution' as 
financial contribution, while a third of the patients and slightly less than half of the 
physicians requested a contribution of a different sort (users: "good attitude and 
helpfulness", "gratitude", "looking after one's health", prophylaxis, help in diagnostics, 
following the prescribed treatment, "to consult a physician only when really needed"; 
physicians: ''patients are ... too critical, negative", need of "understanding, not ... distrust, 
preconceptions", ''patients think that the staff have to indulge their every whim even 
when contradicting the treatment", "hygiene", "take care of their health", "give full 
details"). Among those who suggested, unprompted, that the patient should contribute 
financially (less than half), most supported payment of health insurance contributions. 
" ... obligatory to pay a certain percentage of salary for health insurance, in order to be 
sure that when going to a physician, will be paid attention .. .. " [user] 
" .. . by paying taxes, health insurance - to supply resources for health care" [physician] 
A third supported direct payment (user fee or fee-for-service) , with a few supporting co-
payments or sponsorship. Several respondents mentioned that financial contributions 
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should reflect ability to pay, with the rich contributing more. Two users mentioned a 
need to give gifts to the physician ("to stimulate them" [user]). 
"I have heard that in the West there are distortions of health insurance, where the state 
covers non-essential services, e.g. dandruff shampoo, because the population do not 
participate financially. The system should motivate people to seek care only when 
needed, but not to deter their use - a balance should be found. " [user] 
"A good patient should contribute through showing his/her respect for the physician who 
had treated him/her ... whether with flowers, or some sort of payment ... " [user] 
Several physicians mentioned that patients already pay extensively ("currently they 
contribute for almost everything, buy their own drugs, supplies, but not to staff service" 
[physician], "in many clinics scheduled operations are paid - obviously a necessity" 
[physician]). Several physicians doubted the willingness of the population to contribute. 
"The Bulgarian patient... selfishly demands free consultations or home visits with no 
sound reason due to a deeply rooted psychology: 'if it is free, let's use it no matter 
whether I need it or not', and thus deprive others who really need care ... " [physician] 
"In Bulgaria the patients are accustomed to receive everything without making any 
effort, and are often rude to staff, do not appreciate their work by merit. " [physician] 
The reasons for people being willing to pay were further examined in several stages. 
First, respondents spontaneously listed factors having an impact on willingness to pay. 
Then, they were asked to assess the relevance of several factors identified through pilot 
interviews. Finally, the three most important factors were ranked. 
When giving unprompted answers, the predominant views among patients and physicians 
were very different. The opinions of users were split between ability to pay (16 cases) 
and satisfaction with a high quality treatment or good attitude (14), only a few stating 
other reasons, such as need. Physicians also considered financial status to have an 
impact on willingness to pay (9), but the major factors were attitudes and beliefs (13). 
When presented with a showcard, the situation changed slightly. For a large majority of 
respondents, willingness to pay was associated with two main factors: health needs 
(incidence of serious, life-threatening illness, or illness requiring immediate treatment) 
and patient ability to pay. These were followed by patient satisfaction with the service, 
and surprisingly, how much the patient values his or her health (Table 10.4). 
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Table 10.4. Factors influencing willingness to pay for health care (showcard) 
Factors 
Serious I life-threatening illness 
Patient ' s ability to pay 
Patient ' s satisfaction (higher-quality/ quick/ convenient service) 
Patient's value of their own health 
Patient's politeness/ good manners/ mentality 
Type of service (pharmaceuticals, payment to physician, etc . 
Type of health facility (hospital I polyclinics) 
Circumstances of payment (large/small sum; monetary/ in-kind; 
before/ after the treatment) 
Location (in Sofia or in small town/village) 
Patients (n) 
26 
22 
13 
9 
7 
6 
3 
3 
3 
Doctors (n) 
1 1 
19 
7 
6 
10 
6 
10 
2 
When aggregated into broader categories, it is evident that need is perceived to be of 
primary importance to patients, while physicians rated it second lowest (Figure 10.2). 
Figure 10.2. Factors influencing willingness to pay for health care (grouped) 
Patients Physicians 
Need Ability to 
Ability to pay Circumstances 
Values 
Circumstances 
Satisfaction Satisfaction 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 
These findings corroborate the results from the survey, where senous illness and 
affordability were among the top three reasons for willingness to pay, followed by 
several indicators related to satisfaction and conditions of treatment. 
Importantly, these factors were seen as closely interrelated and some respondents, both 
patients and physicians, found it difficult to distinguish between cause and effect. For 
example, if a patient is seriously ill, whether they consider making a payment will also 
depend on their ability to pay or upbringing (physician). Motivation for payment may be 
determined by the type of service and whether the patient is satisfied with it (physician). 
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Whether patients value their own health is often indistinguishable from the overall value 
system and upbringing (physician). 
The connection between willingness to pay and ability to pay is complex. As some 
respondents noted, people have a real choice whether or not to pay only when they have 
sufficient means. 
"A person may value his/her health, but cannot afford to pay for it" "Everyone ... is 
willing to pay for a quality service, but not everyone has the means". [users] 
In some cases other factors, such as the subjective value of health, may be of higher 
importance: 
" ... it depends to what extent the patients value their health, because even if not seriously 
ill, they may be ready to pay" [user] 
As shown in chapter 7, many respondents already have expenence of formal and 
informal payments for health care. Thus some respondents understood the question in 
terms of whether they are willing to make an informal payment. However, in many cases 
the reasons why users have paid in the past are identical to why they are willing to pay in 
the future, namely to obtain good and successful treatment ("if I think that the physician 
has made an effort, I will express my gratitude" [user]; " ... after the treatment, when I 
assess the service, and whether the physician deserves remuneration"[ user]). As the 
attitudes to the existing practice of informal payments have been explored in chapter 7, 
this issue will not be pursued further here. 
Willingness to pay could also be influenced by whether payment is formal or informal. 
As informal payment usually involves a direct transaction between patient and physician, 
even some formal payments, where the patient pays directly to the physician, may create 
an impression of being illicit. 
"It is much easier when the payment is formalised. You know that it will cost you 2, 000 
Leva to see this specialist, it is much easier than if you have to leave 2, 000 Leva on the 
desk informally. " [physician] 
However, several respondents objected to any (direct) payment as contradicting the right 
to free health care guaranteed by the Constitution. 
" ... If the patient pays, his Constitutional rights are infringed, as the Constitution says 
health care is free ... " [physician] 
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It was also suggested by several respondents that willingness to pay can be dependent on 
the amount of choice available in the system. Clear separation of paid and free services 
was preferred. 
"Depends on patient's financial means. If they can afford it, will go to a private 
physician, but facilities like ours (state) should remain free. " [physicians] 
Factors related to need 
Need is seen widely as a strong incentive for payment, independent of other factors. 
Need is defined as a serious (as judged by the patient), complex, life-threatening, or 
unexpected illness. Many people thought that where there is urgent need ("especially if 
there is pain" [physician]) money will be found somehow. 
"When an illness is quite serious, even if a person don't have the means, will borrow, will 
remorgage their flat, but save themselves or relative from a life-threatening illness. " 
[user] 
"(WTP depends) from the degree of discomfort. For dental services people pay without 
thinking, because they usually go when they have toothache. " [physician] 
"I think that here money do not play a significant role, because when one needs health 
care, he will find a way to provide them. " [user] 
Two respondents noted that, given the high level of illness affecting all income strata in 
Bulgaria, almost everybody needs health care at some stage, so ability to pay becomes a 
much more relevant factor. 
"When in need, everybody is willing to pay ... but many people are too poor to afford to 
do it voluntary. " [physician] 
Factors related to ability to pay 
Another widely held view is that ability to pay is a crucial factor constraining willingness 
to pay. It was noted by several patients that some people may simply be forced to pay by 
necessity, and "able to pay" only with great strain on their resources (patient). The fact 
that people do pay does not reflect a preference for payment. 
"Everything boils down to financial resources of the health facility and financial means 
of the patient. " [user] 
"Every person wants to pay for health care ... the mentality is that if one is paying, will 
be treated better. But people are restricted by their unability to pay" [user] 
"The population in its large majority is socially disadvantaged - I don't see how such 
person could cover the cost of their treatment ... only partially. " [physician] 
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"If all health services are to be paid for, the Bulgarian wouldn 't go to a physician, ... will 
prefer to buy food, for himself and for his family, but not give for health. " [user] 
While most patients tended to perceive willingness to pay as closely correlated with 
income, several physicians thought the association not so clear-cut. 
"I disagree that ability to pay is essential. I have witnessed many cases of people who 
have enough money ... but constantly remind us of their right to free care. " [physician] 
" ... pensioners would give me a small token... while some well-off people, of high 
standing in the society ... treat the physician with disrespect. I don't say they have to give 
money, but giving something small, a small souvenir, is to show respect." [physician] 
Factors related to values and attitudes 
Other factors perceived to have a significant impact on willingness to pay are values, 
beliefs and attitudes to payment. Health awareness and general knowledge, in particular, 
were seen as ways to help patients appreciate the complexity of the service provided by 
the physician and have a better idea about appropriate payment [user]. Physicians tended 
to emphasise these factors to a larger extent. 
"(WTP) depends mostly on growing public awareness. Until a few years ago it was 
anathema to say that you can pay for a consultation. Now I see that quite a few people go 
to private consultation rooms and prefer to pay to get what they want. " [physician] 
"Every reasonable person is willing to pay more, to get rid of illness quicker ... " [user] 
"I would happily pay, if I know that this will contribute to a good health care... to 
improve not only my health, but also health of other people. " [user] 
The hypothesis that the long tradition of free health care in Bulgaria may have 
contributed to a reduced willingness to pay was confirmed to a certain degree in this 
survey. Some respondents (to a larger extent, physicians) thought that, despite 
introduction of payments in many previously free sectors (health, education, social 
services), people are still not used to the idea of payment. 
"We have to get accustomed that every manipulation, hospital admission, element of 
treatment has a price and somebody has to pay for it, otherwise it is a chaos - as it is 
now ... " [physician] 
"Depends on the education, change of the mentality of the patient: to realise that what 
has been done for him is valuable. " [physician] 
"People should understand that health care is not free, and the work of physician, nurse, 
even of hospital attendant, has its monetary equivalent. " [physician] 
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Physicians tend spontaneously to compare payment for health care to other services 
within or outside the health sector. Due to the fact that a small service sector, often 
informal, operated during the socialist period, payment for such services is more familiar. 
" ... people pay for everything: pay to car mechanic, to plumber; to have their television 
set repaired ... but when asked to pay for their health, would say: 'oh no, the state or the 
Party has promised this without money and you are obliged'. But nobody, especially 
now, is obliged. We say somebody is socially vulnerable because they can't buy bread 
and milk, but not if they can 't pay for health care. " [physician] 
It is clear that many people now find it easier to accept payment in the private sector, but 
remain averse towards payment in the public sector. Expansion of the private sector in 
other spheres of society is familiar and viewed positively. In contrast, payment for 
services that were until recently state-guaranteed was seen to require some preparation 
("the patient to be oriented'' [user] "going to private facilities, you know how much you 
will pay" [physician]). One of the reasons that payment may be acceptable in the private 
sector is that it involves an element of choice. 
"Every person knows well their family budget, and respectively according to this budget 
chooses the health facility, the physician, in order to be able to pay. " [user] 
Factors related to patient satisfaction 
Patient satisfaction with treatment was identified as another issue, although less 
important, relating to willingness to pay. Satisfaction may be related to the final 
outcome of treatment (success), or to the process and circumstances of treatment (high 
quality, good staff attitudes, equipment, etc.). Generally more than a quarter of users 
were prepared to pay in order to obtain a pleasant attitude by staff; to gain access to 
professionals who are the best specialists in a certain field ("competence of the physician 
who treats them" [physician]); or if convinced that a particular physician could help 
them. The perceived outcome of treatment also appeared to influence the decision to pay 
among several users ("really of high quality, normal, and effective" [user], "results 
expected from a certain physician" [user]). Some users mentioned being willing to pay 
where treatment abroad is required or treatment is available only in the private sector. 
"If a person is absolutely sure that by means of this payment their health will be 
improved significantly, he/she would be pleased to pay." [user] 
"(recently paid a dentist $200) Not that it wasn't a problem, but I am satisfied with the 
quality of the service and the next time I would go to the same dentist. Because I have 
used before unpaid dentist- it just isn't worth the saving. " [user] 
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"People would pay if they knew they will be well treated and cured. " [physician] 
The type of health facility and its location also influenced willingness to pay for health 
care. 
"people trust institutions, and not personalities. " "The name of the hospital, whether in 
the capital, determines the willingness to pay" [physicians] 
"The type of health facility matters, because people are much more willing to pay in an 
elite health facility, with a better reputation. " [physician] 
"It's easier for the patient to pay and get a convenient contact with the physician... to 
avoid the bureaucracy, at a central, bigger facility, with better quality" [physician] 
The method of payment, e.g. payment in advance or retrospectively, was not considered 
an important factor. People may, however, be adverse towards payment if it is not 
matched by improvements in service ("things are confused: I have paid, paid, and 
haven't received quality." [user]). 
Willingness to pay: projections 
This section draws broadly on contingent valuation techniques. Respondents were 
presented with a hypothetical market, where they gave monetary values to a range of 
health services. Although, in contrast to the contingent valuation method, the 
respondents did not have to compare directly the payment for different services with 
other goods, the emphasis was on rating the services in relation to each other. Thus, 
respondents evaluated first more routine services, such as consultation at polyclinic, 
followed by more complex treatments such as operations, finishing with comprehensive 
insurance. Qualitative research suggested that willingness to pay was often greater for a 
child or close relative than for oneself, and for that reason, study respondents were asked 
to evaluate health services in both situations. 
Data from the population survey 
A large majority of respondents stated that they would consult in the state sector (93% of 
men and 92% of women) if ill, which shows that the state retains its monopoly in 
provision. When a child or close relative is ill, the percentage of those willing to seek 
help in the private sector doubled (8% for illness of respondent; 15% of men and 14% of 
women for illness of child/relative). 
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An open-ended question was asked concerning the prices that respondents would pay for 
different types of service, distinguishing between themselves and their close relatives 
(Table 10.5). Half of respondents indicated willingness to pay 25-30,000 Leva 
contribution yearly for full medical insurance for themselves. This amounts to 1.5-2% of 
the average monthly salary of those employed in the state sector in May 1997, when the 
survey was conducted. However 75% of men were willing to pay 5%) (80,000 Leva) of 
their monthly income for health insurance for themselves, while for women the 
respective figure was 3.5% (60,000 Leva) of the average salary. These values represent 
16% and 12% respectively of the minimum salary. 
In all categories, men expressed an equal or higher willingness to pay for a child or close 
family member. Among women the figures are similar, apart from payment of insurance 
cover where women were willing to pay slightly less, 75o/o of women being willing to 
pay 50,000 Leva or 3% of average monthly salary, in the case of a child or other relative. 
Although, in international terms, these figures are very small, they may actually be an 
even smaller proportion of true income, given underreporting in the private and informal 
sector. On the other hand, official statistics exclude those unemployed and not registered 
as such, thus underestimating the average income figures. Given that a sizeable 
population is below the poverty line, reliant on minimal salary and social benefits, the 
figures in this study appear more significant. 
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Table 10.5. Prices that respondents were willing to pay for selected services (Leva) 
Men Median Percentile 25 Percentile 75 Valid N Nothing 
Respondent 
Full insurance - yearly 30,000 10,000 80,000 142 441 
Birth 17,500 10,000 50,000 70 441 
Operation for appendicitis 10,000 5,000 20,000 139 441 
One-day stay at hospital 2,000 1,000 5,000 156 441 
Physician on call (home visit) 2,000 1,000 5,000 123 441 
Consultation at polyclinic 1,000 600 2,000 194 441 
Child/ relative 
Full insurance- yearly 30,000 10,000 80,000 135 568 
Birth 20,000 10,000 50,000 92 568 
Operation for appendicitis 10,000 5,000 20,000 142 568 
One-day stay at hospital 2,000 1,000 5,000 160 568 
Physician on call (home visit) 2,000 1,000 5,250 125 568 
Consultation in polyclinic 1,000 800 2,000 191 568 
Women Median Percentile 25 Percentile 75 Valid N Nothing 
Respondent 
Full insurance - yearly 25,000 10,000 60,000 186 447 
Birth 15,000 5,000 30,000 192 447 
Operation for appendicitis 10,000 5,000 15,000 220 447 
One-day stay at hospital 2,000 1,000 5,000 244 447 
Physician on call (home visit) 2,000 1,000 5,000 187 447 
Consultation in polyclinic 1,000 500 2,000 286 447 
Child/ relative 
Full insurance- yearly 20,000 10,000 50,000 173 577 
Birth 15,000 5,000 30,000 181 577 
Operation for appendicitis 10,000 5,000 15,000 208 577 
One-day stay at hospital 2,000 1,000 5,000 234 577 
Physician on call (home visit) 2,000 1,000 5,000 179 577 
Consultation in polyclinic 1,000 800 2,000 279 577 
It is important to examine the relationship between reported expenditure and willingness 
to pay in the future. When individuals who have paid during their last consultation were 
divided into those who had paid above and below the median payment (2,200 Leva), 
there was no difference in willingness to pay in the future (68% and 69% respectively). 
However, those who have paid informally in the past were significantly more willing to 
pay in the future (87%), compared to those who have never paid (58%). Surprisingly, 
willingness to pay for consultation or operation, measured in Leva, appears to exceed 
reported actual health expenditure for consultations in the past 4 weeks (Figure 10.3). 
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Figure 10.3. Total health expenditure, informal payments and willingness to pay 
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Data from the qualitative research 
Willingness to pay for health care was explored also in the qualitative research. 
Respondents were presented with several scenarios, including their own acute illness or 
that of a close family member. Consultations at a first-level provider, hospital 
admission, purchase of pharmaceuticals and dental consultation were explored 
separately. 
As in the survey results, many respondents found it difficult to place a monetary value on 
medical services. Users and physicians proposed similar values for their own 
consultations (mean: 2,000 and 2,500 Leva respectively), which is similar to the survey 
data. 
While a large majority of respondents were willing to pay significantly more in the case 
of illness of their child or close relative than for themselves, most were unable to 
determine an upper limit or give an estimate at all. The mean among users was 5,000 
Leva, while there was only one answer among physicians. 
Physicians were less inclined to place monetary values on a hypothetical situation, and 
mostly gave values recommended by the Bulgarian Physicians Union or Ministry of 
Health; or referred to payments actually made by their patients. For example, while 
respondents suggested more realistic payments for hospital admission (mean: 14,000 
Leva), several physicians quoted figures of about 70,000 Leva as there had been 
speculation about introduction of charges for hospital stays in state facilities, later 
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abandoned. Similarly, while patients were willing to pay 13,000 Leva for 
pharmaceuticals on average, physicians suggested a mean of 49,500 Leva. 
The reasons why respondents found it difficult to value health services in relation to 
other commodities will be briefly explored as these are important for understanding 
willingness to pay. Most commonly, respondents' answers were hampered by what they 
perceived to be a "no choice" situation. Respondents commonly felt that in case of 
illness there is no real choice, as the illness has to be treated. Some respondents even 
found it impossible or unethical to discuss possible payment when the health of a child or 
close family member is at stake. Most respondents stated that they would pay not only 
what is affordable for them, but also raise funds through borrowing or sale of property to 
provide what is necessary for the treatment. 
"When it's a question of life and death, I think that the sum doesn't matter too much." 
[user] 
"(child's illness). I would do absolutely anything to help, I would sell my personal 
belongings if I have to, in order to pay for the best doctors. " [user] 
"If it is very necessary and if payment is obligatory, I will pay what I am asked ... 
regardless of financial difficulties. " [user] 
In a broader sense, some respondents thought the question not relevant as prices are 
imposed with no consultation or means testing, thus they have no choice but to pay. 
Several respondents did not feel confident giving an estimate, which they thought 
inexpert and "subjective". While poorer respondents tended to accept the requested 
amount because they could not do anything about it, the wealthier were more inclined to 
accept it as a normal practice. (users: "(would pay) as much as they ask for ... ! wouldn't 
be stingy",· "it's quite expensive, but this is the reality- a person can't choose",· "the sum 
is determined by the physician, and the patient has no choice'). 
Another reason is lack of clarity about the cost of health services, reflecting a chaotic 
expansion of user fees, discretionary informal payments and a largely unregulated private 
market for health care. Physicians were better informed about actual and planned 
payments in the health sector and most reproduced what they have heard about or 
observed ("I am a side in this matter and can't be very objective" [physician]). In 
contrast patients, who had less information, expressed their willingness to pay on the 
basis of their own financial means. Physicians tended to describe the actual situation 
while patients found it easier to imagine a hypothetical market. 
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The open-ended format of the scenario of willingness to pay posed some difficulties ("it 
is difficult to determine the exact sum" [physician]). Many respondents (mostly 
physicians) felt they lacked the necessary details to decide on payment for services or 
medication. As with the previous evidence on factors influencing willingness to pay, 
here willingness to pay was related to type of illness (serious, life-threatening, 
complications, length, level of discomfort); type of consultation (involving diagnostics, 
follow-up, specialised; repeated), type of health facility ("!go to a state facility, in order 
not to pay" [user]); qualifications of physician; whether the payment is to a particular 
person (acquaintance) or to a facility; and available resources in the health facilities. 
Other contextual factors considered important were the rate of US dollar to the Lev, type 
of pharmaceuticals (imported, brand names, substitutes), fluctuations in wages, drug 
prices and standard of living; pharmaceutical trade (resale leading to higher prices). 
Only three respondent were unwilling to pay at all, and in two of those cases it was 
specifically payment for hospital admission that was considered unacceptable. 
Discussion 
This chapter presented quantitative and qualitative results related to willingness to pay 
for health care in Bulgaria. Before discussing the potential implications of these results, 
some limitations will be noted. 
Measuring willingness to pay and beliefs raises several issues. First, as Blaxter notes, 
beliefs are not very good predictors of behaviour123 • Statements given in an interview 
may differ from actual actions, especially related to the stress of illness. 
Second, measuring willingness to pay in a hypothetical situation may not be valid 
because expressed willingness to pay may have been influenced by a tradition of free 
health care in Bulgaria and lack of awareness of cost. According to Drummond, "the 
willingness to pay may prove to be an unreliable indicator in the economic evaluation of 
health decisions and to lead to underestimation of the desire to participate in the system, 
when having the background of previously free access"217 • However, this effect is likely 
to have been mitigated by the increasingly common direct payment for health services 
(chapter 7). Abel-Smith and Rawal reported that respondents did not hesitate to answer 
questions about willingness to pay in a situation of free health services in Tanzania36• 
Similarly, in Kyrgyzstan, which had a Soviet health care system, only about a third were 
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unwilling to pay (39% unwilling or unable to pay for ambulatory care and 39% for 
inpatient care)183 • 
The third point is that measurement of willingness to pay may also underestimate the 
ability of households to pay. Respondents are likely to give figures based only on their 
disposable income, not taking into account their non-monetary assets and reserves. On 
the other hand, this interpretation may reflect more adequately the sums people can 
afford to pay without imposing a longer term burden on their household. 
Although approximately a third of respondents were unwilling to pay at all when asked 
in general (similar to the above given example of Kyrgyzstan), when confronted with 
concrete scenarios and circumstances of payment, only a very small percentage remained 
consistently unwilling to pay. This supports the difference between general beliefs and 
projected behaviour in certain circumstances, but also suggests a change in public 
attitudes during the first seven years of transition. Interestingly, willingness to pay (in 
Leva, for particular health services) exceeds the actual health spending in the past four 
weeks, suggesting a margin for an increase in population spending. However, reported 
expenditure is likely to be an underestimation of the real financial burden of disease. 
There are few studies which look at willingness to pay in Bulgaria. The issue has been 
considered politically difficult, as through the 1990s payment for health services, in 
effect, contradicted the Bulgarian constitution. The results from the current survey are 
broadly compatible with another representative nation-wide survey conducted in 1996163, 
which addressed the acceptability of direct user payment (Table 10.7). Although the 
response scale was different, it is evident that the percentage of those who strongly 
support or oppose the idea of user payments, is similar in both studies. It could also be 
suggested that those who had no opinion may have had reservations about payment, 
which were recorded in the current survey. 
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Table 1 0.6. Willingness to pay for health care: comparison of results 
Current data {1997} Reference data (1996} 
Would you pay (in cash/ Are you willing to accept some form of 
present/donation) for treatment? mixed payment for health services by the 
government and directly by the patient? 
Yes, completely 16.4% Yes 21.6% 
Yes, under certain conditions 47.3% No 47.0% 
No 36.3% No opinion 31.4% 
Predictably, the younger, highly educated, better off (actual and perceived), urban 
dwellers were more likely to be willing to pay for health care, reflecting their higher 
ability to pay. Other factors may include greater awareness of costs and benefits 
involved in paying, but further research is needed. A national study from Bulgaria in 
1991 found similar variations, 61% of the respondents were willing to pay more tax if it 
led to an improvement in the health services, education and other social services (71% in 
the cities, 63% in towns, and only 44% in the rural areas). This could be explained by the 
centralisation of facilities in urban areas and rural residents' inability and unwillingness 
to pay for poor or unavailable services121 • 
In the analysis on willingness to pay there is a very good match between qualitative and 
quantitative evidence. Need (particularly for serious illness) and ability to pay equally 
affect willingness to pay (Figure 10.4). In the qualitative research, values and beliefs 
emerged strongly as an important independent factor influencing willingness to pay. As 
discussed in chapter 9, values, beliefs and attitudes were viewed as particularly important 
in the circumstances of health care reform: population awareness and acceptance of the 
need to pay for health care under the new health financing system; patients 
acknowledging the seriousness of their illness and the complexity involved in health 
professionals' work. 
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Figure 10.4. Diagram of interaction between factors affecting willingness to pay 
CIRCUM 
STANCES 
Circumstances of treatment, and user satisfaction, appeared to be of secondary 
importance. These were thought to be relevant only if need occurs, and to be constrained 
by ability to pay. A nationally representative survey from Bulgaria, conducted in 1995 
among 1, 18 8 respondents over 15, looked at willingness to pay a higher price for a 
higher quality treatment126, and so is not directly comparable with the current survey. In 
it, most respondents were willing to pay to be treated by a highly qualified specialist 
(88%), followed by payment to receive a more attentive service by staff (79%), and less 
waiting time at facilities (54%). As in this study, people were least willing to pay for 
convenience or service provided near their home, indicating that the infrastructure 
(although of poor quality) still exists. 
Another factor strongly affecting willingness to pay is where treatment of children is 
concerned. This study shows that respondents are concerned much more about the health 
of their children or close relatives than their own. This agrees with two other studies in 
Bulgaria196 126 • A qualitative study conduced in 1996 found that when a child is ill, his or 
her parents are prepared to travel "any distance" and to spend "whatever money is 
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required'' (even to "suffer all kinds of humiliations") in order to be able to provide the 
best medical treatment196 • A representative survey in 1997 found that in case of their 
own mild illness, 61% apply self-treatment or alternative medicine and 38% visit a 
physician, in the same situation in relation to a child, 84% directly go to a physician126• 
This reflects a strategy for prioritising within the family, observed also in Armenia where 
children are consistently prioritised within the household in terms of food consumption 
and use of health services218 • 
It was also shown that people with past experience of informal payment are less adverse 
to future payment. This may be explained by custom or satisfaction with results. 
This chapter suggests that willingness to pay seems to be strongly influenced by values 
and beliefs, but when considered in the context of particular circumstances of payment, it 
is to a large extent determined by the concrete situation. The next chapter will further 
examine willingness to pay under several financial mechanisms that are likely to play 
some role in Bulgaria. 
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CHAPTER 11. OPTIONS FOR REFORM: POPULATION 
PERSPECTIVE 
Introduction 
This chapter will examine attitudes to, and understanding of, three methods for health 
financing: compulsory health insurance; user fees; and voluntary insurance; in 
comparison to the existing tax-based model. A compulsory health insurance scheme is in 
the process of implementation, with the Law for Health Insurance enacted in 1998. It is 
also likely that the existing system of wide-spread under-regulated user fees will be 
streamlined into co-payments. Voluntary insurance will provide an optional 
supplementary cover on top of social insurance contributions. These are relatively new 
and unfamiliar mechanisms for financing, and it is unclear to what extent the population 
is informed about current and forthcoming arrangements. 
In circumstances of imperfect mechanisms for enforcement of financing methods in 
Bulgaria (e.g. inefficient taxation), understanding of the population's preferences and 
willingness to pay under a particular model is a decisive factor in compliance, affecting 
the sustainability of the schemes. A viable health financing system has to be acceptable 
from the population's perspective, therefore it is important to understand the viewpoint of 
the population12 • 
This chapter will first examine in tum the attitudes to compulsory insurance; user 
charges; and voluntary insurance. Attitudes to the existing tax-based model will be used 
for comparison. Then, attitudes to methods of health care financing will be assessed 
using two approaches: indirectly, by establishing preferences for certain attributes of a 
financing model, and directly, by asking respondents to choose between financing 
models. 
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Attitudes to alternative methods for health care financing 
Compulsory health insurance 
Results from the population survey 
All respondents were presented with the scenario of introduction of a health insurance 
system. The model was described briefly as payment of monthly contributions to a 
health fund (or funds), which will cover most of the costs of treatments and medication. 
Assuming that membership of a health insurance scheme is not compulsory, respondents 
were asked whether they would like to contribute to such a scheme. The majority of the 
respondents (55% of men and 52% of women) were willing to pay even if they never 
become ill, to insure against insecurity. 7% of women and of men were willing to pay 
only if they perceived a chance of becoming ill. 17% of men and 19% of women were 
unwilling to pay at all, which is consistent with earlier responses. However, 21% of men 
and 22% of women were unsure or did not answer the question. 
About half (58% of men and 50% of women) supported contributions unrelated to risk, 
21% of men and 23% of women supported a risk-rating. 21% of men and 27% of 
women were unsure. 
Respondents were asked to evaluate several alternatives for handling surplus health 
insurance contributions not used immediately to pay for health services (Table 11.1). A 
composite score was estimated, with weighting of 3 for first place, 2 for second place, 
and 1 for third place. It is clear that the most preferred option was for insurance also to 
cover dependants and other close family members. Other highly preferred options were 
that some surplus or unused revenue from health insurance is either returned to the 
contributor or transferred to charity and social welfare payments, followed closely by use 
of funds by the Ministry of Health for national programmes, e.g. for health prevention 
and screening. Use of collected funds outside the health sector (return to the state budget 
or redirection of surplus funds for municipal activities) did not gain support. 
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Table 11.1. Scenarios for utilisation of surplus health contributions 
Men Women 
]St 211d Jfil Composite ]St 21171 3rd Composite 
% score % score Treatment of dependents 59.0 28.0 5.5 2.38 59.8 29.9 3.7 2.43 Return to contributor regularly 25.8 19.1 8.8 1.24 28. 1 15 .1 8.0 1.23 Charity, social security subsidies 6.4 27 .0 29.3 1.02 6.7 30.7 28.8 1. 10 Give to Ministry of Health 6.7 18.1 36.0 0.92 4.1 17.7 39. 7 0.87 (epidemics, health prevention) 
Returned to the state budget 1.1 5.2 12.2 0.26 1.0 4.6 12.0 0.24 Give to municipalities (e.g. for 1.1 2.6 8.1 0.17 0.4 2.0 7.8 0.13 infrastructure) 
The willingness to pay analysis in the previous chapter suggested that respondents may 
find it difficult to judge precisely how much they would pay for health care. Despite this 
potential limitation, recent mass media coverage and public debates related to health 
insurance mean that at least some respondents had a rough idea of a feasible contribution 
size. Typically, respondents declare they are willing to pay 5% of their monthly income 
(15% of men and 12% of women). This figure is comparable with a 1994 survey from 
Bulgaria where 5% was the most common percentage reported205 . The second most 
common percentage was 10% of monthly income (11% of men and 10% of women), and 
the third was 2% (9% of men and 10% of women). When aggregated, it was evident that 
a third (33% of men and 32% ofwomen) were willing to pay up to 5% of their income in 
health insurance contributions. 17% of men, and 14% of women were willing to pay 
more than 5% for health care. 18% of men and 22% of women were unwilling to pay at 
all for health insurance, and another third were unable to suggest a figure for 
contribution. 
Preliminary interviews showed that the institution collecting and managmg health 
insurance contributions may influence the general acceptance of a compulsory insurance 
scheme. A large majority (68% of men and 66% of women) thought that the Ministry of 
Health should be in charge of handling of contributions, with small percentages in favour 
of the Ministry ofFinance (7% of men and 4% of women), and NGOs (3%, both sexes). 
18% of men and 23% of women did not know. Co-operative organisations, 
parliamentary elected bodies and the private sector did not score well and were not 
deemed appropriate to participate in the management of the health insurance funds . 
There was a division of opinions over whether health funds should be organised on a 
geographical or employment basis. An equal percentage of respondents supported the 
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idea of national health funds, or funds decentralised to municipality level (altogether 
24o/o of men and 23% of women). 20% of men and 17% ofwomen preferred enterprise-
based funds, with membership restricted only to their employees. There was little 
support for regional-based funds, probably due to the purely formal functions of the 
regions in Bulgaria, in contrast to the municipalities, which assumed substantial 
administrative responsibilities with the Law for Self-Government of 1991. Notably, 
despite their dominance before 1989, labour unions were not seen as institutions that 
could deal with health fund management, reflecting recent corruption scandals and 
generally low membership. However, 25% of men and 31% of women did not have 
specific preferences or did not answer. 
It was also important to assess to what extent the population was informed of recent 
plans for introduction of a national health insurance system. More than half of the 
respondents (57% of men and 56% of women) had heard about governmental plans for 
introduction of health insurance. 
The majority of respondents found out about plans for introduction of health insurance 
from the mass media. Typically respondents obtained information from one or two 
sources. Television was the most common source (45% of men and 44% of women), and 
equal numbers from the press or radio (30% men and 27% women). The next most 
common sources of information were friends or social networks (19% of men and 18% 
of women) and colleagues at work (13% of men and 12% of women). In a very small 
number of cases, information was obtained from advertising, labour unions or other 
sources. 
The most common combination was television and newspapers (27% of men and 24% of 
women), television and radio (26% of men and 23% of women), or from press and radio 
(19% ofmen and 17% ofwomen). 
In all settlements, television was the most commonly reported source of information on 
health insurance. While in Sofia and the bigger cities the second most important source 
of information after television was newspapers, in small towns radio was an equally 
common source, and in villages, radio was a much more common source than the press. 
Information through family contacts had similar importance everywhere. Those living in 
villages were more rarely informed through work, advertising or labour union 
campmgns. 
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It is important to look specifically at the characteristics of those who were not informed 
about introduction of health insurance in order to identify gaps in information 
dissemination. Those between 40 and 60 appeared most informed of plans for 
implementation of health insurance, while older people were the least informed (Figure 
11.1 ). Among women over 70 there were three times more people who had not heard of 
health insurance plans than in the 40-49 age group, . Awareness was lower also among 
the poor (in the lowest income quartile and with poor self-perceived financial situation) 
compared to the rest. Information about health insurance was influenced by educational 
attainment, more than two-thirds of those with only primary education not being 
informed, compared to a quarter of those with higher education. The divorced, widowed 
or separated were less informed than the married and single. Those with poor self-
reported health were about 50% less informed than those with good health, probably 
because of the relationship of health with income discussed earlier. Predictably, those 
who lived in Sofia were about three times as informed as those living in villages. 
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Figure 11.1. Percentage of those who have not heard about introduction of health 
insurance by range of variables 
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Results from qualitative research 
Views about some key issues in design and running of a health insurance system, such as 
collection and management of revenue from health insurance contributions; level of 
contribution; and type of insurance fund or funds; were explored by means of qualitative 
research. 
Management of health insurance system 
Almost half of the patients thought that the Ministry of Health should take the lead in the 
health insurance system. Another common view (about a quarter) was that 
municipalities (local government) should assume responsibility. Thus, about two-thirds 
of patients supported public ownership and management of the insurance system. The 
state was seen as the only institution capable of discharging the huge task of running a 
health insurance system and controlling revenue flows. 
"The Ministry of Health should collect these contributions and allocate them. There they 
will be controlled the best, and not at local level." "If centralised in the MoH, it would 
bear all the responsibility" [users] 
"This is a matter for the state, to provide a fund to deal with this. I don't exclude the 
possibility to combine it with the local self-government through municipalities, with 
specialised local branch offices dealing with provision of insurance" [user] 
Among the physicians interviewed, about half preferred management of the funds by the 
government, but were less likely to suggest the Ministry of Health. Even when they 
favoured involvement by the Ministry of Health or municipalities, many emphasised that 
the "institution" or body running the health insurance fund should be clearly separated 
within the Ministry of Health structure as an independent "section", or "team"; and 
accountable separately. Only one respondent saw a role for NGOs in managing a 
mandatory insurance scheme, another respondent named the private sector. 
"The MoH, as a part of the government. The things have to be synchronised at state 
level." "Maybe the MoH is the most competent, and will have an idea how to allocate the 
money, for which health facilities, what equipment etc. " [physicians] 
Collection and management of contributions by an autonomous self-regulated body such 
as a health insurance fund (or "bank'') fully independent from the state was a relatively 
popular option (a quarter of users; more than a third of physicians) ("independent as the 
Bulgarian National Bank" [physician]). Such an arrangement was perceived to be more 
"serious", not susceptible to external interventions, and run by technical experts and 
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physicians ("specialised earmarked fund ... only broadly supervised by the state" [user]). 
The fund was most often seen as a financial institution whose task is to maximise 
revenue ("everywhere medicine is a business like any other" [physician]), and provide 
guarantees ("safeguard"), but at the same time have a "social element" [physician]. 
"Health insurance, as well as the pension fund, have to be separate and not dependent 
on the state. There should be a fund ... not controlled by the state who can redirect 
resources to other areas. To be used only for health care. Of course, the government can 
run it, but in agreement with certain law and obligatory procedures. " [user] 
Collection of health insurance contributions 
Some respondents differentiated between the collection of insurance funds and their 
management, many respondents viewing the former as a task for the state due to its 
experience in collecting tax. Deducting health insurance payments at source, as a 
percentage of salary, was seen as the only practical way to ensure actual collection. 
"I think that the most appropriate way is as a percentage on the salary, i.e. the state to 
collect them, respectively for the municipal enterprises - to be collected by 
municipalities; for those attached to ministries- by the respective ministries." [user] 
While some considered the Ministry of Health to be in the best position to collect funds, 
others thought it inappropriate for it to have full control of the health insurance scheme, 
given its other functions. After the Ministry of Health, there was significant support for 
collection and management of funds on a regional basis. Many people did not have a 
strong preference for the Ministry of Health, municipalities, or other organs of 
government, as long as the system is publicly run and controlled. 
''I would have liked the procedure to be as straightforward as possible, not to pay 
salaries to additional staff In my view, in the health ministry there are enough officials 
who could do the job. [user] 
"If possible, this could be done by the municipality, because we cannot burden a Ministry 
of Health, in the end of the day it has many other tasks." [user] 
Others felt the optimal solution to be a board, controlled by state institutions. Two 
respondents emphasised the need for a legal basis to provide guarantees. The main 
themes to emerge were that, whether or not the health insurance system is a fully 
independent entity, or a team within the Ministry of Health or municipalities, there 
should be transparency, accountability and trust. 
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"There should be a commission or board, in which obligatory to have representatives of 
the MoHand of all institutions dealing with health, in order to achieve full transparency 
of resource flows and their allocattion ... in order to have complete effectiveness. " [user] 
"The commission should be elected, to include experts, competent people ... " [physician] 
Some respondents also thought that while contributions can be collected in a separate 
health fund, this should be managed by the Ministry of Health. Several respondents, 
unprompted, advocated local collection and expenditure, in some cases at industry level, 
suggesting confusion with voluntary insurance or simple subscriptions in the private 
sector. 
Use of health insurance contributions 
Another issue was whether the health insurance contributions should be directed to 
health care alone, or to financing broadly related areas such as social care. A large 
majority of respondents preferred health insurance funds to be used only for health care. 
Among many physicians there was a particularly strong feeling that funds should be used 
exclusively for health care. This shows that most respondents understood the formal 
principles of a health insurance system. Many respondents recommended that social 
security be financed by another fund, or other institutions (the state, ministries, 
foundations, charities, rich individuals and firms, the church), thus not burdening the 
health care system. These respondents showed little evidence of awareness of the 
potential complexity of the interface. 
"For covering pressing medical needs. The resources must be differentiated: those who 
are for health care should be unconditionally for that. For other social needs, there is a 
role for foundations, charities, this is quite a different matter. " [user] 
However, a third of patients, although only two physicians, supported the idea that funds 
could be spent also on broader social purposes, reflecting a more holistic and socially-
oriented approach to health care financing. 
"For the majority of people in Bulgaria, health insurance relates only to health care. But 
health is a multi component system, and social conditions can also influence health. ... the 
money has to be used for all these things. " [physician] 
"The allocation of contributions is determined by the law ... if the structure handling the 
health fund allocates money incorrectly, the system will be bureaucratised. " [user] 
From those who supported limiting use of funds to health care only, two groups emerge. 
The first (more patients) is those who see the funds covering only some costs, such as 
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pharmaceuticals, emergency care, or subsidies to the poor for essential drugs. The 
second are those who see all costs being covered, including staff salaries and capital 
expenditure e.g. building new hospitals or new equipment. Given, in the future, the 
accumulation of more significant resources and the possibility for some of the money to 
be spent beyond the provision of basic health care, further distinctions arise. Some 
thought that some of the amassed resources could be used to subsidise the poor to help 
them pay for drugs and food (mainly patients, "currently for the most necessary -
medicines" [user], "social security, yes, as far as it is related to health issues ... " [user]), 
while the physicians thought the surplus should be spent within the health care system 
only, for professional qualification of staff or conference attendance ("it would be hard 
to convince anyone to pay for physicians' services, but if they are told that these means 
will cover their stay in the hospital, they probably would. " [physician]). Several 
physicians thought that even more state subsidies are needed, in addition to the health 
insurance fund. Two patients recommended spending on health care accompanied by 
spending on prevention and promotion. 
"If it is a state insurance system, naturally the state decides whether the money will be 
spend on health care or not ... It is right for this money to stay in the health care system, 
because it's logical if people are happy to pay more and the surplus can be used for 
research and development, staff training abroad, new equipment. " [physician] 
Willingness to pay for health insurance (as a % of income) 
Willingness to pay measured as a percentage of recurrent disposable income was also 
considered in the qualitative part of the research. The response rate was relatively low, 
with 20% of users and 30% of physicians declining to give a figure due to their 
perception of the complexity of multiple intervening factors. 
Among those who gave a percentage, several qualifications were made, especially 
regarding the type and quality of services received ("I would give 10-15%, if I know that 
everything will be all right. " [user]). 
About equal numbers of respondents said that contributions should be below 5%, 
between 5% and 10%, and above 10%. Physicians tended to give mostly figures under 
10%. While most users recognised the need for such payments for health care, and 
viewed then as generally adequate ("completely realistic" [physician], "quite 
appropriate" [physician]), the majority stated that they can pay only with considerable 
difficulties and complications for their family budget ("Oh, it is a percentage of my 
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current income, I can't provide anything with it" [physician], "more than 3-4% would be 
difficult, given that payment for pension fund is 2%" [physician]). Four users viewed 
payments above 10% as "normal" or indicated ability to pay "whatever is necessary" 
with no serious problems. 
"I, as most people in this country, receive small salary, and if it is possible not to pay, I 
wouldn't do it, but according to me it is normal to pay at least 15%." [user] 
"Depending on whether I will insure only me or also my family ... from the monthly 
salary for me 5%, and for the whole family - 15%. " [user] 
All respondents were willing to pay a health insurance premium. Only one respondent 
reported being unable to pay at all. 
"Between 5 and 8%, but I don 't know based on that what you will get. I think that a 
person has to pay for a good health care. " [user] 
"May be it should be about 20%, but not with the salary I get." [physician] 
"In the circumstances of Bulgaria 10% are both a little and a lot. 10% is a significant 
part of my family budget, but on the other hand, it is a small sum, $10, this is nothing ... 
It's very difficult to judge in our conditions ... " [physician] 
Again, there were several respondents who clearly misunderstood the proposals for a 
health insurance system, or confused it with voluntary health insurance. 
" ... it's not me who is going to pay- as in Western Europe. It may be 1% or 5% on top of 
my salary. The employer pays this, if it is some big shot, he can afford it." [physician] 
Principle of health insurance funds 
A range of more specialised questions, in relation to health insurance, were asked of 
physicians only. One concerned the principles on which a future health insurance system 
should be based. Among physicians who responded, two-thirds (12) supported the idea 
of a national health insurance fund, but some suggested that while a national fund can be 
used initially to establish the system, other models, such as regional or municipal funds, 
could be implemented later. National funds are viewed as providing safeguards for 
resources and ensuring regional cross-subsidisation. Enterprise-based professional funds 
were not popular(" ... only for those able to worlC'). 
Single versus multiple health insurance funds 
On the question of whether a single-fund health insurance system or a more pluralistic 
system of multiple funds (possibly competing) is more suitable for Bulgaria, opinions 
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were split. Half of physicians supported a single health insurance fund, and the other 
half multiple funds. The main reasons for selecting a single fund are stability, potential 
for better control, and to ensure coverage of the whole population. Several respondents 
perceived a single state fund as optimal initially, while a more mature system may allow 
for several smaller funds, or private funds, to provide a wider range of services. 
About half envisaged a non-centralised system with several funds. All but two thought 
that, in such circumstances, competition between funds will be beneficial for the user and 
the health care system as a whole. Although competition was generally viewed as a 
''positive" phenomenon (''progressive", "stimulating development of the organisation"), 
several respondents were aware of potential dangers, and recommended non-pnce 
competition (e.g. between types of payment or choice of physicians). Several 
respondents mentioned spontaneously that competition is particularly important if some 
of the funds are private. Several physicians recommended adapting experience from 
elsewhere to Bulgarian circumstances. Notably, Germany and Northern Europe were 
mentioned ("Bismark system", "krankenkassen ") as examples of the operation of multiple 
health insurance funds in a highly regulated environment. In two cases, the example of 
the State Insurance Institute in Bulgaria, a national institution with branch offices 
nationwide; and of the large insurance companies (for property, cars) also operating 
nationwide, were recommended as appropriate organisational structures. Two physicians 
also suggested a single fund with several levels of service. 
Compulsory versus voluntary membership 
Another key issue in designing a national msurance scheme is whether or not 
membership of health insurance funds should be obligatory, and whether there should be 
a choice of fund. This question was also asked of physicians only. Linked to this is the 
question of whether the rich should be excluded as, for example, in the Netherlands. In 
most cases people who were in favour of free choice thought also that the better off 
should not be excluded by the rules of the system. 
There was little support for compulsory membership, all but three respondents stating 
that membership should be optional, and people should be allowed to choose between 
funds. A common view was that participation and level of insurance should be a 
''personal decision" according to one's assessment of likely need. 
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" ... people should be given the opportunity to decide whether to take less money as a net 
salary, but to have free health care (social insurance), or to pay directly at market prices 
at the clinics. " [user] 
There is a clear link between those supporting free choice also thinking that the rich 
should be treated as the rest of the population, due to difficulties establishing wealth. 
Regulation through administrative measures was viewed as risky, difficult to enforce, 
and incompatible with a democratic society and a reformed health care system allowing 
free choice of a physician, facility and method of payment. Many respondents said 
people have to understand clearly the consequences of their choice and, on the other 
hand, the benefits of contributing to a scheme. Still, several physicians favoured 
obligatory membership at least for basic care due to possible externalities. 
"There should be some compulsion, as with the tax on cars. If you get ill and haven't 
paid, you have to pay directly to thefund ... but if you don't want to pay, you should be 
forced, because if you have communicable disease, you may infect others. It is the 
employers who should be forced to allocate ... asfor pension insurance." [physician] 
As noted earlier, almost all respondents favoured a health insurance system that gives the 
opportunity for the richest sections to participate. The arguments for choice were that the 
rich are difficult to identify ("it is a grey zone", "what is the criteria for very rich"), it is 
not "democratic", and unfair, "not very ethical", and they will contribute more in real 
terms via progressive taxation. Excluding the richest from the health insurance system 
was viewed as discriminatory and "in some way violation of human rights". Some 
suggested two parallel funds with higher levels of contribution for the rich covering a 
wider range of services, or supplemental voluntary insurance. Yet several people thought 
that, above a certain income, people will be able and willing to pay directly (mainly for 
non-essential optional services, luxury hospital settings etc.). 
User charges 
Results from the population survey 
A major issue in the implementation of user fees, given low incomes and growmg 
poverty, is who should be exempted and how to protect the interests of disadvantaged 
groups. Clearly, the current system of ad hoc charging and unofficial payments does not 
allow efficient targeting. Official cost-sharing, possibly in the form of co-payment, will 
allow for explicit and publicly supported targeting through exemptions. A social 
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consensus on which groups should be granted an exemption is essential. Although some 
attitudes to user charges have been partially explored in relation to informal payments 
(chapter 7), this section will focus specifically on views on exemption categories. 
It was unanimously agreed that in the case of introduction of user charges or co-
payments in state facilities, some exemptions, or reduced rates for certain groups, should 
be levied (91% of men and 93% of women). This figure is much higher than expected 
given the earlier views on whether patients should pay equally (53% of men and 52% of 
women supporting differentiated payments). The two variables do not correlate strongly. 
A large majority of those who supported equal payment for everybody (86% of men and 
89% of women), also supported exemptions. An explanation for this discrepancy could 
be that the earlier question was more general, potentially covering different types of 
payments (insurance contribution, charges etc.), while the latter is applied only to the 
specific case of user charges. 
Respondents were asked to review a list of groups identified through qualitative research, 
and to select those who should be exempted. The views of men and women were similar 
(Table 11.2). There was wide-spread agreement that the chronically ill or disabled, 
children, socially disadvantaged people and elderly should be exempted. More than two 
thirds also thought that families with young children, breadwinners, or people who care 
for disabled should have their fees reduced. Other groups that were viewed to justify 
exemption were students, the unemployed, and people living alone. There was relatively 
little support for rewarding behavior, e.g. leading a healthy life-style or looking after 
one's health. The view that people willing to pay directly, higher than the official fee, 
receive price discounts, was supported by about a quarter. 
Typically, exemption was recommended for three groups (17%). 12-15% of respondents 
supported exemptions for four to eight groups. Only 1% of men and 2% of women 
stated that none of the listed groups should have their fees reduced. This confirms the 
observation that people are more willing to agree with granting exemption rights when 
asked about particular groups, rather than when asked out of context. 
Those respondents who selected at least one group for exemption were asked to rank the 
listed groups according to need, to be exempted in case of cost-sharing. Children, 
followed by the disabled, disadvantaged people and older people (here understood as 
pensioners) were given the highest composite scores. 
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Table 11.2. Groups to receive price reduction in user fees 
Chronically ill/ disabled 
Children 
Disadvantaged people (orphans etc.) 
Older people 
Families with young children 
People who look after elderly/invalids 
People who are breadwinners/support family 
Young people 
People willing to pay directly a higher than the official fee 
Other 
People having healthy lifestyle 
People with certain merits to society /talents 
People, who are very careful with their own health/ consult a 
doctor immediately if they feel unwell 
Voluntary insurance 
Results from the population survey 
Men(%) Women(%) 
97% 96% 
95% 95% 
94% 94% 
88% 87% 
78% 81% 
74% 74% 
69% 71% 
35% 41% 
22% 22% 
16% 18% 
12% 15% 
11% 12% 
7% 11% 
This section will look at the prevalence of insurance in general, and medical insurance in 
particular. Having insurance might indicate a certain familiarity with insurance 
principles. The characteristics of those insured will then be examined. 
Approximately 38% of men and 27% of women had at least one type of insurance. 
Among men, car insurance was the most common (25%), followed by life (15%), 
property (8%), and accident insurance (7%). Among women, life insurance was the most 
common (15%), followed closely by car insurance(14%>), while accident and property 
insurance were less common ( 4% each). This shows that a significant proportion of the 
population, particularly men, is familiar with the principles of insurance. 
7% of men and 5% of women indicated that they, or any other members of their 
households, have (or have had) insurance against expenditure during illness or other 
related risks. Voluntary health insurance was not available before 1992-3 and is not yet 
well-known or popular in Bulgaria. Qualitative data show that some respondents equate 
medical insurance with life or accident insurance. Of those who reported ever having 
medical insurance, 41 o/o of men and 48% of women also had life insurance, and 16% of 
men and 11% of women had also accident insurance, and it is, therefore, possible that 
some respondents confused medical with life insurance, although it may be simply that 
they have opted for both. 
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Among men and women, variation between socio-economic groups, is similar (Table 
11.3). For car and life insurance, respondents in their 40s, in the higher income quartiles, 
and very good financial situation, higher or secondary education, married, and in good 
health tend to take insurance. The characteristics of those who reported having medical 
insurance are generally similar. They were mostly below 50 (for women) and below 60 
(for men), with higher or secondary education, with a neutral or rather poor financial 
situation. Income quartile and marital status did not make a difference. Among men, the 
incidence of insurance was similar among those with good or bad health, while among 
women more people with good health tend to insure. Apart from car insurance, there is 
no difference between insurance uptake in urban and rural settlements, but a more 
detailed breakdown of categories shows that people in former district centres and small 
towns tend to insure to a higher extent. However, conclusions should be tentative given 
the small numbers reporting having medical insurance. 
24% of men and 19% of women reported having one type of insurance, 9% of men and 
5% of women two types of insurance, and 4% of men and 3% of women three or more 
types of insurance. The most common combination was car and life insurance (7% of 
men and 4% of women: whole sample). Among men, the second most common was car 
and property insurance (6%) and third, car and accident insurance (4%). For women, the 
second most common combination was car and accident insurance (3%), followed by car 
and property insurance (2%). 
Of those insured, 43% of men and 52% of women reported that their insurer was DZI 
(the State Insurance Institute). 21% of men and 18% of women were insured with 
private companies. However, a third did not know the name of their insurer, probably 
because insurance was through employment, set up a long time ago, or covers another 
family member. 
Among those with no medical insurance, opinions about taking voluntary insurance were 
divided. 42% of men and 46% of women were willing to insure themselves, while 39% 
were not. 14% of men and 16% of women stated that they would take voluntary medical 
insurance in any case, and another 28% of men and 29% of women were willing to 
become insured under certain conditions (e.g. advantageous insurance policy or trusted 
company). Slightly below one fifth of all were uncertain or did not answer. 
Those who have not used medical insurance showed a strong preference towards taking 
voluntary health insurance in a state company (51% ofmen and 53%> ofwomen). Much 
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smaller percentages were willing to be insured by a private company ( 4% of men and of 
women), or by a company with mixed (state-private) ownership (4o/o of men and 5% of 
women). Insignificant numbers preferred to be insured by a co-operative organization. 
It should be also noted that of those who earlier stated an unwillingness to insure at all, 
about two-thirds (60%) reiterated this view, a third (32%) stating that they would insure 
in state companies, with very small numbers choosing other options. Thus state 
ownership appears an important factor influencing the decision to take voluntary health 
msurance. 
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Table 11.3. Level of insurance by selected socio-economic variables 
Variable Category Car insurance Life insurance Medical insurance 
(currently) (currently) (ever) 
MEN % (n) % (n) % (n) 
Age group <39 27.3 (65) 18.5 (44) 7.6 (18) 
40-49 49.2 (61) 25.0 (3 1) 9.7 (12) 
50-59 30.6 (30) 16.3 (16) 9.2 (9) 
60-69 9.7 (10) 5.8 (6) 1.9 (2) 
>70 2.1 (2) 1.0 (1) 3.1 (3) 
Income quartile I(> 160,000) 47.2 (75) 26.4 (42) 7.5 (12) 
(Leva) II (100,000-160,000) 24.4 (32) 13.0 (17) 6.1 (8) 
III (60,000-99,000) 16.9 (27) 11.9 (19) 8.1 ( 13) 
IV ( <60,000) 12.5 (20) 9.4 (15) 5.0 (8) 
Education Higher 40.9 (36) 15 .9 (14) 9.1 (8) 
Secondary 34.5 (113) 20.1 (66) 7.6 (2 5) 
Primary 7.8 (19) 7.3 (18) 4.5 (11 ) 
Financial situation Very good/good 61.8 (34) 23.6 (13) 1.8 (1) 
Neither good nor bad 35.1 (65) 21.6 (40) 7.6 (14) 
Rather poor 19.2 (41) 13 .1 (28) 9.4 (20) 
Very poor 13.3 (26) 7.2 (14) 4.1 (8) 
Marital status Married 29.0 (141) 16.4 (80) 7.6 (37) 
Single 16.7 (18) 12.0 (13) 5.6 (6) 
Divorced/separated 12.3 (8) 6.2 (4) 1.5 (1) 
Self-reported health Good/Rather good 29.8 (150) 16.7 (84) 6.8 (34) 
Bad/Rather bad 11.4 (18) 8.9 (14) 6.3 (10) 
Settlement Urban 29.9 (81) 14.4 (39) 7.0 (19) 
Rural 22.4 (87) 15.2 (59) 6.4 (25) 
All 25.4 (168) 14.8 (98) 6.7 (44) 
WOMEN 0/o (n) 0/o (n) 0/o (n) 
Age group <39 19.0 (56) 17.7 (52) 7.5 (22) 
40-49 28.4 (44) 21.9 (34) 7.7 (12) 
50-59 9.7 (15) 20.1 (31) 3.9 (6) 
60-69 5.1 (7) 7.3 (10) 0.7 (1) 
>70 0.7 (1) 1.4 (2) 2.1 (3) 
Income quartile I (> 160,000) 29.1 (53) 19.2 (35) 6.0 (11) 
(Leva) II (100,000-160,000) 18.6 (31) 20.4 (34) 6.0 (10) 
III (60,000-99,000) 11.1 (23) 14.9 (31) 5.8 (12) 
IV ( <60,000) 3.8 (10) 9.1 (24) 3.0 (8) 
Education Higher 23 .1 (40) 19.1 (33) 5.8 (1 0) 
Secondary 19.8 (69) 21.3 (74) 8.0 (28) 
Primary 3.8 (14) 6.0 (22) 1.6 (6) 
Financial situation Very good/ good 25.9 (15) 20.7 (12) 3.4 (2) 
Neither good nor bad 24.2 (61) 19.8 (50) 6.0 (15) 
Rather poor 10.4 (32) 14.6 (45) 5.2 (16) 
Very poor 5.3 (13) 7.3 (18) 3.7 (9) 
Marital status Married 19.2 (110) 17.1 (98) 5.4 (31) 
Single 7.1 (7) 14.3 (14) 6.1 (6) 
Divorced/separated 2.8 (6) 7.9 (17) 3.3 (7) 
Self-reported health Good/Rather good 16.8 (107) 16.8 (107) 6.0 (38) 
Bad/Rather bad 6.5 (16) 8.9 (22) 2.4 (6) 
Settlement Urban 17.2 (66) 14.6 (56) 5.2 
(20) 
Rural 11.3 (57) 14.5 (73) 4.8 (24) 
All 13.9 (123) 14.6 (129) 5.0 
(44) 
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Preference for payment options: indirect evidence 
Each model of health care financing is associated with a set of specific procedures for 
payment. Thus, preference for means of payment might be interpreted as indirect 
evidence of the respondent's preference for the financing model itself. In many cases, 
specific circumstances are likely to determine the acceptability of any financing method. 
In addition, respondents may be likely to indicate support for a model in general, but to 
be neutral or unfavourable to some of its characteristics, due to unfamiliarity or because 
of automatic response. 
This section will address willingness to pay in relation to circumstances of payment 
(timing and location of payment, method of payment, institution or individual collecting 
payments, collection procedure, and presence of choice). Respondents were asked to 
evaluate a set of statements related to their preferred circumstances of payment using a 
five-category scale ('strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree'; 'don't know'). The financing 
models, which are likely to be linked to these circumstances were not explicitly named, 
to reduce the effect of preconceptions. 
Results from the population survey 
More than a third (31% of men and 32% of women) agreed strongly with the statement 
that if health services are paid for, it is better that the patient pays directly at the state or 
private health facility. Another 23% of men and 19% of women rather agreed. This 
might be explained by a preference for higher transparency in health financing and local 
use of funds. However, 31% of men and 30% of women disagreed to a certain extent. 
The non-response rate was below 15% for men and 19% of women, close to the average 
for this group of statements (18% for men and 20% for women). 
62% of men and 60% of women were willing to pay for consultation if they could choose 
the physician themselves, while 27% of men and of women disagreed. 
There was predominant support (3 7% of men and women strongly agreeing) for payment 
at the end of treatment, conditional on a successful outcome. Qualitative research shows 
that adequate outcome, as judged by the user, can be an indicator of quality of service, 
but also can reflect a desire for accountability. 
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Half of respondents (54% of men, 51% of women) disagreed with payment for each 
separate consultation in the process of treatment, while 28% of men and of women 
agreed. 
Given a scenario of obligatory payment for health services, 34% of men and 32% of 
women preferred to pay directly to the physician. About a quarter preferred to pay to the 
administration of the health facility (25% of men and 21% of women), and 15% of men 
and 17% of women preferred to pay to an intermediary, such as insurance company, 
health fund, or state institution. This shows that a majority of 41% of men and 38% of 
women prefer to pay indirectly, without involving the physician. 19% of men and of 
women were unwilling to pay at all. It is evident that the direct exchange of money for 
health services, examples being fee-for-service payments in the private sector; user fees; 
or informal payments; are still preferred by many, possibly due to their perceived higher 
impact and simplicity. 
About a third of all respondents preferred to contribute monthly a certain sum, with no 
co-payments in case of illness (37% ofmen and 34% ofwomen). 20% ofmen and 18% 
of women chose to pay a small percentage of all expenses incurred during treatment. 
18% of men and of women supported payment for each visit at the point of use. 19% of 
men and 20% of women preferred another alternative; including tax, or were not willing 
to pay at all. The non-response rate was 7% for men and 10% for women. 
Results from qualitative research 
Respondents' preferences for payment were examined in semi-structured interviews. The 
suggested options were: payment of user fee for each consultation (covering service, 
drugs); monthly payment with no further expenses; or payment of 3-5% of all treatment-
related costs. Clearly the first and third option are forms of direct payment, either fixed 
rate user fee or co-payment, while the second is a national insurance contribution. The 
wording of the question, and subsequent discussion with the respondent, intentionally 
used descriptive phrases rather than concepts of financing models (for example 'monthly 
payment' or 'subscription' rather than insurance premium). However, unprompted, some 
respondents started using those terms interchangeably. 
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Preference for a payment scheme: respondents themselves 
In the qualitative study, the preference for regular monthly contributions with no 
payment at the point of use is somewhat lower than expected, given the results from the 
study. About half of users, and slightly more physicians, were in favour of this option 
for payment. The main arguments were that it reduced uncertainty ("if I need to use 
health services, to be sure that I will get a response from them" [user]); neutralised risk; 
was easier to accommodate as an expense; was simple and "convenient"; ensured 
subsidies from rich to poor; and collection of more resources for health care, "better 
value for money, particularly in case of serious illness" [physician], ensuring a provision 
of "guaranteed and free treatment" [physician]. 
Of the rest, most supported a fixed fee per consultation, covenng all costs. An 
explanation could be that respondents thought that they were choosing a model 
applicable to the current circumstances in the health care system. Some respondents 
actually viewed user fees as a transitional step to an insurance system with no user 
payments. Two users emphasised that such payment is feasible mainly in outpatient 
circumstances, for less complex illnesses. Fees were seen as "more flexible", easier, 
accounting for individual differences in service utilisation, deterring frivolous demand 
and particularly benefiting those who use health services least. Some sections of the 
population were viewed as able to afford to pay fees. It was also thought to be the most 
simple and feasible form of payment prior to introduction of health insurance. The 
preference was for user fees to cover services as well as drugs, which is not the case in 
Bulgaria. 
Several physicians who generally supported the introduction of health insurance were in 
favour of fees during the transition from tax-based to health insurance financing. A few 
suggested that the fees should reflect the type of consultation and particular service 
received or whether it is a first consultation. In several cases it was emphasised that the 
' 
collected revenue should not be paid directly to the physician, which may create scope 
for corruption. Perceived problems with fees related mainly to lack of affordability in 
case of catastrophic illness. 
Two users and one physician spontaneously suggested a mixed system, combining 
insurance payments with co-payments at the point of use. 
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"Maybe the best option is a mixed system, where a monthly sum and a minimal fee for 
eac~ co~sultation with physician is paid. Thus you will be both guaranteed against 
senous zllness · · · on the other hand it will prevent you from consulting a physician about 
trifles or every day, because you have already paid ... " [user] 
Preference for a payment scheme: those who are chronically ill 
The best options for payment were also discussed in view of the specific circumstances 
of those who suffer from chronic illness or disability. A widely shared preference among 
users was for monthly payment of an insurance premium, followed by payment of 3-5% 
of treatment cost (perceived as a very low amount). Prepayment schemes, in general, 
were seen to ensure timely response by medical staff and continuity of care for 
chronically ill patients. Physicians were split between monthly contribution and special 
policies for coverage of such groups by the state or other public bodies. The latter view 
was expressed only by physicians, even though many users interviewed had chronic 
illness. 
Several respondents supported user fees for the chronically ill, with direct payment to the 
physician in order to ensure a good level of service, or were generally against the cross-
subsidisation entailed by health insurance. Three physicians emphasised the need for 
user fees to differentiate between an initial and follow-up consultation. 
Regarding patients who rarely need medical care, two-thirds of users agreed that the most 
suitable option is direct payment of a fee for each consultation. However, a third of 
patients and almost all physicians still maintained that a monthly contribution under a 
health insurance system should be a "universal practice" [user]), which will provide all 
users with a good standard of health care, and spread the risk in a larger pool ("there is 
no guarantee that they would not start using services more often" [user]). 
Preference for a payment scheme: pensioners 
Pensioners were used as an example of a social group that is recognised by the public to 
have very low economic status and significantly more likely to suffer from chronic 
illnesses. Of those who suggested any payment option, about half were of the opinion 
that this group should receive free health care, covered by the state, pension or 
employment funds, or other bodies. The main reason was their perceived inability to pay 
even minimal fees. The second most common view was that they could pay monthly due 
to their higher health needs and incidence of chronic illness, with significant state 
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subsidies. Several respondents commented on the complexity of the issue, since most 
pensioners have a record of long-term social insurance contributions under the socialist 
system, which are now unavailable. 
Location of payment (users only) 
Unprompted, all but a few respondents indicated a strong preference for indirect methods 
of payment for health care. When a showcard was presented, the opinions split equally 
between contribution to a health insurance company or to a state health fund, many 
respondents selecting both. Many respondents did not have a specific preference as long 
as payment involves an intermediary. Payment to the administration of the health facility 
was deemed more appropriate in current circumstances, while in the future, 
establishment of a health insurance system was envisaged. The option for health funds 
was seen to require radical restructuring of the system and provide better incentives to 
staff and protection of revenue. 
The advantages of payment to the health facilities were that it is local, with closer links 
between actual payment and utilisation of revenue, lower operational costs, and greater 
accountability and cost-consciousness. Also, retaining revenue at the heath facility could 
be a stimulus for better performance and resource allocation according to local needs. 
Several respondents argued that, in this case, funds should be used not only for staff 
payment, but also for improvement of infrastructure. In general, there was a strong 
preference that payment be made at a specific place and handled and allocated by a non-
medical intermediary. 
"The most suitable option is to pay to the administration of the health facility . . . the 
money enter directly into the budget of the facility ... can be allocated quicker and better 
for its needs. The option with the fund creates additional difficulties .... " " ... in this way 
there will be a transparency in the cost of each type of service. " [users] 
In contrast, preference for direct payment to staff in the state or private sector was 
relatively rare. Among the objections were that it diminishes the physician, is 
"inappropriate", "humiliating", increases the workload of professional staff through 
more book-keeping, and creates potential for corruption, tax evasion, and differentiated 
quality of treatment. Four users (although none of the physicians) thought that direct 
taxable payment to a physician was more acceptable in the private sector. 
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Preference for financing method: direct choice 
While the previous section looked at indirect measures of system preference, this section 
will examine the direct choices made by respondents. Earlier chapters suggested that 
many respondents have some broad understanding of financing models (existing and 
alternative models) as a result of public discussions. 
Direct choice of financing method 
Results from the population survey 
Respondents were asked directly for their preferred method for health care financing. 
The financial methods were described briefly, but again not named, to avoid bias. The 
options offered were universal monthly contribution as a percentage of income (national 
health insurance); payment of full costs of treatment at the point of use for each contact 
with the health system (fee-for-service); retaining a formally free system with 
reallocation of more funds to health care from other sectors (tax); and to retain a formally 
free system accompanied by small user charges at health facilities (tax plus user fees). 
40% of men and of women preferred a monthly contribution covering all expenses 
related to illness, with no further payments at the point of use. The next most popular 
option (34% of men and 33% ofwomen) was to retain the current tax based model with 
additional resources. However, 18% of men and 21% of women preferred one-off user 
fees for each visit to a physician, in combination with taxation - in effect, the current 
situation in Bulgaria. Only 2% of men and 3% of women were willing to pay directly for 
overall treatment costs. 6% of men and 4% for women did not express opinions. 
These results are comparable with an earlier question on types of payment (Table 11.4). 
Of those who preferred to pay a percentage of their monthly income covering all 
expenses, 68%) of men and 72% of women confirmed their support for a national 
insurance scheme. Of those preferring to pay a charge for each visit to a physician, 23% 
of men and 29% of women reiterated their preference to pay at the point of use for each 
contact, although the 3 7% of men and 31% of women changed their mind to monthly 
payments, probably because the later question was phrased "cost of full treatment" 
instead of charge. 68% of men and 65% of women, who stated earlier that they would 
not like to pay in any event, indicated a preference for the current model, with transfer of 
more funds from other sectors. 
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Table 11.4. Preference for payment scheme and direction of health reform: comparison 
Type of scheme Direction for health care reform 
(characteristics described) (named) 
MEN 
Monthly contribution 36.6% Health insurance 40.4% 
Small % of treatment 20.0% Free & small fees 33.7% 
Other/wouldn't pay 18.5% Free & higher budget 17.9% 
Fee for each treatment 17.7% Full price per treatment 2.4% 
DK 7.3% DK 5.6% 
WOMEN 
Monthly contribution 33.6% Health insurance 39.6% 
Small % of treatment 18.2% Free & small fees 20.8% 
Other/wouldn't pay 19.9% Free & higher budget 33.2% 
Fee for each treatment 17.9% Full price per treatment 2.9% 
DK 10.4% DK 3.5% 
Results from qualitative research 
The qualitative methods were used here mainly to establish levels of awareness and 
familiarity with some general principles of the model. The user-perceived suitability of 
the existing tax-based model and respondent assessment of several models of health 
financing are examined. 
Awareness 
Questions on choice of financing mechanisms are only valid if respondents are familiar 
with each method. Respondents were asked to list all financial systems they could think 
of, with no prompting. All respondents were aware that the current health care system is 
financed through a state budget, resources being supplied via general taxation, namely 
the General Income Tax (Figure 11.2). Broad awareness of health insurance either as a 
national mandatory system or voluntary insurance is relatively high, although the specific 
principles of these two are not often clearly distinguished. Patients tended to ascribe 
more importance to various sources of sponsorship, international aid, and donations. 
Direct user payments were less often perceived to be a viable source of health sector 
financing. 
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Figure 11.2. Awareness of methods for health care financing 
Patients 
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Figure 11.3 shows results from the assessment of various methods for health financing 
given by the respondents in the course of the interview. In agreement with the semi-
structured format, mostly spontaneous answers were sought, not all directions were 
explored with all respondents, and the questions were asked in random order. This 
ultimately led to reduction in numbers, especially among the physicians, who tended to 
follow their own logic. The most complete information was obtained for the "most 
suitable" or "the best" method. 
Most attention was given to health insurance as a preferred method and the current tax-
based budget financing. In many cases these two were opposed to each other. Most 
respondents expressed desire for change, either as a modification of the current tax-based 
model, or transition to an alternative model, most often mandatory health insurance. 
As shown above, all respondents were broadly aware of the way the health care system in 
Bulgaria is financed. With only occasional prompting, many could name the General 
Income Tax, or describe how resources are collected in a general pool and then 
distributed to different sectors. In itself this shows that the principle of this method is 
relatively transparent, but the actual handling of resources once they are deducted at 
source is less so. The tax-based method was commonly named "budgetary" , "state", "via 
General Income Tax", or "centralised/centrally" (several physicians), "indirectly". 
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Figure 11.3. Comparison of methods for health care financing by selected criteria 
Total: 33 patients, 25 physicians 
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Suitability of financial methods 
There is a marked difference between the views of physicians and users. While a 
significant proportion of patients thought the current state model broadly acceptable, half 
being positive about it, this was a very rare view among the physicians (only 5 agreeing 
to a certain extent). It has to be noted that satisfaction with the current health care system 
and level of financing, is equally low among physicians and patients as discussed in 
chapter 6. 
It is also important to outline the main problems perceived. Respondents were divided 
into those who thought the model suitable to Bulgarian circumstances and those who 
thought it not suitable. In the following analysis the suffixes [ s] and [ ns] were used to 
designate those who viewed the model suitable or not. As throughout this thesis, the 
views of patients and physicians will be examined in parallel. 
Most respondents who viewed the tax based system to be currently suitable had some 
reservations. The main benefits were seen as protection of equity, universal coverage, 
and simplicity for the tax-payer ("the regular deduction of tax did not burden us, health 
care was free .. . , we did not have to waste time paying special tax" [user-s]). In some 
cases respondents were unaware of the advantages of another method, or were neutral 
and did not have a clear preference ("if no more rational model fo r collection of revenue 
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specifically for health care is suggested, and this model is still working... it can be 
retained." [user-s]). However the main point of division is between those respondents 
who favour adjusting the existing model to new circumstances, and those who viewed 
the system as completely obsolete and in need of a radical overhaul. 
"No, it is unsuitable for the Bulgarian conditions, and is ineffective as such. Therefore a 
radical reform in near future is needed ... the Bulgarian Physicians Union, the labour 
unions ... have done some work in this area, and should be given an opportunity to apply 
it in practice. " [physician-ns] 
"In Bulgarian conditions budget financing should be retained to cover a certain group of 
the population, who are very poor ... the rest should be paid." [user] 
"The question is how to adapt the inherited system so that it could start working ... given 
the scarce resources available. " [physician] 
Some respondents (mainly users) felt that the model is generally suited to Bulgaria, but 
not in the new circumstances ("maybe it is suitable, but things change daily, and to get 
closer to Europe maybe everyone will have to have an insurance membership book and 
to know once for all that they are insured." [user-s]). It can be hypothesised that those 
who perceive the model as generally applicable to Bulgaria are the group who see less 
serious inherent problems in the system. Several respondents viewed it as suitable 
during transition. 
"I think that as the entire legislation will be changing with the new conditions in 
Bulgaria, we should move in a painless way to European standards. But this should be 
during a long period, so as not to burden people who are still not provided for." [user-s] 
Notably, among both those who viewed the tax-based model to be suitable for Bulgaria, 
and those who thought it unsuitable, emerging themes were similar, although in the latter 
group such problems were more rarely mentioned. In effect, this may show that desire 
for change may be a product of factors other than objective problems with the model, for 
example, lack of information about alternative financing methods. ("I think that given 
there is nothing else better, this is also some solution" [user]). 
Many respondents, including physicians, did not fully exclude the tax-based model and 
suggested that it could be retained in combination with other financing mechanisms. 
Some perceived a continuing need for the state budget to support vulnerable groups and 
contribute to capital investment. However, most respondents were immediately aware of 
problems, and did not think it fully consistent with the situation after transition. 
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"I think that Bulgaria has to go through the stage when each person will be paid 
adequately for their work, and then pay as in - I think - Holland, Denmark, where the 
social allocations of the net earnings of an average worker reach 40-50%, but on the 
other hand users have excellent health care. " [ user-ns] 
Among the most common concerns regarding budget financing based on general taxation 
was that the health care budget is insufficient for existing needs. This was by far the 
most common objection among those who believed the tax-based method unsuitable and 
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second among those viewing the model as generally applicable. As discussed in chapter 
6, funding deficits have resulted in a visible deterioration in accessibility of care and 
quality, observed by most respondents, including shortages of basic supplies and 
equipment. Several respondents were unsure how the system operates at all ("it is a 
magic - all our surgical supplies come from aid, only our salaries must be from the 
budget" [physician-us]). 
" ... the Ministry covers about 15% of the needs. All the rest comes from foundations, 
donations, user payment for pharmaceuticals... The so called social medicine, in fact 
does not exist anymore. " [physician] 
"The Bulgarian health care is financed by a very small proportion of what is deducted as 
Social Insurance Tax. As a percentage of income, it may be sufficient, but I don 't know 
what share of it is really spent for health care ... ". [user-s] 
"The allocated health care budget is simply not enough, it is exhausted in the middle of 
the year. The state can't cover these huge expenses ... " [physician-ns] 
This was spontaneously and strongly linked, especially among the supporters of the 
model, to inadequate tax collection, underreporting of income, a growing shadow 
economy and rising unemployment. A particular concern was the failure of taxation to 
cover contract-based, part-time employees, or those on 'civil contracts' 1, considered by 
several respondents to increase inequity. 
" ... it is insufficient because it is deducted mainly from people employed in the budgetary 
sphere. It is impossible to collect the 100% due tax from those employed on a private or 
personal basis are - they can 't be covered as taxpayers ... " [user-s] 
"Only people who can be taxed are taxed. Many private firms avoid tax, and their 
employees do not pay General Income Tax like the state ones ... Not all fall under the 
collection procedures. I think that those who actually pay are a minority. " [user-s] 
The funding of the health care system is seen by many as a function of economic 
development ("the money have to come from somewhere. Without the development of the 
1 Type of contract not involving payment of State Social Insurance, similar to freelance status 
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economy there is no health care" [physician-ns ]). Interestingly, in many cases the state 
is perceived as something external and restrictive, not as a representation of the people. 
Another major problem, particularly among those accepting the tax-based model, is that 
the funds are not earmarked for health care, thus it is difficult to control whether they are 
actually spent on health care. 
"As a percentage of income, the tax may be sufficient, but I don't know what share of it is 
really spent for health care ... ". [user-s] 
"The General Income Tax finances not only health but also other social services. The 
revenue is added in a pile, and is then distributed ... It fills gaps everywhere ... There is no 
strategy - it is impossible to have one. " [ user-ns] 
Low accountability also distorts resource allocation which, according to many 
respondents, involves significant bureaucracy. Internal misallocation, with particular 
health facilities benefiting more than others, was noted with no prompting - but only by 
respondents from the countryside. The misallocation also gives rise to potential 
corruption ("once in the budget, the money 'disappear' without a trace" [user-s]). 
"Generally it is fine, but it depends how the subsidies are distributed ... Facilities as 
treated unequally. I saw how a university hospital 'Tzaritza Joanna' and the Lovetch 
district hospital are subsidised ... not according to need." [physician-s] 
"The last seven years clearly showed the ineffectiveness of this system for our health 
care. In Bulgaria there is a heavy bureaucratic system for distribution of resources, a 
delayed transfer to facilities, and ineffective spending. " [ user-ns] 
An emerging issue was that of the structure of governance. Several physicians 
mentioned centralisation as a major problem related to the tax-based model ("in order to 
achieve democracy, the functions of the Ministry of Health have to change from 
controlling to co-ordinating" [physician-ns ]). Bureaucracy is associated with resources 
gmng m1ssmg. Two physicians pointed to a lack of adequate cost containment at 
hospitals and lack of sense of ownership, due to hospitals not being autonomous legal 
entities and their lack of information on costs. 
"The trouble is that even the limited resources for health care are not all spent 
purposefully, are diverted and not spent for high priority services. " [physician-ns] 
Another outcome of the tax-based system, perceived mostly by physicians, was the 
inadequate payment of health professionals, low social status, poor working conditions, 
and lack of a link between performance and salaries, all leading to reduced motivation. 
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The quality of care was not often noted as a problem specific to the tax-based model, and 
as shown in chapter 6, is mostly explained by the macroeconomic situation. 
"The Bulgarian physician is extremely low in the social hierarchy, poorly paid, lacks 
resources, pharmaceuticals ... " [physician-s J 
"In the past everybody was getting the same money. Although these were not enough, 
given that everybody was alike, this was accepted as a matter of fact. Now a coffee shop 
owner gets ten times more than a physician, and he/she feels this situation as abnormal, 
and their work motivation is much lower. " [physician-ns] 
When assessing the suitability of different models of financing to the circumstances of 
Bulgaria, problems associated with the tax-based model were viewed as advantages of 
health insurance, and thus were used as arguments for its introduction. Donations, aid 
and user payments were considered of secondary importance. As mentioned earlier in 
the chapter, many respondents knew some basic terms associated with social insurance, 
made comparisons with other countries, and several had first hand observations ("I was 
in Germany, ill and uninsured, and I saw how nice it would have been if I had health 
insurance. I was impressed how people get high quality care, almost for free." [user]). 
Although users reported certain benefits associated with the tax-based model, such as 
better potential for control over resources, this view was rare among physicians. 
"Given the traditions in this respect, I think the state subsidies (are better) ... also the 
prices of imported drugs on sale in the pharmacies are controlled. " [user] 
A predominant view was that health insurance is the most appropriate model, best suited 
to Bulgaria ("the best system in the world: this is the way for Bulgaria" [user], "the 
world has proven it, there is no other alternative" [physician], "the most perfect model 
long ago adopted in the West, especially in Sweden and Germany" [physician], "why do 
we have to rediscover the wheel?" [user]; "it is used worldwide, regardless whether the 
country is rich or poor" [user], "health insurance is working, there are some minuses, 
but not fundamental, and can be solved'' [physician]). This view was common to a large 
majority of the physicians ("this should be the opinion of every sensible doctor" 
[physician]), and about half of patients. Many physicians claimed to reflect the opinion 
of their colleagues. Its main advantages are seen as providing social protection for all, 
accountability (''for each sum, to know from whom it is taken, and where it is gone" 
[physician]), and ensuring that collected revenue is spent on health care ("to keep track 
precisely what percentage is spent on health care" [physician]). 
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Several respondents noted insufficient political will as a main obstacle to implementation 
of social insurance, while the situation in the health care system has been exacerbated by 
this delay ("they don 't want it because there will be unemployment among physicians 
and nurses ... the system will prove many to be ineffective ... " [physician], "the politicians 
will argue ... the socialists will say that the employer should pay more, others will say the 
employer is not obliged ... the attitude to this can bring down a government. In the West 
they say 'we will reduce tax or reduce health insurance or something else - and people 
choose" [physician]). Two respondents recommended the German health insurance 
system as providing better financial control than a tax-based model. In general people 
thought that implementing a social insurance system would raise Bulgarian health care 
towards Western European standards and would be useful during EU accession. 
An important attribute of health insurance is that it is equitable ("health insurance ... can 
guarantee all groups of the population a good health service" [user], "it more or less 
neutralises the differences in the material status of people" [user], "it is a more caring, 
somehow more social model..." [user]). In contrast to the tax-based model, this is not 
only rhetoric but is sustainable through universal coverage and incentives to participate. 
The difference from the tax-based method is that there are actual resources underpinning 
free (at the point of use) provision. 
Several physicians recommended a combination of state and private funds. 
"The only way is a health insurance system, with finding the right balance between 
public-private funds in collecting resources. If entirely private, I think few people would 
be able to afford it, it would deter 60-70% of the population - it is not the most humane 
way to solve the health problem in the country. " [physician] 
"Via health insurance tax ... The money can go to independent organisations controlled 
by the government, or private- maybe both types should be used to experiment. To start 
with a state insurance fund, and then if effective, to be partly privatised, because the 
private business in Bulgaria has no traditions ... " [physician] 
However, others misunderstood the principles of health insurance, thinking that it will be 
the employers who cover the entire insurance contributions of their employees. In some 
cases health insurance was confused with voluntary insurance, e.g. employers paying for 
their employees at a private medical facility. 
Several respondents also perceived compulsory insurance as a kind of medical savings 
account, where each person pays only for their own health care. Some of those 
respondents (mainly physicians) tended to suggest that if treatment costs exceed the 
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money collected, a co-payment may be required to ensure sustainability and high quality 
of care. Others objected to such co-payment ("If one has health insurance, they shouldn't 
pay additionally" [user]). However, many respondents understood clearly that in the 
case of health insurance, there is cross-subsidisation. Only one physician was aware that 
health insurance is likely to involve rationing of volume and type of services covered, 
and utilisation will not be unlimited. 
A third view was that a "combined" system is more suitable to Bulgaria. Mainly, this 
involves the state retaining obligations such as financing capital investment, emergency 
care and research institutions. Strong state participation through budgetary subsidies is 
viewed to be necessary during transition. Two respondents supported a more pluralistic 
system, where several alternative financing models coexist. 
"Combination of methods ... We can't move entirely to paid health care, because our low 
living standards do not allow us to pay for insurance ... " [user] 
"The state should also be contributing a certain sum, especially for the Institute for 
Emergency Care. " [user] 
"The state has to allocate for health care, because... there will always be people who 
will not be able to give even minimal contributions. Worldwide there are hospitals for 
poor, fully or partially funded by the state " [physician] 
Three respondents attributed some significance to donations; sponsorship by 
organisations and individuals; and direct payment in health care financing; noting the 
example of leading health facilities relying only partially on the state budget to cover 
their needs. Donations were generally perceived as a secondary, supplementary method, 
usually in combination with state financing and mainly to alleviate shortages during 
transition. 
Implementation issues 
The next section explores perception on which method is easiest to implement. Two 
observations were made, first, that respondents tended to equate desirable with feasible 
methods of financing, supporters of a certain method likely to maintain that it is also 
simple to implement. Second, some did not see the relevance of the question and did not 
provide a clear answer as they thought it axiomatic that the benefits outweighed the 
implementation costs. The exceptions were the physicians in whose view health 
msurance was more suitable to Bulgaria, some of whom were aware of potential 
problems. 
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Roughly similar shares of users considered tax-based and health insurance models easv 
to operate, only a minority suggesting another model (3-aid; 1-fee-for-service). Among 
physicians the situation was roughly the same, with slightly more than a third stating that 
health insurance is the easiest option, although a third suggested that health insurance is 
the only way, despite some complexities with implementation. 
"The current one seems the easiest, but it is the most inefficient. " "The easiest is for the 
state to pay everything, but it is unable to do so. " [users] 
"Sponsorship is the easier, but it can't always be predicted." [user] 
"In my view, the health insurance funds remain the simplest and the most natural 
solution to the problem for Bulgaria. " [user] 
Among the issues that have to be resolved with the implementation of a health insurance 
system were adequate legislation and institutional development ("a structure where the 
state and a fund collecting resources will interact" [user]), possible inclusion of private 
providers, identifying the package of services to be covered, and consultations with 
stakeholders. Time, training of staff, accounting systems, investment in material 
conditions were perceived to be essential. Consideration of economic hazards such as 
inflation and unemployment was also thought important ("It is crazy to have health 
insurance given an actual inflation of 300%." [physician]). Several respondents (mainly 
physicians) thought the main issues lie in amassing the initial health insurance fund/s, 
and suggested this could be done via state subsidies, increased budgetary allocations, or 
collection of user fees. 
"To implement a health insurance system, the state has to have large resources, and 
people who want to participate- to have an initial capital. We know how many socially 
disadvantaged, low income groups, pensioners, there are in Bulgaria - it is difficult to 
start such a system. There should be an economic growth first ... " [physician] 
''In order for the health insurance system to start working, maybe some of the patients 
should pay user fees as suggested in 1990-91, but now I don't know whether anybody 
could be made to pay fee given that they pay for almost everything in the health facility. 
May be the budget has to stretch a little bit ... " [physician] 
However, some thought that implementation difficulties (amassing the initial capital) too 
often have been used as an excuse not to reform the system. Only one physician thought 
implementation difficulties a serious obstacle to a health insurance system. 
"We have neither capacity, nor financial means to implement health insurance system, 
which requires large investment in information and other resources - it would be a 
mistake. Currently we could only do small corrections to make the budgetary system to 
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function according to market mechanisms ... It is not so important where the money come 
from, but once in the system, to achieve an effect. " [physician] 
Acceptance by the public 
Another important element is public acceptance of a financing method. Some health 
professionals considered this question to be irrelevant, saying that any reform of this 
scale is bound to face opposition. Among patients, opinions were split as to whether tax 
or health insurance will prove more acceptable, with just a few people suggesting aid or 
user fees. In contrast, most physicians thought health insurance perfectly acceptable, on 
condition that proper preparatory work is carried out. 
Public acceptance of a tax-based system seems to be based on tradition and resistance to 
change, but also lack of trust of feasibility of reforms. Some respondents did, however, 
suggest that this is changing. These views were exemplified by the following comments: 
"Clearly, entirely state financing is accepted the easiest, when one doesn't have to pay 
anything. Of course, it is paid through tax on salary, but it is minimal and people do not 
have a sufficient idea that they give these money. " [physician] 
"The predominant opinion in Bulgaria will be for the state health care to continue, 
everyone to be able to visit their district physician, even if unsatisfied, because many 
people can 't afford the prices in the private sector. In the future this mentality and the 
ability to pay will change. People will get accustomed to pay, but they still can 't. " [user] 
"People who are afraid about their future may prefer centralised financing, in order 
somebody else to be responsible for them. " [user] 
On the other hand some thought that familiarity with mcome tax could lead to an 
acceptance of health insurance, if it is clearly earmarked. A strong motivation for 
accepting health insurance is the guarantee that contributions will be used solely for 
health care as demonstrated by the following quotations: 
"It is difficult for the people given the lack of money they have to pay, but it seems to me 
that people will get convinced that this is the best way, painlessly, not paying I 00% of 
their treatment, but supported by the state and others, through the fund ... " [user] 
"I think people in Bulgaria would accept to pay percentage of their income for health 
care if they are sure that this money will be properly utilised, and will receive adequate 
attention and level of service when needed. " [user] 
"When you invest in your own health, and you know what you will receive back ... and 
there is control, precise rules ... and the cost of the service is clear. " [physician] 
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Public understanding of model 
The question of public understanding of a financing model produced the fewest 
responses, with some respondents viewing the question as not worth discussing. Their 
reasons were difficulty in achieving transparency when implementing a new system, 
difficulty of accommodating many views in reform and, in the view of health 
professionals, a lack of public interest. Several physicians considered that health 
insurance would not be readily understood by the public despite being "the best" method 
for financing. 
No single method of financing was considered to be significantly more comprehensible 
than others. Physicians tended to see health insurance as more understandable, although 
several also pointed out that despite being the most transparent, it may be the most 
difficult to understand. Despite that, several users and physicians viewed a tax-based 
model as the most transparent, while some argued that taxation is most understandable, 
but not most transparent. 
"The health insurance system can easily be accepted, as soon as it is well explained, and 
well applied, because this will be the most efficient method. " [user] 
"The current one (tax)... seems the most understandable, but it is not the most 
transparent although it looks like it at first sight, because after the means go into the 
budget, they can 't be traced. It is not clear how much is for health care, or for other 
areas, and in the end is allocated whatever possible. " [user] 
It was also argued that understanding of a system is not necessary for it to be 
implemented and work well ("the centralised health care is the most understandable for 
the society, but it is inefficient" [physician]). A common view among physicians was 
that few people were familiar with the concept of health insurance, and not clear what 
changes it would involve. As one physician stated, despite the existence of elements of 
health insurance in Bulgaria throughout this century, public understanding usually has 
been "distorted''. Transparency was linked explicitly to the concrete demonstration of 
the exact percentage deducted for health care ("it should be strictly regulated'' 
[physician]). 
" ... in our wage slip it will read 6% of my salary for health insurance, 6% -for pension 
fund ... now they deduct from us about 30-35%." [physician] 
It was also stated that clarity for the public is not a feature of a particular financing 
method, it is more the way the system is run. 
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"That th.e system (tax) has not been transparent so far is due more to political 
connotatwns ... Health care is one of the biggest financial institutions in a country, it 
consumes the most money from the budget, and many people try to get a piece of the pie. 
There has never been a transparent budgeting of health care in Bulgaria, it is not known 
what percentage, the estimates are fairly unreal. " [physician] 
Fairness 
In the same way, respondents were asked specifically to assess whether one system was 
fairer than another. About half saw the current financing as fair, and the other half, as 
unfair. There was no apparent relationship between support for the existing model and 
views on the fairness of the system. However, among those who viewed the current 
system as fair, users and physicians emphasized different aspects, suggesting a different 
understanding of fairness. 
The features of an unfair system are perceived to be low quality of service, lack of 
guarantees, and thus dependence on certain professionals. Unfairness in the health sector 
was also linked, by some, to trends in society since 1989, such as weakening of the state 
("such are the means of the state at present" [user]), and income polarisation. However, 
about half of respondents still thought that fairness is an important underlying principle 
of the health care system, despite the poor conditions, and its loss perceived as 
detrimental to the user. 
It was a common view that the state primary health services, particularly in district 
polyclinics, are accessible, and still fair, although basic ("generally, in the public 
polyclinics all are treated the same, below the average level." [user]). 
Despite this, several respondents argued that fair access is meaningless g1ven the 
perceived low quality of polyclinic staff, with patients bypassing facilities, lack of low 
cost drugs for the chronically ill, corruption, and poor working conditions, inadequate 
resource allocation between urban and rural areas, and between facilities. 
A distinctive theme among physicians was to distinguish between two aspects of 
fairness: attitude of staff and availability of resources. Physicians tended to think that 
staff attitudes are relatively fair but, due to the poor material conditions, standards are so 
low that fairness loses significance for the patient ("given that the treatment is miserable, 
it can't be fair... now it's equally bad for all ... " [user], "everyone who needs help receives 
it, it's another matter how effective it is" [physician]). Payment (in the private or public 
sector) is thought to lead to a better service. 
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Many users emphasised as a manifestation of unfairness, the use (specifically by the 
better off), of a 'connection' or nepotism. This view was rare among physicians. 
Payment of user fees was perceived as inequitable by several physicians. Still, several 
users stated that medical staff do their best to provide services despite difficult 
conditions. 
"Depending on the social status of a person ... who they are, who sends them ... this is the 
service. Or depending on what they will give, what present, what money. . .such 
variations in treatment have always existed in Bulgaria. " [user] 
"If, unfortunately, one is in need, and it is serious, they should have a great luck to come 
across qualified help, which would not cost them any money. " [user] 
Determinants of choice 
The determinants of why someone might choose a particular model have been examined 
according to a range of socio-economic characteristics (Table 11.5alb). All models have 
been adjusted for age. People in the older and less educated groups, with lower income 
or self-perceived financial status, are more likely to support the current tax-based 
financial arrangements. This is surprising given the argument that a compulsory 
insurance scheme would reinforce equity and serve the interests of the vulnerable groups. 
This could be explained by a lack of information among the poor, aversion to change, or 
a feeling of being too poor to contribute at all. There is a clear association between 
willingness to pay for health care and preference for a particular payment method, those 
unwilling to pay being more likely to support the tax-based model. 
These findings are generally comparable to a Bulgarian study from 1994 where 
preference for the existing system was greatest among the old, the poor, and those with 
poor self-reported health205 • Similarly to this study, the young were in favour of 
compulsory and voluntary insurance. However, there were some differences. Among 
higher income groups, the current survey does not show a strong preference for voluntary 
insurance. In the 1994 survey, 71% of males and 61% of females indicated willingness 
to pay official user fees for health services, in the current survey only 44% of men and 
40%> of women supported this view. Compared to 1994, the 1997 survey showed less 
pronounced variations by age, income and health, although for women age and financial 
status were significant predictors. 
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Figure 11.5 illustrates the choice of health financing options . The national health 
insurance system gained most support (55%), followed by voluntary insurance ( 44%), 
user fees/co-payments (37%) and finally, the existing tax-based system (35 %). 
Respondents tended to view a health insurance system and user fees as more compatible 
(19°/o) than tax and user fees (12%) or insurance and tax (10%) (Figure 11.4). 
Figure 11.4. Choice of models for health financing (total percentage of sample) 
TAX 
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Table 11.5a. Predictor of choice of financing model: comparison between models (men) 
Variable Category National insurance Tax Voluntary insurance User fees 
-
% (n) Odds ratio (95% % (n) Odds ratio (95% % (n) Odds ratio (95% % (n) Odds ratio (95% 
CI; age-adjusted) C/; age-adjusted) CI; age-adjusted) age-adjusted) 
Age group <39 67.1 155 1.00 28.6 64 1.00 45.9 102 1.00 37.4 89 I.(JO 
40-49 72.3 86 1.28 (0. 79-2.08) 19.3 23 0.60 (0.35-1.03) 47.8 55 1.08 (0.69-1.69) 42.7 53 1.25 (0.80-1.9 ) 
50-59 62.5 60 0.82 (0.50-1.34) 32.2 29 1.19 (0.70-2.02) 44.2 42 0.93 (0.58-1.51) 46.9 46 1.48 (0.92-2.3 ) 
60-69 31.0 31 0.22 (0.13-0.37) 54.1 53 2.94 (1.80-4.82) 32.3 32 0.56 (0.34-0.92) 33.0 34 0.82 (0.51-1.3 ) 
>70 30.2 29 0.21 (0.13-0.36) 58.7 54 3.55 (2.14-5.89) 32.6 30 0.57 (0.34-0.95) 27.8 27 0.65 (0.39-1.0 ) 
Income quartile I (> 160,000) 77.6 121 1.00 18.7 28 1.00 46.3 69 1.00 40.3 64 1.00 
(Leva) II (100,000-160,000) 64.1 82 0.60 (0.35-1.03) 31.2 39 1.64 (0.93-2.91) 44.3 54 1.01 (0.62-1.64) 38.9 51 0.96 (0.60-1.56) 
III (60,000-99,000) 39.0 62 0.28 (0.17-0.48) 46.2 72 2.49 (1.44-4.32) 38.1 56 0.91 (0.55-1.48) 41.9 67 1.25 (0.77-2.00) 
IV ( <60,000) 43.4 66 0.37 (0.21-0.63) 47.7 71 2.49 (1.42-4.37) 42.9 67 1.16 (0.71-1.90) 31.9 51 0.85 (0.52-1.40) 
Education Higher 77.9 67 1.00 22.6 19 1.00 52.4 43 1.00 43.2 38 1.00 
Secondary 66.9 218 0.55 (0.31-0.97) 26.4 83 1.26 (0.71-2.25) 43.3 133 0.68 (0.42-1.12) 38.7 127 0.85 (0.52-1.37) 
Primary 33.3 77 0.20 (0.11-0.37) 53.5 121 2.75 (1.50-5.02 36.2 85 0.64 (0.37-1.09) 34.3 84 0.82 (0.48-1.39) 
Financial Very good/ good 83.6 46 1.00 19.2 10 1.00 46.0 23 1.00 45.5 25 1.00 
Situation Neither good nor bad 70.4 126 0.44 (0.20-1.00) 24.6 43 1.39 (0.63-3.06) 48.2 82 1.09 (0.58-2.07) 38.4 71 0. 73 (0.40-1.35) 
Rather poor 54.8 115 0.24 (0.11-0.54) 39.5 81 2.54 (1.18-5.47) 41.1 85 0.87 (0.46-1.62) 37.1 79 0. 72 (0.39-1.33) 
Very poor 36.4 68 0.13 (0.06-0.28) 48.9 88 3.37 (1.56-7.27) 35.3 65 0.71 (0.37-1.34) 34.9 68 0.69 (0.38-1.28) 
Marital status Married 56.1 266 1.00 36.2 166 1.00 41.3 191 1.00 37.8 184 1.00 
Single 67.3 70 0.95 (0.56-1.63) 28.4 29 1.04 (0.59-1.82) 46.9 46 1.10 (0.66-1.83) 38.9 42 1.13 (0.68- 1.87) 
Divorced/ widowed 39.1 25 0.61 (0.34-1.08) 44.4 28 1.14 (0.64-2.01) 38.1 24 0.95 (0.54-1.64) 35.4 23 1.01 (0.58-1.75) 
Settlement Sofia 70.6 48 1.00 29.9 20 1.00 41.3 26 1.00 41.4 29 1.00 
City 64.0 128 0.65 (0.35-1.21) 26.0 50 0.89 (0.47-1.68) 46.4 89 1.22 (0.68-2.17) 40.8 82 0.94 (0.54-l.h.f) 
Town 62.8 113 0.65 (0.35-1.22) 31.6 54 1.14 (0.60-2.14) 47.6 80 1.31 (0. 73-2.36) 36.8 67 (UW (0.45-l..f 1) 
Village 37.4 73 0.32 (0.17-0.60) 50.8 98 1.84 (0.99-3.42) 33.0 66 0.81 (0.45-1.46) 33.8 70 0.8~ (0.46-1.45) 
Self-reported Good/Rather good 62.2 304 1.00 31.1 148 1.00 45.0 211 1.00 39.0 196 1. (}(} 
Health Bad/Rather bad 37.7 58 0.63 (0.41-0.97) 50.7 75 1.43 (0.93-2.20) 32.3 50 0. 71 (0.46-1.08) 33.5 53 0.93 (0_() 1-l . .f I) 
Willingness Unwilling to pay 32.0 71 1.00 55.3 119 1.00 37.6 83 1.00 31.1 73 I . 00 
to pay (general) Willing to pay 69.1 291 4.16 (2.88-6.01) 25.4 104 0.32 (0.22-0.45) 44.2 178 1.21 (0.85-1. 70) 41.3 176 1.45 ( 1.03-~_()')) 
TOTAL IN FAVOUR 54.8 362 33.7 223 39.5 261 37.7 249 
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Table 11.5b. Predictor of choice of financing model: comparison between models (women) 
Variable Category National insurance Tax Voluntary insurance User fees 
-
% (n) Odds ratio (95% % (n) Odds ratio (95% % (n) Odds ratio (95% % (n) Odds ratio (95% 
CI; age-adjusted) CI; age-adjusted) CI; age-adjusted) age-adjusted) 
Age group <39 68.8 198 1.00 21.5 61 1.00 49.1 135 1.00 38.4 113 1. 0 
40-49 68.5 102 0.99 (0.64-1.51) 23.5 35 1.12 (0.70-1.80) 50.7 74 1.07 (0.71-1.59) 38.1 59 0.98 (0.66-1.4 ) 
50-59 54.4 81 0.54 (0.36-0.81) 38.5 57 2.29 (1.48-3.54) 42.5 62 0.77 (0.51-1.15) 35.7 55 0.89 (0.59-1.3 ) 
60-69 38.3 51 0.28 (0.18-0.43) 45.9 61 3.10 (1.99-4.83) 43.0 55 0.78 (0.51-1.19) 40.1 55 1.07 (0.71-1.6 ) 
>70 22.9 32 0.13 (0.08-0.21) 56.4 79 4.73 (3.06-7.34) 39.7 56 0.68 (0.45-1.03) 25.5 37 0.55 (0.35-0.8 
Income quartile I (> 160,000) 67.6 121 1.00 20.6 37 1.00 48.5 82 1.00 40.7 74 1.0 
(Leva) II ( 1 00,000-160,000) 64.0 105 1.00 (0.63-1.59) 27.3 44 1.28 (0.77-2.13) 41.8 66 0.80 (0.51-1.23) 35.9 60 0.83 (0.54-1.28) 
III (60,000-99,000) 53.9 111 0.81 (0.52-1.26) 40.7 83 1.98 (1.23-3.19) 44.8 87 0.99 (0.64-1.52) 37.5 78 0.88 (0.58-1.34) 
IV (<60,000) 40.2 101 0.67 (0.42-1.04) 43.4 109 1.68 (1.03-2.74) 46.4 117 1.15 (0.74-1.77) 32.7 86 0. 77 (0.50-1.19) 
Education Higher 78.6 136 1.00 11.0 19 1.00 51.3 82 1.00 39.3 68 1.00 
Secondary 65.1 224 0.51 (0.33-0.79) 28.9 99 3.36 (1.96-5.77) 49.8 166 0.95 (0.65-1.39) 38.8 135 0.95 (0.65-1.39) 
Primary 30.3 104 0.19 (0.12-0.30) 51.8 176 6.05 (3.47-10.55) 39.0 134 0.64 (0.42-0.98) 32.1 117 0. 79 (0.52-1.21) 
Financial Very good/ good 78.9 45 1.00 17.9 10 1.00 52.6 30 1.00 32.8 19 1.00 
Situation Neither good nor bad 64.8 160 0.52 (0.25-1.06) 25.6 63 1.55 (0.73-3.30) 47.3 113 0.80 (0.44-1.42) 39.7 100 0.83 (0.54-1.26) 
Rather poor 53.3 161 0.42 (0.21-0.84) 37.5 113 2.21 (1.05-4.64) 42.5 122 0.69 (0.39-1.23) 37.2 115 0.43 (0.28-0.67) 
Very poor 37.3 87 0.20 (0.10-0.41) 43.7 101 2.87 (1.36-6.08) 44.2 103 0. 75 (0.42-1.35) 31.4 77 0.63 (0.41-0.98) 
Marital status Married 57.5 318 1.00 33.2 184 1.00 45.1 243 1.00 36.3 208 1.00 
Single 72.2 70 1.32 (0.78-2.21) 21.1 20 0.86 (0.49-1.53) 45.1 41 0.84 (0.52-1.36) 42.9 42 1.30 (0.81-2.09) 
Divorced/ widowed 36.2 76 0.78 (0.53-1.13) 43.9 90 0.91 (0.62-1.32) 47.3 98 1.38 (0.96-1.98) 32.6 70 0.97 (0.67-1...10) 
Settlement Sofia 68.9 91 1.00 18.8 25 1.00 48.8 63 1.00 46.7 64 1.00 
City 68.2 167 1.08 (0.67-1.74) 26.6 64 1.44 (0.85-2.46) 48.2 110 0.99 (0.64-1.53) 41.5 102 1.36 (0.74-2.50) 
Town 54.7 128 0.60 (0.38-0.96 39.9 93 2.78 (1.65-4.70) 50.2 115 1.07 (0.70-1.66) 27.0 64 1.28 (0.70-2.JJ) 
Village 31.3 78 0.30 (0.18-0.48) 45.2 112 2.45 (1.45-4.14) 37.5 94 0.68 (0.44-1.06) 33.8 90 1.00 ( 0.54-l.S6) 
Se 1 f- reported Good/Rather good 60.2 375 1.00 28.7 176 1.00 46.9 281 1.00 37.8 241 I . 00 
Health Bad/Rather bad 37.6 89 0. 72 (0.50-1.02) 49.0 118 1.50 (1.06-2.11) 42.4 101 0.97 (0.69-1.36) 31.9 79 O.S5 (OJ>0-1.20) 
Willingness Unwilling to pay 34.1 106 1.00 51.5 159 1.00 39.7 123 1.00 29.1 95 I .00 
to pay (general) Willing to pay 65.2 358 2.94 (2.16-4.00) 24.7 135 0.37 (0.28-0.51) 49.1 259 1.39 (1.04-1.86) 40.2 225 1.56 ( 1.15-2.11) 
TOTAL IN FAVOUR 52.4 464 33.2 294 43.1 382 36.1 320 
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Figure 11.5. Preference for a financing model by selected socio-economic variables 
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Discussion 
This chapter sought to identify preference for a range of health care fmancing methods. 
Despite large scale reforms of health care financing in most Central and Eastern 
European countries72, studies on willingness to pay, attitudes and belief systems, are rare, 
preventing comparison. 
In the context of a long-term dependence on the state budget through collection of 
general revenue, it is very difficult to assess attitudes to financing mechanisms involving 
direct payment. However, in recent years the public has been exposed to several co-
existing finance methods involving a diversity of payment methods, as well as the basic 
system of general taxation. These include earmarked tax for social insurance, out-of-
pocket user charges, and voluntary insurance. This has gradually increased awareness 
and acceptability of 'new' methods. 
Evidence from the quantitative and qualitative research suggests that there is strong 
support for introduction of a compulsory health insurance system. A health insurance 
system, in contrast to the tax-based model, is perceived as able to mobilise more 
resources (through more effective collection); guarantee tighter control; provide 
transparency; offer the greatest benefit for the least contribution; be more user friendly; 
and raise the motivation of staff. A particular advantage of health insurance is that it 
provides guaranteed access to health care in a highly insecure environment. The 
preference for small but regular monthly contributions, rather than one-off user fees or 
fee-for-service payments, may be explained by the increasing unaffordability of health 
care in the years after transition. However, health insurance often means different things 
to different people, and the expectations it invokes can seem somewhat unrealistic. Costs 
often seem to have been underestimated, as contributions were perceived to be covered 
by the employer or the state. This suggests a need for an extensive public campaign 
setting out costs, benefits and potential pitfalls, prior to introduction. 
The complexity and cost of implementing a health insurance scheme have been 
recognised most by the physicians, who have particular concerns about the unemployed 
or informally employed and the lack of initial investment in the insurance fund. 
The existing model was perceived as unable to raise sufficient resources, leaving the 
health system underfunded. However, respondents tended to see the problem of shortage 
of financing as due to lack of political commitment, rather than the model of financing. 
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Despite these views, there seems to be a strong case for retaining significant state 
involvement. The key question is which functions it should have. The state was 
commonly seen to have several functions, some of which overlap. Some see it as a 
primary financier and provider of health care; but more tend to see it as providing a 
safety net for the poor within a health insurance system; others, especially those 
favouring independent insurance bodies, see it having a regulatory function. Many 
problems with state funding were identified, such as a severe shortage of resources; 
misallocation of funds; and lack of budgetary controls. However, many respondents saw 
no real alternatives during the period of transition. This may reflect a lack of information 
on different financing solutions, or simple inertia. A combination of methods during the 
transition seems popular. In assessing a financing model, patients viewed specific issues 
as problematic, although not disagreeing with the principle underlying the model. 
Although some thought changes possible within the current model, only a few believed 
this model to be sustainable in the long run. 
Virtually all respondents were aware of the principles underlying the tax-based model. 
Although many showed good knowledge of a health insurance system, often the 
principles of mixed mandatory and voluntary health insurance were confused. This is 
evident from the common opinion that contributions should be risk-adjusted and optional 
and explains some apparently contradictory answers. In many cases health insurance 
was preferred as it was perceived to be a method widely used in Western Europe, and the 
most familiar. 
It could be argued that from the point of view of the individual, a health insurance system 
resembles the current tax-based taxation operating via collection through payrolls, and 
treatment is free at the point of use. The main attractions of a health insurance system 
are transparency, guaranteed resources for health care, and risk-pooling function. It is 
deemed to provide better insurance against the risk of illness than the current tax-based 
model. Most respondents seem to perceive health insurance to be an ideal solution, and 
believe it can succeed where the current model fails. 
Overall, options involving a significant public responsibility for health financing were 
preferred, but reducing the direct role of the state in the allocation and distribution of 
resources. This is logical given that most people still use, or plan to use, the public 
sector (chapters 6 and 9). The state, despite its inefficiencies, was deemed the only 
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institution trustworthy enough, and able, to provide guarantees during the transition 
period. 
User charges have not received much attention in the current chapter, reflecting the fact 
that most respondents did not perceive them to be a viable method of financing health 
care. In some cases these were seen rather as a distraction from more radical refom1 
(mostly compulsory insurance). 
It can be suggested from the evidence in this chapter, as well as that conceming informal 
payments (chapter 7) that, paradoxically, chaotic use of formal and informal fees and the 
lack of clear rules have prepared the ground for a national health insurance system where 
monthly contributions are seen as the preferred option. Introduction of user fees into the 
public health sector, in the view of many respondents, threatens the basic package of 
care. Using various terms, respondents concluded that what they want is a form of 
insurance that will guarantee unconditional access to health care of acceptable quality 
against pre-determined contributions. 
However, many people believe that they can be treated at no additional cost to 
themselves, and only a few find co-payment under social insurance acceptable. The 
expectation is that in a compulsory insurance system, with more resources available and 
clear rules for the collection and handling of money, there should not be any additional 
user fees or payments requested by physicians. Given that it is highly likely that, 
initially, some cost-sharing will be required to ensure sustainability, and later, potentially 
- to control demand, such an attitude can seriously undermine the credibility of the 
system. 
Overall there is much confusion surrounding potential exemption rules, and doubts about 
what might work, given the volume of those who need to be exempted. Qualitative data 
showed that the idea that some people should receive preferential treatment was 
associated with the old system of privileges for the nomenklatura during the communist 
regime. This chapter also demonstrated that those with better socio-economic status are 
more willing to accept new mechanisms, and that many poorer groups oppose change. 
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CHAPTER 12. FINANCING THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM IN 
BULGARIA: OPTIONS AND STRATEGIES. 
DISCUSSION 
This chapter seeks to bring together the evidence from previous chapters to assess the 
feasibility of compulsory health insurance, the financing system currently being 
implemented in Bulgaria. It also examines co-payment and voluntary insurance, both of 
which are likely to play a supplementary role in any future health financing system. It 
begins with the premise that a successful health financing system has to be sustainable, 
equitable, acceptable, and compatible with traditions and societal values. 
Implications of the research for Bulgaria 
This thesis provides new information that is policy-relevant and especially timely given 
that implementation of health care financing reform is beginning in 2000. The 
contribution of the research can be seen at three levels. At the first level, the research 
describes the basic principles that the Bulgarian population consider appropriate for any 
system of health care financing. At the second level, it examines the strengths and 
weaknesses of different choices of financing system and their impact on different 
population groups. At the third level, the study provides information that will be 
required to fill in details concerning the implementation of whichever system is chosen. 
The implications of the key findings as they relate to decisions at each level will be 
considered in tum. 
Principles of financing 
Since 1990, consecutive Bulgarian governments have sought to reflect certain values in 
their policies on the health care system. Their goal was to enhance choice while 
maintaining solidarity, and they tried to achieve this by creating a pluralist system 
characterised by competition but within a framework of collective responsibility. 
Although individual governments have pursued reforms that differ in detail, this general 
ethos has been supported by governments of different complexions. So far, it has been 
unclear whether these views truly reflect those of the Bulgarian people. This study, for 
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the first time, elicits those principles the Bulgarian population considered essential in any 
future model. 
Public sector control 
There was widespread agreement that health care financing should remain a public sector 
responsibility. This is, however, more a rejection of private sector ownership than active 
enthusiasm for government control. Indeed, the past failure of the state to guarantee even 
basic treatment, or to formulate a coherent health policy, has led to marked public 
dissatisfaction. The views expressed reflect a combination of persistent collectivist 
values as well as fear of the future and economic insecurity. Consequently, there is a 
preference for the creation of para-state bodies, which retain some independence while 
the government remains the guarantor. Other models of ownership, involving labour 
unions, NGOs or co-operatives, found little favour as there is little confidence that they 
would have adequate capacity. 
Egalitarian values 
There is strong support for the principles of universal coverage and guaranteed access to 
essential health care. This could be interpreted as support for a system based on funding 
from general taxation. In reality, such a system is rejected. This is, essentially, the 
existing system which is viewed by most people as failing to comply with these 
principles. The tax based system is seen as under-funded, unresponsive to users, and 
increasingly inequitable. In contrast, the desired principles of universal coverage and 
access to essential care are identified with a system of social insurance. 
A caveat is required. Despite the expression of egalitarian values, when asked about the 
specific implications of a system of social insurance that would involve redistribution of 
resources and risk sharing, the value placed on equity seems to be less apparent. While 
there was widespread support for state provision for low income groups, when it was 
pointed out that this would mean the redistribution of individual's resources, respondents 
were less supportive. These beliefs are, however, balanced by strong support within 
extended families and social networks. 
Accountability and transparency 
Concerns about the past use of resources allocated for health care has created a strong 
demand for accountability and transparency. The preferred option is for a fund managed 
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by independent institution(s), given clear mandates, but under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Health. The government, in particular, is not trusted to spend the money 
collected for health care. Thus, although social insurance can be considered a tax, it has 
a key advantage in that the funds are earmarked for health care, and clearly 
distinguishable within the tax revenue pool; which should ensure that this is what they 
are used for. There is little understanding of the ways in which this can be circumvented 
by, for example, varying the contributions made by the state in respect of those who are 
not in regular employment. 
New role for the state 
There is widespread acceptance that the role of the state in the funding and delivery of 
health care must change, reflecting economic and politicalliberalisation. Many question 
whether the state, in any foreseeable economic situation, can guarantee universal high 
quality services. The state is, however, expected to fund a basic package of services for 
all or to provide for groups that would otherwise have no cover, to supervise health 
insurance funds, regulate the private sector, and protect the rights of patients. There is an 
emerging shift in values as health is seen increasingly as a responsibility of the individual 
rather than the state. 
Summary 
This study establishes that public preference is for a solidarity-based health care 
financing system, that is transparent and accountable to the public. It is expected to be 
controlled broadly by the state, but not to allow the state to assume a disproportionately 
large say in the handling of funds. 
Which financing method 
Although, in the late 1990s, the health system in Bulgaria remains a tax-based Semashko 
model, its underlying principle of universal entitlement to comprehensive free health care 
has been undermined by economic pressures, and users now bear significant costs. 
Access to good quality health care has been increasingly dependent on ability to pay 
rather than need. 
Reforms in the 1990s have sought to maintain access to free health care in a situation of 
falling resources, but this strategy has led to deterioration in the quality of service. The 
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favoured means of mobilising resources has been to transplant proven West European 
financing models. The pro-reform government, elected in 1997, prioritised financing 
reform and legislated for compulsory health insurance, to begin in 2000-01. This 
followed a severe economic shock in 1996-97, which led to a recognition of the 
importance of providing adequate social support, including access to basic health care. 
This is a promising step, as before 1997, health care reform in Bulgaria was hampered by 
the lack of a consistent strategy backed up by timely legislation. The momentum of the 
early phase of transition was lost. Now, however, conditions appear to favour more 
radical reform. There has been some economic recovery since 1997, a consensus on 
policy has emerged, and the government is giving a strong lead. A social insurance 
model has been adopted but this is likely to be supplemented by some degree of co-
payments and supplementary voluntary insurance. 
This study looked at the options for financing against a range of criteria: a) sustainability; 
b) equity; c) public, political, and professional acceptability; d) compatibility with values 
and beliefs; and e) compatibility with traditions. 
Criteria for choice 
Sustain ability 
Whatever system is chosen should be sustainable. Demographic sustainability (the 
ration of non-contributors to contributors) is a major challenge for design of a sustainable 
and equitable health financing system because of the unfavourable demographic trends in 
the last decade, namely negative population growth; ageing; and high mortality among 
men of working age. The dependency ratio is especially high in rural areas. The impact 
of demographic change is exacerbated by economic factors, such as unemployment and 
high levels of poverty. A large proportion of the working age population is either 
unemployed, informally employed, or if employed, paid a low wage. A third of the 
population are pensioners, many living in poverty and suffering from ill health. Despite 
currently optimistic economic forecasts and the existence of social assistance loans 
agreed with the World Bank, planned large-scale privatisation (with resultant industrial 
downsizing) is likely to increase unemployment and poverty in the short run. Weakened 
social protection mechanisms are compounded by the reduced capacity of family and 
social networks to act as safety nets. 
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Factors such as large-scale recesswn, macro-economic restructuring and low liYing 
standards threaten the macroeconomic sustainability of health financing in Bulgaria. in 
In the early 1990s, public budgets fell dramatically due to economic collapse. 
exacerbated by foreign debt repayment. The increasing informal economy and 
unemployment resulted in a drop in tax revenue. Concurrently, pressure on health 
expenditure rose in the face of poorly regulated pharmaceutical supply, and the growth of 
new medical technology. In Bulgaria, as elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, the 
government response has been to shift costs to others (cost recovery, seeking foreign aid, 
tolerance of informal payments); to cut recurrent and, especially, capital expenditure; and 
since 1997-98, to initiate a programme of health financing reform. Prior to 1999, there 
was little effort specifically to improve efficiency or reduce the under-utilised 
infrastructure. 
Given these adverse circumstances, there is limited scope to develop a sustainable health 
care system. The very high dependency ratio in rural areas argues for a system in which 
contributors can be pooled at national rather than regional level, although the burden 
falling on those in work will inevitably be high. Designing a realistic basic benefits 
package to be covered by compulsory health insurance and prioritising services may not 
be feasible politically. Financing reform must, however, be linked to changes in the 
system of delivery, so as to maximise outputs from reduced capacity. Currently, the 
health care system is oriented towards curative services, with an excessive infrastructure 
and specialised staff, and no incentives for efficiency. However, downsizing is likely to 
be politically sensitive. 
Equity 
This study described two major challenges to equity: first, inequalities in health; and 
second, marked difficulties in the population's access to health care. 
Older, poorer and less well-educated people are more likely to be unhealthy and to have 
long-standing illness. These groups are also less able to cope with illness-related 
expenses. Although outside the scope of the present studies, there is a wealth of research 
from other countries on why this is so. The 'inverse care law' 145 (those with highest need 
accessing services least) was not seen, but the pattern of similar level of utilisation in the 
presence of considerable health inequalities indicates that the use of services by some 
groups is disproportionately low compared to their need. 
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The study of utilisation patterns paints a complex picture. Although overall the system 
retains some degree of equity, different socio-economic groups do access different 
facilities, at different levels of the system, and differ in their level of satisfaction. Poor 
people are particularly disadvantaged; they are more likely to use lower quality services 
at primary care level, where the deterioration in facilities has been greatest. Once they 
move beyond primary care, most users face major problems related to affordability 
(especially of pharmaceuticals), bureaucratic procedures, lack of choice, 
unresponsiveness of staff and other hidden barriers to access. This is apparent from the 
use of various coping strategies for obtaining better service, such as informal payments, 
seeking 'connections', use of emergency channels, or opting directly for private 
treatment. The worst off people have little choice but to use official channels, with 
resulting poor quality service. 
Out-of-pocket health care expenditure is regressive. Although older and poorer people 
pay similar amounts as the rich for treatment, the sums represent a higher proportion of 
their income. Official user charges for pharmaceuticals or in-patient expenses are also 
regressive and are not linked to income. Informal payments appear relatively more 
equitable, physicians seeming to take into account the financial circumstances of 
patients. However, while poor people may not be asked to pay, they tend to receive a 
second-rate service. 
Users increasingly bear costs through out-of-pocket payments, despite a constitutionally 
guaranteed right to free health care. Although reported expenditure is mainly from 
recurrent household income, it is often seen as unaffordable. Costs associated with in-
patient care, treatment of chronic illnesses, and imported pharmaceuticals, are 
particularly likely to obstruct access to health care. Pharmaceuticals constitute the 
largest, most unaffordable, and regressive component of health care expenditure. This 
reflects the liberalised market, a shortage of cheaper generic products and cuts in targeted 
subsidies. Extensive use of self-treatment (especially among those who cannot afford to 
pay or do not have a 'connection'); 'after-hours consultations' with physicians of their 
acquaintance; combining prescribed and non-prescribed (potentially of lower quality) 
medication; or simply ignoring symptoms; all suggest unaffordability and deterred 
demand. Direct treatment-related expenses were covered almost exclusively from within 
the immediate household, with little support from the state or other institutions. 
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Taken together, these findings suggest that the task of establishing an equitable 
exemption procedure under a new financing system will be paramount. 
Acceptability: public, professional, political 
This study found considerable enthusiasm for wide-reaching reform, but support was 
uneven. There was less among the worst off, who favoured the existing tax-based model, 
although the planned redistributive social insurance model is designed to benefit them. 
Resistance to reform by the vulnerable groups (old, the poor, less educated and those in 
poor health) might reflect a lack of information, as shown in this study. However, lack 
of information may not be the only problem. Long-term poverty and income insecurity 
in the 1990s, and slow social sector reform, contributed to support for the few remaining 
social benefits, radical reform offering only unpredictable consequences. In addition, 
given the climate of liberalisation, many anticipate that any change of financing 
arrangements is likely to require higher user contributions, which are opposed by those 
less able to pay. 
Acceptability of a financing model among the public and professionals reflects different 
factors, not always underpinned by a sound understanding of the principles. A model 
appears acceptable to the public primarily if it guarantees access to good quality care, 
with minimal payment at the point of use. Principles such as transparency, 
accountability and financial control are extremely important. For health professionals, a 
model is viewed as acceptable when providing adequate financial incentives, good 
working conditions and opportunities for professional development. 
The hypothesis, that the long Bulgarian tradition of health care free at the point of use 
may have mitigated against willingness to pay explicitly for health care, was only 
partially confirmed. It was not the case among those better off, highly educated, 
younger, urban residents, all of whom were relatively willing to pay. 
The past decade has seen the introduction of a wide range of new financing systems: 
earmarked social insurance tax (e.g. pension, social security); direct out-of-pocket 
payments; and voluntary insurance. When combined with the failures of the 'free' health 
care system, there is an emerging willingness to consider a range of alternatives. 
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Compatibility with societal values 
This thesis argues that it is essential for a new health financing model to be based on 
shared societal values, such as solidarity, and shared responsibility for health among the 
state, health professionals and individuals. 
Abandoning a model based on general taxation will transform the role of the state 
' 
dismantling its monopoly of health care financing. This study showed a marked 
preference for autonomous health insurance bodies as well as decentralisation, in effect -
support for reduced state control. At the same time, there seems to be a strong case for 
the state to retain a significant role in maintaining equity by covering poor and vulnerable 
groups, financing capital investment or certain high-cost services, covering insurance 
deficits and guaranteeing collective rights to health care. Even the well-off favoured a 
public-private mix, a state-financed minimum level of basic services supplemented by a 
private component, which was regarded as providing incentives for quality. This shows 
that a collective (state) responsibility for health is seen, still, as a central value. Thus, 
there is a desire for health to remain a public concern while increasing the emphasis on 
individual responsibility. 
Collectivist values in Bulgaria imply acceptance of a financing system based on 
solidarity, such as social insurance. Support for equal rights to free health care regardless 
of income, age, or health status is widespread, with little of the social variation that might 
be expected in a more individualistic society. In general, wealthier people are willing to 
pay a higher contribution, while retaining their right to free basic care. 
Nevertheless, the egalitarian values are not unambiguous. Although many people 
support the concept of vertical equity (different payment for equal service according to 
ability to pay), there is a view that this need not mean care that is completely equal. A 
two-tier system of facilities, in which the rich obtain a luxury service at a higher cost 
(financed through direct payments or voluntary insurance), while the poor have access to 
a similar service at more basic facilities, is seen as a practical arrangement. Surprisingly, 
such a two-tier system was widely seen as meeting untapped demand, freeing public 
resources for the poor, and not detrimental to equity. There was little awareness of the 
message encapsulated in Titmus' comment that "A service for the poor is a poor service". 
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Compatibility with tradition 
The historical, political, demographic and economic circumstances in Bulgaria outlined 
in appendix 2, should be taken into account when assessing the feasibility of health care 
financing options. 
Historically, the state has played a major role in the economy of Bulgaria: protectionism 
towards industry (prior to 1944) followed by the imposition of collective ownership, and 
totalitarian control of all spheres of social life under the communist regime (1944-89). 
The state budget financed many health services before 1944 and later played a major role 
in covering most of the cost of the health sector. This dominance had some positive 
effects, such as raising living standards in the post war period, with provision of 
comprehensive social services and institution building. 
Before 1944, Bulgaria was relatively socially and economically homogenous. Income 
structure was relatively flat, with a small industrial elite, small industrial workforce and a 
mostly rural population working on small and evenly distributed private landholdings. 
The development of co-operatives in the 1920s, further fragmentation of land and slow 
capital concentration, also maintained egalitarian structures. In these circumstances, 
community based solidarity initiatives emerged at local level or within extended family 
and social networks, rather than more widely. Despite successful promotion of industrial 
sickness funds in urban settings, with social insurance for state employees, on the whole, 
occupation-based health insurance was less prominent than elsewhere in Central and 
Eastern Europe (appendix 2). 
The communist regime sought to reinforce pre-existing egalitarian traditions through 
collectivisation of land, redistribution of income and some convergence of living 
standards across society. Although solidarity had been deeply rooted in Bulgarian 
society, after 1944 the structures were damaged when the existing, diverse financing 
sources were replaced by a state monopoly. In the 1990s, income polarisation, 
insecurity, and the high social cost of macroeconomic policies borne by the population, 
led to a resurgence of attitudes supporting collective forms of health financing. 
At the beginning of the 20th century (1887-1944) Bulgaria also had a sizeable private 
health care sector, based on direct payment. Its adverse effects were partly mitigated by 
a tradition of charity, family and community support, and state intervention. Some 
degree of private provision persisted during the communist period, expanding rapidly 
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after 1991. This suggests that some contribution involving direct user payment might not 
be completely out of place. 
These observations indicate that social insurance and private health care financing are 
generally compatible with traditions in Bulgaria, but both have a less well developed 
institutional basis than in other Central and Eastern European countries. 
Feasibility 
Assessing the complexity of implementation of different financial systems was not the 
immediate objective of this study, but some indirect information was provided. One 
finding is that setting exemptions based on reported monetary income is likely to be 
invalid. Assessing individual resources is complex in a largely non-cash economy. 
Given that self-reported financial hardship is a better predictor of illness and affordability 
than income, use of income exclusively to determine exemptions may result in poor 
targeting and deter the worse off. The clear link between poverty and health underlines 
the need to target those who suffer a double burden of being both economically 
vulnerable and in ill health. 
Second, health reform in Bulgaria, especially at this crucial stage, has to be underpinned 
by systematic research into patients' needs and expectations, such as levels of health; 
health seeking behaviour; expenditure; and how social institutions and stakeholders 
might respond to change; rather than on anecdotal evidence. Regular monitoring is 
essential during implementation, given the probability of a continuation of rapidly 
changing economic circumstances. In the 1990s, the implicit understanding was that a 
universal health insurance system is the only option available for Bulgaria given its 
widespread implementation in Central and Eastern Europe. Differences in economic, 
cultural and historical circumstances, and available funding for investment and training, 
were disregarded. While recognising that there is a consensus on such a system, the 
implications have not been evaluated systematically. 
Such information should inform the necessary public debate on many politically 
sensitive issues, such as informal payments, co-payments, and solidarity. Policies also 
should be consistent with the established legal framework, a situation that has not been 
apparent so far. 
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The options 
Compulsory health insurance 
Despite the widespread acceptance of health insurance, there is little recognition of the 
associated problems. This research underlined a number of challenges that could 
threaten the implementation of compulsory health insurance in Bulgaria. 
Income-related contributions in a social insurance system are unlikely to provide a 
sustainable source of financing without substantial state contributions, given the adverse 
demographic picture. Differences in ageing and burden of disease, coupled with 
selective depopulation of rural areas, will require heavy regional cross-subsidisation. 
The state is likely to play a key role in covering exempted groups and, potentially, 
financial deficits of insurance funds; ensuring capital investment; and regulating 
insurance funds. Other extra-budgetary sources, from the informal sector, NGOs, donors, 
or development agencies (e.g. the World Bank health insurance loan) also might be vital 
to sustain the system. 
It is likely that, at least m the medium term, social msurance contributions will 
supplement, rather than replace, government budgets. Given that mobilisation of 
resources is the main objective of health insurance, renewed shortages may undermine 
support. It is important to agree on the precise roles of the actors in the health insurance 
system, and a realistic level of state commitment. 
An emerging pattern of irregular or informal employment, and the resulting low 
compliance with tax and social insurance liabilities, raises serious concerns for the 
sustainability of a compulsory insurance system. The self or privately employed are 
among the highest earners and reputedly have always avoided tax. Thus they are likely 
to avoid payroll-based insurance contributions. Insufficient tax revenue will lead to 
higher contribution levels for those who do pay and reduce the redistributive effect of 
social insurance, thus perpetuating tax evasion. The Bulgarian tax system lacks effective 
instruments for assessing in-kind income in rural areas and has poor procedures for 
enforcing compliance. 
Unfavourable economic and demographic trends, unemployment, and rising informal 
employment combined with inefficient tax collection have eroded the tax base. The need 
to exempt, fully or partially, a large section of the Bulgarian population might be the 
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single most important factor that will undermine the sustainability of health insurance 
funding. 
Sustainability is a generic problem in systems raising revenue through general or social 
insurance tax. However, given the wide acceptance of compulsory insurance in Bulgaria, 
and provided it is operated transparently, it can be expected to mobilise more revenue 
than at present, especially from untapped informal sources, and therefore be more 
sustainable than other methods. Given the low pool of contributors, it is important to 
create clear incentives for the participation of high-income groups and the self-employed. 
Compliance could be enhanced by tying benefits to contribution rather than employment, 
although the latter requires a more complex records' system 134, and may compromise 
solidarity. Alternatively, the informal sector can be captured by flat-rate contributions, 
levies on agricultural products, or fees based on property22 • Employers could be 
encouraged to contribute for their employees through tax incentives, potentially reducing 
the negative effect of insurance on the labour market. 
The fiscal viability of a health insurance system in a situation of macro-economic re-
structuring may be also threatened by inflation and delayed adjustment of insurance 
premiums. Moreover, potential negative effects of social insurance are well recognised. 
Employer contributions, leading to high labour costs and thus higher consumer prices, 
could ultimately affect the competitiveness of the economy. The government can 
guarantee the funds against the effects of inflation but this requires additional funding 
from taxation, and can be very complex. Tax incentives for employers to contribute for 
their employees may be useful, although this is difficult given the current state of the tax 
system. An improving economic performance, fiscal stringency and successful control 
of inflation since the introduction of the currency board in 1997, gives rise to some 
optimism. 
Another challenge is the likely increase in health expenditure typically associated with 
social insurance systems7 • In Western Europe, rising health expenditures have reflected 
consistently improving standards of living, less pronounced income polarisation, and 
rising popular expectations71 • Bulgaria is still suffering the consequences of a crisis 
among the worst in Central and Eastern Europe. A high-cost compulsory insurance 
system is likely to be constrained by contributors' income insecurity and falling public 
budgets, on which overall health financing continues to depend. However, as current 
expenditure is very low by Central and Eastern European standards, a sustainable 
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increase under a social insurance - if distributed equally and spent efficiently _ is likely 
to have a positive effect. 
Both the public and health professionals view health insurance as reinstating universal 
and essentially unlimited access to a nearly comprehensive package of high-quality 
services, in exchange for monthly insurance contributions with no further payment at the 
point of use. Clearly, such an approach is unsustainable. Measures to control costs are 
needed, such as agreeing a realistic basic benefits package; restricting choice of provider; 
GPs acting as gatekeepers; restructuring of the system to improve efficiency; but have 
received little attention. The alternative, additional funding from co-payments or higher 
contribution rates, which would add to an already high tax burden, is unlikely to be 
acceptable. 
Due to the somewhat limited experience with occupational sickness funds or third party 
insurance prior to 1944, and its absence thereafter, detailed preparatory work is of critical 
importance prior to implementation, including information campaigns, public discussion 
and capacity building. Although public debate has intensified since 1998, it may be still 
insufficient. A national insurance system is seen as a relatively simple model, and there 
is a danger that its complex administrative requirements may render it opaque to the 
population and undermine confidence. 
Social insurance requires complex organisational change of the health system in terms of 
infrastructure; managerial guidelines; legal and administrative framework for contracting 
and exemptions; trained staff; accounting and audit; and information systems. It is likely 
to be costly. Moreover, it entails transformation of the tax-system. Some administrative 
integration between health insurance funds and the social security system within the 
National Insurance Institute might reduce operational costs and facilitate means-testing; 
but is currently unfeasible. The cost of compulsory insurance may exceed the cost of the 
present system without achieving a tangible improvement in services and outcomes in 
the short term, thus difficult to sustain politically. A hasty implementation of social 
insurance could reproduce the weaknesses of the tax-based model, while creating a high-
cost non-transparent system. 
Equity and social justice are important motives for the introduction of compulsory 
insurance. The government's long-term commitment to exempt the poor, via transparent 
criteria and procedures, is essential. Targeting via local level mechanisms to minimise 
abuse and cross-subsidisation at national level could help to ensure that state subsidies go 
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to those with highest needs. This is a huge task given the volume of those who need to 
be exempted and could be jeopardised by difficulties in establishing and sustaining 
exemptions. Setting affordable contributions sensitive to income differentials and 
variability is a challenge, while targeting is expensive, complex, and prone to abuse by 
staff and users. Particular groups, e.g. single-person families, are likely to remain 
considerably disadvantaged given the importance of intra-household support. 
On the other hand, although social insurance is an intrinsically egalitarian system, it 
involves a major shift from collective (state or corporate) to individual responsibility for 
health. This shift has two dimensions: financial responsibility, given that entitlement is 
based on individual contribution; and responsibility to maintain one's health, giving 
people a more proactive role in their health and life-style decisions. This reflects a 
changing perception of the role of the state in the health sector. Increasingly, the state is 
perceived to provide a safety net within a health insurance system; or to regulate 
independent insurance funds; rather than the principal health care financing institution. 
The state is expected to exercise some control over health funds and be involved in 
collection and allocation of revenue, mostly due to lack of a suitable alternative. In 
practice, control over funds might be difficult if these are autonomous. 
Although many people are familiar with the basic principles of a universal insurance 
system, there are many misunderstandings as to what this entails in practice. 
Compulsory health insurance is neither clearly distinguished from voluntary insurance 
nor some aspects of medical savings accounts. A key issue is that many people were 
unaware who would bear the cost of universal health insurance, or believed this would be 
solely the employer or the state. Insufficient understanding of the system often leads to 
unrealistic expectations (e.g. immediate rises in physicians' income and quality of care), 
which could reduce the support for social insurance, once the full implications are clear. 
These challenges have been recognised by Bulgarian experts, but rarely discussed in 
public forums or addressed in policies. The range of services in the basic benefits 
package, degree of choice, and mechanisms to counter user and provider hazard, have to 
be negotiated between main stakeholders - health professionals, public, insurers, the 
government - to prevent a fall in support for social insurance. Efforts to discard inherited 
control-and-command practices, such as consultations with stakeholders, better public 
information, and mobilisation of previously suppressed community initiatives, have been 
evident rarely in the health reform process. 
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Solidarity-based compulsory health insurance is considered by far the best financing 
option due to its perceived strengths. This model is widely accepted across socio-
economic strata and by almost all health professionals. Politically, it appears the only 
feasible option in Bulgaria, as it reconciles the interests of users (essential treatment and 
lower out-of-pocket costs); health providers (improved remuneration, social status, and 
working conditions); and the state (increasing resources for health care). Lack of 
political will was seen as the main obstacle so far to social insurance, and its 
implementation in Bulgaria was seen as a preparatory step towards EU accession. 
Social insurance is commonly perceived as an antidote to the existing tax-based model. 
From the individual's point of view, a health insurance tax is similar to income tax -
both are deducted at source and treatment is free at the point of use. Although income 
tax is progressive, while social insurance tax is a fixed percentage, in both cases net 
contribution increases with income, which is viewed as fair. However, social insurance 
is seen as ensuring accountable and flexible health care spending, better financial control 
and safeguarding collected revenue for health care against redirection to other sectors and 
misuse. Compulsory health insurance was universally viewed as more equitable and 
redistributive at societal level. It is also seen to provide a more reliable insurance against 
the risk of illness, compared to the existing model, as it ensures broad coverage and high-
quality services. The perceived simplicity and transparency of the procedures for 
collection, handling, and allocation of revenue, is another factor for wide-spread support 
for insurance. Although the planned contribution level corresponds to what people in 
this study said they are willing to pay monthly for comprehensive insurance, and that 
such payment is considered legitimate- for the majority, it is rather unaffordable. 
Paradoxically, it seems that those with better personal circumstances (younger, healthier, 
highly educated, urban residents, better off and those willing to pay for health care in 
general) prefer to pay regular insurance contributions, rather than fees for each episode of 
illness or opt for voluntary insurance, despite their lower risk of illness. This 
receptiveness to insurance based on risk-sharing might have been shaped by economic 
insecurity, widespread user payments, and increasingly unaffordable health services. 
Moreover, if the collecting institution is trustworthy, it is viewed as a means to save 
money in an inflation-prone environment, to spread payment over time, or to cover 
dependants. However, the rich may be unwilling to bear the costs of the universal 
insurance scheme if the benefits do not match expectations. The worse off, who could 
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benefit most from social insurance, are less supportive of it, probably due to poor 
information and aversion to change. 
This study found a strong preference for a national insurance system based on universal 
entitlement and risk sharing at societal level, suggesting a significant level of solidarity. 
Generally prevalent egalitarian values are reinforced by growing poverty and income 
inequalities, social insecurity and dissatisfaction with the health system. It also reflects 
support for public, but not necessarily state-dominated, health care financing solutions. 
Tax-based system 
The existing tax-based model for health financing gained the least support, although its 
underlying principles are similar to social insurance, and well understood. Severe 
underfunding of the health system in recent years has shaped the perception of the model 
as unsustainable and excessively bureaucratic. Insufficient budgets were often seen as a 
by-product of economic crisis, but also of the inherent features of the tax-based system. 
Some of the concerns expressed in relation to financing from general taxation are very 
similar to those related to social insurance: unsustainability in the face of economic 
collapse, weak tax collection, underreporting of income, unemployment, and tax evasion 
in a growing shadow economy. Problems specific to the tax-based model are the 
dependence on changing political priorities, fears for misuse of funds not earmarked for 
health care, weak accountability and overcentralised governance (in the Ministry of 
Health) with a lack of democratic control over the budget handling process. 
Still, a sizeable share supported the existing system, while demanding an increase in the 
health budget. Public acceptance of a tax-based system seems to result from tradition 
and resistance to change, as well as lack of trust in the feasibility of radical financing 
reform. Among those who are undecided about health insurance there is potential to 
increase support through effective public information; given the familiarity with income 
tax, similarly egalitarian core values, and the provision of guarantees on the use of funds. 
Another emerging view favours a "combined" system, with the state financing capital 
investment, emergency care and research institutions. Strong state participation, through 
budgetary subsidies, is viewed to be necessary during transition. 
The acceptability of the existing system is so low that it is rarely recognised that 
measures to improve transparency, budgetary control and management, and to introduce 
new provider payment mechanisms, can be implemented within the existing institutional 
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framework. Such policies are seen as possible only under a social insurance system and. 
as shown by the reforms in 1989-1997, it proved impossible to achieve consensus for 
reform within the tax-based model, or to provide incentives for change among key 
stakeholders and the public. 
Voluntary insurance 
Voluntary insurance appears to have a niche in Bulgaria, mainly to cover a range of 
elective services. It is unlikely to assume a major role due to the limited client base and 
low purchasing power, so that insurance premiums are likely to be unaffordable for most 
people. Voluntary insurance gained less support than social insurance, but was still 
considered far more acceptable that out-of-pocket payment. Inadequate legislation, fears 
of inflation, insufficient information and lack of confidence in private insurers were seen 
as the main constraints to expansion of private insurance. Again, the better off tend to 
favour voluntary insurance. 
On the positive side, voluntary insurance could have a role for "luxury" services; for 
clinical services not covered by compulsory insurance; and for people able and willing to 
opt for supplementary cover on top of social insurance. Potentially it may mobilise 
resources, otherwise inaccessible (not spent, or spent informally) from high-income or 
informally employed sections and reduce the burden on the public sector. It could be 
promoted through diversifying the insurance packages on offer, and tax concessions, 
although in other countries, tax relief on contributions has been shown to have an adverse 
net effect on government revenue219 • Voluntary for-profit insurance is likely to be 
sustainable, as premiums are risk-adjusted. 
People are more familiar with voluntary insurance than with social insurance, due to a 
long tradition of life, accident and car insurance in Bulgaria. The absence of third party 
insurance and inability to pay out-of-pocket has been a major barrier to private sector 
expansion. A private sector based on out-of-pocket payment has a long tradition in 
Bulgaria, existing before 1944, and partially in the mid-1970s, and was re-introduced 
after 1989 in line with macro-economic liberalisation. Support for voluntary insurance, 
and to some extent for direct payments, indicates a preference for diversification of 
financing options available to the user. At the same time, declining quality and lack of 
choice in the officially free public sector have forced people to seek insurance cover, 
allowing convenient access to the more responsive private service. 
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Despite these potential benefits, voluntary insurance could create a two-tier service and 
reduce equity. Despite the predominant egalitarian values, this possibility did not face 
significant opposition, as long as essential (non-luxury) services are guaranteed for all, 
including the rich. However, retrospective reimbursement of insurance claims may be 
problematic during transition due to inflation and weak administrative capacity. Fee-for-
service payment of providers in combination with reimbursement by a third party insurer 
may lead to overutilisation, overtreatment and cost escalation, requiring mechanisms for 
cost-containment. A clear governmental policy and legislation is needed to control 
standards, competitive practices, and promote investment. 
Out-of-pocket payments 
Out-of-pocket payments in the public sector, both formal and informal, were seen as a 
less viable option for health care financing mainly due to inherited expectations for free 
health care, and a lack of tangible impact on the quality of care as a result of such 
payments. Out-of-pocket payments for pharmaceuticals constitute a major share of 
treatment costs in Bulgaria, and in their present form are regressive. The main objections 
to user fees are that they are inequitable; deter access; and shift the burden towards older, 
poorer and more disadvantaged groups who are more likely to be ill; while precise 
targeting of exemptions is complex or susceptible to corruption. The economic crisis 
leading to falling health budgets has required cost-sharing, but has also reduced the 
population's ability to pay. In many cases, legal co-payments add to, rather than replace, 
informal transactions that are largely culturally-determined. Such costs, in addition to 
social insurance contributions, will increase significantly the burden on users. Out-of-
pocket payments are seen to cover funding gaps rather than increase total resources, and 
threaten access to services without providing a lasting solution. 
Informal payments appear to have had a twofold effect on the acceptability of 
compulsory health insurance. Chaotic spread of informal and semi-formal payments and 
the lack of clear rules, have increased support for a national health insurance system 
backed by the state, among the public and health professionals. However, the first phase 
of implementation of social insurance in Bulgaria involves small co-payments, seen as 
necessary to ensure sustainability. Public resistance to co-payments or non-compliance 
could jeopardise the social insurance system if the policy is imposed without 
consultations. Wide-spread out-of-pocket payments have led to increased cost-
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consciousness of the population, and a perception that 'free health care' is associated with 
the past. At the same time, given the unaffordability of direct payment and the absence 
of other alternatives for individuals to provide for themselves, universal social insurance 
has become the most acceptable option. Since 1989 informal payments are more 
frequently requested and less affordable. People strongly object to the two tier service 
created in the public sector where poorer people have restricted access to elite state 
facilities, expensive pharmaceuticals and better specialists. Co-payments are viewed as 
only a temporary measure in transition to a fully operational health insurance system that 
would have no user payments. 
Nevertheless, the preference for direct one-off charges or informal payments with 
immediate impact on service should not be underestimated. Direct community 
participation has roots in the national tradition, not entirely suppressed by the socialist 
system. Direct payments often are seen as more transparent than social insurance, 
although their subsequent use is less so. They are convenient for people with irregular or 
high incomes, or the healthy, as they reflect closely utilisation. Fee-for-service payments 
in the private sector are deemed acceptable as they reflect individual choice. 
Given the expectation that social insurance will eliminate most user payments, and the 
inherited attitudes from the previously free health system, a policy of user co-payments 
has to be underpinned by careful preparation. New legislation and clear administrative 
guidelines on how compulsory and voluntary insurance will coexist with co-payment, are 
needed. 
It was unanimously agreed that if co-payments are to be introduced in state facilities, 
certain groups should be exempted or subsidised. While the current system of ad hoc 
charging and unofficial payments does not allow targeting, official cost-sharing should 
be based on explicit and publicly supported exemptions. There was widespread 
agreement that children, the disabled, socially disadvantaged people and the elderly 
should be exempt from direct payment, and possibly from other contributions. Other 
groups in need of support were families with young children, sole breadwinners, carers 
for the disabled, students, the unemployed, and people living alone. Support for such a 
wide range of groups reflects extensive poverty and vulnerability in Bulgaria. This 
research found a broadly existing social consensus about which groups should be granted 
exemptions, but prioritising them could pose a significant challenge. 
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The introduction of co-payments in the public sector, to supplement a national insurance 
system, is likely to be politically controversial. In the 1990s, user payments of different 
sorts have expanded gradually and acquired somewhat semi-official status, although 
these have not been explicitly part of the reform debate. There is some support for de-
stigmatised, transparent and accountable revenue to be collected at health facilities with 
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visible benefits to the patient, e.g. paying for basic supplies. Some direct benefit for staff 
accompanied by stricter control of abuse, and a gradual change in the 'culture of gifts' 
may be essential in implementing co-payments, otherwise they might increase charges 
paid by ordinary users. Introduction of progressive cost-sharing for pharmaceuticals in 
particular, using flexible payment options and subsidies for essential drugs, may be 
protective m the face of liberalised retail prices that are largely thought to be 
unaffordable. 
The incentives for informal exchanges are unlikely to be eliminated altogether by the 
social insurance system. Those payments that reflect tradition will continue to burden 
the users and interfere with the operation of the new financing systems in the short run. 
It is possible that some out-of-pocket payments could be channelled into the system 
through charitable giving or targeted investment, perhaps with tax incentives. 
Filling in the details 
This thesis provides information that can inform choices on timing, method of payment 
and handling of revenue, and the type of institutions involved, that are acceptable to the 
population. Several important questions arise. 
Compulsory or optional membership? 
It is widely agreed that a national health insurance system based on solidarity should 
cover the whole population, including the rich, due to difficulties in assessing income, 
and the need to maximise risk-sharing. However, universal coverage is seen as an 
opportunity rather than an obligation. Physicians, in particular, tended to support 
optional membership of a social insurance system. Compulsory membership, despite 
being desirable, was considered by many to be incompatible with a democratic society, 
and difficult to enforce. 
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Who should own I regulate the fund? 
The inherited near monopoly of a single public institution collecting and managing 
health insurance contributions, and commissioning services, did not gain support. There 
was strong support, particularly among patients, for public ownership of health insurance 
funds. Often, the state was seen as the only institution able to collect funds. However, a 
degree of autonomy was also desired to improve technical capacity and reduce political 
pressures, provided there is sufficient accountability. There was also a marked 
preference for voluntary insurance to be publicly owned, specifically by the state. 
Although many respondents envisaged the Ministry of Health or central government 
adopting a regulatory role (to collect, allocate or control funds), there was a reluctance to 
entrust it with full control of the health insurance scheme. Again, when discussing the 
finer details of compulsory health insurance, notably whether the health insurance system 
will be a fully independent entity, or a section within the Ministry of Health or 
municipalities, it was re-iterated that, regardless of design, the key principles of health 
financing should be transparency, accountability, and trust. 
What can the funds be used for? 
It was considered particularly important that health insurance revenue be used 
exclusively for health care, while other social needs are financed from external sources, 
illustrating an awareness of the main principles of a social insurance system. There was 
also strong support for use of revenue to finance national health programmes. Financing 
basic services and pharmaceuticals is seen as a primary aim, while pay increases and 
capital investment were viewed to be feasible only if there is a surplus of resources. 
There are divergent views on whether health insurance funds should subsidise 
pharmaceuticals for the poor, or whether this should be covered by social funds. 
One or multiple funds? 
A central question facing the creation of any social insurance system is whether to have 
one or multiple funds. A significant majority of physicians favoured creation of a single 
national health insurance fund, but some suggested the creation of multiple, 
geographically defined funds when the system matures. National funds were viewed as 
providing financial safeguards and ensuring regional cross-subsidisation. Significantly, 
enterprise-based funds were unpopular. Among the public, opinions were divided on 
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whether a single state health insurance fund or a more pluralistic system of multiple, 
competing funds, is more suitable for Bulgaria. Arguably, a national public scheme, 
with a single insurer collecting funds and commissioning services, is closer to the former 
monopoly model and so appears more feasible and acceptable at this stage than 
decentralised funds, or small-scale community insurance schemes. Community 
financing requires a high degree of grassroot community mobilisation, high social 
cohesion and developed community networks. Its development could be hampered by 
ageing, depopulation and low resources (labour or income) in rural areas, as well as large 
disparities across regions. It might be feasible in the long run, given advancing land 
privatisation, rural regeneration projects, and financial and technical support for such 
schemes. 
Methods of payment 
There was a strong preference for indirect methods of payment for health care, with the 
involvement of an intermediary, such as insurance fund or health facility administration. 
The common view is that payments should be regulated by strict rules and handled by 
non-medical staff, thus minimising physicians' workload and potential for corruption. A 
third party institution was seen as essential in handling risk, especially in case of 
catastrophic illness where costs to the user would be unaffordable. Where a preference 
for direct payment to staff was expressed (payments in the private sector, user fees, or 
informal payments), it was because of simplicity, retention of funds locally, and a 
perceived direct impact on the quality of treatment. 
Conclusion 
In broad terms, the reform dilemma in the 1990s has been whether the Bulgarian heath 
care system should adopt the Beveridge or Bismarckian model of health financing220 • 
Although the Bismarckian model played some role in Bulgaria in the 1920s and 1930s, it 
was far less than in Poland or Czechoslovakia. Since 1945, the Soviet-style "Semashko" 
model funded through general taxation, with a state monopoly in health care financing 
and provision has been dominant. This model is closer to the Beveridge model, although 
less accountable and flexible. 
In the 1990s, the Bismarck model was widely favoured by the Bulgarian government, 
providers' associations and donors. It was considered to avoid the disadvantages of the 
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tax-based model, while maintaining equity. Furthermore, all Central and Eastern 
European countries and many countries of the Former Soviet Union are in a process of 
transition from tax-based to social insurance financing. The benefits of a health 
insurance system in attracting the support of the population are seen as raising health 
spending, transparency, solidarity, and improved relationships with patients70 • 
Table 12.1 presents an assessment of the applicability of several methods for health 
financing in the circumstances of Bulgaria, as perceived by the population. Compulsory 
health insurance is seen as the best option in terms of potential sustainability, equity and 
acceptability by all stakeholders. The rationale for compulsory insurance lies partly in its 
resemblance to the existing tax-based model and its potential to guarantee universal 
coverage. Although social insurance was promoted as a model protecting the interests of 
vulnerable groups, in this study, it was the better off who were most enthusiastic. Those 
who have suffered most from transition are more pessimistic. Interestingly, despite its 
popularity, social insurance is seen as not perfectly compatible with values and 
traditions, and is unfamiliar. Conversely, out-of-pocket payments and tax-based models 
are familiar and have a long tradition, but are seen as unsustainable, inequitable, and 
thus, unacceptable. 
Table 12.1. Applicability of health care financing methods in the circumstances of Bulgaria 
by a range of criteria (based on respondent's views) 
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This may indicate willingness to support radical reform. Acceptance of new financing 
options based on their perceived benefits (transparency, accountability) and negative 
personal experience with the current model may raise expectations unsustainably. The 
observation that people appear more satisfied with models with which they are less 
familiar (social insurance), and disillusioned with more familiar options (tax-based 
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financing and out-of-pocket payment), is seen elsewhere70 • The wide range of informal 
coping strategies commonly undertaken by patients indicate a lack of trust in the existing 
financing model and suggest that a new system has to rebuild confidence in the public 
health care system. 
The strong preference for public systems such as tax and social insurance and the low 
acceptability of voluntary insurance and out-of-pocket payments reflects persisting 
collective values. Nevertheless, it is now widely accepted that the population should 
contribute directly to the cost of their treatment, through health insurance contributions, 
direct payments, or even donations. When studying the value systems and beliefs, there 
are contradictions, due to the dynamic change during transition and different speed of 
change among different groups. This makes it difficult to establish what constitutes a 
'dominant value set' and draw conclusions on whether a model is compatible with it121 • 
A more open public discourse would be useful to clarify differences between methods 
and their practical implementation. This requires a shift from a prescriptive reform 
language, imposing ready-made "expert" solutions, or sensationalist mass-media 
accounts, to coherent and accessible analysis of financing options, creating a "more 
informed environment"39 • A forum for public debate should involve not only political 
parties and professional organisations, but also NGOs and patient groups. The media 
could be used more effectively to encourage debate and to reach marginalised groups. 
Although it appears that many people have a good general understanding of the social 
insurance system, an insufficiently clear explanation of its complicated rules and 
exemptions could undermine support and compliance among the population. 
Contribution to the wider literature 
This research provides an example of how one can examine in-depth the system of health 
care financing in a country. It uses a framework incorporating a population perspective 
(health and illness behaviour; ability and willingness of users to pay for health care; 
values, beliefs and public preferences); and contextual factors (history, economy, 
demography, and starting conditions in the health care system) (Figure 12.1). Increasing 
differences between the countries in Central and Eastern Europe suggest that reform 
strategies cannot be transplanted mechanically and health financing reform should be 
informed by a comprehensive country-specific analysis. An important lesson from this 
382 
study is that it is essential that a generic health financing model 1s adapted to the 
circumstances of a country. 
Figure 12.1. Framework for analysis of health financing methods 
Contextual factors 
ECONOMY, HISTORY, 
POLITICS 
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HEALTH PROFILE 
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
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REFORM 
HEALTH 
FINANCING 
MODELS 
User perspective 
PATTERNS OF HEALTH 
AND ILLNESS BEHAVIOUR 
ABILITY TO PAY 
WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
VALUES, BELIEFS AND 
ATTITUDES 
This research provides new empirical information and offers an insight into the 
challenges facing those who seek to restructure health care financing in Central and 
Eastern Europe, offering directions for comparative analysis. It seeks to inform decision-
makers on the options for financing a health system and their applicability in Bulgaria, 
and prepare the ground for further research and public debate. 
This research assumes public support for health care reform to be essential for its 
success. In Bulgaria, understanding of attitudes and beliefs among the population has 
been perceived as secondary to technical implementation of reform. Given the sizeable 
informal sector, and the inefficiency of the tax collection system in Bulgaria, popular 
compliance with a given financing scheme is likely to be crucial for its sustainability. 
Although elections are now free, there is little de facto accountability to the electorate, 
and public participation in the policy-making process remains limited. 
This study provides an example of how these different dimensions may be studied, 
triangulating quantitative and qualitative research methods and data sources. On most 
issues there is a good match between qualitative and quantitative evidence, 
demonstrating how data collected through different methods can validate and supplement 
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each other. However, the different research methods employed inevitably lead to some 
contradictions that need to be explored further. 
Individually, the chapters provide important new information on health and health 
seeking behaviour, in a post communist country, especially insights on willingness and 
ability to pay given the previous, formally, free-of-charge system. This could be useful 
for other transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe, given their common 
inheritance and similar direction of reform. 
Attitudes to financing methods were assessed by means of two approaches: indirectly, by 
establishing preferences for specific procedures associated with each financing model, 
and directly, by asking respondents to choose between vignettes describing different 
financing models. Although attitudes and practice may not always coincide, the study 
may serve as a guide that could be used in implementing current reforms. 
The research provides systematic analysis and insights on the incidence and nature of 
informal payments in the health sector in Bulgaria, the first time this has been explored 
in a representative survey. These were less than expected, very complex, organised in a 
chaotic, although adaptive, system, and not especially regressive. The study developed 
the concept of informal exchanges, suggested definitions and criteria for informal 
payments that could be used in international comparisons; and suggested a 
methodological approach for their investigation, combining quantitative and qualitative 
data, and a range of direct and indirect investigative techniques. Household health care 
expenditures, and willingness and ability to pay, remain relatively unexplored in Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
The survey also demonstrated the use of 'self-assessed financial situation' as a proxy 
(and possibly more valid) measure for income, given underreporting of income in 
transition economies. Health insurance based on income-related contributions does not 
take into account non-monetary income, assets, social status, privileges, and access to 
social networks, which could be predictive of illness and ability to pay. Despite some 
methodological limitations generic to such studies, such as lack of validation; difficulties 
in measuring income; and incidence of illness; this work provides relevant new 
information. 
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Next steps 
This research seeks to inform discussion on health care financing in Bulgaria and to 
place this debate more firmly on the policy agenda. It is timely given the implementation 
of the health insurance system from mid-2000. This research, by its design, provides a 
broad picture of factors likely to shape public and professional responses to change. The 
study also collected baseline data on phenomena that are insufficiently understood in 
Bulgaria, such as informal payments and willingness to pay. Undertaking empirical 
research of this scale, given the scarcity of comparable studies in Bulgaria, proved to be a 
huge task, consuming significant time and resources. The results of this research will be 
disseminated among policy-makers involved in health sector reform in Bulgaria, 
academic research centres, and among donors and technical advisers by means of 
publication of papers, seminars, and personal communication, ideally to inform directly 
specific health policy decisions. 
The lessons from this research could be useful in two ways: 
I. This study could provide an agenda for future research in Bulgaria that will examine 
particular issues in more detail. Given the changing context of health financing reform in 
Bulgaria, several broad areas for further research could be seen as a logical continuation 
of this study: 
• It will be possible to trace the impact of reform on patterns of illness behaviour and 
use of different levels of the health system using the 1997 study as a baseline. The 
same study design, incorporating qualitative and quantitative research, is applicable, 
with the instruments refined taking into account experience from this and similar 
studies. 
• Comprehensive analysis of population health care expenditure, with its formal and 
informal components, will be important to set levels of social insurance contributions 
and co-payments. Assessing expenditure in relation to household income is essential 
to determine affordability and fine-tune exemptions. Studies attempting to measure 
income and health expenditure, including this one, have faced significant 
methodological difficulties. It will be necessary to have a continuing dialogue with 
those responsible for widely used instruments, such as those used in the World Bank 
Living Standards Measurement Studies, and household panels maintained by the 
National Statistical Institute in Bulgaria. 
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• Another direction for research is to study the long-term sustainability of the new 
system, given the expected burden of disease and level of contributions, using 
modelling techniques. This research has emphasised the importance of detailed 
projections and future work should link with the 'Financial and Economic Analyses 
and Prognoses' department at the National Health Insurance Fund. 
• Continuing in-depth analysis would help track changes in perspectives of key interest 
groups, as well as evolving public, professional and political views. This could be 
done using methodology and baseline data from this study. Data should be collected 
more extensively among rural populations and marginalised groups (e.g. the Roma). 
II. The research, or some of its elements, can be replicated in other countries that are 
reforming their health financing systems amidst far-reaching socio-economic changes. 
This is feasible given the similarity in health financing reforms across Central and 
Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union. This study has proved to be relevant directly 
to the work of Oxfam GB (for whom the author now works) in their Former Soviet 
Union, Eastern Europe and Middle East region, in several ways: 
• Dissemination of results from this study has contributed significantly to an emerging 
interest, within Oxfam, in examining the implications of social insurance for access 
to basic services in countries with previously extensive state financing and provision 
of health care (Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union, to some extent- Yemen) 
• It has improved the conceptual understanding of health financing, refining the 
approach to an extensive community co-managed insurance programme implemented 
by Oxfam in the Transcaucasus since 1995. 
• Theoretical and methodological knowledge gained in this research has contributed to 
improving the design of a major cost-sharing study in Yemen to be finalised by the 
end of 2000; and has supported the process of developing an agreed Oxfam advocacy 
platform on cost-recovery. 
• Methodology from the Bulgarian research was replicated in a proposal for a 
collaborative project between Oxfam and LSHTM on 'Improving access to basic 
health care by the poor in Armenia', submitted for funding in 2000. In it, 
professional researchers and local NGOs will monitor population access to essential 
health care and pharmaceuticals and provider behaviour through small panel survey 
and in-depth interviews. 
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• Further Oxfam research and advocacy on access to health care in relation to macro-
economic policies and debt relief are planned in 2000-01, in the framework of 
Poverty Reduction Strategies formulation (PRSP) being developed in a number of 
countries throughout the region (Albania, Yemen, the Caucasus) by the World Bank, 
government and civil society representatives. 
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APPENDIX 1. BULGARIA: COUNTRY PROFILE 
Geographical conditions and geopolitics of Bulgaria 
This chapter seeks to place the research undertaken in the context of Bulgaria. Each 
country has a unique history and geography, giving rise to a particular set of norms, 
values, economic and political structures. A health system does not exist in isolation 
and, inevitably, is influenced by these factors, which affect what is or is not possible or 
acceptable. 
Bulgaria is situated in south-east Europe, on the Balkan Peninsula and has an area of 
110,994 sq. km (42,855 sq. miles). It is bordered by Romania and the Danube river to 
the north, Serbia and Macedonia to the west, Turkey to the south-east, Greece to the 
south and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) to the east across the Black Sea. Historically, 
the geographical location of Bulgaria has been considered strategic for the balance of 
power in the Balkans. At the end of the 19th century the collision of geopolitical 
interests between several Western European nations and Russia led to their military and 
political involvement in Bulgaria (the "Eastern Question"221 ). These external influences 
had important consequences for the establishment of the modem Bulgarian state. Such 
geographical proximity to Asia and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) has had implications 
for the national identity. Nowadays, the strategic location of Bulgaria near the Turkish 
Straits determines the political role of Bulgaria in the Balkan peninsula. Its control over 
key land routes, from Europe to the Middle East and Asia, has equally significant 
economic consequences222 • Among these have been potential for trade relations with 
Europe, as well as the Middle East, development of trade and railway routes and fuel 
pipelines connecting Europe and Asia. The Black Sea access allowed Bulgaria recently 
to join the Black Sea Economic Zone. However, the advantages of its key geographical 
location have not been fully exploited. 
Three quarters of Bulgaria is covered by mountains, Rila Mountain (2,925m /9,596 ft) 
being the highest in the Balkans. While these geographical conditions have not been 
favourable to the expansion of cultivated land, ski and hot spring resorts have provided 
opportunities for the tourist industry. Despite this potential, most of the mountainous 
regions, as well as the resorts along the Black Sea coast, are run down, due to poor 
maintenance and inadequate investment. Lack of legislation on foreign investment in 
general, and ownership of land in particular, have slowed down capital investment. 
Sofia is the capital and largest city, containing an eighth of the population. The major 
cities are Plovdiv, Pleven, Russe (Danube port), Burgas and Varna (Black Sea ports). 
Bulgaria inherited an extensive road system 36,922 km (22,942 ml) (1992), providing 
accessibility to most areas of the country. There are three major ports and one major 
international airport. 
Bulgaria is divided into twenty-eight administrative districts and 256 municipalities. The 
district administration is centrally appointed, while the municipalities are governed by 
elected councils and a mayor. Several ministries, including the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Health, have 28 district offices139• 
With the Local Self-Government and Local Administration Act (1991), the 
municipalities were authorised to collect taxes, allocate their budgets according to their 
own priorities, and to finance and provide health care, social services, education and 
other local services. 
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Brief historical overview prior to 1989 
The Bulgarian state was established in 681, by Khan Asparuh. The Bulgarians are 
~escendants of the Bulgars (nomadic people from Central Asia, who migrated to Europe 
m the 6th century AD) and of the local Slav population. In the 9th century AD, Eastern 
Orthodox Christianity was adopted as a state religion. Under Tsar Simeon (893-927) 
Bulgaria became a leading power and the third biggest state in Europe. During his reign, 
the first proto-Slavic (Cyrillic) alphabet was invented and popularised by the Greek Slavs 
Konstantin and Kiril. This process was supported by the Bulgarian tsars in order to 
facilitate the consolidation of the Bulgarian nation and to establish a church independent 
of Byzantium. Between 1018 and 1185 Bulgaria was conquered by Byzantium and, 
subsequently, the Second Bulgarian Kingdom was established. 
In 1396, Bulgaria was conquered by the Ottoman Empire and occupied for five centuries, 
until 1878. During that time the Bulgarian nationality, language and religion was 
threatened by extinction and thousands of Bulgarians were massacred by Turks, in 1876, 
in order to suppress popular revolts. Bulgaria was liberated with the help of the Russian 
Tsar Alexander II's army after the Crimean wars. The country became a sovereign 
kingdom in 1908. During the period of Ottoman rule, many Bulgarian intellectuals were 
educated in Russia and maintained close contact with the Russian intelligentsia who 
represented a more liberal way of thinking. The Russian empire was a source of hope 
and progress. Despite the pro-German orientation of the Bulgarian elite and monarchy, 
Russia was popularly regarded an ally. Even during the totalitarian regime supported by 
Russia, policy-makers and ordinary people still considered it a natural partner for 
ensuring economic growth and the political security of Bulgaria. This partly explains the 
total compliance of Bulgaria to the Soviet model of social and economic organisation. 
The attachment to Russia was exploited by left-wing political parties and leaders, even 
after 1989, for populist aims. 
Bulgaria was a German ally during both the First and Second World Wars. In 1917, the 
left-wing Agrarian party came to power and, in 1919, introduced land reforms with re-
distributive effects. It was the only peasant party ever to rule in Europe119 but was 
overthrown in 1923 by a fascist coup and authoritarian pro-monarchist government was 
established in 1934 under King Boris III. The communist party drew supporters mainly 
among the industrial working class, who were disappointed by the alliance with 
Germany, loss of land during the Balkan wars, and fascist crimes. Despite being a 
German ally in the Second World War, Bulgaria protected its Jewish population of 
50,000 from the Holocaust223 • In 1944, the Red Army invaded German-occupied 
Bulgaria. 
In 1946 the Bulgarian monarchy was abolished and, in 194 7, a new soviet model 
constitution was imposed. The country was governed by a broad communist dominated 
alliance ('Fatherland front'). Industry was nationalised and land aggregated in 
agricultural co-operatives. During the 1950s, hard-line Stalinist methods were used. 
There was systematic repression of the elite and intelligentsia, leading to the death or 
imprisonment of a majority of the rich proprietors, intellectuals, artists and land owners 
opposed to the nationalisation of the land. Even physicians with large private practices 
were under suspicion. In 1954 Todor Zhivkov assumed power and remained head of 
state for 36 years. Uniquely among the occupied countries of Eastern Europe, Bulgaria 
applied for republican status within the USSR. Strict adherence of Bulgaria to the 
economic and political conditions set by USSR led to almost total isolation. Opposition 
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was repressed and private proprietorship eradicated more successfully than in other 
Central European countries, except Albania. In the 1980s, the established trade balance 
in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) became unsustainable. The 
state started to lose control over prices and wages, and energy imports from the FSU 
became significantly more costly. In response to a changing political climate, 
~p.e~ifically th~ USSR's introduction of Perestroika in 1985-89, the communist party 
Initiated evolutiOnary reforms to adjust the planned economy to the world economy. 
Another factor that discredited the government was the forceful assimilation of the 
Bulgaro-muslim ethnic minority in 1984-5, which provoked international protests. These 
policies involved forceful adoption of Bulgarian names and curtailing civil liberties, such 
as banning public use of the Turkish language and closure of newspapers targeting the 
ethnic Turks. There is some contested evidence that Bulgaro-muslims were killed in the 
campaign. There were isolated terrorist bomb attacks, but beyond that the evidence of 
violence has remained anecdotal. Historically, some ethnic tensions have long existed in 
Bulgaria, but they have not been of the scale seen in other Balkan states. There were 
several waves of emigration. The Turkish population started leaving the country after the 
liberation from the Ottoman empire in 1878. Subsequently some 340,000 emigrated 
between 1912 and 1936125, joined by another 200,000 in 1944-1980 and about 400,000 in 
1989. Since 1990, most ethnic Turks who emigrated in 1989 have returned and become 
actively involved in political dialogue through their representative party, the Movement 
for Rights and Freedoms. 
Democratic reforms 1989-1997: success and failure 
The start of democratic transition in Bulgaria was officially proclaimed on 9-10 
November 1989, with widespread political support. In December 1989, the right to free 
opposition, free speech and a free press was established, and the power of the Bulgarian 
Socialist party curtailed. The Union of Democratic Forces, comprising 14 opposition 
groups, was established in December 1989. In 1991, Todor Zhivkov was indicted on 
charges of corruption and abuse of power. Some commentators argue that what 
happened in Bulgaria was merely a coup221 , with a change of leadership within the ruling 
party encouraged by the Soviet Perestroika of 1985. Indeed, there was less evidence of 
popularly supported political movements, labour union activities or visible dissident 
groups, than in other Central and Eastern European countries. 
A group of economic and political factors facilitated the fall of communism. Despite its 
publicised efforts, the government failed to reform the economy. Living conditions 
rapidly deteriorated in the 1980s. Trust in the former regime was undermined by cover-
up of the Chernobyl catastrophe and chemical pollution of the town of Russe from a 
chemical plant across the Romanian border. These were used by a 'green movement' as 
a focus of popular discontent. The intelligentsia became more active due to influences 
by dissident movement and achievements elsewhere. In the summer of 1989, there was 
also the biggest wave of emigration of Bulgaro-muslims from agricultural areas to 
Turkey, with serious consequences for the year's harvest. In addition, several political 
scandals occurred in the 1980s caused by revelations of the circumstances surrounding 
the murder in London of Georgi Markov, and the attempt to murder Vladimir Kostovm; 
m Markov and Kostov were journalists, working in the West, who exposed the Bulgarian regime. 
Markov was killed by a poisoned shot from an umbrella, in London, 1977 
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and scandals related to the lavish life-styles of party members and their families. All 
these factors combined to produce the population's vocal support for democratic reforms. 
Import.ant democratic changes were initiated, including separation of legislative and 
executive powers, creation of a functioning multiparty system and free elections. The 
Bulgarian Communist Party lost its control over political, social and state institutions, the 
Ministry of Interior's secret police department, trade unions and other communist-
dominated organisations. Unfortunately the reforms and its promoters were slow to 
reach rural and small town populations, which was evident in the voting behaviour at the 
first two elections for a National Assembly (Parliament). Lack of a parliamentary 
majority prevented the Union of Democratic Forces from enacting legislation which 
would have underpinned a real reform process, health reform being a clear example. It 
became increasingly difficult to attract voters who were further aggravated by the 
deepening economic crisis. 
With one of its first decrees after 1989, the new government re-legalised private farming 
and gradually lifted price controls (April1990). The price of food increased dramatically 
and food shortages became common. In January 1991, prices of most goods were 
liberalised. The process of privatisation was initiated and many small businesses, 
especially in tourism, services and retailing, were legalised. In March 1990, strikes were 
legalised with the exception of health, military personnel and several other sectors. The 
stabilisation and adjustment programme of the government was supported by a loan of 
$250 million from the World Bank, agreed in August 1991 as a start of foreign assistance 
for reforms. 
Several socialist governments, stemming from the new socialist elite, succeeded each 
other before the former Communist Party (renamed the Socialist Party), regained power. 
It won the majority of seats in the General National Assembly in the first free elections 
held in June 1990, as a result of better resources, experience and strength in rural areas, 
based on a network of local party officials. In November 1990, after mass student strikes 
in Sofia and a boycott of the Parliament by opposition deputies, the socialist government 
resigned. The democratic opposition leader Dr Zhelyu Zhelev was elected president by 
the National Assembly in 1990 and re-elected in a general election in 1992. 
In July 1991, a new Constitution was adopted, replacing the communist constitution and 
reaffirming Bulgaria's determination to be a modem parliamentary democracy. The 
country was defined as a parliamentary republic, legislative and executive power being 
separated legally. The president is head of state and commander in chief of the armed 
forces, elected by direct vote for a five-year term of office. The legislative power is 
exercised by the unicameral General National Assembly (Parliament) which has 240 
members, elected through proportional representation, for a four-year term. The 
threshold for parties to achieve representation in the Parliament is 4% of the national 
vote. 
After a number of short-lived Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) and 'expert' 
governments, the inability to achieve consensus on the direction of reform led to the 
Bulgarian Socialist Party winning the majority of seats in the National Assembly in 
December 1994. The scale of their victory was most notable in the rural areas and small 
towns. The restoration to power of the ex-communist party could be explained by 
disappointment with the slow pace of economic reforms and low living standards, 
conservative and communist-led local administration and the lack of an entrepreneurial 
middle class involved in small businesses224 • The new image of the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party with their social-democratic agenda for market reforms, combined with measures 
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for s?c~al_protection,_ was appealing in an atmosphere of economic decline, insecurity and 
pessimistic economic forecasts. These developments were similar to the "stn· f 
. . c: ng o 
vtctones 10r revamped communist parties", which occurred across Central and Eastern 
Europe after 1992225 • 
Box Al-l. Democratic reforms in Bulgaria 1989-1998: Key events 
10 Nov 1989 
Nov-Dec 1989 
Early 1990 
June1990 
August 1990 
Early 1991 
June 1991 
July 1991 
Oct 1991 
1992 
May 1992 
1992-94 
December 1994 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1996 
Feb 1997 
April1997 
June 1997 
1997 
1997-8 
Formal end of the communist regime 
Todor Zhivkov resigned 
Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) established, led by Zhelyu Zhelev 
Bulgarian Communist Party's (BCP) power curtailed 
Rights to free speech, free press and political freedom established 
Round table discussions on reform priorities: political freedoms, 
establishment of free market, private farming, property restitution 
Bulgarian Socialist Party won first free elections for General National 
Assembly (Parliament) 
UDF leader Zhelyu Zhelev elected president by the National Assembly 
Socialist government forced to resign after mass strikes, replaced by a 
coalition government 
Zhivkov indicted on charges of corruption and abuse of power 
End of Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
Democratic Constitution adopted 
Parliamentary elections won by the Union of Democratic Forces 
Zhelyu Zhelev elected president in first direct presidential elections 
Bulgaria enters the Council of Europe 
Non-party cabinet of "experts" voted in by the Parliament 
Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) won early parliamentary elections 
Bulgaria joined NATO's 'Partnership for peace' 
Bulgaria applied for European Union membership 
Petar Stoyanov (UDF) elected president, stepped into office in 1997 
Bulgaria joined the World Trade Organisation 
Socialist government collapsed following economic and political crisis 
Caretaker government appointed by the president 
Union of Democratic Forces won the majority at general elections 
Currency board introduced 
Government applied for NATO membership 
Comprehensive assistance programme agreed with the World Bank, the 
IMF and the European Union 
The government failed to fulfil its election promises and, in April 1997, the Union of 
Democratic Forces won the majority of seats in the Parliament. The current president, 
Petar Stoyanov, also a candidate of the Union of Democratic Forces stepped into office 
in 1997. The new government included strongly pro-reform politicians. In June 1997, a 
currency board was introduced, as a tool for enforcing fiscal discipline and tight control 
over government spending, restoring confidence in the lev, and avoiding hyperinflation. 
Another element of the programme was large-scale privatisation with the aim ofboosting 
economic growth and profitability. Other government priorities included land reform, 
reform of the banking system, and the creation of a legal environment favouring foreign 
and domestic investors. Totalitarian mechanisms and structures have been dismantled 
successfully but the new democratic mechanisms are still in the process of construction. 
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In 1998, a three yea~ loan of $800 million was agreed with the IMF, aiming at 
devel?pment of financial markets and reform of agriculture, the tax system, and social 
secunty. The fact t~at the go:emment and the president were elected by a large majority 
vo~e, for the first time provided the consensus needed to introduce painful structural 
adjustment and currency stabilisation in Bulgaria. Public consensus and commitment to 
radic.al reform programme on behalf of Bulgaria, as well as international support, were 
considered paramounf26 • 
Bulgarian economy: structure and trends 
Economy (1944-1989): a brief overview 
During the five centuries of Ottoman domination, Bulgaria was held in a state of 
feudalism and relied mainly on agricultural production. Manufacturing, trade, and 
extraction of raw materials started to develop during the National Revival (Renaissance) 
movement at the beginning of the 19th century. This growth was a response to larger 
demand, not only locally but also promoted by the Ottoman Empire, in order to obtain 
higher tax revenues and to modernise the army227 • Later, trade contacts with Western 
Europe expanded, favoured by the convertibility of Ottoman currency. Manufacturing 
was based on a traditional guild system and independent artisans, which did not 
encourage industrial development. 
In the post-liberation decade, Bulgaria remained predominantly an agricultural country. 
During 1878-1912 agriculture accounted for about three-quarters of gross output125• The 
economy relied overwhelmingly on grain exports (70% of exports in 1911) and thus was 
susceptible to the fluctuation in international grain prices, falling demand and bad 
harvests. Between 1926 and 1930, tobacco exports grew in significance, replacing grain. 
Over-dependence on certain agricultural exports and trade partners (Germany in 
particular), for tobacco exports, greatly reduced flexibility. 
The tradition of continuous state involvement in economic life began at this time. The 
state assumed a major role in promoting Bulgarian industry. Among protectionist 
measures implemented before 1914 were import tariffs and legislation to encourage 
private industry, such as tax exemptions and reduction in railway freight rates. 
Nevertheless a consistent programme was not developed. Partly as a result of this policy, 
Bulgarian industry showed a higher growth rate than other Balkan states. Large-scale 
manufacturing in Bulgaria increased by 13% per capita between 1904 and 1911 
compared to 10% for Serbia and 5.3% for Romania. Yet fixed capital was insufficient 
and labour scarce and expensive125• During the First World War (1915-1918) the state 
sought to mobilise the economy using policies such as price setting for authorised 
exports. 
After the First World War, the state continued to play a dominant role in politics and the 
economy. The latter involved centralisation of decision-making, initiatives to promote 
growth, leadership but no actual investment or ownership. Public institutions, such as 
ministries and banks, established a leading role over private enterprises. In 1894, the 
Bulgarian government enacted the first formal industrial legislation in the Balkans and, 
in 1903, the first state bank for agricultural credit in the region was formed125• Broad 
state control was exercised through an extensive state bureaucracy: its size doubled 
within several years after the First World War and state salaries accounted for 39% of 
1930 budget expenditure. 17 of every 1,000 Bulgarians were state employees, a figure 4-
5 times the Western European average. This expansion increased the potential for 
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corruption: by 1928, almost one-quarter of all Bulgarian crimes leading to convictions 
were committed by state or local officials125 • 
The high growth rate of mechanised manufacturing during the 1920s was unsustainable 
and did not stimulate further industrialisation and capital growth. There was a lack of 
foreign investment, a small domestic market, small-scale production and a backward 
agriculturally-oriented economy. The world economic crisis of the 1930s led to 
economic stagnation in Bulgaria through a sharp decline in agricultural prices, economic 
isolation and lack of credit from Europe. Economic necessity led Bulgaria closer to the 
expanding German markets. By 1926-30 Germany was already receiving a quarter of all 
Bulgarian exports, another quarter going to the rest of Central and North-East Europe125 • 
These contacts were mainly of an economic nature, not ideological. There were attempts 
in the 1930s to reduce state control over industry and liberalise the economy. Yet 
support from state institutions continued to be a determining factor for the success of 
private initiatives. State ownership of economic enterprises grew significantly. 
The communist regime, established in Bulgaria 1944-1948, engaged in radical reform of 
all aspects of the economy, along the Soviet model. Most of the reforms were in 
disregard of national traditions. Collectivisation of agriculture was accomplished during 
1948-1958, although more slowly than any other initiatives undertaken in 1944-47. 
While, in the beginning, collectivisation was performed through voluntary activities such 
as propaganda and economic incentives to give up land, in the 1950s there were more 
aggressive measures such as intimidation and police pressure on landowners. Relatively 
even land distribution, general poverty, backwardness, and a historical basis for co-
operative forms of organisation facilitated the collectivisation process. By 1959, only 
2% of the land was still in private hands, with 0.4% by 1972125 • The tendency to 
aggregate land in large collective farms and in vertically integrated Agro-Industrial 
Complexes in the 1970s was radically different from the pattern of traditionally small 
plots of land, small-scale production and the few large estates before 1944. Massive 
nationalisation of the land in Bulgaria contrasted with Poland, where private ownership 
of plots of land was largely preserved. 
Another shift in the Bulgarian economy after 1944, was the emphasis on industrial 
development as opposed to agriculture, against a background of a predominantly 
agricultural economy. The redirection of capital investment was followed by the 
workforce which migrated from the rural to urban areas, starting a process which is 
posing problems of rural depopulation. The smaller and ageing rural workforce has been 
increasingly under pressure to produce agricultural products for export and for internal 
consumption. 
The gross national product of Bulgaria is estimated to have increased by an annual 
average of 4.4o/o between 1913-73, the highest growth registered among all European 
countries, whose average growth was 3% per year. Contrary to the official propaganda, 
the high growth had actually started earlier. In the period 1913-50, despite its 
predominantly agricultural economy, Bulgaria's GNP grew by an annual average of 
2. 7%, or almost double the European average of 1.4%. These estimates, however, suffer 
from methodological problems among which are contradictory definitions of GNP in 
Bulgaria and in the West and inaccuracies in the national accounts of Bulgaria. There 
was general impoverishment after the Second World War, which greatly reduced the 
GNP of Bulgaria, but the continued industrial growth since the 1950s merely perpetuates 
a tendency started much earlier. 
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Manufacturing industry was fully nationalised in December 194 7. The Soviet example 
was followed more closely than in any of the other Central and Eastern European 
countries. Large-scale investment and workforce flows were directed towards heavy 
industry. A system of central planning of outputs and inputs was established. As a result 
of these policies, the share of industry in the net material product had increased from 
23o/o to 48% in the period 1948-60, while the share of agriculture fell from 59% to 
27%125• In terms of structure, the shares of food processing, textile and other consumer 
products declined and the emphasis was placed on heavy industry: machinery, 
metallurgy, electronics and chemicals. By 1980, these accounted for 36% of industrial 
production, compared with 5% in 1939 and 17% in 1952. In 1960-1980, production of 
machine building, electronics, chemicals and pharmaceuticals increased and was directed 
towards export. In response to this, labour flows were redirected towards industry and, 
in the 1980s, the total population involved in agriculture was only slightly above 20%, in 
1948 it was estimated at 80%. This represented a major structural reform. 
The share of overall investment in agriculture almost doubled between 1950 and 1960 as 
a result of an investment wave at the end of collectivisation, to reach the highest level in 
Central and Eastern Europe, but then declined to the original level by 1975. Despite the 
ideologically guided policies, the importance of agricultural production for local 
consumption and for export remained strong during the communist regime. In 1956-
1970, crop and animal production grew at an annual average of 4.1% per capita, a higher 
rate than that achieved anywhere else in Eastern Europe. Since the 1960s, there has been 
a shift away from cash crops such as tobacco and cotton, to fruit, vegetables and vines, 
but growth has slowed since the 1970s. The main production since 1960 consists of 
livestock and feed grains (two-thirds of output) and wheat, com, barley. 
The growth of the Bulgarian economy has been highly dependent on foreign trade. The 
main objective was to secure exports in return for energy, which had the largest 
proportionate increase in the import structure. There are minor deposits of coal and oil, 
but Bulgaria has to import over 75% of its energy for domestic consumption. Across 
Central and Eastern Europe it is the most dependent on energy imports. The Soviet 
Union was not a significant trading partner until the 1940s, but since then trade has 
accounted for about half of Bulgarian turnover. West Germany accounted for 8% of 
Bulgarian imports in 1959, much more than from any other Western European country. 
Trade with the west declined further due to the low quality of Bulgarian manufactured 
exports, which were targeted to the less competitive Soviet market. 
In 1949, the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) was created comprising 
all other Central and Eastern European countries and the USSR. The designation of 
countries as specialising in production, or assembling particular products, started in the 
early 1960s. Bulgaria does not have significant mineral sources, apart from some lignite 
coal, lead, iron, copper, and zinc, but the economy has specialised mainly in 
development of heavy industry, mining, metallurgy and chemical industry, dictated by 
the division of activities in the CMEA. By 1975, one-third of industrial output was for 
the transport sector, such as ship-building, fork-lift trucks. Bulgaria was forced to 
diminish its predominantly agricultural orientation. The main exports were machinery, 
textiles, chemicals, non-ferrous metals, timber, iron and steel products. This led to 
significant environmental pollution. The CMEA guaranteed Bulgaria access to a large 
and stable market for food and manufactured exports in exchange for raw materials and 
strategic energy supplies, such as oil and natural gas from the Soviet Union, at 
preferential prices. Gradually Bulgaria became heavily dependent on the USSR for oil, 
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as well on the other partners, to sell low-quality products. In 1985, Bulgaria exported 
56.5% of all exports and imported 56.1% of its overall imports from the Soviet Union. 
Several factors contributed to the visible improvement in living standards between the 
late 1950s and the 1980s. Firstly, between 1965 and 1980, the authorities promoted use 
of quasi-private 'personal plots' of land leased from the agricultural complexes, mainly 
for vegetables and animal feed. In Bulgaria and Hungary the state sector provides inputs 
and services to the personal plot sector because of their immediate effect on consumer 
living standards, and to channel additional working hours into the official economy1 19• 
These personal plots did not truly represent private activities and were in a symbiotic 
relationship with the state. Yet distribution of surpluses among extended families, or for 
sale according to officially set prices, served to improve urban food supply by the 1970s. 
Despite this success, the share of agriculture in overall investment declined steadily from 
nearly 30% in 1961 to less than 10% of total fixed investment in the mid-1980s119• At the 
same time, with the accomplishment of collectivisation in 1958, subsequent investment 
and social welfare policies, rural living standards improved significantly by the 1960s. 
Despite the lack of consistent investment in agriculture, improvement of living standards 
among the rural population has been most dramatic and, by the mid-1970s, the 
productivity and incomes of the previously impoverished rural population were equal to 
the urban population, in contrast to the Soviet model119• In the 1970s, a number of 
collective agricultural farms were aggregated with industrial activities to achieve better 
productivity. Housing is predominantly privately owned. This led to a smaller 
proportion of salaries being spent on food and more on consumer goods and leisure. The 
share of food in personal consumption fell from 52.5 % to 48.3 % for 1960-8, and to 
44.5% by 1977, and the average daily consumption of calories reached the Western 
European level of 3,500125• 
Secondly, there was a better supply of consumer goods in the market, despite their small 
share in the structure of the Bulgarian exports, in contrast to energy. There were some 
shortages of specific products at certain times. The most significant improvements in 
post-war living standards were achieved in the 1960s and 1970s. Lampe125 demonstrates 
the increase, using data on consumption of food, clothing, transportation, housing, 
services and durables. In 1983, the per capita consumption of all categories of 
foodstuffs, apart from bread, rose. Although it failed to reach UN norms, this was ahead 
of levels elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. Similar steady improvement was 
observed for durables and housing. Yet the hidden expenditures and price increases, the 
scarcity and poor quality of consumer goods neutralised the increase in industrial wages. 
Thirdly, between the late 1960s and the late 1970s, Bulgaria benefited most from the 
CMEA exchange at pre-agreed terms which led to improvement in the living standards of 
the population. 
As a consequence of destalinisation in Bulgaria in the 1950s, some economic reforms 
were initiated, involving investments in agriculture and increased supply of consumer 
goods. The labour shortages and slower rate of aggregate growth since 197 5 has 
intensified pressure to use labour more intensively and capital more efficiently125 • 
Demand for additional labour occurred in several industrial sectors as a result of low 
rates of population growth, full incorporation of women in the labour force, introduction 
of a two day week-end in 1974, and the slowed pace ofmigration to urban areas125• Since 
the 1960s, under internal pressure to increase the productivity of labour and capital, 
strategies for restructuring of the economy have been explored. Farming was labour 
intensive but increasing inputs was difficult. Some reforms towards decentralisation of 
economic decision-making were initiated in the mid-1960s but, after the events in 
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Czechoslovakia in 1968, the hard-line policies of centralisation predominated. The 
Bulgarian Communist Party created a few ambitious strategies in the 1970s. It planned 
to improve the supplies of consumer goods and amenities, and to utilise the latest 
technological achievements in order to raise the quality of exports. This proved 
unfeasible due to isolation from the West, trading restrictions, and oil-price rises in the 
1970s which increased the prices of imports. In the 1980s, several programmes aimed to 
raise productivity, improve the quality of manufactured goods, secure exports and apply 
new management strategies based on decentralisation, democratic election of enterprise 
leaders, competition, and self-sufficiency. Reform failed, due to foreign debt preventing 
high technology imports, the need to export good quality domestic products, shortage of 
trained staff, reluctance to participate in reform and lack of trust. In 1985-7, other 
attempts at economic reform took place, involving self-management and economic 
planning119• 
The growth of the economy was much slower in the early 1980s, resulting in a decline of 
living standards and reduced access to quality goods, even domestically produced, which 
ultimately undermined public confidence. The gradual process of political opening up 
brought a sense of democratic achievement, as well as bitterness at the sight of the 
economic reality of Bulgaria compared to Western Europe. Some of the economic 
problems stemmed from poor agricultural production and resulted in a drastic price rise 
in 1984-85. Some authors125 believe that the oil shock of 1973 which affected Western 
Europe did not cause significant disruptions in the economy of Bulgaria. The effect may 
have occurred later, in the 1980s, when the Soviet Union adjusted favourable oil prices to 
world levels and began to sell oil to Central and Eastern European countries on the basis 
of a formula derived from OPEC prices119• The crises in the Soviet Union in the mid-
1980s forced Bulgaria to search for internal solutions to energy needs and to increase 
imports from the Middle East. Bulgaria built a nuclear power station at Kozlodui on the 
Danube and started building another. The result was a rise in costs and energy 
disruptions. These, and the overall economic stagnation, made 1985 the worst post-war 
year for overall economic performance. 
The economy of Bulgaria post 1989: General characteristics 
A mixture of internal and external pressures on the Bulgarian economy caused a 
succession of economic crises during the 1990s. After 1989, the income drop in Bulgaria 
was one of the highest in Central and Eastern Europe and larger than for Latin America 
after the 1982 debt crisis228 • Savings and household resources declined in a situation of 
high inflation. Industrial and agricultural output fell more than in any other Central and 
Eastern European country229 • Subsequently, food rationing was introduced due to severe 
shortages of flour, dairy products and other basic products. Bulgaria had been 
traditionally self-sufficient, and even exported surpluses of grain, yet, in the mid-1990s, 
the agricultural sector was in a critical situation and the country relied heavily on 
international aid for regular supplies of grain and other basic products. 
Part of this collapse could be explained by the 1991-92 attempt to implement 
comprehensive and rapid economic liberalisation ("big bang" approach), similar to 
Poland230 • In early 1991, a massive price liberalisation led to increases of about 700% in 
consumer goods' prices231 • There is agreement that the initial conditions in Bulgaria 
were relatively worse than in other Central and Eastern European countries, such as a 
lack of developed financial and fiscal institutions, the most centralised economy in 
Central and Eastern Europe, low confidence and bad debf32 226 • The "shock therapy" 
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programme in 1991-1994/5, included liberalisation of prices, removal of most barriers to 
foreign trade, abolition of central planning, revival of the private sector, restitution of 
land and urban property, and establishment of the basic institutions needed for 
development of monetary and fiscal policy. Despite the initial momentum, after 1992, 
the reforms slowed down. However, many of these achievements were based on an 
undervalued currency, energy subsidies, payment arrears and soft bank credits, and 
proved unsustainable. The reform policies of the early 1990s lacked consistency and 
continuity and implementation of key legislation has been delayed226 • 
In early 1997, the banking sector collapsed (one-third of all banks ceasing to operate), 
monthly inflation reached 311%223, the Lev was devalued, and GDP fell dramatically, 
causing a budgetary crisis, with loss of confidence in economic policy. This collapse 
was due to macroeconomic mismanagement, slow privatisation, a growing budget 
deficit, an unstable banking sector, and inadequate agricultural policies226 • The economic 
collapse led to a political crisis, the fall of the socialist government, and early elections in 
April 1997 which led to the accession of a democratic government committed to a 
decisive pro-reform policy. 
Among the causes of the crisis were the slow pace of reform in agriculture, specifically 
de-collectivisation, lack of capital investment and agricultural credit for private farms, 
and inadequate price and export regulations leading to cheap imports. All this led to 
decreased output and food shortages. In broader terms, the disproportionate fall in rural 
living standards in the 1980s, migration from rural regions, and lack of incentives for 
involvement in agricultural production contributed to these failures. 
The deterioration of the social security system during transition to a market economy led 
to impoverishment of a large part of the population. The percentage below the poverty 
threshold in Bulgaria was 20-25%, taking into account disposable incomes and property 
ownership233 • Different estimates suggested that two-thirds of the population were below 
the minimum living standard in 199423\ with growing numbers of those living in 
poverty. At the same time, the budget could not cope with demands for adjustment for 
inflation of pensions, salaries and unemployment benefits. International aid has been 
used to support the poorest, the elderly and disabled through earmarked benefits for 
heating, food and pharmaceutical bills. In this respect the social cost of transition has 
been high, borne by the Bulgarian population with minimal support. The National 
Statistical Institute estimated that real income per capita fell by 50% between 1989 and 
1995226• 
The collapse of the CMEA, in January 1991, caused an external demand shock in 
Bulgaria, possibly the largest in Central and Eastern Europe. This brought to an end the 
guaranteed trade exchange among the Central and Eastern European countries and 
artificial prices. Some bilateral agreements were re-instated in 1998. While the 
economies of Czechoslovakia and Poland were more self-sufficient, not least in energy 
needs, Bulgaria was heavily dependent on the FSU for imports of energy and as an outlet 
for low-quality goods. The fiscal crisis, a shortage of hard currency due to falling 
exports, and slow foreign investment, led to a budget deficit. 
The foreign debt of $10 billion (1997), and creditors' stricter demands for servicing of 
the debt, constituted another serious problem. Among Central and Eastern European 
countries Bulgaria is the only one to be classified by the World Bank as a "severely-
indebted middle-income economy", external debt being 104.8% of GNP in 1994 (debt 
above 80% of GNP has been considered critical)235 • Debt repayments were rescheduled 
in 1993 after an agreement with the "London Club" of western commercial-bank 
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creditors. However, in 1996 the external debt was 89% of GNP, one of the highest in 
Central and Eastern Europe236 • In 1997-98 additional loans were secured from the World 
Bank, the IMF and the European Union. Bulgaria had the lowest rate of foreign 
investment in Central and Eastern Europe229, due to an unfavourable political climate and 
lack of coherent economic reform. 
Important external factors that affected adversely the economy of Bulgaria were the UN 
sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro (1992-95), and on Iraq since the Gulf War. Former 
Yugoslavia, Iraq and Libya were important Bulgarian trade partners, and continue to owe 
large sums. The situation in former Yugoslavia led to disruption in trade between 
Bulgaria and the rest of Europe due to the need to substitute established rail and road 
routes via Serbia, and use alternative slower routes via Romania. By September 1994 the 
cost of sanctions was calculated at $2.71 billion221 • Transit agreements with the UN 
proved too complex to administer efficiently. Another impact of the sanctions has been 
to encourage criminal activities such as smuggling of goods and petrol from Bulgaria. 
For its energy needs, Bulgaria relies mainly on oil and naphtha imported from the FSU or 
the Middle East and processed in Bulgaria. The Gulf War halted the supply of oil from 
Iraq, turning Iraq into Bulgaria's largest debtor and thus increasing dependency on the 
FSU. This entailed shortages in household and industrial supplies. In 1997, agreement 
was reached with the FSU for crude oil supplies. Agreement with Iraq on the settling of 
debt through delivery of oil was achieved much later. The war in Kosovo has had a 
profound impact on Bulgaria through disruption of trade routes and a fall in foreign 
investment, but the scale of the loss is still to be assessed. 
Bulgaria faced serious shortages of power, because of problems with traditional 
suppliers, mainly the FSU, and frequent disruptions in the operations of the Kozloduy 
nuclear power station, which provides 40% of the power in Bulgaria. The European 
Union has expressed concerns about the safety of the Koz1oduy plant and restructuring of 
the energy sources of Bulgaria has been put forward as a major requirement for 
accession237 • 
In the 1990s, with the breakdown of traditional trading ties, Bulgaria sought new trading 
partners. In 1997, about half of the trade turnover was with OECD countries, mainly 
European Union countries214 • Despite contracting trade with Central and Eastern Europe 
and the Former Soviet Union, Russia remained the largest single partner, due to essential 
fuel exports to Bulgaria. 
Foreign investment in Bulgaria was among the lowest in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Between 1991 and 1996 it amounted to $831 million, with Germany being the largest 
investor223• The environment for investment was viewed as less hospitable than 
elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, mainly due to contradictory government 
policies; high inflation; unstable taxation rules, laws and contractual arrangements; and 
bureaucracy226 • 
In 1996, services made the highest contribution to GDP (54%). The share of industry 
remained important, at 31% of GDP, with the main sectors being machine building, 
metalworking, food processing, chemicals, textiles, and electronics. Slow reform in 
agriculture led to a lower share of GDP (11 %)223 • 
There was an urgent need for capital investment for energy supplies, infrastructure, and 
the social sector. For several years after 1989, negligence, corruption, and transfer of 
resources to private companies contributed to the deterioration of capital investment. 
Giant factories inherited from socialism continued to function although their products 
were expensive and non-competitive internationally. In many cases they were beyond 
402 
rescue by state subsidies but, for political reasons, could not be closed. Instead the 
socialist led or supported regimes had merely delayed the collapse of unprofitable 
enterprises by soft credits. A large part of the road and railway infrastructure 
deteriorated rapidly. Urban infrastructure remained in slightly better condition than the 
rural, due to centralised maintenance. Despite sufficient water reserves, probl ems wi th 
the supply system caused severe shortages and water rationing in many regions. During 
the winter of 1994-95, the population of Sofia had water for only 16 in every 72 hours. 
The breakdown in public hygiene, combined with other socio-economic fac tors, caused 
outbreaks of communicable diseases such as dysentery and salmonellosis, which were 
previously controlled. 
In 1997 Bulgaria's GNP was USD 1,140 per capita (Atlas methodology) or USD 3,860 
adjusted for purchasing power parity. This places Bulgaria under the average level of 
1,230 GNP per capita for the lower middle income economies238 (Table Al-l ). 
Table Al-l. GNP per capita: Atlas method and PPP estimates (1997) 
Source: World Development Report 1998/99. Knowledge for Development. The IBRD I The 
World Bank. Oxford University Press, 1999 
Ranking Country GNP per capita, Purchasing 
(WB Atlas method; Power Parity 
US dollars) (International 
dollars) 
High-income economies (average) 25,700 22,770 
Slovenia 9,680 12,520 
Upper middle~income e~o(lOI].ies, (average) 4,520 7,700 
Czech Republic 5,200 11 ,380 
Croatia 4,610 
Hungary 4,430 7,000 
Slovak Republic 3,700 7,850 
Poland 3,590 6,380 
Estonia 3,330 5,010 
Cower middle~ii1come economies (average) 1,230 3,760 
Russian Federation 2,740 4,190 
Latvia 2,430 3,650 
Lithuania 2,230 4,510 
Belarus 2,150 4,840 
Romania 1,420 4,290 
Bulgaria 1,140 3,860 
Macedonia, FYR 1,090 
Ukraine 1,040 2,170 
Low-income ecohomies (average) 350 1,400 
Albania 750 
Europe anp Central Asia (average) 2,320 4,390 
World (ave'rage) 5,130 6,330 
Contracting industrial output of state enterprises was among the fi: st sym~toms of 
economic transition. While in 1989 industrial output grew by 2.2%, m 1991 1t fe ll by 
27.8% and remained mostly negative (Figure Al-3)229 . Rapid decline in levels of 
industrial production immediately after transition was observed in m~st Central and 
Eastern European countries although later reversed, in contrast to Bulg~na where ~utp~t 
remained negative. According to other sources, the decline in industnal productiOn m 
Bulgaria after 1989 is even higher239 . The output collapse curtailed the tax base and the 
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abi.lity to collect tax rev~nue leading to a budget deficit. It should be noted that these 
estimates are based mamly on the industrial output of the state ente · 1 
· · f · . . rpnses, a arge 
maJonty o which almost ceased functwnmg for political reasons and lack of a lea· 1 t. · b · fl · · · . .:)S a 1 ve 
asis or pnvahsati.on. After 1991, It was the informal economy, mainly in trade, that 
accounted for the highest growth, as indicated by expenditure. However estimates show 
that since the introduction of a currency board in 1997, output may 'have increased, 
reaching about 6% in 1998237 • 
Figure Al-3. Industrial production growth rates (percentage rates of change) 
Source: TransMONEE database 3.0. UNICEF International Child Development Centre (!CDC) , 
Florence 
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GDP in constant prices also declined, the greatest declines being in 1991 ( -11. 7) and 
1996 ( -1 0.9)229, caused by the shocks of price liberalisation, collapse of industrial 
production, hyperinflation and the latent effects of recession in previous years, 
particularly the crises of 1990 and 1996-7 (Figure Al-4). GDP growth was achieved only 
in 1994 and 1995 (1.8% and 2.1% respectively). Similar strong declines of GDP were 
registered also in Romania, Russia and Ukraine239 . 
The informal economy also posed problems for Bulgaria. A sizeable informal economy 
is associated with loss of tax revenue through wide-spread tax evasion. According to 
National Statistical Institute (NSI) estimates, in 1997 the share of the 'shadow' economy 
was 17% of GDP, but limitations in the measurement instruments have cast doubt on this 
estimate. Some MPs argued that the informal economy reached 45-50% of GDP, 
although this was not supported by concrete evidence. These events led to the director of 
the National Statistical Institute being accused of manipulating figures, and dismissed, 
after a majority vote in the Parliamenf40 • World Bank experts have calculated the size of 
the informal sector based on data on labour participation and wages232 as two-thirds of 
the private sector contribution to GDP in 1993, even under the most conservative 
scenario. 94% (67.2% - in a conservative scenario) of the estimated operational surplus 
of the private sector in 1994 was from the informal sector of the Bulgarian economy and 
not taxed. Although most of the officially reported growth of the private sector was 
attributable to informal activities, the rate of investment remained low. More 
importantly, the wages were not as high as expected and most people working in the 
informal sector did not have social insurance, which may have serious implications for a 
universal compulsory insurance scheme. 
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Figure Al-4. GDP growth rates in constant prices (percentage rates of change) 
Source: TransMONEE database 3.0. UNICEF International Child Development Centre (/CDC), 
Florence 
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Officially registered unemployment was 13.7% of the labour force at the end of 1997214 . 
Total unemployment as a percentage of the labour force reached its highest level of 16% 
in 1993 and then fell slightly (Figure Al-5)229 • Other estimates point to higher rates, at 
21% (ILO), in 1993. The unemployment rate in Bulgaria in 1996 is comparable to the 
rates of Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The relatively high unemployment rate in 
Bulgaria could be explained partly by the weakening of the state sector and the slow 
take-off of the private sector241 • However, employment did not fall as sharply as 
industrial output, which caused a decrease in productivity and increase in production 
costs. The unemployment figures should not be taken at face value, because it is not 
clear how many of the registered unemployed are involved in the informal economy or 
whether all unemployed actually register237 • There is evidence that unemployment has 
affected disproportionately the Roma minority. For example, in Lorn, a town in north-
west Bulgaria with a large Roma community, over 95% of the Roma population were 
unemployed in 1997242 . 
Figure Al-5. Registered unemployment rate (annual average 0/o of labour force) 
Source: TransMONEE database 3.0. UNICEF International Child Development Centre (/CDC) , 
Florence 
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The government budget as a percentage of GDP in Bulgaria was the lowest (-14.7% 
budget deficit in 1992) of all the Central and Eastern European countries239 • Changing 
labour markets created high demands on the social security system for payment of 
benefits. Moreover the reduction of formally employed people (a drop of 47% in public 
employment), contributed to the growth of self-employment and, ultimately, the informal 
economy. 
There was a rapid growth in the number of registered private companies (from 14,000 in 
1989 to 200,000 in 1991) predominantly in the manufacturing sector (25%), services 
(24%) and the trade and retail sectors (15%), although a large proportion are not 
operational. During the 1990s, the take-off of the private sector has been generally 
slower than indicated by the above figures due to subsequent closure of companies, 
especially in manufacturing. The share of private activities increased significantly not 
only due to the establishment of new businesses and privatisation of state-owned assets, 
but also as a result of the decline in the output of the state sector243 • 70% employ fewer 
than 5 persons (app. 4.3% of the work force) and account for only 1% of the exports224 • 
More than 60% of the companies are sole proprietorships, because of tax concessions and 
the easier registration procedure. 60o/o of small businesses rely on their own resources, or 
informal loans, to start up and only 3% use bank loans. Real wages are set relatively low 
and the level of education and skill of the labour force is high. 
The mass privatisation of state enterprises in Bulgaria started in January 1996, but 
proceeded very slowly until 1997-98. However, some spontaneous privatisation, 
including criminal activities, without any compensation to the state, started immediately 
after 1989. Privatisation faced strong political opposition. Less than 1,000 enterprises 
were handled by the Agency for Privatisation in the period 1993-1996. Shares of 1,150 
enterprises were also transferred via voucher privatisation in the initial round of bidding 
at the end of 1996. Shares in the privatised enterprises have been reserved for cash 
privatisation, employee ownership and retention by the state243 • 
Especially sensitive, because of social implications, have been decisions to privatise very 
large or strategic enterprises. Large unprofitable state enterprises have been receiving 
resources from the state budget, which has been needed urgently elsewhere. On the other 
hand, the private sector prior to 1989 was marginal and mainly in services, with semi-
private agricultural enterprises. In contrast, in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, 
private entrepreneurship was relatively widespread during the socialist era. In addition, 
in Bulgaria there was scarcity of the credit needed to establish a private sector. Finally, 
legislation on foreign investment and other issues relevant to privatisation has been slow 
to appear. As a comparison, in the Czech Republic and Russia approximately two-thirds 
of aggregate output comes from enterprises in which the state no longer holds a majority 
stake. In Bulgaria and Ukraine the private share is estimated to be about 40%243 but, 
especially in Bulgaria, it is mainly small-scale privatisation in the retail, service, tourism, 
and shadow private sectors. 
In 1990, the government started restoring land and buildings to former owners or their 
descendants. De-nationalisation of land and industrial buildings proved very slow and 
administratively complex due to lack of consistent documentation, scattered plots and the 
large amount involved (98% of land was collectivised by 1958). The 'Privatisation 
Law', enacted in May 1992, aimed to transfer state assets to the private sector through 
sale of shares in state-owned enterprises to employees, at the highest possible price, with 
no reference to the social context of the vouchers. A law enabling purchase by foreign 
businesses is still under discussion due to fears that assets might be bought cheaply as 
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there are not enough Bulgarian businesses able and willing to buy shares and operate the 
large state enterprises. Privatisation involved high administrative costs. 
The Union of Democratic Forces government, elected in April 1997, introduced a 
stringent programme for macroeconomic stabilisation. It introduced a currency board 
(exchange rate of the Lev fully backed by foreign currency reserves), a plan for reform of 
the banking sector and other restrictive fiscal and monetary policies aimed at controlling 
inflation guaranteeing the stability of the currency. The currency board is the framework 
for comprehensive policies of fiscal and structural policy reform. 
The programme also involved completion of privatisation of land and the bulk of state-
run near-bankrupted enterprises in 1997-8. Until 1997, privatisation had been largely 
small-scale, in the service sectors, through restitution of urban property, and in many 
cases, through spontaneous private activity. Under an IMP supported privatisation 
programme, 40% of Bulgaria's state owned productive assets or 1,200 companies, a third 
of state industry by capital, was to be privatised in 1997 through both direct cash and 
mass voucher privatisations243 • 
Before the autumn of 1997, 1,050 companies had been privatised, 600 had a controlling 
stake transferred to individuals and 92 to registered investment funds. There have been 
some delays in privatisation of the large enterprises due to lack of offers and complex 
administrative procedures. Revenues from potential large-scale privatisation were 
viewed as critical in financing the state budget. Negotiations for privatisation of banks 
started in 1997. These policies, together with enforcement of relevant legislation, aimed 
to attract foreign capital investment and to create a favourable climate for private 
entrepreneurship. In general, privatisation was slower than expected and many of the 
large-scale sales had to be rescheduled due to unforeseen difficulties. 
Reform in Bulgaria has also been supported by the European Union PHARE programme. 
Between 1990-1997, Bulgaria received €605 million, or 8.5% of total PHARE funds for 
Central and Eastern Europe. The highest shares were spent on infrastructure (20%) and 
critical aid (14%). The Emergency Social Assistance Programme (1996-7) provided 
immediate assistance to 1.5 million poor or disadvantaged people during the crisis of 
early 1997. 
A European Union briefing from 1999 stated that macroeconomic stability had been 
achieved under the currency board regime, inflation and budget deficit targets had been 
met, and confidence in the currency restored237 • Since 1998, the main priorities for 
preparation for European Union accession have been institution building and support for 
structural reform, particularly acceleration of privatisation (mainly of large enterprises 
and banks). 
Demographic and health status 
Population distribution 
The total size of the population has been growing steadily from the beginning of the 
century until the 1990s, when this trend reversed {Figure Al-6). The shares of men and 
women are very similar, with the proportion of men declining only slightly. 
There were major changes in population distribution between urban and rural areas. 
Bulgaria has traditionally been an agricultural country, between 1900 and 1946 a large 
majority of the population (about 80%) was living in rural settlements {Figure Al-7). Yet 
the share of the urban population increased steadily between 1946 and 1997 from 25°/o to 
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almost 70%. The largest increases in the urban population occurred in the 1960s and in 
the 1970s as a result of mass migration from rural areas provoked by collectivisation of 
land, and a shift towards jobs in industry located mainly in or around towns. Accelerated 
migration from rural to urban areas was a response to labour shortages in industry and 
state incentives to attract labour, as well as improved living standards in towns at the 
time. Urban and rural population almost equalised in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
After 1970, the migration from rural to urban areas has slowed considerably. At that 
time overpopulation in big towns became a fact and the state enacted regulations 
prohibiting free migration of people and requiring residence permits. Between 1990 and 
1996 there was a net migration from urban to rural areas, for economic reasons, but it is 
unlikely that this trend will produce major changes in rural-urban distribution. 
The official religion of Bulgaria is Orthodox Christianity, the official languages are 
Bulgarian and Turkish. Estimates of the size of the minority populations in Bulgaria 
have been highly politicised and unreliable. Ethnic groups in Bulgaria have not been 
officially recorded since the 1956 Census, in which Bulgarians constituted approximately 
90% of the population, and the remaining 10% were predominantly Ethnic Turks119 • The 
Ethnic Turks or Bulgaro-Muslims, were estimated at 8.3% of the population in 199224\ 
with other estimates at 10%223 • The Roma population was estimated to be 2.6% in 
199224\ with alternative estimates between 3-5% and 8%, the latter supported by human 
rights activists245 • Under-representation of these ethnic minorities as stakeholders must 
impact on their access and use of social services, and in particular, health care. 
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Figure Al-6. Population of Bulgaria by sex 
Sources: Public Health Statistics Annual: Bulgaria 1992-96. National Centre of Health 
Information, Ministry of Health, Sofia, 1993-97 
The National Statistical Institute. Statistical Reference Book 1998. Sofia: Statistical Publishing 
House, 1998 
Panev A. Development and character of the health care in Bulgaria. Sofia, 1947 
Lampe J R. The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century. Croom Helm, 1986 
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Births, deaths and natural growth 
Since the beginning of the 20th century, the birth rate has declined consistently (Figure 
A1-4; Table A1-2). Between 1990 and 1950, the lowest birth rates were during the First 
and Second World War (in 1916-1920 and in the 1940s) as well as in the late 1930s 
when the economic situation worsened246 • Lampe125 calculates that the decline started 
early in this century and that the decrease in overall population growth was due mainly to 
the lowered birth rates in the rural areas: from 42 per 1,000 in 1906-10, the highest pre-
war birth rate in the Balkans, to 33 per 1,000 in 1926-30; and to 23 per 1,000 by 1936-
40. He interprets this as a response to periods of worsening economic conditions. 
Mcintyre points that the sharp decline and low levels of fertility in the 20th century were 
based on radical reductions in marital fertility, which is not consistent with the general 
European pattern119• Fertility control by married couples in circumstances where there 
was a high prevalence of marriage may be explained by economic difficulties, such as 
insufficient agricultural land and rural poverty, low living standards, education, and 
modernisation as well as the inheritance of a specific pattern of extended household 
organisation (Zadrugan). The observation of low fertility in a mainly agrarian society 
appears surprising since other evidence shows that it is the transition to modernisation 
that causes similar low fertility. Since 1940, the annual percentage change in birth rate 
has been positive only in the 1950s and in the 1960s. The former represents a post-war 
peak, as in all European countries, and the latter came as result of general improvement 
of living standards in Bulgaria. After 1990, the birth rate declined even faster, with an 
average of -5.6% annually. 
Figure A1-8. Live births, deaths and natural growth (1900-1997) 
Sources: same as in Table 2 
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Table A1-2. Live births, deaths and natural growth in Bulgaria 
So~rces: ~~blic Health Statistics Annual: Bulgaria 1992-96. National Centre of Health 
R /~formation, Mmlstry of H_ealth, ~o?a, 1993-97; The National Statistical Institute. Statistical 
e erence Book 1998. So_fla: Stat1st1cal Publishing House, 1 998; Panev A. Development and 
character of the health care m Bulgaria Sofia 1947· Lampe J R Th B 1 · E · 
· , , . e u ganan conomy m the 
Twentieth Century. Croom Helm, 1986 
Year Live Births Deaths per Natural Growth Infant Mortality per 
per 1,000 1,000 per 1,000 1,000 live births 
1881 33.7 nla nla nla 
1898 39.5 nla n/a 142.0 
1900 42.2 22.5 19.7 131.0 
1901-1905 40.7 22.5 18.2 143.0 
1906-1910 42.1 23.8 18.3 n/a 
1911-1915 38.6 22.3 16.3 n/a 
1916-1920 26.6 23.1 3.5 n/a 
1921-1925 39.0 20.8 18.2 156.6 
1926-1930 33.1 17.9 15.2 146.5 
1931-1935 29.3 15.5 13.8 142.0 
1936-1940 23.3 13.7 9.6 132.3 
1941-1945 22.1 13.5 8.1 128.1 
1940 22.2 13.4 8.8 n/a 
1950 25.2 10.2 15.0 nla 
1960 17.8 8.1 9.7 45.1 
1970 16.3 9.1 7.2 27.3 
1975 16.6 10.3 6.3 23.1 
1980 14.5 11.1 3.4 20.2 
1985 13.3 12.0 1.3 15.4 
1990 12.1 12.5 -0.4 14.8 
1991 11.1 12.8 -1.7 16.9 
1993 10.0 12.9 -2.9 15.5 
1995 8.6 13.6 -5.0 14.8 
1997 7.7 14.7 -7.0 17.5 
In general, the crude mortality rate has been declining since the beginning of the 20th 
century, peaking during the First World War. Mortality reached its lowest level in the 
1960s (8.1 per 1,000), probably reflecting the post-war improvement in living conditions, 
and widespread public health interventions undertaken at the end of 1940 and in the 
1950s. Since 1965 the death rate has grown steadily until the present. The highest 
average annual increases in mortality were registered in the 1970s and in the 1990s. The 
reasons for the increase in the death rate since the 1960s have not been studied 
specifically in Bulgaria but this was a phenomenon common to the Central and Eastern 
European countries and detailed analysis has been undertaken of the situation in several 
other countries, such as Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia247 • There, death rates rose 
most among young and early middle aged men, especially those who were unmarried248 • 
Mortality rates in the transition period, especially since 1992 (2.2% average annual 
increase) are much higher than those in the West, above the CEE average, and unlike the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, have not improved since the transition. In the 
1990s, male mortality increased at one of the highest annual rates registered in Bulgaria, 
while female mortality has stagnated since the beginning of the 1990s, lagging behind 
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CEE levels, and far behind the EU average166• This seems likely to be related to economic 
and social problems, but more research in Bulgaria is needed. 
These increases are, in fact, somewhat obscured if only overall mortality is examined, as 
there was a steady improvement in infant mortality. The causes contributing to the rises 
in mortality were largely cardiovascular disease and accidents, and evidence from other 
countries in the region show that social exclusion, alcohol, tobacco, poor nutrition and 
lax enforcement of safety legislation are likely to be particularly important factors. 
As a consequence of the falling birth rate, combined with rising mortality described 
above, natural population growth declined between 1930 and 1940, but recovered in the 
1950s (15 per 1,000) and in the 1960s (9.7 per 1,000). Following stabilisation in 1965-
70s, the natural population growth declined consistently. The slow population growth 
and low fertility levels were not considered a problem by the communist government 
until 1956-1960, triggered by concerns about labour shortages. In the 1960s, the 
government introduced positive (economic incentives) and negative measures (restriction 
on abortions) to raise the fertility level, but these had little effect119• These were 
combined with efforts to raise productivity since the mid-1960s. By the 1980s, the issue 
was regarded as a serious threat to future economic growth and a comprehensive state 
policy was formulated including not only more restrictions on abortions, but also family 
allowance payments, enhanced maternity leave, and other benefits. 
Since 1990, for the first time in this century, population growth has been consistently 
negative. Importantly, in the 1990s, the pace of decline of the natural population growth 
accelerated. Between 1990 and 1997, the average population growth was -4 per 1,000, 
compared to an average growth of6 per 1,000 in 1950-90. 
The overall negative growth obscures the rural-urban differences, growth in the villages 
contributing most of the decline. Thus in 1997, the negative growth was -3.7 per 1,000 
in urban and -13.9 per 1,000 in rural settings, with the average being -7244 • It is apparent 
that the demographic situation in the rural areas is much more catastrophic, with 
problems such as rural depopulation, ageing and thus, higher burden of disease, 
particularly cardio-vascular mortality21 \ and has implications for the regional structure of 
health financing. This negative population growth, since 1990, has been attributed to the 
combined effect of long-term trends in birth and mortality rates249 • Several waves of 
emigration of younger people, and other factors related to transition, which might have 
contributed, have not been examined in Bulgaria. 
Age-specific causes of death 
Cardiovascular diseases are the main cause of death in the Bulgarian population and their 
relative share of total mortality has increased constantly, accounting for 63.6% of all 
deaths in 1994250 • Mortality from cardiovascular diseases among males in Bulgaria is 
among the highest in Europe166, above the CEE average and diverging further from the 
EU, where rates are declining steadily. Mortality from neoplasms has increased to be the 
second major cause of death, accounting for 14.1% of all deaths in 1995. 
When considering the age-specific causes of death, cardiovascular diseases are the main 
cause of death among those above the age of 35, particularly among men (Table Al-3). 
In the 0-14 age groups, the main causes of death are congenital anomalies, co~~iti?ns 
originating in the perinatal period, and respiratory diseases, followed clo~e~y ~y mJunes. 
The main causes of male and female mortality in the 15-34 age group are mJunes. 
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Table A1-3. Age-specific death rates per 100,000 population: main causes (1994) 
Source: estimates based on Health for All Data Base. European Region. World Health 
Main causes of death 
(Males) 
0-14 
Congenital anomalies 
Conditions originating in the 
perinatal period 
Respiratory diseases 
Accidents 
Other 
Total 
15-34 
Accidents 
Cardiovascular diseases 
Cancer 
Other 
Total 
35-64 
Cardiovascular diseases 
Cancer 
Accidents 
Other 
Total 
65+ 
Cardiovascular diseases 
Cancer 
Respiratory diseases 
Other 
Total 
Overall mortality rate 
Mortality 
rate 
0.29 
0.29 
0.27 
0.26 
0.38 
1.49 
0.92 
0.23 
0.15 
0.30 
1.60 
5.75 
2.73 
1.39 
2.38 
12.27 
49.31 
9.31 
4.01 
9.86 
72.49 
15.02 
Organisation, Regional Office for Europe, June 1999 
Main causes of death Mortality 
(Females) rate 
0-14 
Congenital anomalies 0.27 
Respiratory diseases 0.23 
Conditions originating in the 0.23 
perinatal period 
Accidents 0.12 
Other 0.31 
Total 1.16 
15-34 
Accidents 0.21 
Cardiovascular diseases 0.16 
Cancer 0.12 
Other 0.11 
Total 0.61 
35-64 
Cardiovascular diseases 2.65 
Cancer 1.59 
Accidents 0.30 
Other 0.37 
Total 4.91 
65+ 
Cardiovascular diseases 45.45 
Cancer 5.24 
Signs, symptoms and ill- 3.72 
defined conditions 
Other 2.23 
Total 56.64 
Overall mortality rate 11.52 
Since the 1980s, standardised death rates from circulatory diseases per 100,000 
population have increased sharply above the CEE average, in contrast to declining rates 
in the EU (Figure A1-9). The increase is less marked among women, but the level 
remains two and a half times higher than the EU rates. The death rate from cancer 
remains below the EU and CEE averages, although some increase in male deaths (35-64) 
from cancer has been observed in the 1990s (Figure A1-10). While in the EU deaths 
from injuries have declined steadily, the opposite trend was registered in Bulgaria, 
though the death rate from injuries remains below the CEE average (Figure A1-11). 
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Figure A1-9. SDR circulatory diseases, all age/100,000 (male/female) 
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Source: Estimate based on Health for All Data Base. European Region. World Health 
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Figure A1-10. SDR Malignant neoplasms, all ages/100,000 (male/female) 
Source: same as above 
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Figure A1-11. SDR Injuries, all ages/100,000 (male/female) 
Source: same as above 
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Age-specific trends in mortality show differences which are concealed by the total rates. 
Since the second half of the 1980s, the age-adjusted mortality from cardiovascular 
diseases among men above 65 has started to fall, while that of the 35-64 group grew 
most. Among women, mortality from cardiovascular disease fell in all age groups. In 
1980-1994 the mortality rate from cancer (all ages) also increased among men, by the 
most in the 35-64 age group, remaining almost constant among women. Deaths from 
injuries for men and women increased in the 1990s among those between the ages of 15 
and 64, with male deaths from injuries rising steeply above the EU levels. There are a 
few positive changes, for example, female mortality rate from respiratory diseases has 
fallen dramatically since mid-1980s, and halved in the over 65 age group. However, in 
1994, it still was the third most important cause of death for men. 
Infant mortality rates show a significant improvement throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
with rates notably lower than the CEE average. While in 1989-1994 infant mortality 
rates continued to fall in the West and in CEE, Bulgaria and Albania were the only 
countries where infant mortality increased. By 1994, Bulgaria had the third highest 
infant mortality rate in Central and Eastern Europe, after Albania and Romania. 
The trends in maternal deaths per 100,000 live births were closer to the Western 
European than the CEE average. There was some increase in maternal mortality in the 
early 1980s, but in the 1990s it continued to fall. 
Although the factors responsible for the deterioration in adult mortality are still poorly 
understood, one factor was the failure to sustain the gains in health status achieved in the 
1950s and 1960s. The emphasis on prevention in government regulations did not 
translate into an efficient system of health promotion, with co-ordinated strategies 
against unhealthy lifestyles and the effects of alcohol, diet and smoking. Even in areas 
where there had been significant successes, such as childhood immunisation, 
deterioration was seen during the mid-1990s when shortages were at their worst. This 
may have affected ethnic minorities to a larger extent but no official data are available. 
One reason for the drop in vaccination levels was the need to import vaccines131 • In one 
region, polio immunisation of the Roma population was halted, due to shortage of 
vaccines, and resumed only after the arrival of foreign aid. 
There are several newly emerging challenges for the Bulgarian health system in the 
1990s, such as the rise in reported cases of tuberculosis, STDs and other communicable 
diseases. While in the 1990s the incidence of tuberculosis in the West continued to 
decline, in Bulgaria the number of new cases has increased (Figure Al-12). The 
incidence of syphilis also increased in the 1990s, in contrast with the EU and CEE 
figures which remained stable. 
There was inadequate information on whether the system was responding to need and on 
the quality of care provided, especially for rural areas. Socio-economic problems after 
1980, and especially after the start of the economic transition in 1989, were associated 
with a dramatic fall in the birth rate which, in the presence of a rising death rate, caused 
negative population growth. The absence of family planning facilities together with 
socio-economic factors in the early 1990s, contributed towards one of the highest 
abortion rates in Europe. Only 23% of women of childbearing age used contraceptives in 
1992-94131 • 
In addition, some sources have suggested that environmental pollution, consequent on 
obsolete technologies, might have imposed a threat to the health of the population in 
certain areas of the country13, although there is no conclusive evidence for this and 
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pollution levels have decreased due to de-industrialisation at a time when adult death 
rates have continued to rise. 
Figure A1-12. Tuberculosis incidence I syphilis incidence (cases per 100,000) 
Source: Health for All Data Base. European Region. World Health Organisation, Regional Office 
for Europe, June 1999 
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As with other demographic indicators, life-expectancy improved dramatically in the post-
war years. Between the late 1950s and the early 1970s, life-expectancy at birth achieved 
an unprecedented increase of 17.6 years for men and 21.3 years for women. The life-
expectancy patterns are notably different for men and women (Figure A1-13). Although 
there is a growing body of research on trends in mortality in neighbouring countries, the 
reasons have not been studied in Bulgaria. The peak in male life expectancy in Bulgaria 
was reached in early 1970s, when it almost converged with the EU average and was 
higher than the Central and Eastern Europe average. While in the West male life-
expectancy improved steadily, in Bulgaria it stagnated through the 1970s and 1980s, 
although it was always much higher than in the Soviet Union. 
In the 1990s, male life-expectancy experienced a decline, in 1994 reaching levels seen in 
the 1960s. Between 1989-91 and 1995-97, it fell from 71.2 to 70.4 years, lagging 
significantly behind western European levels, although not comparable to the massive 
drop observed in Russia. Female life expectancy remained constant throughout the 
1970s, and has improved only slightly since. It did not decline in the 1990s, as did male 
life-expectancy, but still remained below the CEE average and at much lower levels than 
Western Europe. It should be noted that a composite measure such as life-expectancy at 
birth obscures the scale of the problem as continuing improvements in infant mortality 
counterbalanced a marked deterioration in adult mortality. The failure to improve life-
expectancy at birth, in Bulgaria after 1989, has not been systematically explored. 
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Figure A1-13. Life expectancy at birth in Bulgaria (male/ female) 
Source: Health for All Data Base. European Region. World Health Organisation, Regional Office 
for Europe, June 1999 
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The Bulgarian population is ageing, as are most other Central and Eastern European 
countries, creating economic and social problems {Figure A1-14). Between 1965 and 
1997 the 0-14 age group fell by 30% overall (-1.5% annually), the share of over 60 
increased by 64% (1.5% annual growth), while the 15-59 group remained relatively 
stable over the same period. In 1997, 22% of the population was over 60. 
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Figure A1-14. Age structure of the population in Bulgaria (percentages) 
Sources: Public Health Statistics Annual, National Centre of Health Information, Ministry of 
Health, 1996, Sofia, Bulgaria 
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There are significant differences in age distribution in rural and urban areas (Table A1-4). 
Between 1970-1997, the share from the 15-59 age group remained relatively stable with 
only small decreases (-2.7% in urban and -6.8% in rural areas). The share from the 0-14 
age group fell more quickly in rural areas (by a total of -33.3% in 1970-1997) compared 
to a fall of 20.9% in the urban population, caused mainly by much lower birth rates and 
migration to towns. In 1997, the age group over 60 was about 32% of the rural, and 17% 
of the urban population. Clearly migration of younger generations to urban areas and 
abroad is a very strong factor contributing to ageing of the population in rural areas. 
However, it should be noted that between 1970 and 1997, the share of the population 
over 60 grew slightly faster in the cities (total growth of 61.8%; 1.8% annually) than in 
the small towns and villages (a total growth of 58.1 %; 1.6% annually). This might have 
been a consequence of past migration waves. Over the same period, the average annual 
pace of change in rural and urban areas has been similar in all age groups. 
Table A1-4. Age structure of the population in Bulgaria (percentages) 
Source: Public Health Statistics Annual, National Centre of Health Information, Ministry of Health, 
1996, Sofia, Bulgaria 
year Total population Urban population Rural population 
0-14 15-59 60+ 0-14 15-59 60+ 0-14 15-59 60+ 
1965 23.9 62.9 13.2 n!a nla nla N/a n!a n!a 
1970 22.7 62.4 14.9 21.7 68.0 10.3 23.8 56.0 20.2 
1975 22.3 61.6 16.1 22.6 65.9 11.5 21.7 55.7 22.6 
1980 22.1 62.0 15.9 22.9 66.0 11.1 20.8 55.4 23.8 
1985 21.5 60.8 17.7 22.8 64.1 13.1 19.1 54.8 26.1 
1990 20.1 60.3 19.6 21.2 63.8 15.0 17.9 53.1 29.0 
1993 18.6 60.6 20.8 19.3 64.6 16.1 17.1 52.4 30.5 
1995 17.7 61.0 21.3 18.2 65.1 16.7 16.5 52.3 31.2 
1997 16.8 61.7 21.6 17.2 66.2 16.7 15.9 52.2 31.9 
The dependency ratio (ratio of non-working age to working age population) was 0.68 in 
1996229 • Estimates based on data from the National Statistical Institute show that it may 
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have been 0.74 in 1997, with higher values in rural populations0 • 15% of men and 29% 
of women are of pensionable age (60 and 55 years respectively). However, 29% of the 
population receives pensions, including social, disability or other type of pensions. The 
pensioners are the bottom end of the income distribution, with the average pension 27% 
of the average salary in 1997214 • In effect, most pensioners are unable to pay for health 
care whether in tax, insurance premiums or user fees, and will need coverage by the state. 
Recent changes in marital status also may affect equity. The crude marriage rate per 
1,000 fell by half between 1985 and 1997, one of the highest drops in Central and 
Eastern Europe, with the exception of the Baltic states and former east Germany229 • 
Between 1992 and 1997, the proportion of those over 15 who were married declined 
from 74% to 61%. There is evidence from the early 1990s that household size is not 
related to being in poverty in Bulgaria92 • However, due to sharing of resources within 
extended households, those who are divorced, single or living alone, in general are in a 
more vulnerable position and more likely to be faced with financial barriers to health 
care. 
In summary, it is important that the specific demographic and health characteristics and 
trends in Bulgaria are taken into consideration when assessing the applicability of health 
care financing solutions. 
Income distribution 
After the liberation from Ottoman occupation at the end of the nineteenth century, 
Bulgarian society was relatively homogenous in terms of income and status divisions221 • 
The old aristocracy disappeared and a new elite was slow to appear. A higher income 
class started to emerge among those engaged in trade and land cultivation, but income 
and social stratification developed slowly. Much employment was based on extended 
family and social networks. This was reinforced by conservative traditions in the 
agricultural society. Many of the land-owners worked on their own land. In towns, 
manufacturing guilds were created, based on a rigid hierarchy, but their organisation was 
based more on collective responsibility and mutual help, than on purely economic 
principles. Formation of a wealthy elite involved in large-scale industry in the 1920s was 
interrupted by the communist accession to power in 1944. 
Bulgaria remained an agrarian economy through the first half of this century, and private 
ownership of land could be used as a proxy measure for income distribution in the years 
before 1944 (Table Al-5). By the tum of the century, the majority of private holdings 
were typically small, scattered and fragmented119• The absence of modernisation in 
agriculture resulted in widespread rural poverty. By the end of the nineteenth century the 
ownership of private land was relatively evenly distributed, with only 10% of the 
population owning more than 50 hectares of land. Roughly half of the landowners had 
less than 1 0 hectares. Consolidation was slow to develop despite the fact that the 
holdings were often divided into scattered plots, or away from the villages or too small to 
produce a surplus that could be sold. In the 1920s, the predominance of smaller plots 
was reinforced by the Agrarian Party's policy of radical land reform, which restricted the 
size of the holding which one peasant household could work. Maximum ownership 
allowances for certain types of land were specified and families possessing under 1 
hectare were provided with land. As a result of land redistribution, the percentage of 
0 The official figure for Bulgaria is 0.48, with 0.40 in towns and 0.67 in villages (1997), but 
details on methodology are not provided 
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private plots over 30 hectares decreased at the expense of categories with lower holdings. 
Although the programme had certain equalising effects in terms of ownership, it did not 
promote the consolidation of existing holdings because the redistributed land was 
scattered. These policies were largely retained after the fascist coup and demise of the 
government in 1923. 
Table A1-5. Distribution of private land by year (percentage of the land) 
Sources: Lampe J R, The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century, Croom Helm, 1986; 
Lampe J R, Jackson M R, Balkan Economic History, 1550-1950, 1982, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington 
1897 1908 1926 1934 
under 5 ha 22.0% 23.8% 23.6% 30.0% 
5-10 ha 26.6% 29.4% 34.5% 36.5% 
10-20 26.4% 26.6% n/a n/a 
20-50 14.7% 13.4% n/a n/a 
10-30 ha n/a n/a 36.6% n/a 
over 30 ha n/a 14.3% 5.3% n/a 
over 50 10.0% 6.8% n/a n/a 
The communist regime built on pre-ex1stmg egalitarian traditions. A form of co-
operative was introduced by the Agrarian Party in the 1920s. Egalitarian orientation, 
mutual help and voluntary participation in community initiatives were perceived as 
qualities of the Bulgarian national character since the National Revival (Renaissance)251 • 
As discussed elsewhere, the state has been a stakeholder in the economy since the 1878 
liberation. Under communist governments, state intervention expanded into all spheres 
of social life. A lack of visible social, economic and occupational divisions promoted a 
general sense of equality. Comparison of Bulgaria and Greece in the mid-1970s shows 
that the ratio of household income of the 95th income percentile to the 5th percentile was 
11:1 in Greece and only 5:1 in Bulgaria198• This and other research suggest that the 
income structure in Bulgaria under the communist regime was generally flat and 
uniform. There were marginal income differences between the white collar, blue collar 
and agricultural workers but this effect was neutralised through transfers within extended 
households. The rural and urban areas were equalised in terms of basic living standards 
although many consumer services and the choice of products varied between regions. 
Yet the nationalisation of economic activities, unparalleled in Central and Eastern 
Europe led to the opposite effect. Research shows that it alienated large sectors of the 
population, reduced participation in state and community life and led to withdrawal into 
the family216 • 
Values and norms, concerning socio-economic divisions have far-reaching consequences 
for the compliance of users with any financing of a health system. The curtailing of 
private activities and private ownership of land have inhibited the development of civil 
society and personal responsibility as well as entrepreneurial attitudes. These 
circumstances do not provide a strong basis for acceptance of a model based mainly on 
voluntary insurance. On the contrary, solidarity and mutual help, especially cost-sharing 
in extended families, has been rooted in the culture of the society. However, after 1944, 
these values were emptied of their content. 
After 1989, the previously egalitarian wealth distribution was reversed due to effects of 
macroeconomic restructuring and lack of policies neutralising its social effect. Income 
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polarisation and the diminishing sense of social security led to a resurgence of attitudes 
supporting collective forms of provision. In the first years of transition it was shown that 
income inequality was low compared to other lower middle income economies, with Gini 
coefficient at 0.26 (1992), although comparisons of the bottom 40% to top 20% suggest a 
higher income discrepancy92 • The Human Development Report also demonstrated that 
the richest 10% of the population received 24% of the total resources, while the poorest 
10% received about 3% in 1995234 • In the light of these findings, the officially promoted 
social insurance model based on solidarity may not be unambiguously consistent with 
current societal values and preferences. Further research is needed to determine which 
socio-economic groups would support introduction of this model. 
Bulgaria among other countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
The Central and Eastern European countries, in political terms, were seen as 
indistinguishable during the Cold War. Soviet policies most often addressed the region 
as a whole. Their economic, cultural and historical differences were poorly understood 
in the West, since they displayed uniform policies, common ideology, institutions and 
values. 
After the democratic transformation throughout the region, beginning in 1989, hidden 
differences were quick to emerge. This process had started earlier, with the revolts in 
East Germany in 1953, in Hungary and Poland in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and 
in Poland in 1980, which demonstrated different attitudes. In the course of the 1990s, the 
differences, contradictions, and national specificities showed a new division in Europe. 
Central Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia) and the Baltic states 
drifted apart from Eastern Europe, politically and economically, towards western Europe. 
This group of countries diverged from the rest of Central and Eastern Europe in the speed 
and scope of economic and political reforms, degree of privatisation, and commitment to 
reform. Moreover, there is a view that the central European countries, "from an older 
historical perspective" 252 have experienced a process of cultural, historical and 
geopolitical identification with deeply rooted values of Western European civilisation, 
and have moved away from the rest of the former socialist partners216 • This coincided 
with a reduction of Soviet influence. The financial and political support these countries 
received from Western Europe (an example being rapid NATO membership for Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic253, and a fast-track procedure for European Union 
accession) was due to economic factors but also to "values and shared historical 
experience"25\ cultural compatibility, and being part of a European Union member's 
"traditional sphere of influence"255 • 
Bulgaria received less favourable treatment in Europe. It was categorised with Romania, 
the FSU, Macedonia and Albania as lagging behind in its economic recovery, reluctantly 
abolishing socialism and slow to accept European democratic values and institutions. 
There was a lack of support for radical reform from the electorates. One of the important 
differences was the pace of privatisation. While Russia achieved rapid privatisation of 
above 70% of all productive enterprises243, and in the Czech Republic large numbers of 
state-owned enterprises were privati sed via a voucher scheme, the pace of privatisation in 
Bulgaria was far slower (see previous section). Politically, the possibility of being 
integrated with Western European structures such as NATO was remote before the 
elections in 1997. Until 1996-1997, Bulgaria was not welcomed by the European Union 
in terms of business investments, promotion and aid. Investment, training, building 
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democratic institutions, and exchange of knowledge of democratic structures was small-
scale and sporadic. 
For Bulgaria, this situation started to change in 1997 when international support for 
reform took the form of loans and partnership projects, outpacing the earlier 
humanitarian aid and mechanical imports of know-how from the industrialised countries. 
Although Bulgaria has been a member of the 'Partnership for peace' initiative since 
1994, its formal application for NATO membership was not submitted until 1997. 
Bulgaria has had an Association Agreement with the European Union since 1994 and 
formally applied for full membership in 1995, but progress in negotiation prior to 1997 
was slow. It was recognised that what is likely to work more effectively is an 'equal 
democratic partnership ' 3 and an exchange of information and experience between Eastern 
and Western Europe. 
It has been argued that there are several reasons why the situation in Bulgaria was 
especially unfavourable towards the development of a pluralist society. Emergence of 
civil society was obstructed by the systematic extermination of the elite in the post-
World War decade and the total political control exercised by the Communist party and 
police forces. Most observers agree that the early consolidation of power of the 
Bulgarian Communist Party "was the most brutal in post-war Eastern Europe"119• There 
were strikes by Plovdiv tobacco workers in 1953, but they lacked strong leadership and 
were easily suppressed. In other Central and Eastern European countries, institutions 
such as the church, labour unions, and other civil society organisations retained a degree 
of independence from the state. For example, in Poland the church provided an 
alternative philosophy, in Bulgaria it was fully suppressed and attendance was punished. 
The Bulgarian communist party functioned as a mass party, enrolling one of the highest 
proportions of the population of any ruling communist party in Central and Eastern 
Europe119• 
The existing middle class has been eliminated gradually and all potential for 
entrepreneurial activities removed. While in Poland farming remained wholly private88 , 
by 1958 Bulgarian agriculture was fully nationalised following the Soviet example. A 
number of small-scale private businesses were preserved across Central and Eastern 
Europe, most notably in Hungary, in Bulgaria, such activities were driven underground. 
In Bulgaria the transition to central planning was facilitated by government involvement 
in economic life which had increased since the beginning of the century; undeveloped 
agriculture; and the existing egalitarian pattern of landholding; all of which gave the 
landowners less motive to resist collectivisation119• 
Compared to the 1920 and the 1930s, the economic achievement of the regime in raising 
living standards was undeniable. Soviet type institutions worked relatively well for 
Bulgaria, producing rates of economic growth and structural change that are among the 
highest in the world for most of the period from 1945 to 1975119• Crompton notes that 
" ... at least in the years up to about 1970, the regime, quite literally, delivered the 
goods"221 • A survey conducted in the 1970s indicated optimism about a range of topics 
such as economic conditions, social mobility, expectations for the future, and quality of 
health care. The high satisfaction with the way of living was explained by more subtle 
forms of control during that period, stable improvement of living standards, and 
egalitarian policies198 • 
Historically, Bulgaria does not have the pattern of popular anti-Russian or anti-Soviet 
opinion seen in other Central and Eastern European countries. Traditionally, Russia has 
been seen as a liberator, in particular because of its role against the Ottomans. Links 
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with Russia have been of central importance to the establishment of the modem 
Bulgarian state (1908) and for economic exchange in 1940-1990. Although the 
Bulgarian Communist Party was formed on Leninist principles prior to 1917, it never 
received wide-spread support prior to 1944. On the other hand the BCP came to power 
in a society where, with few exceptions, anti-communism was not a well-rooted popular 
political ideology1 19• Other authors explain the passivity of Bulgaria before 1989 by 
national characteristics such as the legacy of the Bogomil movementP, preaching 
withdrawal in the personal sphere and rejection of any political activity221 • These remain 
debatable. 
P The Bogomil movement was a widespread heresy in twelfth century ~ulgaria which 
condemned all worldly activities as evil and preached asceticism, equality among people and 
withdrawal into rural communities 
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APPENDIX 2. THE BULGARIAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: 
HISTORY, CHARACTERISTICS AND REFORM (1989-1999) 
This chapter examines the health system in Bulgaria, including its historical 
development, organisational features, structure, and the reforms it has undergone since 
1989. The analysis will broadly adhere to the framework developed to describe health 
systems by WHO for the Health Care in Transition (HiT) reports. The health status of 
the population will also be discussed. In the light of the objectives of the current 
research, more attention will be given to the finance side of the health system, current 
situation and reform trends being considered in detail. 
Historical background 
Establishment of the health care sector before 1944 
During the Ottoman domination (1396-1878), there were three parallel strands of health 
care provision in Bulgaria. The Ottoman Sanitary Administration introduced "town 
doctors" and quarantine services to control plague and other epidemics256, but these were 
far from satisfying the needs of the population. There were also attempts by more 
progressive Turkish officials to organise health services for the populations for which 
they were responsibleq. 
The second strand arose in the early 19th century, when enlightened Bulgarian 
communities, influenced by the National Revival movement, endeavoured to organise 
their own health care provision and establish secular primary schooling. Those 
Bulgarian towns which were more developed culturally and economically, and which had 
greater autonomy, took the initiative to appoint a "town doctor" (on a subscription basis) 
to serve the Bulgarian population256 • This was subsidised by municipal resources and by 
charity. Funds were raised at community and village levels also, with the better-off 
giving a higher share of their income. These practices were based on a tradition of 
mutual help and solidarity. The funds covered recurrent costs such as basic materials, 
physicians' salaries and treatment of the poor, on a one-off basis. Most often, payment 
to physicians was as fee-for service, in cash or in kind, including exchange of services. 
In cases of inability to pay, patients had to use savings, take a loan from a professional 
money-lender or receive help from extended families and networks. 
The third strand arose in the second half of the 19th century when some social and health 
insurance policies were offered, mainly by Western firms. They were attracted by large 
markets in the Ottoman Empire for the outputs of European industry, availability of raw 
materials and cheap labour, and concessions for building, mining, and industry227 • 
While industrial workers' movements were active in claiming social protection in 
Western Europe, hired labour in the Bulgarian territories consisted of poverty-stricken 
peasants, former artisans and apprentices, who were not experienced in protecting 
collective interests. It was the firms themselves, aiming to manage the staff efficiently, 
which established some basic health care activities and organised social insurance. Free 
q In 1865, Mithad Pasha, who ruled the Dunav vilaet, promoted building of hospitals for migrant 
Tatars and Circassians. Several Turkish civil hospitals appear in the period 1865-1867256 
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health care was the only type of social protection available at the time and it varied in 
volume and type. Two French engineers reported (1848-1849) that a mining firm in 
Samokov, at its own expense, hired a doctor to look after the health of their workers and 
' 
also, in 1860, opened a hospitaF27 • There are other examples from the 1860s of mainly 
French companies employing physicians and providing free health care in their own 
hospitals and pharmacies. In 1869, the "Statutes of ore-mining" envisaged health 
benefits, specifically access to an on-site health centre and a doctor, and monetary 
benefits in case of disability or death of workers. The law was not strictly enforced, but 
it influenced the development of similar legislation in post-liberation Bulgaria. 
Development of a Bulgarian national health system began during the Russian-Turkish 
wars (1877-1878). After the liberation of Bulgaria (1978), the foundations of a state 
social insurance system were established with the Tumovo Constitution (1879). 
Coverage was limited to civil servants, the military and other state employees. Health 
insurance was not differentiated within the framework of social insurance. There is 
evidence of considerable Russian influence on institution building and health system 
organisation after 1878. Russian representatives appointed regional doctors256 • The 
position of 'general-inspector' (equal to health secretary) in 1881-1983 was occupied by 
a Russian military physician and the newly created Medical Council consisted of 
physicians trained mainly in Russia257 • The first city hospitals began to be built at that 
time. 
The first regulation targeted specifically at the health system was the "Temporary Rules 
for Organisation of the Health Administration in Bulgaria" (1879) which bore a strong 
Russian influencer (Box A2-1). This decree established the statutory basis of the health 
system, created a Medical Council at the Ministry of Interior, and regulated certification 
of privately practising physicians and pharmacies. The "Temporary Rules ... " allowed 
communities to appoint their own 'town or village physicians' if they had a population of 
fewer than 8,000 and were able to support a physician256 • Out-patient health care and 
pharmaceuticals in the hospitals were to be provided free of charge for all. The poor 
received free hospital treatment and some pharmaceuticals if they presented a certificate 
of poverty257 • These provisions continued democratic practices established during the 
National Revival, the difference being that the costs of health care were covered by the 
state rather than by communities through charity. The most important provision was the 
delegation of authority to local, directly elected bodies. Municipalities became 
responsible for hospital management, public health functions and allocation of health 
budgets. This, in effect, decentralised decision-making and increased democratic 
tendencies in the administration of state health care. A negative effect was that, in 
practice, this involved shifting medical costs to the municipalities. 
The "Police Rules for Public Health" of 1879 set out the basis of public hygiene. They 
attempted to combat communicable diseases and to enforce sanitary control. Large 
factories were required to employ a physician on an annual salary or if not, to ensure 
visits by district physicians, including preventive check-ups. District medical authorities 
were entrusted with a range of responsibilities for health care and sanitary provision, and 
epidemic control. However, the "Police Rules" were inadequate given the shortage of 
trained staff and the lack of explicit criteria for action. 
The "Public Administrative Statute for Contracting and Obligations of Entrepreneurs" 
(1882) regulated the monetary and in-kind benefits from health insurance. Each 
enterprise was required to create a mutual insurance fund to support workers in case of 
r The "Temporary rules ... " were an almost literal translation of the Russian sanitary laws 
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accident or illness or death. The funds were to be raised from employers and represented 
2% of the wage bill, which were then repaid to the employer by the state. This system 
created perverse incentives as the employers received back sums taken from them and 
not used for health care. In addition there was no regulation of the volume, type and time 
period within which the benefits were provided. 
In 1882, several laws called "Civil Medical Laws" were passed, regulating the preventive 
tasks of district and town doctors, sanitary control in schools and enterprises, health 
education, STD control, frontier health controls, and compulsory notification of 
communicable diseases such as diphtheria, scarlet fever and typhoid. The position of 
'general-inspector' was curtailed and health care placed under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Interior through the Civil Sanitary Direction, which became a central 
institution managing health care256 • The Interior Ministry Secretary was head of the 
Medical Council. The decision-making role of the Medical Council was reduced, 
retaining roles that were more consultative than executive. With the "Sanitary Law" in 
1888, health care was incorporated into the state administrative structure. Local regional, 
district, and municipal institutions and doctors became fully subordinated to the local 
administrative authorities. District governors and mayors were responsible for the health 
care in their areas. The law introduced free hospital treatment for certain categories of 
patients, but in general curtailed earlier access to free care for the population257 • There 
were state-provided funds for medicines for the poor, bought locally by district doctors 
or other local bodies, but in many rural areas there were only more expensive private 
pharmacies, leading to a shortage of free medicines. Free drugs for the poor were 
supplied through some charity initiatives on an irregular basis. Several draft laws, 
proposed in 1897, but not enacted, recognised that the burden on the population should 
be reduced and suggested the establishment of three categories of hospital with different 
payment regimes in each category or even entirely free hospital care257 • The Russian 
influence tended to diminish with the beginning of the withdrawal of their 
representatives from Bulgaria in 1879. The "Sanitary Law", enacted in 1888, drew 
extensively on contemporary Romanian and French medicallaws257 • 
The "Law for Protection of Public Health" (1903) takes a step in the same direction by 
further extending the responsibilities of the village health centres to include every aspect 
of health and hygiene for their respective populations, including sanitary control, health 
services' provision and administration and preventive measures. The law regulated an 
earlier process of development of a network of health catchment areas, which set the 
basis of village health care and improved access256 • Municipalities with a population of 
more than 4,000 were obliged to have physicians and district medical committees and 
were expected to expand their staff and earmark resources to assist the government in 
improving public health257 • In practice this meant reducing the state's role in financing 
and providing health services locally. Private practice by doctor's assistants (feldschers) 
in the village health centres was permitted. The health services increased their share of 
the municipal budgets. What is overlooked is that many poorer municipalities lacked 
specialised facilities, staff and equipment. In the 1903 law, health care is perceived as 
hospital-based and there is no provision for primary care services. Soon afterwards 
another regulation addressed infectious diseases, and especially smallpox, requiring 
compulsory notification of STDs, and introduced regulation of prostitution, prisons, 
psychiatric and maternity hospitals, and introduced the concept of social medicine. No 
effort was made to introduce immunisation, to enforce hygienic control, or to combat the 
causes of disease. NGOs and other charitable associations were pro-active in addressing 
the needs of specific groups, providing leadership and funding. In 1910 the first 
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tuberculosis dispensary was opened by the Society Against Tuberculosis, while the first 
government-sponsored dispensary opened in 1927. In 1924 the Red Cross established 
maternity consultation r{)oms. 
Building the foundations of state-provided health care in Bulgaria, at the end of the 19th 
and beginning of the 20th century, focused mainly on the expansion of health services 
and hospitals, and training of physicians. The larger state hospitals were opened during 
the Russian-Turkish war, and served initially as temporary military hospitals. They had 
many Russian staff and medical supplies were provided by the Russian Red Cross and 
the Slavic Charity Society. At the end of the 19th century, there were 18 hospitals, only 
5 of which had existed before the liberation246 • In Bulgaria in 1877 there were only 27 
doctors; in 1893, there were 300 physicians, 405 doctor's assistants (feldschers) and 14 
dentists256 ; in 1903 there were 559 physicians, and in 1921 this rose to 900 physicians257 • 
On average there were 1,543 people per doctor in 1903, with the lowest figure of 664 in 
Sofia. Medical staff were unequally distributed and, in 1903, only 20.7% of the 
population had direct access to medical care. Partly as a result of staff shortages, the role 
of the feldschers was expanded. They performed a similar role to feldschers in Russia 
and were employed mainly by the state. They were considered the backbone of state 
health care at the time256 and had a leading role in the provision of out-patient care. 
Leading authors at the time saw this staff category as more adequate for the 
circumstances of Russia, but not of Bulgaria257 • In a report from three hospitals, the 
number of patients treated increased 5 times between 1879 and 188!246 • The first 
maternity hospital was built in 1903 in Sofia, and in 1918 became a university hospital. 
A number of hospitals were built with contributions by the local population. Evidence 
for the diminishing Russian influence was the falling number of physicians educated in 
Russia. In 1903, more Bulgarian physicians were educated in France (37%), than in 
Russia (18.8%), in marked contrast to the situation in the 19th century257 • 
In 1903, there were 79 hospitals which fell into the following categories by ownership: I) 
state supported facilities: first-grade state hospitals and second- and third-grade 
municipal hospitals; 2) facilities created at the initiative of public or charitable 
organisations (hospitals, ambulatories, charity-supported child consultation rooms, Red 
Cross dispensaries etc.); 3) private clinics and consultation rooms, including those owned 
by foreign firms256 257 • Among the foreign hospitals were the "Klementinska" hospital, 
opened in 1891, under the patronage of Princess Klementine (a member of the Tsar's 
family), whose staff consisted of members of Western European Catholic orders. 
Another "Catholic hospital" was built in 1882, in Plovdiv. These hospitals offered high 
standards of care and attracted patients from other Balkan countries257 • In 1905, in the 
Troyan hospital, the first sanatorium for tuberculosis patients in the Balkans was opened. 
In the first I 0-15 years after independence, the number of hospitals increased rapidly, a 
quarter of which were private. The share of private hospital beds was small257, probably 
due to the lower ratio of beds to staff, compared to the state hospitals. There was a two-
tier system, in which the state hospitals had the worst conditions in terms of staff and 
equipment. State-provided health care failed to provide cover for a significant portion of 
the population and, especially in the late 1920s, in combination with falling standards of 
living and high levels of private provision, did little to address the health care needs of 
the population. 
A series of laws (Box A2-1) enacted in the first decade of the 20th century, concentrated 
on setting standards for labour conditions, health and safety regulations, and, to a lesser 
extent on accidents and illness insurance. The first two laws were the "Law for 
' Women's and Child's Labour in the Industrial Enterprises" (1905) and the "Law for 
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Mutual Aid Funds of Workers in the State Enterprises and for Privileges of their Wages" 
(1905); followed by the " Law for Aid of State Workers in Case of Disability and 
Illness" (1906) and the "Law for Inspection of Labour" (1907). The "Law for Aid ... " 
envisaged free treatment for workers, with monetary compensation amounting to 100% 
of the salary if the illness was less than 3 months, and a pension if it was longer. 
Working hours for teenagers were limited to 10 hours daily and one month maternity 
leave was introduced for the period immediately after birth257 • The right to free health 
care could not be exercised due to a shortage of public facilities. These laws were not 
strictly enforced. Only small fines were given to employers who breached the law. 
These issues were brought to the attention of policy-makers by the growth of industry 
and the rapid increase in the numbers of hired labourers, often working in extremely 
unhygienic conditions. Data from 1904 show that, in large scale industry, only 2% of 
workers worked 8 hours per day, 36% worked 8-10 hours, 47%- 10-12 hours and 15%-
12-15 hours and more246 • Exploitation of children and women was common, with 12% of 
the work-force being children under 15. Women were paid significantly less than men246 • 
Mortality in female workers in Gabrovo was found to be 40 times higher than in men257 • 
Wages of manufacturing workers were often insufficient to cover even basic needs. 
In 1894-1907 repeated strikes by workers in the more unionised branches of the economy 
(such as printers, weavers, tobacco workers and miners), pressed for higher wages, better 
working conditions, and insurance against illness and accidents, especially for the state-
employed. The main objectives of the workers were extension of state coverage and the 
creation of professionally-based mutual insurance funds. The first friendly society was 
created in the 1880s in the printing industry, with active involvement of the Czech 
printers working in Bulgaria, who recreated the principles of corporate social 
insurance227 • The society sought to provide support in case of illness or leaving work. 
The owner was sympathetic, being acquainted with similar initiatives by Austrian 
workers. Another successful workers' organisation was the 'Bulgarian Typographic 
Society', established in 1883 in two cities. It provided cover against old age, illness, 
accident and unemployment, but was very selective, had high membership fees and 
targeted the "elite workers" in the branch. Similar societies were created by teachers 
(1882), employees (1884), shoemakers (1891) and others227 • The Bulgarian State 
Railways introduced their own network providing in-kind health benefits in 1889227 • Yet 
such successful initiatives remained the exception rather than the rule. Their example 
failed to spread even within the same industry. The main reasons were the lack of 
unanimity between the labour unions, Communist Party and other workers' organisations. 
There was a lack of unity even within sectors. The industrial workforce remained small 
compared to agriculture, and compared to other countries. The workforce was 
inexperienced, and this affected the maturity of leadership and organisational structures. 
In 1905, after a strike by printers in Sofia, the first collective contract was signed257 • 
Development of the health care system took another direction, with a number of laws 
regulating health insurance and, in particular, mutual insurance funds involving workers 
in industry. These were the "Law for Integration of Funds for Workers' Insurance" 
(1915), the "Law for Hygiene and Safety of Labour" (1917), "Law for Insurance of 
Workers and Employees in Case of Disability and Illness" (1918), "Law for Social 
Insurance" (1924) and "Law for Finding Jobs and Insurance in Case of Unemployment" 
(1925). These laws obliged employers to provide safe and hygienic conditions for 
labour. These developments led to integration of the ten health funds existing within 
different Ministries. The "Law for Social Insurance" (1924), introduced compulsory 
insurance against accidents and illness for all employed in the public and private sector, 
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and covered maternity benefits and retirement pensions. There was a single fund into 
which all contributions were made, similar to Bismarck's "krankenkassen"139• An 8-hour 
working day ( 6 hours for teenagers) was introduced. Health insurance coverage through 
mutual insurance funds was extended to the self-employed. By 1948, 69% of the 
population was covered by health insurance. Forms of sickness funds were organised by 
labour unions in more developed industries such as mining, printing, and the railway. 
These provided coverage against specific accidents and work-related risks, where 
coverage was provided mainly by the state or the employers, but did not provide cover 
against the wide spectrum of other health risks. In 1920, the mayor of Sofia suggested 
that free health care should be extended to all the population of Sofia. The Communist 
Party was against the initiative since free health care was to be financed mainly through 
taxes levied on workers; and suggested that instead, high income groups should be 
excluded from free coverage257 • 
The "Law for Public Health" introduced in 1929, and valid until the 1950s, created 
facilities for control of tuberculosis, STD and alcoholism, as well as managing maternal, 
child and school health care. Despite attention to health promotion, the law did not 
envisage creation of primary health care facilities. The Law promoted the private sector 
and furthered the state's withdrawal from ambulatory care, which was to a larger extent 
delegated to the municipalities256 • Hospitals had to organise small-scale ambulatories, 
sometimes even in their waiting rooms, in order to deal adequately with the patient 
flows. Some village authorities ran their own public consultation rooms for the poor. 
Where private doctors were employed, there was a tendency to redirect patients to their 
private practices. 
In 1918, in response to increased demand for physicians during the First World War, the 
Faculty of Medicine was established. Heath centre midwives delivered about 30% of 
births246 • Low numbers of educated doctors handicapped development of the private 
sector, on which health care was then based. In 1901, the Bulgarian medical and dental 
associations were created. Membership of the Bulgarian Physicians Union was made 
compulsory with the 1929law. 
The transfer of responsibilities from the central state institutions to local authorities 
continued. The municipalities had to determine their population needs, health care 
budgets, and organisation of facilities. While, in 1921-22, 60% of health centres were 
financed from the state budget, in 1930 this percentage was 9.2%. In 1921-1926, the 
municipalities financed 10% of the health centres, in 1930 this was 59.6%246 • However, 
state involvement in policy and institution building was significant. Hospitals remained 
largely state-run. Public hospitals were financed from the state budget supplemented by 
donations from wealthy citizens or charities. Health administration was scattered 
between different Ministries and each provided services free of charge at, for example, 
the Workers Hospital, or Transport Hospital. There was a shortage of beds in the public 
sector, and a quarter of all beds were private (23.7%). 
The lack of a unified Ministry of Health and a de-centralised administration of the health 
system did not operate efficiently or encourage the formulation and implementation of 
consistent health policy strategies. A key area requiring state intervention was regulation 
of sanitary conditions. For example, 77% of drinking water supplies came from wells 
and other local sources, the 23% from modem water mains was of unknown quality. It 
also encouraged regional disparities in access to health services. The development of the 
health care system had benefited the urban population to a larger extent, while the 
population in rural areas often had limited access to adequate health care and thus 
commonly sought the services of traditional healers, midwifes and other unqualified 
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persons. However the barriers to access were mostly geographical and, until 1944-48, 
tended to decrease with the extension of the network of facilities. 
Through the period 1887-1944 the private sector played an essential role in health care 
provision. The Medical Council, at the end of the 19th century, consisted mainly of 
private physicians, who continued to be powerfuF57 • Out-patient care relied almost 
entirely on private physicians, since the state placed less importance on primary 
compared to hospital care. The "Law for Protection of Public Health" (1903) regulated 
private health establishments and established the right to create them256 • In 1903, only 
about half of Bulgarian physicians worked in the public sector. In Sofia, in 1927, there 
was a total of 20 hospitals, of which 4 were state owned, 1 public, and 15 private. Of 33 
ambulatories, only 3 were state ones, 7 were municipal, and the rest private. Despite the 
state's focus on hospitals, some 62 private hospitals existed in 193!246 • However, most 
were small private out-patient practices, with one or two "family doctors" (GPs) or 
specialists. In many cases two generations of physicians from the same family worked 
together. Payment to physicians was on a fee-for service basis, but the sums involved 
were deemed affordable at least by urban lower-middle class5 • Insurance coverage for 
medical costs was not widely available apart for some industrial workers. Hospital 
treatment was paid, mainly, out-of-pocket and directly to physicians and other staff, with 
a small percentage going to the clinic. People, who would otherwise use state health 
services, sought private physicians in case of emergency or for home visits. Informal 
mutual support and community networks continued to play a vital role in enabling 
patients to pay for health care. 
In summary, the main characteristics of the Bulgarian health care system from 
independence until 1944 were: 1) a well developed private sector dominating all levels of 
health care; 2) a weaker public sector focusing mainly on treatment, but not prevention 
of illness, although there were promising initiatives in preventive care and safety at 
work; 3) state priority to secondary and tertiary health care and an absence of primary 
care facilities; 4) social insurance coverage was limited mainly to state employees, albeit 
with some tendency to gradually extend the coverage; 5) improvements in health and 
social benefits affected almost exclusively industrial workers and not other groups such 
as peasants, who were disadvantaged because they were not organised; 6) inequity of 
access existed between urban and rural areas and between regions; 7) the supply of 
qualified physicians, facilities, and number of beds was inadequate for the needs; 8) 
health districts were entrusted with too many functions and had limited motivation to 
follow national strategies; 9) a lack of a consistent national policy as well as of 
institution such as the Ministry of Health setting hygienic and sanitation standards; 1 0) 
undeveloped social medicine and lack of statistics on the determinants of health in the 
population. 
sIn-depth interviews with people living during this period reveal little awareness that insurance 
existed 
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Box A2-1. Establishment of the health care system in Bulgaria: 1878-1944: Kev events 
1879 Te~porary Rules for Organisation of the Health Administration in .Bulgaria 
Pohce Rules for Public Health 
1903 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1910 
Law for Preservation of Public Health 
Law for Women's and Children's Labour in the Industrial Enterprises" 
Law for Mutual Aid Fund of Workers in the State Enterprises and for 
Privileges of their Wages 
Law for Aid of State Workers in Case of Disability and Illness 
Law for Inspection of Labour 
First tuberculosis dispensary opened by the Society Against the 
Tuberculosis. 
1915 Law for Integration of Funds for Workers' Insurance 
1917 Law for Hygiene and Safety of Labour 
1918 Law for Insurance of Workers and Employees in Case of Disability and 
Illness 
Faculty of Medicine created 
1919 Law for Combat of Malaria 
1924 The Red Cross opened maternity consultation rooms 
1924 Law for Social Insurance 
1925 Law for Finding Job and Insurance in Case of Unemployment 
1927 Governmental tuberculosis dispensary opened 
1929 Law for Public Health (abolished 1951) 
Establishment of the Semashko model (1944-1989) 
From the previous section, it is clear that the health care system of Bulgaria before 1944 
had many inherent problems, which provided a basis for the introduction of the 
Semashko system. These included inadequate coverage of the population by the state-
supported health services and the subsequent inequities between high- and low-income 
groups. Facilities and staff were scarce and unequally distributed between rural and 
urban areas, hampering access. In addition, health status suffered from the effects of war 
and the global recession in the 1930s. 
The socialist Semashko model originated in the Soviet Union and was imposed in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The socialist health care system in Bulgaria 
was established in three stages256, which will be discussed briefly, followed by analysis of 
the strengths and weaknesses of the system. 
The main objectives of the first stage (1944-1949), were to extend health insurance 
coverage to more sections of the population and to achieve rapid health gains through 
emergency measures to deal with the immediate health problems of the post-war period. 
The government faced the task of reducing the burden of illness on society caused by war 
and poverty. Health was considered a state priority to a degree unprecedented in 
Bulgarian history. The state aimed at mainly quantitative improvements benefiting the 
majority of the population. The emphasis on health by the first communist governments 
could be explained by the need to ensure a steady supply of workers needed for 
economic recovery and to increase working capacity in order to raise the productivity of 
the socialist economy. The Decree for Universal Free Health Care (1951) eliminated 
social insurance coverage and established a budget financed health system, free at the 
point of use. 
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The first step in natio~~l~sation of health ~are consisted of a ban on private ownership of 
large-sca~e health fac~hhes and pharmacies. The newly created Ministry of People's 
Health mmed to eradicate communicable diseases, such as tuberculosis, malaria, and 
parasitic diseases, which were widespread prior to 1944. In this it was largely successful 
but, due to inefficient management, some of the achievements were not sustained. The 
first action of the Ministry of People's Health was to start building a network of 
ambulatory, outpatient and hospital units; to improve hospital care; to introduce health 
and social protection of mothers and children; to address social problems causing 
disease; and to extend health care provision in the villages and for workers in industrial 
enterprises258 • Building health centres and maternity clinics in the villages involved the 
active participation of the local authorities (People's Councils) and the public, and was 
regulated by the "Law for Co-operative Building of Hospital Facilities". These policies 
led to a dramatic increase in the number of health facilities and qualified staff. A second 
Medical Faculty was created in Plovdiv, along with 15 schools for auxiliary staff, and 
curricula were restructured. The Constitution of Bulgaria (194 7) defined the main 
responsibilities of the state in the area ofhealth care: "The state looks after public health, 
through organising and managing health care ... ". The state was also the primary agent 
in health education, mass physical education, protection of maternity and childhood, and 
public insurance. 
In contrast to the mainly quantitative achievements of the first stage development of the 
post-war Bulgarian health care system, the second stage (1950-1970) aimed at qualitative 
improvements. In this stage, the basis of the socialist health care system was established, 
following closely the principles of the Soviet Semashko model. The state and party 
apparatus introduced the principle of free health care for the whole population in 1951, 
and this policy outpaced the economic capacity of the state at the time259 • The objective 
of stable improvement in the health status of the population was addressed through 
extending health care facilities, capital infrastructure investments and better supplies. 
The quality of health care was enhanced through use of new technologies and hospital 
mergers. In the 1960s and 1970s there was extensive construction of new facilities139, 
mainly high-cost hospitals. Ambulatory health care provided at polyclinics became more 
accessible: annual visits per doctor increased from 1.06 in 1950, to 5.25 in 197!258• A 
referral system was introduced in primary care and dispensaries, and professional health 
care for workers expanded. After 1956, in line with economic growth and rising living 
standards, prevention was emphasised. 
The 83 dental care stations in 1944, had increased to 3,270 by 1970258 • The decision-
making power of the Ministry of People's Health was increased. In accordance with the 
Soviet model, a State Sanitary Inspection and network of sanitary-epidemic stations, 
working in the area of infectious diseases' prevention and control, supplemented by 
research institutes and societies, were created. A new Faculty of Medicine was opened in 
1960 in Varna. In 1950, the Health-Resort Office was opened, responsible for 
recreational facilities related to health. Between 1950 and 1970 the Semashko system 
was fully established and achieved major successes, as measured by demographic and 
health indicators. Infant mortality was reduced and life expectancy greatly increased. 
Tuberculosis rates declined and malaria and typhoid were eradicated. The achievements 
of the system seem likely to have been due to a combination of socio-economic and 
health care factors. In the Constitution of 1971, state involvement in health was set out 
in conjunction with public insurance, a pension system, and other social security benefits 
("The state serves the people through creation of conditions for improvement of well-being, 
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education and health of the population ... Every citizen has the right to free health care. The state 
and the public institutions look after the health of the children and adolescent"). 
During the third period (1970-1989) further change was incremental, but failed to build 
on the achievements of the previous stages. A major characteristic of this period was full 
nationalisation of health care. In 1972, private out-patient practice, which continued to 
exist on the margins, was eradicated. This measure aimed to protect the interests of the 
population, remove the material transaction between doctor and patient, improve the 
standard of care and enforce the principle of free and accessible health care258 . In 1972 
the State Council created the Medical Academy, a teaching hospital with integrated 
research functions, specialised training and tertiary care. In the 1970s, another four 
Medical universities were created along similar lines. Medical training was re-organised 
and centralised. In 1973, the Moral Code of the Physician in Bulgaria was introduced, 
addressing, among other ethical issues, under-the-counter payments. It is clear that the 
main improvements in life expectancy were achieved in the 1940s, since the late 1960s 
the total life-expectancy of the population, especially of men, has not improved further 
{Figure A2-1). 
Figure A2-1. Life expectancy at birth in Bulgaria (1955-1995) 
Source: Public Health Statistics Annual. Bulgaria 1995. National Centre of Health Information, 
Ministry of Health, Sofia: 1996 
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The "Law for People's Health" was passed in 1973, replacing the "Law for Public 
Health" (created 1929 and abolished in 1951). There was no law on public health 
between 1951 and 1973, and the health system was regulated mainly through 
governmental decrees and Ministry of People's Health regulations. The Law created a 
legal basis for the development of the health care system and functioned, with some 
amendments, until the present. The Law summarised the achievements of the previous 
stages: the right to free health care, a preventive orientation, environmental protection, an 
increase in birth rates, raising of the status of the medical profession etc. The Law 
emphasised the public characteristics of socialist health care and the right to free, 
accessible and qualified health care for all citizens, through a network of health 
establishments. Control was consolidated at the Ministry of People's Health139, and the 
health facilities at local level were jointly controlled by Ministry of People's Health and 
People's Councils259 • Only three Ministries were allowed to maintain their own health 
facilities: the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Defence. 
It was recognised that the health system interacts with a complex of economical, medical, 
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and educational factors. For that reason Ministries, People's Councils, social services, 
and labour unions, were required to collaborate in order to produce consistent 
stra~egieS259 • The La~ gave a ~entral role. to prevention in a broad sense, including 
environmental protectiOn, reduction of smokmg and alcoholism, nutrition and workplace 
hygiene. The law defined certain obligations of citizens and public organisations to 
protect their own health by means of prevention and education activities. These were not 
achieved because of the characteristics of the public organisations, their lack of initiative 
and total subordination to the state and the communist party. 
For the purposes of this analysis, the advantages and disadvantages ofthe socialist model 
(1944-1989) will now be discussed in general, without separating the developments in 
each stage. This is possible due to the continuity of the model. 
As applied in the Bulgarian context, the Semashko model had several advantages, which 
contributed to its popular support. The most significant achievement of the early 
communist regime was the entitlement to a comprehensive package of health services for 
the entire population82 • The right of every citizen to free and accessible health care was 
defined in the Bulgarian constitutions (1947, 1971) and in the "Law for People's Health". 
Universal coverage was achieved in the 1950s, together with general improvements in 
living standards and introduction of a comprehensive social insurance system for all 
groups in the population. However, industrial workers situated in urban areas had 
privileged access to a broader range of health services, which was one of the reasons for 
accelerated migration from the rural areas. A continued tendency to protect industry at 
the expense of agriculture perpetuated certain inequities between the rural and urban 
areas. State commitment to universal provision was undermined by economic problems 
throughout the period. 
The shift in ideology in the wider society, after 1944, affected health care provision in 
several important ways. The socialist health system was based on egalitarian principles 
rooted in Bulgarian national culture and values. During the National Revival through the 
19th century, health became a collective concern at local community or family level. In 
the phase of capitalist development before 1944, health care was considered an 
individual responsibility and the state sought only to provide a safety net for those in 
need. Yet the tradition of mutual help was largely preserved in the rural communities. 
According to the communist doctrine, the state was responsible for financing and 
providing a wide range of welfare benefits, including free health care. The sphere of 
collective rights was extended at the expense of individual rights, such as civil and 
political rights. According to a sympathetic commentator, collective responsibility was 
the only way to apply public health policies, hygiene and sanitary control: 
"Improvement of the living standards of the population ... as well as improvement of 
conditions of labour ... is not and cannot be a personal concern " 246 
Although a public health care sector existed before 1944, it was denounced by the 
authorities: 
"Free-of-charge out-patient care of poor and ill people should not and cannot be 
perceived as publicly-organised help. It is an expression of state charity, which 
characterises each authority ... a means to rule and lead the economically weak"246 
From 1944 to 1989 the state held a monopoly in financing and providing health services. 
The public insurance system prior to 1944, which provided combined social and health 
coverage, was abolished. The health sector, similar to other social sectors, was financed 
directly from the state budget and managed by central government. The transparency of 
the tax-based finance system was extremely low. Although the stable flow of budget 
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resources allowed for long-term investment in infrastructure and planning, the health 
system was generally underfunded, as other governmental priorities emerged. The state 
failed to guarantee a consistently good quality of care, sufficient supplies and equipment, 
or to provide adequate incentives for staff. 
The Semashko model radically transformed the pre-1944 structure of the health care 
system by focusing on extensive provision of primary health care. Health policies 
dramatically improved geographical access to care. Without this, the claim for universal 
coverage would have been meaningless. Primary care and first level specialist health 
care was provided mostly through a network of polyclinics. These were primary care 
facilities employing physicians with a general medical background and a few types of 
specialists. Polyclinics controlled referral to hospitals (also known as 'phased' care), but 
their 'gate-keeping functions' gradually deteriorated and most patients were able to 
bypass them. Some of the higher rated polyclinics were integrated with hospitals. 
Among other first-level providers were village workers and school health centres, 
specialised dispensaries for management of chronic diseases and stations for emergency 
health care. A major achievement was the introduction of far-reaching public health 
campaigns for compulsory immunisation, screening and other prevention strategies. 
Administratively, since 1950, primary care in Bulgaria was based on district (raion) and 
smaller catchment areas (uchastak/ neighbourhood) divisions within an integrated 
primary care polyclinic network. The district system was introduced in Bulgaria under 
Soviet influence. Before 1950 it covered mainly villages, but later it was extended. 
Each polyclinic covered an area divided into therapeutic, paediatric and obstetric-
gynaecological districts, and each district was divided into a number of territorial 
sections. 'District physicians', together with nursing staff ('district teams') provided care 
for a designated number of people. Most typically the district therapist covered up to 
3,000 people249 • In this system, patients were allocated to physicians according to their 
address139, aiming to establish long-term contact between the district physician and the 
patient249 • Among the duties of the district physician were to treat and prevent diseases, 
to monitor the health status, causes of illness and environmental hazards of their 
population and provide health education. Family physicians, mostly in the private sector, 
had been familiar in Bulgaria from the beginning of the century. The difference from the 
pre-1944 period was that in the socialist system free choice of primary care physician 
was not allowed. Lack of choice of physician and facility were among the major reasons 
for distortion of the district and catchment areas system249, with most users trying to 
bypass the primary care level. 
The administrative division of the territorial units, the referral system, and the long-term 
contact between district physicians and patients facilitated full coverage of the population 
and ensured access to health care. However, there were a number of disadvantages of the 
primary care system. Among these were lack of personal choice of physician, high-cost 
health care due to oversupply of polyclinic specialists, division of responsibilities among 
physicians and other medical staff, lack of users' influence on the quality of care249, 
bureaucratic referral procedures, and low incentives for physicians. Primary care 
provision favoured urban areas which led to regional disparities. The inefficiency of 
primary care services, coupled with excessive specialisation of staff and staff imbalances, 
gradually shifted the emphasis to curative specialist health care. 
As a consequence of a range of factors, the health status of the population improved 
radically. Morbidity rates from many diseases, widespread in the past, such as 
tuberculosis, typhoid, scarlet fever, whooping-cough, fell sharply. For example, the 
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incidence of tuberculosis fell considerably, from about 1,658 cases per 100,000 
population annually in the 1920s to 379 per 100,000 in 1970 and to 129 in 19852561• 
Many diseases, such as polio, diphtheria and malaria were eradicated. The average life-
expectancy at birth increased from 51.75 in 1939 to 71.66 in 1976 and there were 
significant decreases in mortality in all age groups. These improvements occurred 
mainly in the first 35 years (until the 1980s) according to certain authors256 ; while 
according to others these held for a shorter period after 1944. Many of the positive 
trends regarding health and demographic status stagnated or were reversed in the 1970s 
and there is still uncertainty about the causes of this. 
The Ministry of People's Health, created in 1944, assumed most functions in health 
policy, control and budgeting. Initially, this centralisation produced positive results by 
establishing relevant institutions, consolidating existing experience and creating national 
policies and standards in health care, hygiene and health education. The central planning 
mechanism, co-operation between health units and the centralised reporting of data on 
the health of the population, in theory allowed formulation of national health strategies 
using a rational approach. However, a number of shortcomings made the over-
centralised management inefficient. This process was contrary to the pre-1944 trend of 
democratic self-government and delegation of power to local administrations. After 
1944, local People's Councils initially retained some control over health care, but this 
was soon curtailed. The subsequent centralisation led to inability to manage local 
facilities. The Ministry of People's Health was supported by a heavy, hierarchical 
bureaucratic apparatus, which delayed decision-making. Most centralised structures 
were politicised, with control by the Communist Party. Policies were rarely based on 
analysis of available data on the state of the health sector and health status, and were 
often misreported for ideological or political purposes. In many cases the Ministry of 
People's Health had to follow the party line, against its better judgement. 
Another feature of the health care system between 1944 and 1989 was the package of 
strategies to promote extensive growth, in order to overcome the inherited undersupply 
of capital investment and staff. Accordingly, budgets were calculated according to the 
numbers of beds and staff, not according to the needs of the population. This created 
incentives for maintaining inefficient levels of staff and beds, high admission rates, and 
long hospital stays. There was widespread overconsumption and overtreatment in order 
to justify inputs. Inputs also grew through unrealistic admission rates in the higher 
medical universities. Similar strategies to achieve growth were observed in other 
economic sectors. Extensive growth also served the purposes of providing 'hard 
evidence' when reporting to a higher authority. Initially, the socialist system achieved 
quantitative improvements, but failed to reform when saturation levels were reached. 
As discussed in the previous section, the private sector was prominent in health services 
provision in Bulgaria before 1944. This situation changed dramatically after 1944, when 
large-scale nationalisation was undertaken. However, nationalisation of private health 
care occurred more slowly than in other sectors. Private operations were performed until 
1951, when nationalisation of the wider economy was already completed. This may have 
been perceived as a political risk for the Communist Party which was still consolidating 
its powers in the Parliamentary coalition. Out-patient private practice was not banned 
until 1971. It consisted of single-doctor private practices of specialists and dentists that 
were closely monitored by the tax authorities. While in Bulgaria there was a niche for 
1The value for 1920 is an approximation. Data for 1970 and 1985 from Public Health Statistics 
Annual. Bulgaria 1995. National Centre of Health Information, Ministry of Health, Sofia: 1996 
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existence of small-scale private practice until relatively late in the period of communist 
rule, in the Czech Republic, private practice by physicians was restricted by laws in 1951 
and 1952 and closed down in 1954, and private practice by dentists was allowed only 
until 1972. This tolerance of private practice in Bulgaria might be explained by the 
initial state priority for primary care provision and the shortages of specialists in 
secondary care until the 1970s. Private practice by specialists fitted well with the 
framework of facilities and provided a means of offering specialised care at low-cost. It 
supplemented, rather than replaced, the parallel state services. Nevertheless, strategy 
documents showed that the underlying policy was an ultimate abolition of the private 
sector. 
Another characteristic of the Semashko system was that it underestimated the 
administrative and organisational needs of the system. There was a shortage of trained 
managers and administrators who could provide support for the clinicians, who most 
often managed large facilities. The overt effect was bureaucratic management, 
inefficiency and waste. Despite waiting lists being officially non-existent, shortages of 
supplies, specialised hospital beds and staff were common. Lack of control over 
resources and unaccountability led to two-tier services, preferential treatment and 
corruption. 
The system also aimed to ensure that health care was closely linked to medical research, 
and collaborated with other institutions with an indirect impact on health, such as 
educational authorities. This was achieved by top-down rule by decree from the Socialist 
Party, and although some joint campaigns were initiated, in many cases the collaboration 
remained purely formal. 
A few studies conducted in the 1970s indicated high levels of satisfaction with the 
performance of the health care system119• The studies suggested a correlation between 
positive assessment of the health care system and the overall living standards of the 
population which improved in the post-war period until the 1970s, prompting optimistic 
views about current social conditions and the future in general. Moreover, perceived 
equity of access to guaranteed state health care, universal entitlement, easy access to 
health services and health promotion measures, and health gains, may have accounted for 
the positive attitudes towards the health care system registered in the 1970s. The lower 
levels of satisfaction registered among users and health professionals in the 1980s, also 
identified in the in-depth interviews forming part of this thesis, may have been caused by 
shortages, unresponsiveness to consumer need and lack of choice. 
The totalitarian state exerted full control over the representation of the medical 
profession. The national medical association and other professional societies were 
replaced with a single trade union139, with mostly formal functions. There was no forum 
for the discussion of issues related to health policies, contributing to a lack of 
transparency. This limited research to what was deemed ideologically correct. 
In summary, the main principles underlying the Semashko system were: 1) nationalised 
care provided free-of-charge 2) monopolistic funding and provision; 3) comprehensive 
coverage of the population; 4) centralised management and planning; 5) accessible 
(geographically and financially) and equitable health care; 6) priority of prevention and 
primary health care provision; 7) broad public participation; and 8) close collaboration 
between institutions, and between health care and research. In practice, however, these 
were not always achieved. 
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The Bulgarian health care system in the 1990s: Inheritance and 
reform 
Health care reform 1990-1997: an overview 
After 1989, following the democratic transition, the dismantling of the totalitarian state 
affected most sectors, including the health system. In the 1990s, health care reforms in 
Bulgaria mostly attempted to transform the Semashko system along the lines of the pre-
1944 health care organisation, which seemed a logical process of returning to the 
traditions in health care. Thus, the main reform directions were re-establishment of the 
private sector in health care and in pharmaceutical trade, development of family 
medicine, strengthening the role of medical organisations and transformation of health 
financing. 
Among the first reform developments was the start of liberalisation of the health care 
system, in line with the general economic restructuring. In 1991, out-patient private 
practice in the health sector was re-legalised by an amendment to the Law for Public 
Health from 1973 and with a Decree for the Conditions and Procedure for Private 
Medical Practice260 (Box A2-2). The Decree regulated out-patient private practice for 
legally qualified medical specialists and set the conditions for licensing private facilities. 
Apart from provision for private health care, the 1991 amendments to the Law for Public 
Health reinforced the right of users to free health care: 
"Every Bulgarian citizen has a right to free medical care in the state-owned health 
establishments under the conditions of this Law" (article 2 (1)) 
In a parallel development, in July 1991, the entitlement of every citizen to free health 
care in the state facilities was reaffirmed in the new democratic Constitution: 
"Citizens are entitled to health care which shall guarantee accessible medical aid and to 
free medical care in accordance with provisions and procedures defined by law. The 
health care of the citizens shall be financed from the state budget, employers, personal or 
joint insurance payments and other sources in accordance with provisions and 
procedures defined by law" (article 52) 
In response to the rapidly developing market for pharmaceuticals and the entrance of the 
large pharmaceutical companies, new legislation was introduced. The Law for 
Pharmaceuticals and Pharmacies in Human Medicine (1995) regulated drug licensing, 
registration, import and export and retail trade, and supplemented the Decree for the 
Conditions and Procedure for Coordination of Export and Import of Pharmaceuticals 
(1995). 
The private sector, although for out-patient services only, grew at a fast pace. Quality of 
care was substantially enhanced in the small-scale private out-patient establishments, 
thus increasing demand. In 1992-5 there was a process of vertical and horizontal 
integration of private practices into group practices, private polyclinics and health 
centres, mainly in urban areas. Of the privately practising doctors, 35% now have 
contracts to perform private consultations in public health facilities. The remainder work 
in private rooms, private polyclinics or at home. The market for private health care is 
concentrated mainly in Sofia and the other large cities. 
Private services could not expand further relying only on out-of-pocket cash payments 
and in the absence of any insurance mechanisms. The market for physicians' services has 
lagged behind the markets for pharmaceuticals and dental services, with official 
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payments for private services at only 1-3% of health expenditure94 • Large-scale 
privatisation of hospitals was hampered by unsuccessful attempts to pass a health 
insurance law, slow privatisation in the wider economy, insufficient investment and 
worsening macro-economic conditions. After an initial peak, the demand for private 
services stagnated and started to fall. The periodic economic crises, translating into 
falling living standards, meant that users were increasingly unable to pay out-of-pocket 
for private health care. 
In December 1995, the Health For the Nation, a National Health Strategy prepared in 
collaboration with WHO, was launched by the Socialist government, a year after their 
return to power. The 1997 elected democratic government commissioned a more 
comprehensive policy document in 1999. This outlined current health status and health 
system priorities, and presented a broad framework for reform and implementation steps, 
in agreement with the WHO "Health for All by the Year 2000". 
The Draft Law for Health, which would replace the Law for Public Health from 1973, 
was submitted to the Parliamentary Commission, but has not been enacted since. 
Instead, there have been numerous amendments required by the reform process. 
Another reform achievement was the dismantling of the communist-dominated labour 
union of physicians and re-establishment of the Bulgarian Medical Association and the 
Bulgarian Physicians' Union in 1990139• Several other professional organisations 
emerged, such as the Bulgarian Stomatological Association, the Association of Private 
Pharmacists, the Association of Hospital Directors, and the Nurses Association, as well 
as three labour unions. Finally, the Law for the Professional Organisations of Physicians 
and Dentists was passed by Parliament in 1998. It established the functions and 
organisation of the Physicians' and Dentists' associations, in which the participation of 
all practising health professionals is compulsory. 
A number of NGOs representing the interests of patients suffering from specific diseases 
(diabetes, blindness, deafness) were established, although organisations protecting the 
rights of wider patient groups were slow to emerge. Some have developed links with 
foreign NGOs such as the British Diabetic Association. In 1995, it was the Bulgarian 
Physicians Union that proposed the introduction of a Charter for the Rights of Patients. 
In 1992, the Medical Academy, a national body providing highly specialised care and 
medical training, was closed down by a Law. The regional branches were granted 
independence as Higher Medical Institutes. 
Under the socialist government (1994-1996), several reform initiatives in primary care 
were undertaken. It was recognised that there is a need for general practitioners (similar 
to the 'family physicians' of before 1944) to provide more personal service, to act as 
'gate-keepers', and to substitute for large numbers of narrow specialists at primary care 
level. In 1994, the Higher Medical Council defined the status and functions of general 
practitioners. A pilot training programme for GPs was initiated with the support of the 
EU PHARE programme and later, 90 hours of teaching in family medicine were 
incorporated in the curricula of the Higher Medical Institutes. A programme for 
postgraduate specialisation in general medicine also has been approved by the Higher 
Medical Council. Other schemes include a PHARE-funded one-year course in family 
medicine for specialists in general medicine, an eighteen-month course for specialists or 
short-term courses for already practising district practitioners in polyclinics139• 
The reform also sought to improve staff motivation, in two ways. Firstly, in 1996, a 
performance-related component was added to physicians' salaries, taking into account 
the number of patients registered with the respective physician, work qualifications and 
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other indicators. In effect these bonuses were set too low and paid retrospectively, which 
resulted in inflation further undermining their value. The second step was to introduce 
choice of 'family physician', exercisable annually at the state polyclinics. 
Steps were undertaken to transform the tax-based model of health financing. With the 
participation of different stakeholders, several proposals for a health insurance law were 
prepared. In 1993, a Draft Law on Health Insurance gained wider support, was reviewed 
by the government and submitted to the Parliamentary Commission, where it was 
debated, but subsequently side-lined, in 1995. It proposed a compulsory health insurance 
scheme administered by 28 district branches of the Ministry ofHealth. 
The democratic government elected in 1997 showed commitment to speed up the 
financial reform and, in June 1998, the Health Insurance Law was passed. The 
compulsory insurance scheme will become fully operational in 2000. The Law envisages 
a Bismarck-type insurance system, with a single statutory insurer (the National Health 
Insurance Fund) with 28 regional offices. The NHIF will be an independent body, 
directly accountable to Parliament and governed by a board appointed every four years. 
Contributions will be based on a payroll tax and deducted at source. Employer and 
employees will each pay 3%, the self-employed will pay 6%140• The contributions of 
pensioners will be paid by the state budget and those of the unemployed or poor, by the 
municipalities. The NHIF will purchase health services from public and private 
providers. Payment to staff will be based on capitation, with a fee for service 
component. 
A project to support implementation of a health insurance system was agreed with the 
PHARE programme of the EU in 199484 • The first phase of the project involved 
developing procedures for measuring the costs of a range of treatments taking into 
account duration, intensity and outcome of treatment, and introducing information 
systems similar to the DRG concept. In 1993-94 the Ministry of Health commissioned 
research from the National Centre of Public Health, involving comprehensive pricing of 
different treatments, according to duration of treatment, volume of work, pharmaceutical 
consumption etc. as a preparatory step to introduction of performance based payment 
methods. This work was later used to set the levels of user fees in the public sector, 
which were legalised in 1997. 
Throughout the 1990s, the health system has continued to be financed entirely from 
general tax revenue. Despite a declining share of GDP spend on health care, both in 
relative and real terms, the reform has sought extra-budgetary sources of financing, rather 
than transforming the financing mechanisms. The systematic underfunding of the health 
sector caused shortages of essential drugs, including antibiotics, insulin and analgesics. 
In 1994-8 a chaotic introduction of semi-official user fees and informal under-the-
counter payments supplemented budgetary revenue at the state facilities. In December 
1997, user fees for an extensive list of services were regulated with the Decree for the 
Conditions and Procedure for Payment of Health Care of Patient's Choice. 
In the 1990s, foreign aid was essential to sustain the health care system. During the 
crisis of 1996-7, the Emergency Social Assistance Programme funded by the EU PHARE 
programme provided pharmaceuticals or reimbursement of pharmaceutical bills to the 
poorest section of society. In many hospitals, most basic supplies were donated from 
international agencies, some even from other CEE countries. 
Another set of reform policies aimed to improve the management of existing resources. 
Attention was focused on restructuring of the health system, hospital closures, lay-offs of 
staff, training of managers and reduction of the administrative costs of the bureaucratic 
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apparatus. Since 1992, health care facilities have been recognised as legal entities, with 
the right to participate in a contract. Moreover, following a governmental decree in 
1994, they have been allowed to contract out auxiliary and support services, and food and 
drug supplies on an annual basis. Under the second phase (1995-1996) of the EU 
PHARE project, the testing and implementation of various payment systems, information 
systems, managerial options and staff training were initiated in two pilot districts (in 
Smolyan and Gabrovo ). This phase also envisaged conducting a survey of the 
population and health care staff in order to test the acceptability of various reform 
options. The second phase of the project came to a halt due to delay in establishing a 
legal framework, and decisions regarding financial and managerial arrangements, and the 
survey was not carried out. Another EU PHARE project involved restructuring of the 
emergency care network. 
More recent legislation supporting the implementation of health insurance was the Law 
on Health Care Facilities enacted in 1999. Under the provisions of this Law, health 
institutions will be legally and financially independent, with fully autonomous and 
flexible management, including responsibilities for hiring staff, entering contractual 
agreements with the national insurance bodies, handling costs and implementing internal 
restructuring140 • Hospital and primary care will be clearly separated and a process of 
accreditation of hospitals, which is likely to lead to closure of facilities, will be initiated. 
The Law also envisages a performance-related payment to physicians and facilities. 
Donor agencies were instrumental in most reform developments through provision of 
emergency aid, technical and financial assistance. In 1996, a joint loan for $47 million 
was agreed between the World Bank, Council of Europe Social Development Fund, the 
PHARE programme and the Bulgarian government (participating with $7.7 million), 
aiming to restructure health policy and management, primary health care, emergency 
services, and blood transfusion139• The European Commission's PHARE Programme 
alone has provided €40.5 million for a comprehensive reform programme140 • 
Restructuring of health financing has been recognised as an essential component of 
reform along with structural reform of health care, with emphasis on primary care 
development (pilot projects in 1999 sponsored by the WB in 24 municipalitieS140), 
training of GPs, establishment of information systems, and pharmaceutical regulation. 
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Box A2-2. Health care reform in Bulgaria: 1989-1998: Key events 1 
1990 
1991 
April 1991 
1992 
1992-1995 
1993-94 
Oct 1993 
1994 
Dec 1994 
Dec 1995 
1995 
1996 
Dec 1997 
1998 
June 1998 
1999 
The Bulgarian Medical Association and the Bulgarian Physicians' Union re- ! 
established 
New Constitution and an amendment to the Law for Public Health from 
1973 guaranteed the citizens' rights to free health care 
Decree for the Conditions and Procedure for Private Medical Practice 
Law for closing down the Medical Academy 
National Centre of Health Information created 
Vertical and horizontal integration of private practices 
Evaluation of volumes and types of medical activities began 
Draft Law for Health introduced in the Parliament 
Draft Law on Health Insurance submitted to the Parliament, withdrawn in 
1995 
Governmental Decree for contracting-out supplies and services 
Centre for Health Insurance system created 
The Higher Medical Council introduced "General Practice" speciality 
National Health Strategy launched 
Decree for the Conditions and Procedure for Registration of 
Pharmaceuticals 
Law for Pharmaceuticals and Pharmacies in Human Medicine 
Decree for creation of 28 district centres for health care under the MoH 
Decree of the Ministry of Health curtailed the power of economic directors 
Hospital budgets to be determined according to the volume of work, not size 
Charter for the Rights of Patients suggested by the Bulgarian Physicians 
Union 
Decree on a new procedure for determining health professionals' salaries 
Decree on the organisation of the primary health care of the population 
Introduction of free choice of 'family physician' 
National Centre for Public Health created 
Decree No.22 from 9 December 1997 for the Conditions and Procedure 
for Payment of Health Care of Patient's Choice, amended in Feb 1998 
The Law for the Professional Organisations of Physicians and Dentists 
The Law for Health Insurance enacted 
The Law on Health Care Facilities enacted 
Draft Health Strategy prepared by the Ministry of Health 
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Organisational structure of the health care system 
The ~~in ~~akeholders in the Bulgarian health care system are the Ministry of Health and 
mumc1pah~Ies (lo_cal government) (Figure A2-2). The influence of health professionals 
has been 1?cr~asmg t~ough re-establishment of professional organisations and their 
representation m the H1gher Medical Council. NGOs have become more active. 
Figure A2-2. Organisational chart of the health care system 
Sour~e: bas~~ on HiT (Health Systems in Transition) on Bulgaria (in press) . Profile on Health 
Care m Translf1on. World Health Organisation, Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen: 1999 
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Despite the tendency for decentralisation since 1992, the Ministry of Health is the main 
decision-maker and regulator in the health sector. It is largely responsible for the 
financing and provision of a basic package of health care services, formulation of 
national health policies and development of draft legislation. The direction of reform is 
largely determined centrally. The Ministry of Health supervises networks of health care 
facilities, tertiary care centres involved in research and training, specialised research 
centres (psychiatric, pulmonary etc.), the regional hygiene and epidemiology 
inspectorates, a national network of 28 regional emergency care centres and 72 sanatori a 
and balneological institutions139 • The Ministry of Health also controls, jointly with the 
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Ministry of Education, five Medical Universities and affiliated university hospitals, and 
two faculties of dentistry, but these are financed directly by the Ministry of Finance. 
The activities of the Ministry of Health are de-centralised to 28 Regional Health 
Directorates created by a Decree in 1995. The regional Ministry of Health offices are, in 
effect, information centres (branches of the National Centre of Health Information 
founded in 1992) which collect and analyse the health-related data published in bulletins 
of the Ministry of Health. Other research centres affiliated to the Ministry of Health are 
the National Centre of Health Promotion, and the National Centre for Public Health 
(former Centre for Health Insurance). However, there is no evidence that the reform 
process has actually drawn on detailed analysis of any of these data. 
Municipalities are locally elected government bodies. The Local Self-Government and 
Local Administration Act (1992) gave them a greater independence in decision-making. 
The Ministry of Health retained control over only 30% of health provision. 
Municipalities own, finance directly and manage the majority of health facilities (mainly 
polyclinics, regional hospitals, specialist pulmonary, paediatric, gynaecological and 
psychiatric hospitals and specialised dispensaries139) and also have responsibilities for 
sanitation and environmental control. In some areas they offer better quality of care and 
improved working conditions than those financed by the Ministry of Health. The 
appointment of directors of municipality-owned facilities is agreed between the district 
offices of the Ministry of Health and the local authorities. The municipal health facilities 
are supervised by both municipal councils and the Ministry of Health, with their director 
being accountable to both bodies. This Ministry of Health involvement in the 
management of the municipal health facilities, and the resulting diffusion of 
responsibility, has often caused tensions. 
Although the municipalities are the main policy-making bodies in relation to health care, 
the district authorities (28 former local government units) control the district integrated 
hospitals, providing hospital treatment to the population of its municipalities or as a 
referral hospital for other municipalities. On the negative side, the lack of clear national 
policies have resulted in local authorities taking ad hoc decisions, creating disparities 
between regions. 
The Higher Medical Council is an independent institution chaired by the Ministry of 
Health including representatives of other Ministries, physicians' and dentists' 
associations, and the medical universities. It advises on health policy, health care 
organisation and postgraduate medical training, and licensing of the private health 
sector139. 
The Pharmaceutical Council exists within the Ministry of Health and defines the 
requirements for the production, storage, usage and sale of pharmaceuticals and medical 
equipment, and functioning of pharmacies. The council comprises representatives of the 
Ministry of Health, the professional associations, and the National Drug Institute. 
Parallel systems of health care have a long tradition in Bulgaria. In the absence of an 
independent Ministry of Health before 1944, every Ministry provided health services for 
their employees. After 1989, in addition to the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Defence continued to own, 
finance and manage their own health facilities. The Ministry of Defence owns f~urteen 
hospitals13s, the Ministry of Transport owns five. The Ministry of Internal Affatrs ~nd 
the Ministry of Defence (the Military Medical Academy) have, altogether, 3 teachmg 
hospitals with 2,000 beds, providing comprehensive treatment, the largest a~~ .best 
equipped hospital complex in Bulgaria. 40% of all patients at the complex are civthans, 
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such as officials, diplomats, or referred patients84 • The Ministry of Health has not 
attempted to take control of these facilities because of their high cost and volume of 
services they provide. 
Decentralisation of the health care system 
The socialist health care system in Bulgaria was characterised by highly centralised 
control and planning. The first initiatives of the transition (1989-91), involving market 
liberalisation and privatisation, followed from a strong reaction against central planning 
in the economy. 
Formally, the Ministry of Health is responsible for planning the health care system, based 
on comprehensive data and collaboration among structural units. Since 1992 devolution 
of administrative power and transfer of ownership, to local government, of a large part of 
the health facilities has led to municipalities assuming a leading role in the financing and 
provision of health services139• The increasing responsibilities and independence of the 
local authorities led to erosion of the regulatory capacity of central government and its 
authority to implement national policies. Although the regional health administrations 
are formally accountable to the central level, it is only in areas where local governments 
are weak that the centralised bureaucracy continues to dominate the health care 
administration, though not to the same extent as before 1989. Even though the Ministry 
of Health has the power to regulate all facilities, even the ones owned by local 
government, its role is largely advisory. 
The consequences of decentralisation have had advantages and disadvantages. Among 
the negative effects have been inability to introduce reform in the face of local vested 
interests, unclear responsibilities and local government's lack of experience in health 
care management. On the positive side, decision-making at local level was strengthened 
and more flexible local health policies were applied, including some innovative 
approaches to financing of health facilities. For these reasons, in 1994-5, there were 
considerable pressures for centralisation from the Ministry of Health (leading to creation 
of local MoH branches), but with no lasting success. 
The main system of health financing 
The health care sector in Bulgaria is financed from general government revenues. 
Registered tax payers pay General Income Tax which is approximately 15% of payroll 
costs and is deducted at source. In addition, private employers pay 35% above the 
employee's salary for 'state-public insurance'. General Income Tax is accumulated in 
state insurance funds, and partly transferred to the municipalities. The separation of the 
funds for social insurance from the state budget was made possible by the Law for the 
Social Insurance Fund (1996). The social insurance funds are managed by the National 
Insurance Institute. 
Every fiscal year a national budget for health care is determined by the government and 
voted by the Parliament (the State Budget Law), allocating shares to health care, 
education and other sectors, according to politically determined priorities. The largest 
items of expenditure are interest payments, defence and security, and transfers to 
municipalities84 • The Ministry of Finance allocates part of the health budget to the 
Ministry of Health and the municipalities. Some teaching hospitals and tertiary care 
centres receive their budgets directly from the Ministry of Finance. 
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Municipalities are allocated funds from central government budget according to 26 
criteria, including local income, population, and health care provision139• In addition to 
transfers from the state budget, municipalities also collect local tax. Thus, in 1998 the 
overall health budget was formed from a 55% contribution from the municipal budgets 
and 45% from the republican budgef61 • Of their total budget, the municipalities allocate 
on average 34% to health care, which is then distributed among municipal-owned 
facilities139• There is considerable disparity between municipalities in resources 
dedicated to health due to variations in municipal budget revenues and non-transparent 
allocation of subsidies from republican budgef61 • 
In recent years the budgetary resources have been insufficient to cover the whole year, 
and many facilities have accumulated debts for electricity, pharmaceuticals etc. Funds 
usually arrive late making planning difficult. 
Complementary sources of finance 
Apart from the state-provided budget, the health care sector in Bulgaria has some limited 
revenues from tuition fees from foreign medical students, out-of-pocket expenditure for 
pharmaceuticals sold in pharmacies, and payments for health care by foreign citizens. 
In the circumstances of economic crisis and health budgetary decrease after 1989, 
universal entitlement to health care benefits was not sustainable. Extra-budgetary 
sources of financing have been sought. A range of user payment mechanisms emerged 
as a means of saving the system from collapse (Table A2-1). These have had a 
detrimental effect on universal access and equity. In the absence of clear regulation and 
uniform standards, such out-of-pocket payments have created confusion among users. 
Other rationing devices have been waiting lists and cancellation of planned operations. 
Table A2-1. Type of payments reported in state health facilities in 1997 
Given to Compatibility with Compatibility with 
the Constitution other legislation 
Under-the-counter To medical and/or 
2ayments for staff services auxiliary staff no no 
User fees for: To the administration 
• Pharmaceuticals of the health facility Use oflegislation 
• Tests (receipt not always yes regulating donation 
• Food, bed linen etc . provided) of property or other 
goods, but not 
• Hospital admission/stay specifically health 
• Staff services (limited) care 
S2onsorshi2, donations Administration of the yes health facility 
Individual staff 
members 
Semi-official user fees started to be used in particular health facilities as an alternative 
source of funding, between 1994 and 1997. They were viewed as an emergency measure 
during the transition to a national health insurance system. Initially, official user fees 
were charged only for pharmaceuticals and on what were deemed to _be "optional" or 
"luxury" services, such as dental care with more expensive matenals, eye-g~asses, 
abortions, infertility treatment, physiotherapy, and balneotherapy1 39 • In 1995, It was 
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already rou~ine. practice for hospital patients to pay for pharmaceuticals, dressings and 
other matenals 1fthese were in short supply. 
In 1997, by Decree, user fees were extended to cover a larger proportion of treatment 
costs including, ~ypica~ly, pharmaceuticals and consumables, and in many cases tests, 
food, hotel fees (mcludmg luxury rooms) and bed linen in some hospitals. Revenue was 
collected in extra-budgetary accounts and spent on basic supplies and drugs. However, 
user fees provided few additional resources (1-2%), insufficient for substantial 
improvements in infrastructure and quality of care. In general, user fees did not 
supplement physicians' remuneration. 
Pharmaceutical costs increased disproportionately and posed the largest burden on users. 
It should be noted that although many ambulatory drugs were paid for out-of-pocket 
during the socialist era, the state subsidised a wide range of groups. After 1989, the level 
of subsidies was narrowed, while at the same time the cost of pharmaceuticals rose due to 
extensive imports, unavailability of cheaper local products, privatisation of the 
pharmaceutical sector and inadequate regulation. Between 1990 and 1998 government 
expenditure on pharmaceuticals rose from 12.3% to 23.7%, but the true cost for the users 
is likely to be higher140 • In general, the supply of drugs was improved by expansion of 
private companies and the presence of international pharmaceutical firms. At the same 
time, the decline in local production of pharmaceuticals and thus, shortages of low price 
generic equivalents, made users increasingly reliant on imported brands sold at 
liberalised prices. State subsidies covered only some vulnerable groups (chronically ill, 
children, war veterans) and some expensive pharmaceuticals such as those for cancer 
chemotherapy, and cardiac disorders. The regulation of prices of pharmaceuticals and 
definition of maximum profit margins was not sufficient to contain the costs of the 
pharmaceutical market. The price liberalisation of medicines made them inaccessible to 
the majority of the population13\ and many hospitals were unable to purchase 
pharmaceuticals and supplies for in-patient care. 
Collection of user fees was legally justified as "voluntary donations". Before 1997, 
when user fees for a large range of services were legalised by governmental decree, they 
were semi-legal and set at the discretion of the individual health facilities. There are only 
general guidelines for the size of payments. Strong support among users for legalisation 
of user fees has been registered in 1994, long before their legalisation, with 65% of 
respondents in a survey conducted among 1000 respondents aged 18+ in 1994 stating 
that they were in favour of the introduction of official user fees for health services205 • In 
many cases the fees aimed not so much to improve quality of care, but to make treatment 
possible at all. The underlying assumption is that the official payment will cover all user 
costs and make illegal payments unnecessary. 
Another type of out-of-pocket payment is under-the-counter payment (UCP). In contrast 
to official user fees, collected and accounted for by the administration of the health 
facility, UCP are given directly to physicians and for a particular service. They are 
illegal. In a survey conducted in Bulgaria in 1994, 42.9% of the respondents reported 
having paid in cash for officially free services in a state medical facility (UCP) in the 
preceding two years205 • The research in this thesis aims to provide more extensive data 
on the scale and characteristics ofUCP, using a variety of techniques. 
An increasingly common extra-budgetary source of funding is voluntary charitable 
contributions and sponsorship by individuals, firms and foundations which resurged after 
1989. There are no data on their size, but it is unlikely that they will bring a steady flow 
of funds into the system, unless tax incentives are introduced. Subscription contracts 
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between employers and state health providers for a certain volume of services are seen as 
another potential source of funds. Foreign aid was also important for coping with 
funding crises in the health sector. 
In the established market economies, voluntary health insurance offers an additional type 
of coverage. This form, although expanding, does not attract significant resources due to 
the small size of the high-income tier in Bulgaria who might be able to afford it. Lack of 
legislation, and fiscal problems such as the difficulty of reimbursement in the presence of 
high inflation, have deterred potential clients. Confidence in insurance companies has 
been undermined due to adverse experiences in the past. 
Health care expenditure 
Public expenditure allocated to health care, as a percentage of GDP, fell after 1992 as a 
consequence of the low priority placed on the health care sector and competing demands 
from other sectors. In 1992, health care expenditure reached its highest point of 5.4% of 
GDP262 or, according to other sources, 6.8% of GDP166, compared to the EU average of 
8.4% and CEE average of 5.1% (Figure A2-3). Within only two years, the per capita 
expenditure on health in Bulgaria was reduced almost by a half, from USD 70 in 1992 to 
USD 38 in 1994. However, data from the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Health in 
Bulgaria show that in 1994-1998, the share of GDP spent on health remained stable, at 
3.5% on average. This is low in view of EU and CEE spending and closer to the NIS 
levels. 
Per capita health expenditure in Bulgaria (USD PPP) in 1996 was also estimated to be 
lower in view of the EU and CEE values: $150 PPP per capita in Bulgaria, compared to 
$1,645 PPP in the EU, $749 in the Czech Republic and $219 Hungary140• 
There appear to be significant differences in resources dedicated to health care among the 
Central and Eastern European countries (Figure A2-4). In Bulgaria, Albania, Romania 
and Poland, which retain a tax-based system, there is a decline or stagnation in the level 
of health financing and expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Their expenditures in 1994 
were below the CEE average of 6% of GDP17 (4% for Bulgaria). In contrast, in 
countries which adopted national health insurance systems after 1990 (Croatia, Slovenia, 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Lithuania), expenditure on health tended to 
grow considerably. It is difficult to determine the reasons for these increases, but they 
have been attributed to cost-escalation effects of the universal insurance systems. 
However, data also show that, at the end of the 1980s, the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia, which had tax-based models at the time, still spent more on health than the 
other CEE countries. It is notable that the highest level of spending, before 1989, was 
registered in Croatia which had a variation of a health insurance model. 
Data on health expenditure covers mainly budgetary spending by central and local 
government. The out-of-pocket payments, such as official user fees and informal 
payments are beyond the scope of existing health expenditure estimates. There is no 
comprehensive information on spending incurred in the private sector. 
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Figure A2-3. Health expenditure as a percentage of GDP: comparison 
Source: Health for All Data Base. European Region. World Health Organisation, Regional Office 
for Europe, June 1999 
Chellaraj G, Adeyi 0, Preker A, Goldstein E. Trends in Health Status, Services, and Finance. 
The Transition in Central and Eastern Europe. Volume II: Statistical Annex, 1996. World Bank 
technical paper No. 348, Social Challenges of Transition Series, The World Bank, Washington DC 
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Primary health care 
Primary care in Bulgaria is organised through a network of polyclinics. In contrast to 
some western countries, in Bulgaria primary care, as the first point of contact with a 
health facility, is actually out-patient care provided by specialists84 • Each polyclinic 
covers a designated area (raion) and has three main types of practitioners: a district 
therapist (serving population of about 2,500-3,000 inhabitants over 15), a paediatrician 
(for 800-1,200 children below 15) and an obstetrician-gynaecologist (for 16,000-18,000 
women). There are 1,650 districts (uchastak) in Bulgaria. The district physicians are not 
sufficiently trained to provide a full range of primary care services. The polyclinics 
provide immediate access, not requiring referral, to a number of narrow profile 
specialists. There is an emphasis on specialisation in internal medicine and thus about 
40% of polyclinic specialists are internists249 • 
The polyclinics are distributed geographically according to the size of population served. 
They are divided into five categories according to the size of settlement and specialities 
represented. Thus, type I to III are located in towns and big cities and provide the full 
range of specialised care. They may be integrated with teaching or other hospitals. 
Types IV-V are present in small towns and in large villages with populations of 6,000-
20,000 people, offering only two or three specialities, including paediatrics if there are at 
least 1,000-1,200 children under 15 in the area249 • There are also rural health centres and 
posts, the latter covering smaller populations, served by a district doctor or feldscher. 
Other features of the Bulgarian primary care system are the urban concentration of highly 
qualified staff, lack of GPs (until recently), and shortages of auxiliary staff. There is an 
excessive specialisation among doctors, 84% being specialists. This has led to 
underutilisation of primary care services, low motivation of staff and high costs of 
primary care. This is a common problem across the CEE countries, reflecting inefficient 
manpower planning. Despite the oversupply of specialists in Bulgaria, there are 
shortages of specialised staff in rural areas, and in more than 1,000 settlements there are 
only feldschers140• 
Problems in the primary care system, such as long waiting times, low standards of care, 
and the unfriendly attitude of staff have discouraged utilisation (Table A2-2). Although 
the annual per capita number of out-patient visits and attendances at dentists has steadily 
increased since the 1970s, some drop in utilisation rates is observed in the 1990s. This 
fall may have neutralised some of the overutilisation associated with the Semashko 
model or the 'unnecessary demand', but it is likely that some of the deterred utilisation 
may have negative implications for the health of the users. However, the general level of 
outpatient utilisation in Bulgaria is among the lowest in CEE (Table A2-3). 
Table A2-2. Average number of outpatient activities per person 
Year 
1970 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
1996 
Out-patient visits per person 
(including visits at home) 
5.4 
7.0 
7.9 
7.2 
5.9 
6.3 
Ambulatory 
attendance of dentists 
1.3 
1.9 
2.2 
2.0 
1.3 
1.4 
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At present, reshaping of the polyclinics system is envisaged, although there is still no 
clear strategy. Among debated options are the introduction of capitation payments to 
family physicians, partial privatisation and self-management of health facilities. Current 
training of GPs under the EU PHARE programme is likely to have far-reaching 
consequences for the long term radical restructuring of the system. 
Secondary and tertiary care 
The current health care system still bears the influence of the extensive growth strategies 
and oversupply of inputs advocated by the communist government in the 1970s. In 
1997, Bulgaria had the highest ratio of beds to population (10 per 1,000) in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE average of 7) (Figure A2-5). Between 1980 and 1994, while the 
overall tendency in the CEE and CIS was towards a decline in the number of beds, 
Bulgaria was the only country where the bed numbers actually increased. This may be a 
result of the restrictions imposed by the municipalities on reduction of beds, and of the 
large proportion of "social beds" u 140 • Comparisons are problematic, however, as 
different data sources cite different figures, presumably because of definitional 
differences. For comparability, in the following discussion, WHO data are used. 
In terms of hospital utilisation, Bulgaria shows a considerably lower admission rate than 
the other CEE countries (Table A2-3) despite the high number of beds. Higher admission 
rates appear likely to be associated with the effects of universal health insurance systems 
(e.g. Czech Republic, Hungary). The average length of stay in 1997 (12.9 days) is in the 
middle of the range for the CEE (CEE average of 11.2). However, the bed occupancy 
rate in acute hospitals, at 64% (1996) is somewhat lower than in CEE, NIS and the EU166 • 
The share of hospital inpatient expenditure in the total health expenditure of Bulgaria is 
among the highest in CEE, demonstrating the system's orientation towards curative 
services. 
The health system overlaps with some social care activities, such as sanatoria, nursery 
schools and old age homes, institutions for mentally and physically disabled etc (in 1997, 
199 altogether, with 50,596 places139). The role of these facilities is unclear. They are 
financed by the municipalities, but in many of them, users are currently required to pay 
fees. 
u Hospitals beds used for longer term stays of elderly, poor or other socially disadvantaged 
groups 
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Figure A2-5. Hospital beds and number of physicians/nurses (per 1,000): comparison 
Source: Health for All Data Base. European Region. World Health Organisation, Regional Office 
for Europe, June 1999 
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The most significant change which occurred in secondary care (in Bulgaria, after 1989) 
was the legalisation of the private sector. The private sector has grown rapidly and by 
the end of 1998, there were 16 small private hospitals, 97 private polyclinics, and 16 
laboratories140 licensed by the Ministry of Health and the Medical Council and 10,000 
private practices licensed by the Municipalities139 • 
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Table A2-3. In-patient utilisation and performance in selected countries (1997) 
Source: Health for All Data Base. European Region. World Health Organisation, Regional Office 
for Europe, June 1999 
HiT (Health Systems in Transition) on Bulgaria (in press). Profile on Health Care in Transition. 
World Health Organisation, Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen: 1999 
Country No. of outpatient Average length In-patient care Hospital inpatient 
contacts/ person/ of stay in days admissions per expenditure/% of 
year 1997 100 population total 
Albania 1.7 7.9 7.7 44 c 
Bulgaria 5.9 a 12.9 15.6 59 b 
Czech Republic 15.1 12.3 20.2 26.1 
Estonia 7 10.9 18.3 n/a 
Hungary 18 a 11 23.7 32.4 f 
Latvia 4.5 12.9 21.7 56.7 
Lithuania 7 12.9 21.8 n/a 
Poland 5.2 10.4 11.6 b n/a 
Romania 8 10 20.9 63 
Russia 9.1 16.6 20.6 73.6 d 
Slovakia 11.8 b 12.1 19.9 32.1 e 
Slovenia 6.8 10 16.2 48.9 
FYR Macedonia 3 13.4 10 29.4 a 
EU average n/a 11.1a 19 a n/a 
CEE average 8.3 11.2 16.8 n/a 
NIS average 8.2 15.9 18.6 n/a 
a. 1996 b. 1995 c. 1994 d. 1992 e. 1990 f. 1989 
Health care staff 
In 1997, Bulgaria had 3.5 physicians per 1,000 population, which is equal to the EU 
average, above the average for the CEE (2.5 per 1,000), but lower than NIS (4 per 1,000) 
(Figure A2-5). Between 1980 and 1990, the number of physicians and auxiliary staff in 
the public sector increased (Figure A2-6). Since 1995, this tendency has reversed, not 
least because of some restriction on the number of students admitted to medical schools 
in the early 1990s, and physicians leaving the system, disenchanted with the conditions 
offered in health care. The numbers of dentists remained stable. Bulgaria has 5. 7 nurses 
per 1,000 population, which is equal to the CEE average and lower than in the NIS (8. 7 
per 1 ,000). The Ministry of Health has planned a 10% reduction in staff followed by a 
30% cut in hospital staff over five years through early retirement and transfers140 • 
The number of privately practising medical professionals in Bulgaria has increased 
dramatically. Since 1991, when private out-patient practice was legalised, the number of 
registered privately-practising physicians rose sharply until 1994 (from 4,124 in 1992, to 
9,424 in 1994250). Increases were less significant for dentists and for nurses, paramedics 
and other auxiliary staff who saw few opportunities in the private sector. In 1997, 30% 
of all physicians were providing private services as well as working in state facilities, 
while 80% of dentists were entirely in the private sector140 • The numbers of registered 
physicians fell after 1994. It is likely that this drop was related to policies of the socialist 
government which opposed physicians practising in both private and public facilities. 
Given that most registered private physicians were using private practice to supplement 
their state job, often sharing the same premises; and the weak position of the out-patient 
private sector; many physicians chose to keep their state jobs. At the same time a 
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succe~sion of economic crises in 1995-6 created insecurity and discouraged entrance to 
the pnvate market among many state physicians and investors. 
Figure A2-6. Medical staff in the public sector per 1,000 of population and in the out-
patient private sector 
Source: Public Health Statistics Annual. Bulgaria 1995. National Centre of Health Information 
I 
Ministry of Health, Sofia: 1996 
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Health care facilities' budgets are determined annually on the basis of historic data such 
as numbers of beds and staff, available equipment, patients treated, and fiscal projections 
for subsequent years (inflation rates, economic growth etc.). The procedure for 
allocating funds is inefficient, with only a weak relation between funding and activities. 
It favours urban hospitals. The budget is organised along separate lines (for salaries, 
food, pharmaceuticals etc.) and managers cannot shift resources between lines. 
Staff in public health facilities in Bulgaria are paid salaries. Despite the introduction of a 
small performance related component, remuneration does not reflect quality, complexity 
or volume of work. Physicians in Bulgaria have among the lowest incomes among all 
state employees who have higher education133 • The average salary is fixed through 
collective bargaining for each sector. Salaries have been raised periodically and adjusted 
for inflation by the government, but inflation prior to 1998 increased much faster than 
salaries could be updated. Payment by salary has not created adequate incentives for 
providing high-quality treatment and for professional development. Attitudes towards 
users have been formal due to the lack of feedback expressed through free choice of 
physician in the system. 
In addition to their salaries, physicians could receive official income from private 
practice. In the private sector physicians are commonly paid on a fee-for-service basis if 
they own the practice, and through capitation if they work for a private facility. 
Alternative unofficial payment mechanisms include income from 'after hours practice' or 
from under-the-counter payments, in cash or in-kind. 
454 
REFERENCES 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
McKee M, Mossialos E, Belcher P. The influence of European Union law on national health 
policy. Journal of European Social Policy 1996; 6:263-286 
Kokkonen P, Kekomaki M. Legal and economic issues in European public health. in 
Normand C, Vaughan P (eds). Europe Without Frontiers. The Implications for Health. John 
Wiley & Sons, 1993 
D'Intignano B M. Health services and the Single Market. Workshop discussion report, in 
Normand C, Vaughan P (eds). Europe Without Frontiers. The Implications for Health. John 
Wiley & Sons, 1993 
Wlodarczyk W C, Mierzewski P. Health service reform in Poland: From Words to Deeds. 
International Social Security Review 1992, University ofLodz and Ministry ofHealth and 
Social Welfare (Poland) 
HiT (Health Systems in Transition) on the Czech Republic & on Poland. Profile on Health 
Care in Transition. World Health Organisation, Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen: 
1994 
CNN. World News Story Page (search on Bulgaria: Oct.1996-Feb.1997). http://cnn.com 
Saltman R, Figueras J. European Health Care Reform. Analysis of Current Strategies. WHO 
Regional Publications, Copenhagen: World Health Organisation, Regional Office for 
Europe, European Series, No.72, 1997 
World Development Report 1993. Investing in Health. The IBRD I The World Bank. 
Oxford University Press, 1993 
Oreskovic S. The Results of the Health Care System Revolution in the Former Socialist 
Countries in Europe. IX International Conference of the International Association of Health 
Policy, Thessaloniki, Greece, September 1995 
Davidov B. Comparative Analysis of Different Insurance Health Care Systems Aimed at the 
Development of Theoretical and Practical References for the National Health Policy. Report 
of a project funded by NATO, January 1992 (in Bulgarian) 
1997: There is no human security in Bulgaria. 24 chasa 30 March 1998 
Waddington C, Enyimayew K. A price to pay, part 2: The impact of user charges in the 
Volta Region of Ghana. International Journal of Health Planning and Management 1990; 
5:287-312 
Hertzman C. Environment and Health in Central and Eastern Europe. A Report for the 
Environmental Action Programme for Central and Eastern Europe. Washington, D.C.: The 
World Bank, 1995 
Donaldson C, Gerard K. Economics of Health Care Financing. The Visible Hand. 
Macmillan: 1993 
Abel-Smith B. An Introduction to Health. Policy, Planning and Financing. Longman: 1994 
Saltman R. A conceptual overview of recent health care reforms. European Journal of 
Public Health 1994; 4 (4): 287-293 
WitterS, Ensor T (eds). An Introduction to Health Economics For Eastern Europe and the 
Former Soviet Union. Centre for Health Economics, University of York. UK: John Wiley & 
Sons, 1997 
OECD. The Reform of Health Care. A Comparative Analysis of Seven OECD Countries. 
Paris: OECD, 1992 
OECD. The Reform of Health Care Systems. A Review of Seventeen OECD Countries. 
Paris: OECD, 1994 
Groenewegen P, Calnan M. Changes in the control of health care systems in Europe. 
Implications for professional autonomy. European Journal of Public Health 1995; 5(4): 
240-244 
455 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
Doorslaer ~'Wagstaff A, .Rutten (eds). Equity in the Finance and Delivery of Health Care. 
An InternatiOnal Perspective. Oxford Medical Publications, 1993 
N_orma~d C. Choosing and Funding a Health Care Program. in Bogetic z, Hillman A (eds). 
Fmancmg Government i~ the Transition: Bulgaria. The Political Economy of Tax Policies, 
Tax Bases and Tax Evaswn. The World Bank Regional and Sectoral Studies, Washington 
D.C.: The IBRD I The World Bank, 1995 
Reinhardt U. The Health System of the United States: Lessons for Other Countries. In 
Dunlop D, Martins J (eds). An International Assessment of Health Care Financing. Lessons 
for Developing Countries. EDI Seminar Series, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1995 
Chollet D, Lewis M. Private insurance: principles and practice. In Schieber G ( ed). 
Innovations in Health Care Financing. Proceedings of a World Bank Conference, March 10-
11 1997. World Bank Discussion Paper No.365, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank 
McGuire A, Henderson J, Mooney G. The Economics of Health Care. Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1988 
Mills A. Improving the Efficiency of Public Sector Health Services in Developing 
Countries: bureaucratic versus market approaches. London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine, PHP Departmental Publication No. 17, 1995 
Saltman R, Von Otter C. Implementing Planned Markets in Health Care. Open University 
Press, 1995 
Hsiao W. 'Marketization'- the illusory magic pill. Health Economics 1994; Vol3: 351-357 
Akin J, Birdsall N, de Ferranti D. Financing Health Services in Developing Countries. An 
Agenda for Reform. A World Bank Policy Study, Washington DC: The World Bank,1987 
Creese A. User charges for health care: a review of recent experience. Health Policy and 
Planning, 1991; 6(4): 309-319 
Abel-Smith B. The world economic crisis. Part 1: repercussions on health. Health Policy 
and Planning 1986; 1 (3): 202-213 
Creese A, Kutzin J. Lessons from cost-recovery in health (draft). WHO, Geneva, 1994 
Abel-Smith B, Figueras J, Holland W, McKee M, Mossialos E. Choices in Health Policy: 
An Agenda for the European Union. Luxembourg: Dartmouth, LSE, 1995 
Gertler P, Locay L, Sanderson W. Are User Fees Regressive? The Welfare Implications of 
Health Care Financing Proposals in Peru. Journal of Econometrics 1987; 36: 67-88 
Birch S. Health care charges: lessons from the UK. Health Policy 1989; 13: 145-157 
Abel-Smith B, Rawal P. Can the poor afford 'free' health services? A case study of 
Tanzania. Health Policy and Planning 1992; 7 (4): 329-341 
Kutzin J. Experience with reform in the financing of the health sector. WHO, Division of 
Strengthening Health Services, National Health Systems and Policies Unit, 1994 
Nolan B, Turbat V. Cost Recovery in Public Health Services in Sub-Saharan Africa. EDI 
Technical Materials, Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1995 
RussellS, Gilson L. User fees at government health services: is equity being considered? an 
international Survey. LSHTM, PHP Departmental Publication No. 15, 1995 
McPake B. User charges for health services in developing countries: a review of the 
economic literature. Social Science and Medicine 1993; 36 (11): 1397-1405 
Fiedler J. Increasing reliance on user fees as a response to public health financing crisis: a 
case study ofEl Salvador. Social Science and Medicine 1993; .36 (6): 735-747 
Litvack J, Bodart C. User fees plus quality equals improved access to health care: results of 
a field experiment in Cameroon. Social Science and Medicine 1993; 37 (3): 369-383 
Waddington C, Enyimayew K. A price to pay: The impact of user charges in Ashanti-Akim 
district, Ghana. International Journal of Health Planning and Management 1989; 4: 17-47 
Mwabu G, Mwanzia J, Liambila W. User charges in government health facilities in Kenya: 
effect on attendance and revenue. Health Policy and Planning 1995; 10 (2): 164-170 
456 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
Gil~on L, Russell S, Buse K. The political economy of user fees with targeting: developing 
eqmtable health financing policy. Journal of International Development 1995; 7 (3):369-
401 
Ryan M, Birch S. Estimating the effects of health service charges: Evidence on the 
utilisation of prescriptions. University of York, Discussion paper No.37, 1988 
De Bethune X. The influence of an abrupt price increase on health service utilisation: 
evidence from Zaire. Health Policy and Planning 1989; 4: 7681 
de Roo A. Contracting and solidarity: Market-oriented changes in Dutch health insurance 
schemes. in Saltman R, Von Otter C. Implementing Planned Markets in Health Care. Open 
University Press, 1995 
Moorhouse A. User fees: fair cost containment or a tax on the sick? The Canadian Nurse 
May 1993: 21-24 
Huber J. Ensuring access to health care with the introduction of user fees: a Kenyan 
example. Social Science and Medicine 1993; 36 (4): 485-494 
Thomason J, Mulou N, Bass C. User charges for rural health services in Papua New 
Guinea. Social Science and Medicine 1994; 39 (8): 1105-1115 
52 Waddington C, Enyimayew K. A price to pay: The impact of user charges in Ashanti-Akim 
district, Ghana. International Journal of Health Planning and Management 1989; 4: 17-47. 
and Waddington C, Enyimayew K. A price to pay, part 2: The impact of user charges in the 
Volta Region of Ghana. International Journal of Health Planning and Management 1990; 
5: 287-312 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Weaver M. User fees and patient behaviour: evidence from Niamey National Hospital. 
Health Policy and Planning 1995; 10 (4): 350-361 
Yoder R. Are people willing and able to pay for health services? Social Science and 
Medicine 1989; 29 (1): 35-42 
Kupor S, Liu Y, Lee J, Yoshikawa A. The effect of copayments and income on the 
utilisation of medical care by subscribers to Japan's national health insurance system. 
International Journal of Health Services 1995; 25 (2): 295-312 
Cherkin D, Grothaus L, Wagner E. Is magnitude of co-payment effect related to income? 
Using census data for health services research, Social Science and Medicine 1992; 34 (1): 
33-41 
Diop F, Y azbeck, Bitran R. The impact of alternative cost recovery schemes on access and 
equity in Niger. Health Policy and Planning 1995; 10 (3): 223-240 
Shepard D, Carrin G, Nyandagazi P. Household participation in financing of health care at 
government health centres in Rwanda. in Mills A, LeeK (eds). Health Economics Research 
in Developing Countries. Oxford University Press, 1993 
Lewis M. A study of hospital fees in the Dominican Republic. in Mills A, LeeK (eds). 
Health Economics Research in Developing Countries. Oxford University Press, 1993 
Wouters A. Improving quality through cost recovery in Niger. Health Policy and Planning 
1995; 10 (3): 253-271 
Mills A. Exempting the poor: the experience of Thailand. Social Science and Medicine 
1991; 33 (11): 1241-1252 
Creese A. Organisation and financing of health care reform in countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Report of a meeting held at the WHO, Geneva 1991. Journal d 'Economie 
Medicate 1992; 10 (112): 5-40 
Griffin C. Welfare gains from user charges for government health services. Health Policy 
and Planning 1992; 7 (2): 177-180 
Musgrove P. What should consumers in poor countries pay for publicly-provided health 
services? Social Science and Medicine 1986; 22 (3): 329-333 
McPake B, Hanson K, Mills A. Community financing of health care in Africa: an 
evaluation of the Bamako initiative. Social Science and Medicine 1993; 36 (11): 1383-1395 
457 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
David J, Do drug copayments work?, Canadian Medical Association Journall994· 150 
(9~: 1491-3. Review ofHurley J, Johnson NA: The effects of co-payments within d~g 
reimbursement programs. Can Public Policy 1991; 17: 473-489 
Willis C, Leighton C. Protecting the poor under cost recovery: the role of means testing. 
Health Policy and Planning 1995; 10 (3): 241-256 
Saltman R, Figueras J, Sakellarides C. Critical Challenges for Health Care Reform in 
Europe. State of Health Series, Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press, WHO, 
1998 
Mills A, BennettS. Lessons on sustainability from middle and lower income countries. 
Funding health care and long-term care: options in Europe. Analytical Study. The European 
Observatory on Health Care Systems, WHO, 2000 (draft) 
Normand C. Social Health Insurance Systems. Funding health care and long-term care: 
options in Europe. Analytical Study. The European Observatory on Health Care Systems, 
WHO (2000 draft) 
Ludbrook A, Maynard A, The funding of the national health services. What is the problem 
and is social insurance the answer?, 1988, University ofYork, Discussion paper 39 
Recent reforms in organisation, financing and delivery of health care in Central and Eastern 
Europe in light of accession to the European Union. Background paper, Consensus 
Programme, May 1998 
73 Massaro TA, Nemec J, Kalman I. Health system reform in the Czech Republic. Policy 
lessons from the initial experience of the general health insurance company. JAMA. 1994 
Jun 15; 271(23): 1870-4 
74 Busse R. Funding the social health insurance in Germany- basic characteristics and the 
effect of recent changes. Funding health care and long-term care: options in Europe. 
Analytical Study. The European Observatory on Health Care Systems, WHO, 2000 (draft) 
75 Abel-Smith B. Book review: Akin J, Birdsall N, de Ferranti D. Financing Health Services 
in Developing Countries. An Agenda for Reform. A World Bank Policy Study, Washington 
D.C. 1987; Health Policy and Planning 1987; 2 (4): 355-358 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
Bennett S, Creese A, Monasch R. Health insurance schemes for people outside formal 
sector employment. Current Concerns, ARA Paper number 16, 1998, Division of Analysis, 
Research and Assessment, WHO 
Stinson W. Community-financing, PHC issues. APHA. Washington D.C. 1982 series 1 No. 
4; Potential and limitations of community-financing. World Health Forum 1984; 5 
Arhin DC. Rural Health Insurance: A Viable Alternative to User Fees?, LSHTM, PHP 
Departmental Publications No.19, 1995 
Abel-Smith B, Dua A. Community-financing in developing countries: the potential for the 
health sector. Health Policy and Planning 1988; 3 (2): 95-108 
Gilson L, Kalyalya D, Kuchler F, LakeS, Oranga H, Ouendo M. Promoting equity within 
community financing schemes: experiences from three African countries. A study 
commissioned by UNICEF as part of its Bamako Initiative Operational Research 
Programme, 1999 
Barr N ( ed). Labour Markets and Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe: the 
Transition and Beyond. Oxford University Press: 1994 
Preker A Feachem R Market Forces in the Health Sector: the Experience of the Former 
' ' Socialist States of Central and Eastern Europe, 1993, Conference paper presented at an EDI 
Senior Policy Seminar, China 
Abel-Smith B. Assessing the Experience of Health Financing in the United Kingdom. In 
Dunlop D, Martins J (eds). An International Assessment of Health Care Financing. Lessons 
for Developing Countries. EDI Seminar Series, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1995 
Schaapveld K. Krleza-Jeric K. Stiphout J. Management Aspects of the Bulgarian Health 
Care Reform. TNO Prevention and Health, division Public Health and Prevention, report 
PG 95.075, November 1995 
458 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
Enthoven A. Market-?~sed reforn: of U.S. health care financing and delivery: managed care 
and managed competitiOn. In Schieber G ( ed). Innovations in Health Care Financing. 
Proceedings of a World Bank Conference, March 10-11 1997. World Bank Discussion 
Paper No.365, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank 
HiT (Health Systems in Transition). Profile on Health Care in Transition series. World 
Health Organisation, Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen: 1999 and 1994 
The World Bank LSMS survey in Bulgaria 1995. Data and documentation at 
http://www.worldbank.org/html/prdph/lsms/country/bg95/bg95datb.html 
HiT (Health Systems in Transition) on Poland. Profile on Health Care in Transition. World 
Health Organisation, Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen: 1994 
Normand C, Weber A. Social Health Insurance. A Guidebook for Planning. WHO, 1994 
Tibouti A, Flori Y, Juillet A. Household Surveys of Health Care Demand and Health 
Expenditures. A Practical Guide. Bamako Initiative Technical Report Series, No.17, 
UNICEF, 1993 
RoseR, Makkai T. Consensus or Dissensus in Welfare Values in Post-Communist 
Societies? 1993, Studies in Public Policy 219, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 
University of Strathclyde 
Hassan F, Peters K. The Structure of Incomes and Social Protection During the Transition: 
The Case of Bulgaria. Europe and Central Asia Department, The World Bank, January 
1995 
RussellS, Fox-Rushby J, Arhin D, How to do (or not to do) ... Willingness and ability to 
pay for health care: a selection of methods and issues. Health Policy and Planning 1995; 10 
(1): 94-101 
Delcheva E. What do consumers pay for health care in Bulgaria? Journal of Health 
Economics 1999 (in press) 
Burrows C, Brown K. Are any numbers better than no numbers? The sorry state of 
willingness-to-pay and some major methodological shortcomings. Aust-Health-Rev 1992; 
15(2): 135-44 
Patton Q ( ed). How to use qualitative methods in evaluation. Sage Publications, 1987 
Strauss A, Corbin J. Basics of qualitative research. Grounded theory procedures and 
techniques, Sage Publications, 1990 
Dean J, Eichhorn R, Dean L. Limitations and advantages of unstructured method. In 
McCall-Simmons. Issues in participant observation. A Text and Reader. Addison Wesley, 
1969 
Hudelson P. Qualitative research for health programmes. Division of Mental Health, WHO, 
Geneva, 1994 
100 Burgess R ( ed). Field research: a sourcebook and field manual. London: Allen and Unwin, 
1982 
101 Fontana A, Frey J. Interviewing: The Art of Science. In Denzin Nand Lincoln Y (eds), 
Handbook of Qualitative Research, Sage Publications, 1994 
102 Britten N. Qualitative Interviews in Medical Research. BMJ22 July 1995; 311: 251-253 
103 Maier B. Assessment of the district health system using qualitative methods. London: 
Macmillan, 1994 
104 Robson C. Real world research. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993 
105 Kroeger A. Health Interview Surveys in Developing Countries: A Review of the Methods 
and Results. International Journal of Epidemiology 1983; 12 (4): 465-481 
106 Whyte W. Interviewing in Field Research. In: Burgess R ( ed). Field research: a sourcebook 
and field manual. London: Allen and Unwin, 1982 
107 Foddy W (ed.). Constructing Questions for Interviews and Questionnaires. Cambridge 
University Press, 1994 
108 Barnard A, Burgess T. Sociology explained. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 
459 
109 
Merton R, Fiske M, Kendall P. The focused interview: a manual of problems and 
procedures. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1956 
110 Goodman H, Waddington C. Financing Health Care. UK and Ireland: Oxfam, 1993 
111 Krippendorf, 1980 in Robson C. Real world research. 1993, Oxford: Blackwell 
112 
Hammersley M, Atkinson P. Ethnography: Principles in Practice. London: Routledge, 1995 
113 Balabanova D. Health care reforms in Bulgaria: Current problems and options for 
development. EuroHealth, October 1995; 1(2): 25-28 
114 Tremblay M. The Key Informant Technique: A Non-Ethnographic Application. In Burgess 
R (ed). Field research: a sourcebook and field manual. London: Allen and Unwin, 1982 
115 Ford N, Sporne C. Survey Interviewing and Key Informant Interviewing. Institute of 
Population Studies, January 1988 
116 Seeley J, Kajura E, Mulder D. Methods used to study household coping strategies in rural 
South West Uganda. Health Policy and Planning 1995; 10 (1): 79-88 
117 Grootaert C, Cheung K F. Household Expenditure Surveys, Some methodological issues. 
Living Standards Measurement Study Working Paper No. 22. Washington, D.C.: IBRD/The 
World Bank, 1985 
118 Cumper G. Health Sector Financing: Estimating Health Expenditure in Developing 
Countries: A Discussion Paper. EPS Publication No.9. Evaluation and Planning Centre for 
Health Care, LSHTM, 1986 
119 Mcintyre R J. Bulgaria. Politics, Economics and Society. Pinter (Publishers), 1988 
120 ESOMAR. Harmonisation of ESOMAR criteria for demographic data. 1996 
121 Divisions Within Bulgaria. A Survey of Economic and Political Behaviour by NAPOC, 
Sofia. Studies in Public Policy No. 199. Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of 
Strathclyde, 1992 
122 Dey I. Qualitative data analysis. A user-friendly guide for social scientists. Routledge, 1995 
123 Blaxter M. Health and lifestyles. London: Routledge, 1990 
124 Malina A. Basic principles of the state health policy in the Czech Republic. Antidotum, 
Management in health sector (WHO & Health Care Managers' Association in Poland) 
1994; Supplement #1 
125 Lampe JR. The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century. Croom Helm, 1986 
126 NOEMA - Social Research and Marketing. Program 'Health'. Survey report. Sofia: 1995 
127 HiT (Health Systems in Transition) on the Czech Republic. Profile on Health Care in 
Transition. World Health Organisation, Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen: 1994 
128 Mierzewski P. Reform experiences. Facing the challenges. Antidotum, Management in 
health sector (WHO & Health Care Managers' Association in Poland) 1993; Supplement #1 
129 Balicki M, Sabbat J. The state's responsibility for health care in Poland. Antidotum, 
Management in health sector (WHO & Health Care Managers' Association in Poland) 
1994; Supplement #1 
131 
130 UNDP. Poverty in Transition? The Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS, July 1998 
Summary of preliminary findings of the UN Inter-agency need assessment mission, 
February-March 1997 
132 Vitkova M. Paving the way for stabilisation of the system. Forum Medicus, 8 January 1996 
133 Borissov V, Rathwell T. Health care reforms in Bulgaria: an initial appraisal. Soc Sci Med 
1996; 42 (11): 1501-1510 
134 Bogetic z, Hillman A (eds). Financing Government in the Transition: Bulgaria. The 
Political Economy of Tax Policies, Tax Bases and Tax Evasion. The World Bank Regional 
and Sectoral Studies, Washington D.C.: The IBRD I The World Bank, 1995 
135 Goldstein E, Preker A, Adeyi 0, Chellaraj G. Trends in Health Status, Services, and 
Finance. The Transition in Central and Eastern Europe. Volume I, 1996. World Bank 
Technical Paper No.341, Social Challenges of Transition Series, The IBRD/ The World 
Bank, Washington, D.C. 
460 
136 
Ahmad, Dreze J, Hills J, Sen A (eds). Social Security in Developing Countries, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford: 1991 
137 
Kumchev T. Bulgarian Health Care: Which way in 1995? Forum Medicus, 1995 
138 
Koushev. Medical services in the period of privatisation of agriculture. Social Medicine 
1994;2 
139 
HiT (Health Systems in Transition) on Bulgaria. Profile on Health Care in Transition. 
World Health Organisation, Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen: 1999 (in press) 
140 
Ministry of Health. Better health for a better future in Bulgaria: a health policy proposal. 
Ministry ofHealth, Sofia, February 1999 
141 
Davidov B. Bulgarian health insurance system: some pros and cons. Social Medicine 1996; 
3: 38-41 
142 Slavchev P, Georgieva L. The reform of health care in Bulgaria in the light of international 
experience. Social Medicine 1995; 2: 23-27 
143 Delcheva E, Popov M. Market infiltration in health care. Forum Medicus, January 1995 
144 Barr N, Harbison R. Overview: Hopes, Tears, and Transformation. in Barr N ( ed). Labour 
Markets and Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. The Transition and Beyond. The 
IBRD/ The World Bank, Oxford University Press, 1994 
145 Hart JT. The inverse care law. Lancet 1971 Feb 27; 1(7696): 405-12 
146 Miilunpalo S, Vuori I, Oja P, Pasanen M, Urponen H. Self-rated health status as a health 
measure: the predictive value of self-reported health status on the use of physician services 
and on mortality in the working-age population. J-Clin-Epidemiol1997; 50(5): 517-28 
147 Doorslaer E, Wagstaff A, Bleichrodt H, Calonge S, Gerdtham U, Gerfin M, Geurts J, Gross 
L, Hakkinen U, LeuR, O'Donnell 0, Propper C, Puffer F, Rodriguez M, Sundberg G, 
Winkelhake 0. Income-related inequalities in health: some international comparisons. 
Journal of Health Economics 1997, 16: 93-112 
148 Schaapveld K, Chorus A, Perenboom R. The European health potential: what can we learn 
from each other? Health Policy 1995; 33: 205-217 
149 Gwatkin D. Poverty and Inequalities in Health Within Developing Countries. A Paper 
prepared for the Ninth Annual Public Health Forum of the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine, April 1999 
150 Goetzel RZ, Anderson DR, Whitmer RW, Ozminkowski RJ, Dunn RL, Wasserman J. The 
relationship between modifiable health risks and health care expenditures: an analysis of the 
multi-employer HERO health risk and cost database. Association of Health Services 
Research 1998; 15: 129-
151 Terry PE, Fowler EJ, Fowles JB, Are health risks related to medical care charges in the 
short-term? Challenging traditional assumptions. Am-J-Health-Promot. 1998 May-Jun; 
12(5): 340-7 
152 McGee DL, Liao Y, Cao G, Cooper RS. Self-reported health status and mortality in a 
multiethnic US cohort. Am J Epidemiol1999 Jan 1; 149(1): 41-6 
153 Idler EL, Kasl SV, Self-ratings of health: do they also predict change in functional ability? 
J-Gerontol-B-Psychol-Sci-Soc-Sci 1995 Nov; 50(6): S344-53 
154 GrauL, West B, Gregory P. "How do you feel?" Self-reported health as an indicator of 
current physical and mental health status. J-Psychosoc-Nurs-Ment-Health-Serv. 1998 Jun; 
36(6): 24-30 
155 Waidmann T, Bound J, Schoenbaum M. The illusion of failure: trends in the self-reported 
health of the U.S. elderly. Milbank-Q 1995; 73(2): 253-87 
156 Berg-Kelly K; Ehrver M; Erneholm T; Gundevall C; Wennerberg I; Wettergren L. Self-
reported health status and use of medical care by 3,500 adolescents in western Sweden. 
Acta-Paediatr-Scand 1991 Aug-Sep; 80(8-9): 837-43 
157 Hultsch DF; Hammer M; Small BJ. Age differences in cognitive performance in later life: 
relationships to self-reported health and activity life style. J-Gerontoll993 Jan; 48(1): PI-
ll 
461 
158 Bradford VP, Graham BP, Reinert KG. Accuracy of self-reported health histories: a study. 
Mil-Med 1993 Apr; 158(4): 263-5 
159 Elkeles T, Seifert W. Immigrants and Health: Unemployment and Health-Risks of Labour 
Migrants in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1984-1992. Soc Sci Med 1996; 43 (7): 1035-
1047 
160 International variation in socio-economic inequalities in self-reported health. A comparison 
of the Netherlands with other industrialised countries. Netherlands Central Bureau of 
Statistics, Erasmus University, The Hague: sdu/publishers/ cbs-publications, 1992 
161 Johnson DB, Li Y, Kimminau K. Relative importance of sociodemographic factors in 
assessment of self-reported health status for different ethnicities: a baseline study of Hawaii 
QUEST participation 1994. AHSR-FHSR-Annu-Meet-Abstr-Book 1996; 13: 131 
162 Sundquist J, Johansson SE, Long-term illness among indigenous and foreign-born people in 
Sweden. Soc-Sci-Med 1997 Jan; 44(2): 189-98 
163 Ivanov L, Glutnikova Z, Kalinov K. Adequacy and quality of primary health care 
(consumers' and doctors' opinion). Report from a sociological survey. The National Centre 
of Public Health, Ministry of Health, Sofia: Bulletin 1, December 1996 
164 OECD Health Data 97. OECD/ CREDES 
165 Health survey for England 1996. http://www.official-documents.co.uk/document/doh/ 
survey96/ehcont.htm 
166 Health for All Data Base. European Region. World Health Organisation, Regional Office 
for Europe, June 1999 
167 Bobak M, Pikhart H, Hertzman C, Rose R, Marmot M. Socioeconomic factors, perceived 
control and self-reported health in Russia. A cross-sectional survey. Soc Sci Med 1998, Jul; 
47(2): 269-79 
168 Chawla M, Berman P, Kawiorska D. Financing health services in Poland: new evidence on 
private expenditure. Health Econ 1998; 7: 337-346 
169 Minev D, Dermendjieva B, Mileva N. The Bulgarian country profile: the dynamics of some 
inequalities in health. Soc Sci Med 1990; 31(8): 837-846, 
170 Townsend P, Whitehead M, Davidson N. Inequalities in Health, 1992 Edition 
171 Rahman 0, Strauss J, Gertler P, Ashley D, Fox K. Gender differences in adult health: an 
international comparison. Gerontologist 1994 Aug; 34( 4): 463-9 
172 Ross CE, Bird CE. Sex stratification and health lifestyle: consequences for men's and 
women's perceived health. J Hlth Soc Behav 1994; 35 (161) 
173 Ross CE, Wu CL. Education, age, and the cumulative advantage in health. J-Health-Soc-
Behav 1996 Mar; 37(1): 104-20 
174 Marmot MG, Fuhrer R, Ettner SL, Marks NF, Bumpass LL, RyffCD. Contribution of 
psychosocial factors to socioeconomic differences in health. Milbank-Q 1998; 76(3): 403-
48 
175 Kanarek N, Alt P, Predictors of excellent and poor self-rated health status, MD BRFS 
1993-95 Association ofHealth Services Research. 1998; 15: 33 
' 176 Mackenbach J, Kunst A, Cavelaars A, GroenhofF, Geurts J, and the EU Working Group on 
Socioeconomic Inequalities in Health. Socioeconomic inequalities in morbidity and 
mortality in western Europe. The Lancet 1997 June 7; 349: 1655-1659 
177 Benzeval M. The self-reported health status of lone parents. Soc-Sci-Med 1998 May; 
46(10): 1337-53 
178 Helmert U, Mielck A, Shea S. Poverty, Health, and Nutrition in Germany. Reviews on 
Environmental Health 1997; 12 (3): 159-170 
179 Arber S. Integrating nonemployment into research on health inequalities. Int-J-Health-Serv 
1996; 26(3): 445-81 
18° Kawachi I, Kennedy BP. Income inequality, social cohesion, and population health: new 
frontiers in research on social inequalities in health. Association of Health Services 
Research 1998; 15: 219-20 
462 
181 
Hraba J, Lorenz F, Lee G, Pechacovam Z. Gender differences in health: evidence from the 
Czech Republic. Soc-Sci-Med 1996 Nov; 43(10): 1443-51 
182 Demery L, Mehra K. The incidence of social spending in Bulgaria. A background paper 
prepared for the Bulgaria Poverty Assessment Study of the World Bank. (draft), Oct 1996 
183 Abel-Smith B, Falkingham J. Financing Health Services in Kyrgyzstan: the extent of private 
payments. Mimeo LSE Health, London: London School of Economics 1995 
' 184 Kaplan GA, Camacho T. Perceived health and mortality: a nine year follow-up of the 
Human Population Laboratory Cohort. Am J Epidemio/1983; 117: 292-8. 
185 Goldstein MS, Siegel JM, Boyer R. Predicting changes in perceived health status. Am J 
Pub! Health 1984; 74: 611-15. 
186 Wnuk-Lipinski E, Illsley R. Introduction. Soc Sci Med 1990; 31(8): 833-836, 
187 Whitehead M. The Health Divide. In: Inequalities in Health. London: Penguin, 1992 
188 Strauss J, Thomas D. Health Nutrition, and Economic Development. J Econ Literature 
1998; 36: 766-817 
189 Asthana S. Variations in poverty and health between slum settlements: contradictory 
findings from Viakhpatnam, India. Soc Sci Med 1995; 40: 177-88 
190 Yach D, Mathews C, BuchE. Urbanization and health: methodological difficulties in 
undertaking research in developing countries. Soc Sci Med 1990; 31: 507-## 
191 J6zan P, Forster DP. Social inequalities and health: ecological study of mortality in 
Budapest, 1980-3 and 1990-3. BMJ 1999; 318: 914-5 
192 Balabanova D, Bobak M, McKee M. Patterns of smoking in Bulgaria. Tobacco Control, 
1998; 7:383-385 
193 Balabanova D, McKee M. Determinants of alcohol consumption in Bulgaria. Alcohol and 
Alcoholism (in press) 
194 Hoffmeister H, Bellach BM. Die Gesundheit der Deutschen. RKI-Hefte 711995. Berlin: 
Robert Koch-Institut, 1995 
195 Public Health Statistics Annual. Bulgaria 1996. National Centre of Health Information, 
Ministry of Health, Sofia: 1997 
196 Main findings. A background paper prepared by Gallup for the Bulgaria Poverty 
Assessment Study of the World Bank. January, 1996 (unpublished material) 
197 Safran DG, Taira DA, Rogers WH, Kosinski M, Ware JE, Tarlov AR. Linking primary care 
performance to outcomes of care. J-Fam-Pract. 1998 Sep; 47(3): 213-20 
198 Apel H, Strumpel B. Economic well-being as a criterion for system performance: a survey 
in Bulgaria and Greece. In Economic well-being in a system of social indicators. Ann 
Arbor, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan Press, 1976 
199 Mossialos E. Citizens and health systems: main results from a Eurobarometer survey. 
Employment & social affairs. Health. European Commission. Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 1998 
200 Griffin C, Paqueo V. The development, growth, and distribution of public and private 
medical resources in the Philippines. in Mills A, LeeK (eds). Health Economics Research 
in Developing Countries, Oxford University Press: 1993 
201 Framework for the Measurement of Unrecorded Economic Activities in Transition 
Economies. Paris: OECD, http://www.oecd.org//sge/ccnm/pubs/gd/cdge1411/present.htm, 
1997 
202 Tanzi V ( ed). The Underground Economy in the United States and Abroad. Toronto: 
Lexington Books D.C. Heath and Company, 1982 
203 Transparency and accountability: the case of public hospitals in Latin America. Inter-
American Development Bank. Research Network Project- fifth round (1998-1999), 
http://www.iadb.org/oce/44b.cfm?PROJECTNUM=19, (in progress) 
204 Ensor T, Savelyeva L. Informal payments for health care in the Former Soviet Union: some 
evidence from Kazakstan. Health Policy and Planning 1998; 13(1): 41-49 
463 
205 Delcheva E, Balabanova D, McKee M. Under-the-counter payments for health care. Health 
Policy, 1997; 42: 89-100 
206 HiT (Health Systems in Transition) on Hungary. Profile on Health Care in Transition. 
World Health Organisation, Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen: 1999 (in press) 
207 Bulgaria: Bulgarians perceive rampant corruption. Public Management Forum, Sigma, 
May/June 1998, Transparency International; 
http://www. transparency .de/ documents/newsletter/ 
208 Gopakumar K. Citizen Feedback Surveys to Highlight Corruption in Public Services. The 
Experience of Public Affairs Centre, Bangalore. Transparency International Working Paper, 
the Annual General Meeting of Transparency International in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 
Sept. 1998 
209 Falkingham J. Barriers to Access? The growth of private payments for health care in 
Kyrgyzstan. EuroHealth, Special Issue Winter 1998/99; 4(6): 68-71 
210 World Bank and ACER Governance and Corruption in Albania: the imperative of 
institutional reform. A preliminary empirical inquiry and implications. Paper prepared for 
Albania Anti-corruption workshop, Tirana, June 30, 1998 
211 Data published by the "Klan" magazine in June 1998, provided with the kind assistance of 
Besim Nuri, from the World Bank 
212 UNDP. Human Development Report. UNDP, Kazakstan, 1997 
213 Leichter H. A comparative approach to policy analysis. Health care policy in four nations. 
Cambridge University Press, 1979 
214 The National Statistical Institute. Statistical Reference Book 1998. Sofia: Statistical 
Publishing House, 1998 (in Bulgarian) 
215 The National Statistical Institute. Incomes, expenditures and consumption of households. 
1995-1999. Sofia: Statistical Publishing House 
216 van Zon H. Alternative Scenarios for Central Europe. Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary. Avebury, 1994 
217 Drummond M. Methods for the economic evaluation of health care programmes. Oxford 
New York Oxford University Press 1997 
218 Gomart E. Social Assessment Report on the Health and Education Sectors in Armenia. Dec. 
1996 
219 Hennell T. Paying for the NHS. BMJ 2000; 321: 898 
22° Cichon M, Normand C. Between Beveridge and Bismarck: Options for Health Care 
Financing in Central and Eastern Europe. World Health Forum 1994; 15 
221 Crampton JR. A Concise History of Bulgaria. Cambridge University Press, 1997 
222 CIA. The World Factbook 1998. http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/bu.html 
223 U.S. Department of State. Background Notes: Bulgaria. October 1998, 
http://www.state.gov/www/background notes/bulgaria_9810_bgn.html 
224 Bartlett W. Privatisation and Small Firms in Bulgaria: An Overview. Working paper 116, 
School for Advanced Urban Studies, University ofBristol, 1993 
225 
.•• rich man, poor man, beggar man .... The Economist Feb 3-9 1996; 338:31 
226 OECD. OECD Economic surveys: Bulgaria. Paris: OECD, 1997 
227 Mihailov H. Beginning of social insurance protection of the working class in Bulgaria. 
Hygiene and Health Care 1980; 23 (4): 381-387, Medicine and Sport state publishing 
house, Sofia 
228 Walton M. Households and the State. in Bogetic Z, Hillman A (eds). Financing Government 
in the Transition: Bulgaria. The Political Economy of Tax Policies, Tax Bases and Tax 
Evasion. The World Bank Regional and Sectoral Studies, Washington D.C.: The IBRD I 
The World Bank, 1995 
229 TransMONEE database 3.0. UNICEF International Child Development Centre (ICDC), 
Florence 
464 
230 Bogetic Z. Bulgaria in Transition: An Overview. in Bogetic Z, Hillman A (eds) Financing 
Government in the Transition: Bulgaria. The Political Economy of Tax Policies, Tax Bases 
and Tax Evasion. The World Bank Regional and Sectoral Studies, Washington D.C.: The 
IBRD I The World Bank, 1995 
231 Jeffries I. Socialist economies and the transition to the market. Routledge, 1993 
232 Hillman A, Mitov L, Peters K. The Private Sector, State Enterprises, and Informal 
Economic Activity. in Bogetic Z, Hillman A (eds) Financing Government in the Transition: 
Bulgaria. The Political Economy of Tax Policies, Tax Bases and Tax Evasion. The World 
Bank Regional and Sectoral Studies, Washington D.C.: The IBRD I The World Bank, 1995 
233 Definition of poverty according to European standards. Pari 10 June 1998 (in Bulgarian) 
234 Bulgaria. Human Development Report 1995. Sofia: National and Global Development, 
UNDP, 1995 
235 World Development Report 1996. From Plan to Market. The IBRD I The World Bank. 
Oxford University Press, 1996 
236 World Development Report 1998199. Knowledge for Development. The IBRD I The World 
Bank. Oxford University Press, 1999 
237 Briefing No.6. Bulgaria and the enlargement of the European Union. 
http:llwww.europarl.eu.intlenlargement/briefingslen/6al.htm, 26 February 1999 
238 The World Bank. World Development Indicators on CD ROM. 1997 
239 Herr H, Tober S, Westphal A. Output Collapse and Economic Recovery in Central and 
Eastern Europe. in Herr H et al (eds). Macroeconomic Problems of Transformation. 
Stabilisation Policies and Economic Restructuring. Aldershot, 1994 
240 The 'blue' MP Alexander Hadjiiski takes on the Statistics, Pari 21 May 1998 (in Bulgarian) 
241 Bizled international schools information service, 1996-99; http:l/bizednet.bris.ac.uk/ 
242 RomaiGypsies: A European Minority. Minority Rights Group International Update, March 
1998 
243 Movit C. Privatization and the pace of economic transition-Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Russia, and Ukraine: some non-Bank perspectives. PlanEcon, Washington D.C., Oct.1997 
244 The National Statistical Institute. Statistical Reference Book 1993. Sofia: Statistical 
Publishing House, 1994 (in Bulgarian) 
245 Emerson M (Minority Rights Group International). presentation at ECOHOST seminar at 
the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Spring 1998 
246 Panev A. Development and character of the health care in Bulgaria, Sofia, 1947 (in 
Bulgarian) 
247 McKee M, Bobak M, Kalina K, Bojan F, Enachescu D. Health sector reform in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Romania. Croatian Medical Journa/1994; 35: 238-44 
248 Hajdu P, McKee M, Bojan F. Changes in premature mortality differentials by marital status 
in Hungary and in England and Wales. Eur J Pub! Health 1995; 5:259-64 
249 Popova S, Feschieva N. The state of primary medical care in Bulgaria. Journal of Public 
Health Medicine 1995; 17:6-10 
250 Public Health Statistics Annual. Bulgaria 1995. National Centre of Health Information, 
Ministry of Health, Sofia: 1996 
251 Hadjiiski I. Optimistic Theory About our People. Sofia: Bulgarski pisatel publishing 
house, 1974 (In Bulgarian) 
252 Bojar M. Europe without frontiers. in Normand C, Vaughan P (eds). Europe Without 
Frontiers. The Implications for Health. John Wiley & Sons, 1993 
253 Democrats at NATO's door. The Economist June 1-7 1996; 339: 15 
254 Frost G. New Life for the Atlantic Relationship. The Economist May 18-24 1996; 339: 40 
255 Single-currency-minded. The Economist Dec. 23-Jan. 5 1996; 337: 45-46 
256 Nikolov I, Andreev E, Kurtev V. 100 years of health care in Bulgaria. Rentgenology and 
Radiology, 1974; 4: 211-221 
257 Davidova B. History of health care in Bulgaria. Sofia: 1956 
465 
258 Apostolov M. 40 years of socialist health care. Hygiene and Health Care, 1984; 27 (5): 401-
407, Ministry of Health, Medicine and Sport state publishing house, Sofia 
259 Golemanov H. The first socialist law for people's health. Hygiene and Health Care, 1974; 
17 ( 1 ): 1-6, Ministry of Health, Medicine and Sport state publishing house, Sofia 
260 Decree No.5 from 22 April 1991 for the Conditions and Procedure for Private Medical 
Practice, Darzhaven Vestnik (official publication of the Bulgarian Parliament), 1991; 37: 4-
7, Ministry ofHealth 
261 Delcheva E. Health Care Financing. In Gladilov S, Delcheva E (eds). Health Care 
Economics, Sofia: Grafikkonsult, 1998 
262 Chellaraj G, Adeyi 0, Preker A, Goldstein E. Trends in Health Status, Services, and 
Finance. The Transition in Central and Eastern Europe. Volume II: Statistical Annex, 1996. 
World Bank technical paper No.348, Social Challenges of Transition Series, The World 
Bank, Washington, D.C. 
466 
LIFE·STYLE AND HEALTH SERVICES 
(MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE) 
Section A: HouMhold deac;rlptlon 
00 Household members 
CODER FOR Al 
Family relation to the meln reepondent 
6 Sl1terlbrother of IN! main respondent or 
ol the w•felhuaband/ partner 
Wifethuabandlpwtner (cohabitaUon w1lhout otriCial OrendsonlgranddlllJt;Jhler of tho mam 
mwrlege) of the main respondent respond en II W1 1elhuliband/ partne~ 
Son/daugh'-' of the mam , .. pondent end the Orandmotherlgrandfathor of the main 
wifelhuabandlpwtnw reapondenV wife /husband/ partner 
Sonldaught. only of lhe m.., respondent or only Other relative 
of the wif-.thuabandlp•ln• 
MottMir JfMh• ollhe man respondent, or of 10 Non-relatNe . member of the househOld 
wtlalhulbandlp•VIOI 
Lower than Pflmwy 
Pnmwy 
Uncomplet~ Mcondary 
Profe .. lonal t.chnic,. tchool 
~wy: g.t'* .. 
Secondwy: ~banal (polytechn•ca) 
Coli• 
Uncomplet.d 1-vgher educabon 
Higher edueaOon 
10 PostQradua\11 d~r .. 
Occuplflon If pruent 
NUIMry 
Sehool boV{girt 
Unlve1slty s1Udent woR.rwt~ 
UniYetlity 1tudent non-working 
Free4anc.e 
ONn•l~net of privale avricultural company 
Own•lco-ow!Wf of ptlvlle company in 
industry, lla1e, Of In other MCtoll 
Employee !worker full time. inc. in v•llagot 
EmpklyM I woriuw on salary. part-time 
(ind . in v•hQ .. ) 
10 Unemployed /bottween JoO• 
II PenUonef 
12 HousewlfeAnc. on matem1ty leave 
13 Olher 
Single 
Mauled 
Uvlng together (wi thout marriage) 
Sopatalod f dl\'orcedl widowed 
Refuae1 to answer 
Good 
RathM good 
Rather bad 
Bod 
DKI NA 
RECENTt 'f WHO IS THE PERSON , WHO CONTRIBUTES MOST TO THE HOUSHiOLO 
INCOME? 
AA_A. 
AA_B. 
1-stmember 
2-nd member 
COOEOO 
COOE00 
UsUALL '(IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD WHO IS Tl-IE PERSON , WHO MAKES THE DECISIONS 
A5_A. 
A5_B. 
FOR BIGGER PURCHASES? 
1-st member 
2-nd ~rember 
COOEOO 
COOE 00 
A6. LfTS SUGGEST Tl-IAT YOU ARE IU AND YOU HAVE TO TAKE A MEDICINE . IT IS 
POSSIBLE Tl-IAT YOU BUYA BuLGARIAN MEDICINE, AT A PRICE OF 1000 LEVA, CR 
AH IMPORTED BRAND NAME, WHICH IS BETTER, BUT AT A PRICE OF 4000 LEVA . 
NDAMALL YWHO PARTICIPATES IN DECIDING SUCH MATTERS? 
Yes No 
A6_A. 1-st ~rember 
A6_B. 2-nd member 
A6_C. l-111 member 
A6_D. 4-th 1rember 
A6_E. $-ttl member 
A6 _F. &-ttl 1rember 
A6_G. Not an issoo: buy only Bulgarian medicines 
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Section 8 : Health status 
Good 
Rather good 
Rather bad 
Bad 
DO DO 
..; ... 
~Qo:not m,d~-·: 
Yes 
1-st mentioned· 
2·rd mentioned: 
3-rd mentioned: 
No 
CODES of the disease grou~s 
1 Pulmonary diseases 
2 Co4dSiflu 
3 Eye dtseases 
4 Traumaslir,ur.a slpoisontng 
5 Skin diseases 
6 Cardio-vascul ar d1seases 
DO DO 
...; <d 
7 Neopl asm (tnc. tumours, cancer ) 
6 Kidne y dtseases. gynaecokJ9 ical , 
t:rostate 
DO DO DO DO 
...: ..; o; 
82_A 
82_6 
~ 
CODE DO 
CODE DO 
82 c CODE DO 
t =Oo-toEU ~T/::-,.--~J~"JhY/( ~-./. ',i 
15 CosmetiC surg ery 
18 Gaslro-enterolog!Cal 
17 Respiratory diseases 
16 Pregnancy. blfth 
19 Symptoms. undiagnosed condtiiOnS 
20 LNer. gallbladder 
21 Brain diseases 
22 NeurologiCal 
9 D•sease of bones and jo tnts. ar1hnhs 23 AJ ierg~s 
10 lnfed10us disease 24 Oto- rhmo 
11 Psych1ainc 97 Other ~l nesse s 
12 Endocn nolog JC al d•sease (d tabetes, 98 Has never been til 
obes1ty) 
13 Haematolog ~e al dtseases (anaem a. 99 OKINA 
leuCOSIS ) 
14 Dental 
Yes No 
83A 1·st ment iOned 1 2 
836 2-nc:l ment10ned 1 
8 3C J- th mentioned 
Yes, every day 
Somel1mes 
No 
DO Approx1mate number o r c1gare11es per day 
Freauency of consumption 
Doesn't AJmost Several days At least AI least 
drink ever-1 day per week (1· once per once per 
(5-7 days 4 days per monlh three 
I oer week l week l rronlhs 
Atleast OK 
once per NA 
year 
6_1 Solfils 2 3 5 
6_2 Wine 5 
6 l Beer 1 3 4 5 
Doesn't dnnk Quantity Measure 
7_ 1. Spirits 00000 grams wee kly 
7 _2. Wine 00000 bottles 750 m1 'Neekly 
7 _3. Beer 00000 bottles 500 ml weekl y 
86. How MANY TIME s HAVE YOO BEEN 1u IN THE LAST 12 MONTHs. INCLUDING YOuR I 
ILLNESS AT PRESENT, IF ONE ? 
WI!~J9J~.JW!kt.f.of ~.i:edii&i21J&~kff!.di.M 
00 Total number 
99 Not even once 
The illness didn 't seem serious 
In the settlement v.tlere I live , there isn 't a permanently employed doctor/other 
health worl<er 
The heaKh facility is too far away 
4 I could not afford rt r.,ancially 
5 I did not think there was an effective treatment 
6 I do not feel that the health service is good enough 
7 I take other sort of tteatment /set-treatment 
8 I didn 't have time 
9 Other reason 
10 OK/ NA 
WHAT WAS THE TOTAL NUMBER OF CONSULTAT10f'.JS MSITS TO DOCTOR/OTHER 
HEALTH WORI<ER THAT YOU 010 IN RELAnON TO YOUR LAST ILLNESS? 
*riff.PII!!!R.ft.d~lt:r.7f',?a£l:~Ji:Sklktlliilllt:Zf®:®Wifffij 
DO Number of oonsultations/visrts 
WHOM 010 YOU CONSULT, WHEN YOU WERE LAST TIME Ill? PLEASE ANSWER FOR 
'""==EA"'C"'H,_:CONTACTWITH DOCTOR/OTHER HEALTH WORKER . 
Person consulted Consultat ons 
B15a B15b B15c B15d B15e 
1-st 2·nd 3-rd 4-th 5-th 
Physician from the emergency 1 1 1 1 1 
serv~ees 
GP 2 2 2 2 2 
Specialist in palyclinK: J J J J J 
Specialis1 in hospital 4 4 • 4 4 Dentist 5 5 5 5 5 
Nurse 6 6 6 6 6 
Midw1fe 7 7 7 7 7 
Pharmacist 6 6 6 6 8 
Other ... .... .. .. ......... .. .. ... .. ....... 9 9 9 9 9 PIHie Write In · .,.,._,~~!.'·,• ~~ 
Hasn't consuUed 10 10 10 10 10 
815 
6·th 
1 
2 
J 
4 
5 
6 
7 
6 
9 
10 
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LAST(MOST RECENT) ILLNESS 
RN<t to ttr. -.&pon<Hm : You f<now lh..t dlllwvnt f*>p/o h• v• dilfonnf 
Jtratvg/M ..,q,., lh.y _,.. HL I.M'1 111/t abo<Jt )'O<rl P!raor!o/ ltral-rJY. For 
oxamplo ~~did )'OU do during your /ut/l,.u. 
89 PlEASE , REMEMBER. YOUR l..A3T ILLNES SI AC CIOENT/OR HE.Al Tl-1 PR06LE III OF A1fY 
~· WH.A.TWAS IT? 
wrfto ln U.. co"- olttr. dl-• fiTO<JP 
DO CODE of the d i .. ue 
CODES of the dla.eaa.e groupa 
1 Pulmonary d1sea.ses 
2 Colds/flu 
3 Eye diseases 
T raumastiflune stpo1sonu'9 
Skm d1seases 
Cardio-vascul ar dlSeases 
Neoplasm (inc tumours. cancer ) 
Kidney d1seases. gynaecologiCal , 
prostate 
9 01sease of bones and JOints, arthnlls 
10 lnfect~au s disease 
11 Psychiatr iC 
12 Endocr inological diSease (diabe tes, 
obes1ly) 
13 Haematolog~eal diseases (anaem1a, 
leucosis) 
14 Dental 
15 Cosme L1c surgery 
16 Gastro-enteroiogiCal 
17 Resp1rator1 dl.seases 
18 Pregnarcy, b~r1h 
19 Symptoms. undiagnosed cond1t10ns 
20 L111er . gal lbladder 
21 8ta1n dtseases 
22 Neurolog iCal 
23 AJierg~es 
24 Oto- rh1 no 
97 Other Illnesses 
98 Has never been dl 
99 DK/~IA 
8 10. WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME THAT YOU H.A VE EXPERIENCED ILLN ESS ? 
o,. •nawer(t, 2 or 3}. Wrlto l~ lh• be<;ilrtnlng of tn.IIJrt"'"-
My last lllneu was racenlly {in the lest 4 
weeks: ApriUmey 1997) 81 0_ 1a month 
DO 
8 10_2a 8 10_20 8 10_2c 
My last illness was long time ago (more then 4 
weeks ago) 
Doe.sn 't know I Has never been itl 
Yes 
No 
f;=! oO lo 814 . 
month season 
DO 0 
816 . WHER E 010 TH E CONSULTATION(S) OUR INO YOU R LAST ILLNES S TAKE PLACE? 
~ans;wer~C::,.':f{!l/J!;t::/b";:t"'·':r~conSIJ/tB&iui.•Thalotal/-'&l 
n · '' ·'' ·"" s · - ·· 'tJ<IfiO ' ln8t'4 ·,, , 
Place of treatment Consultation 
B16a B16b B16c B16d 
1·st 2-nd 3-rd 4-th 
At your home 1 1 
AI !he home of the phvsician/health oorker 2 2 
In health centre 3 3 
In state polyclinic 4 4 
In city hospital (e.g. First City Hospital) 5 5 
In district hosoilal 6 
In universrtV-teaching hosprtal e .g. 7 
In -piiQ9ov" 8 8 8 
In hospital, provDing care for certain 9 9 9 
professionslirdustries ( Hosp~al of the Interior 
Ministry, e1c.l 
Pr ivate room (ind. private palyclinid room at the 10 10 10 10 
I physician 's home) 
By telephone 11 11 11 11 
Other ................. ...... .... ....... ..... 12 12 12 12 
PleBse· 'Wrfti 'Ji7"7YJ:·~;;: (>"<;J~;::;;~;~;>x,~:,<r~;:. ";.1lfv 
I 
B16e 
S.th 
10 
11 
12 
817 . P LEASE REMEMBER THE BEGINNING OF YOUR LAST ILLNE SS. D ID YOU TAK E ~y 
COURSE OF MEDICATION, SPECIALISED TREATMENT, PROCEDURES , HERBS , HOME 
TREATMENT, OVER SEVERAL DAYS 7 
B17A. Proscribed 
Medicines 
Procedure/treatment 
Herbs/home procedures 
Other 
Med icines 
Procedure/treatment 
Herbs/home procedures 
Other 
8 18 . 010 YOU STOP Tl-IE COURSE OF TRE.t.Tlr.4ENT/ PROCEDURES/ {PR ESCRIBED OR 
NON-PRESCRIBED)? 
1. Up to two answers One an.swer for prescnbed and one for non·prescnbed 
a t aA 8tea 
Pr .. crlb•d Non-pr•tcdbed 
year 
DO 
81 6 
6·t 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
10 
11 
12 
No . I completed the treetment 1 ~ If two t naW'lln f Otr l , 
No I am still1n thi piOCUS Yo~ . 1 stOP"PeCI th e med1cmea 
Yes , I s tooped the ptocedutes 
Yu , I tlopp•d th• he r b~ home 
treatment 
Yu , 1 stopped lhe olhot lyp• o f 
tr ea tment 
Ol:her/C an·t r• memo• r 
OK I NA 
I r10 1D BZI 
1 
1 
WHAT W AS THE MAIN REAS ON FOR 't'OU TO INTERRUPT THE PqESCR IBED COUR SE 
OF -..EOIC INE/ PROCEDURES/ TR EATMENT? ANO WHA r ABOUT TH E NON· 
PRESCAIBED7 
B1 9A 91 98 
Prescribed Non·oroscrlbe 
11en better 1 
The treatment/medicine& didn't helo- 2 
The medk:ines were two eiOensive J 
1 didn't have time 4 
Termrnalion SUIIQes1ed bYthe medical staff 5 
The circumstances at the hearth establishment prevented 6 
me from comoletino the treatment 
The medicines/treatment were not ava<lable in the 
I oharmacies 
Other 
1 haven't intenupted 
Medicines 
Procedures 
Herbs/ home treatment 
Other 
Yes 
No 
OKINA 
B20A 
Prescrib.d 
1 
2 
J 
4 
7 
6 
9 
B20B 
Non· orescribed 
1 
2 
J 
4 
822. Do YOU THINK THE SALARIES MEDICAL PR OFESSIONALS OET ARE LON, A.SOUT 
RIGHT , OR MIQH ? 
922 A 922_9 
Phy1iCian1 Nur1e1 
Low 1 1 
Aboul rig ht 2 2 
Hioh J J 
OKINA 4 4 
1 
2 
J 
4 
5 
6 
7 
6 
9 
B22_C 
Dentists 
1 
2 
J 
4 
WHAT HAPPEN AT YOUR LAST VISIT/CONSULTATION? WHAT 0 10 THE PHYSICIAN 
(OTHER STAFF) 00? 
Conversation wrth medical staff 
Physical examination (s pecialised) 
Check-up 
Check-up (post treatment) 
Blood pressure measuring 
X-rays/ EKG / ... 
Blood test (Laboratory tests ) 
Minor operation 
Operation 
Prescribing of medicines 
Vaccination 
Other 
827 1 
827=2 
827 J 
82(4 
827 5 
827=6 
827_7 
8276 
827=9 
827 10 
827-11 
927-12 
827=13 OK/ NAJ Has never attended physician/hearth wor1<er 
828_A 112 Travening I walking !Q and from the hearth 
establishment/orivate room 
828_9112 Wa~ ing time before the consultation 
828_C1/2 Wa~i';l time after the consurtation (e.g. for 
resuns 
828_0112 length of consurtationlexamination 
828_E1 /2 Administrative arrangements before and after 
the consultation, referral to other hearth 
establishments 
828_F 1/2 Searching for medicines/ consumables 
828_0 1/2 Other activities related to the consurtation lvisrt 
828_H OK! NA/Has never attended physician etc. 
•nawer ... ~· ·~~· ''~n · 
In my settlement 
In a settlement up to 50 km from mine 
In a settlement from 50 to 100 km from mine 
4 In a settlement from 100 to 200 km from mine 
5 In a settlement more than 200 km from mine 
6 Abroad 
7 Other 
6 DKINA 
Hours 
DO 
DO 
DO 
DO 
DO 
DO 
DO 
99 
Yes 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
No 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Minutes 
DO 
DO 
DO 
DO 
DO 
DO 
DO 
d 
469 
8 23 How •aou r fH ESA tN C 
OUOMT , ~ HIOH 7 
Low 
Abou1 riQht 
HIQh 
DKI NA 
B2J_A 
Phys i ci~n 
I 
1 
2 
J 
J 
82J B 
r 
B2J C 
Nur i.s Do rltrsu 
1 I 1 
2 2 
J J 
4 I • 
Last consultaUonstvlsit wu recently (in the last 
4 weeks: ApriUmay 1997) 82~ Ia moOth 
DO 
Seasons · code : 
wmt., I . sonng 2 
summ.- 3. au tumn .: 
824 2a 
mofith 
DO 
B24 _ 2'b 8 2J _2c 
Last consultations/visit was some time ago 
(more than 4 weeks ago) 
season year 
0 DO 
NAJ Has never attended physician/health worker ~GotoD1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
State 
Private (pclycl inic, consultation room) 
NAJ Has never attended physician/health wcrker 
He/she is my district phys<c<an and I always vis<t him 
W e know each other well and usually he/she are treating my famly 
I was referred by district or hcspitaJ physic ian 
He/she was recorrvnended by an acquaintance, who is a doctor 
He/she was reccrrmended by relative/acquaintance 
I saw, heard , read and advertisemenVnotice 
I came across on him by chance/emergency/no other chc ice 
Other 
OK! NA/ Has never attended physic<anihealth wor1<er 
830. WERE YOU SATISF IED WITH THE QUALITY OF THE HEAl.TH SERVIC E RECEIVED AT 
YOU R LAST CONSUL TATION7 
One·answer per row. AskforHCI> olem.tll·of(heHrdce MJdrKCtfl the 
answ.,. ~Oidinli (o, UiJJ~•!IIvvn _/:>e(<>W.,;ili,~ • • "4 
BJOA 
BJOB 
BJOC 
BJOO 
BJO E 
BJOF 
BJOG 
BJOH 
8301 
. . . . . 1 Satisf<ed 
2 Rather satisf<ed 
J Nerther satisf<ed. nor dissatisf<ed 
Rather dissatisf<ed 
Dissatisfied 6~ :"7'DM!A Notfi>Obe-~ 
Wartina time 1 2 
Len th of consultation 1 2 
Attrtude of s1aff 1 2 
Ou1come of the treatmern 1 2 
Confidential/tV 1 2 
Cos1 of treatment 1 2 
Overall level of service 1 2 
Hvoiene 1 2 
A-pDaratus, medicines. wnsumables 1 2 
3 
3 
3 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
J 
4 
• 
• 4 
4 
4 
• 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Section C 
Cl 1 Travel e"'l''_nses 
fC1_1A Train 1 2 Cl lAI II 
f C1_ 18 Coach 1 2 Cl 181 
r c1 _1 C Public transport 1 2 Cl ICI no.of tickets 
1 CI_IO Cab 1 2 Cl 101 II I C1_1E Car (expenses for petrol: km I ravelled , Cl 
-
l EI i[ ;l= km or l~res __l>!ltro_l)_ 1 2 Cl 1E2 litres 
1 CI _IF Other vehicle 1 2 Cl IFI II 
r c1 _1o Total e!Q_end~ure 1 2 Cl 101 
c1 2 Medlcatloniconsumablesl Inc spectacles and lenses etc 
1 CI _2A Total e~ture 1 2 C1 2A I II II II 
IC1 _28 I From the total , are there any part 
1 12 covered by the state, munidpalrty, CI_2BI 000000 
ernolover etc. (Lv.)? 
2 CI_JA000000 
-
CI _SA Total expendrture 1 2 CI_SAI 000000 
CI _SB From the total , are there any part 
covered by the state, munidpalrty, 1 2 CI _SBI 000000 
employer etc.J.Lv~? How much? 
C1_6A 000000 
CI _6A 000000 
ON THE OCCASION Of THIS LAST CONSULTATION/TREATMENT 010 YOU HAVE TO 
SEARCH FOR AOOTIONAL MEANS TO ?A Y THE REQUIRED AMOUNT? 
1 No , I paid from the recurrent monthly income/ budaet of lhe household 
2 I used investmentslsavi!!ll_s 
3 I sold property/goods/house/land etc. 
• I borrowed 5 Other 
6 No expenses flnsignificant 
C5. T AU<JNO ABOUT THe EXPENSES FOR THE SAME LAST EPISODE Of ILLNESS, 
APPROXJMA TB. Y WHAT PERCENTAGE OF THE MONTHI... Y INCOME OF YOUR 
HOUSEHOLD WERE THEY? 
lloHt•i!!~.W~'UWiXY!W 
ODD % 
998 Can't judge 
999 No expenses 
IN YOUR OPINION, OfO THE QUALITY Of THE HEALTH SERVICES IN THIS CASE 
JUSTIFY THE EXPENDITURE INCURRED? 
Expenditure were low in view of the leve l of service 
About right 
Expendrture were high in view of lhe level of service 
Can't judge 
No expenses/insignificant 
Other 
DKINA 
0URJNO YOUR LAST TREATMENT , HAS ANY SERVICE/MEDICATION ETC. BEEN 
REFUSED OR DELAYED CUE TO SOME Of THE FQ..LOWING REASONS: 
Waa refused/delayed, because I couldn 't pay 
Was refused/delayed ror other reasons 
Was refused/delayed . and I am not sure for the reason . but suspect that it 
was because I could not pay 
There was not such case 
DKINA 
Lv 
Lv 
470 
c I '2 
-
01 I ) 
Cl ')A 
-
Cl 14 
Cl IJA 
-
: I 15 
Cl l SA 
-
Loss of income (due to absence 
from private business) : Tolal 
oss 
Other inconvenience (e g . less 
free lime): 
1 P/Nse record wtar klnd 
Cl 12AI .......... 
-
12 
(I 12A2 
Gift s , donation s I for medical or admimstratNe staff -- . 
Present gtven 
1 12 P/Nu record ~I kind 
Cl 
-
13~1 ·-- ....... 
Cl 1Y.2 ..... .. 
How mucn did Iiley cos! you (1n Cl 
-
138 1 
- Jl ll 
Leva)? 
Other servlcesl_g_ratuities done for lhe medical personnel 
Gratu11y 1 1 2 PIGsa rKOrrJ wtw klnd 
Cl ,.,, ,_ ............ Cl 
I 4A2 .. .. 
1 How mucn did Iiley cos1 you (1n 
1 Leva)? 
I Cl 148 1 
-
;Ill II 
Other expenditure 
Other expendrture 1 2 PINs• record~~ kind 
Cl T5 A 1 . 
-
......... ... .... 
Cl 1SA2 ......... .. .. 
1 How much did !hey cosl you (in C1 _ 158 1 L l Jl 
I Leva)? 
, 
-
I I 
C2. WHAT WAS THE EFFECT OF THE TO TAL E.XPENDITURE ACCOMPANYING YOUR~ 
CONSU LTATION AND THE FOLLOWING TREATMENT ON THE SUOGET OF YOUR 
HOUSEHOLD? 
One answer for the last consultation from the last Illness of the 
r&Spondent? 
The expenditures were leo high 
The expendilures were ralher h1gh 
The expendilure were moderale 
The expenditure were rather low 
5 The expendilure were insignificanVno expendilure 
6 I can 't judge 
CJ. WHAT PROPORTION OF THE EXPENDITURE ON YOUR LAST CONSULT ATIONfvlSIT 
W ERE PAID BY YOURSELF AND WHAT PROPORTION WAS PAID BY SOMEBODY ELSE 
Record all mentioned answers;. Their sum should be no more than 100%. 
'/, of expenses 
CJA Yours en ][ ] 0 
CJB Other household members J[JD 
CJC Relative/f riend ouiSide lhe uuu 
household 
CJD Stalelmunicij)ality_ 
CJE Insurance company 
C3F Employer 
CJG Other 
UIJ to 100% 
CJH No expenses /ins,gnificanl 998 
CJI Can 'l remember/OK 999 
C8a. Mona:i C8b. Present 
For med•cat10n/consumaotes , , 
For the seNK:es of a nurse/ hospLial 2 2 
atlendanl 
For hosp1tal admission 3 
To phys~etan for operation .. . 4 4 
To phys~e•an for examination 5 5 
To physic•an for test 6 6 
For medrcal cer1 ifica te 7 7 
8 8 For something else 
I have never give n any1 h•ng 9 9 I => i3q lo C1 
NA 10 10 
C9 HOW MUCH OlD THE TREATMENT IN THE STATE MEAL TH ESTABLISH ~ro!ENT COST 
vou?(INCL. PAYMENTs/PRESENTS)? APPROXIMATELY WHEN WAS THA f? 
Wrlteln the •urns and d.ate .• ff plJ)IITHHJts .or pnHtltt ~given •evara! -~ 
timH. wrthllnonly-tbehlghmtpqmetJtlpruat~t .. '"*!(' -..a->.<<:.-""'" . k'•,_,_,.4J 
C9 I Monlh DO 
C9- 2. SeasonO 
c(J Year DO 
Seaaona-
code: 
w1 n ter 1, 
spring 2: 
summer J: 
autumn 4 
C9 4. Payment 
- DDOOODLeva 
C9 5 Pnce of present 
- DDODDDLeva 
HOW WOULD YOU ASSESS THE TOTAL SIZE OF THE PAYMENT/THE PRICE OF THE 
PRESENT? 
e answer In eadl column ( or Jl<lymenf and for present) 
C1 0 A C10 8 
Payment Presen t 
Low 1n view o f lhe level of serv1ce 1 1 
Aboul nght 2 2 
High in view of lhe level of service 3 J 
Ca n't udge 4 4 
C10A. WHERE DID YOU TAKE THE MONEY TO PAY ITO GIVE PRESEN"T FROM? 
One answer In NCh column (tor payment arrd tor present) 
--
C1 0a A CtOa 8 
Payment Present 
No. 1 pa1d from !he recurrenl monlhly 'ncomel 1 1 
budge! of lhe household 
2 I used 1nves1menlslsav_1'1g5 2 
1 sold property/goodSihouselland elc J J 
~ ~ I 1 borrowed 
5 5 j l Olher 
HAVINO IN MINO ONLY THE HIGHEST PRESENT/ PAYMENT YOU HAVE GIVEN, 010 YOU 
OIVE IT BEFORE OR AFTER THE TREATMENT (OPERATION ETC .)? 
C11 A C11 B 
Paym-ent Present 
Before the treatment 1 1 
Aher the treatment 2 2 
D.Jrina the treatment 3 3 
Other 4 4 
Yes 
C12A In case of serious illness 1 
C12B For consulatlon with a prominent specialist /dinic 1 
C12C Because I knew that I will receive a hiah-aualitv service 1 
C120 Because I knew that I will be treated immediately 1 
C12E Because I had eoo h money 1 
C12F Because I was satisfied with the successful treatment 1 
C120 Because my child/person verv dose to me were ill 1 
C121' Because the price was affordable 1 
C121 To be treated dose to my home 1 
C12J Because I knew that there would be good apparatuses/ medication 1 
in the healh establishment 
C12K Because the physician paid me special attention 1 
C12L Because the atti1ude of staff was verv good 1 
C1J. IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS HAVE YOU STAYED OVERNIGHT IN HOSPITAL OR OTHER 
HEALTH ESTABLISHMENT? 
000days 
999 DKINA 
Section D 
OJ8 
03C 
030 
03E 
OJF 
030 
03H 
031 
03J 
03K 
04. 
ACCOROINO TO YOU, SHOULD AU. PEOPLE PAY EQUALLY FOR A CEFHAJN HEAlTH 
SERVICE? 
Not sure 
NA 
.... . ... :. "· ' .. ;11191~ .~ "'-:$i£l:<l  
1. Strongly agree 
2. Ralhl!f agree 
3. Rather disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
5'Jf.~DKII'IA'M#to~'Nd,k&h~..$l®W%Wl 
If the health service shoukt be patd, it is better the patient to pay direcUy 
at the health e.stabHshmenV orivate consultation room 
, 2 
The stale health ca-e is the most suitable for Bulaarian circumstarces 
I v.ould agree to pay for consultation. if I couJd choose the physician, 
whom to visit 
In case there is payment, the treatment should be paid in the end, ln case 
ol successful outcome 
If the health service shou4d be paid, each consultation should be paid for 
separately. in tho procoss of troatmenl 
Private practice in heaUh care is a good thing 
PriVately practi.si'"9 physicians are more responsible then the state-
omployod 
In private more aHention is oaid to the alieni 
I Privately practls1_ng physCians are better quali ied than the rest 
Privately practising physic1ans do no( have the opportunity for effective 
treatment due to the lack or apparatu985 etc. 
It is accep«aote or a physiCian in state health utablishmenllo accept 
rroney from hislhor potionls 
You PERSONALLY, WOULD YOU PAY (IN CASH/PRESENT/DONATION) FOR 
TREATMENT, CONSULTATION ETC .? 
Yes, uncond~ionally 
<~~~'.Z 
Yes. under certain cond~ions 
No 
1 2 
1 2 
2 
2 
1 2 
, 2 
, 2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
N 
4 
4 
4 
4 
471 
I C 15 . 11'1 't--EN NERE YOUR MOS T RECENT ADMISSION TO rlCSPITilL 1 
One an_.,. (1, 2 or J). F/11/n a1 tho ro•P9C1Jvo row. 
My l.ut hospital admission was recently (In the 
last 4 weeks : ApriUmay 1997) 
C I S 1<!1 
mo~th Seasons-code : 
DO .,tl"tl a t I SPf lnQ 2. summ e r 3, 4-tJ b.unn J 
C 15_2a C 15_ 2b C15 _2c 
My last hospital admission waa some time .ago 
(more than 4 WHks ago) 
month season 
DO 0 
NA 
C16. HAVE YOU EVER A n e NOEO PRI\IAT'E PHYSICIAN/OENTJS T IN A CONSUlTATION 
RCCM OR INA PRJ VATE HEALTH ESTABLISt-<f.!ENT? 
One answ.,. p..- row 
C 16A Physooan 
C 16B Den1is1 
Yes 
I C17. HON Wc::>lA_D YOUASSESS THE PAYMENT? 
No 
one answer {arco/Uf!W. The.an.swers i(V notlo.be f$acJ. 
C17A . C17 8. 
Low compared to the level of serv ice 
Abou1 nght 
High compared to the level of service 
Not sure 
NA 
Physician 
, 
2 
3 
Dentist 
1 
2 
3 
C18 . ARE YOUW!LLJNG TO VISIT AGAIN PRNATE CONSL.l.TATION R~? 
On, answw rar.Co/1./mn •. Tho answers .lff8 not Lo be rTJad. 
Yes, unconditionally 
Yes, under certain conditions 
No 
DK/NA 
C18A 
Physician 
1 
2 
3 
C18B 
Dentist 
1 
2 
3 
IN YOUR OPINION DO THE FEES AT THE PRIVATE HEALTH FACILITIES RESPOND TO 
THE SERVICE RECEIVED BY THE PEOPLE? 
D4A 1 
04A_2 
04A_J 
04A_4 
D4A5 
04A_6 
D4A_7 
D4A_a 
D4A 9 
The fees are low in view of the level of health service 
Abou1 right 
The fees are high in view of the level or hea~h se rvice 
Not sure 
NA 
NCM I AM OOINO TO TELL YOU SEVERAL CONDITIONS, WHEN PEOPLE AAE 
GENERALLY WILLING TO PA. Y FOR TREATMENT. YOU PERSONALLY WOULD YOU PA.Y 
IN SOME OF THESE CA.SES? 
Yes 
In case or serious 11l ness , 
For consultation Wllh a prominent specialisl /din1c , 
If I know beforehand that I w1ll receive e h-iQti-qUal~y serv~ce , 
11 know that !hal I 'Will be treated immediately , 
If I have enough money 1 
If 1 am satisfied with the successful treatment , 
If my child/person very dose to me are ill , 
If the price is affordable , 
If I could be treated dose to m_y_ home , 
04A_10 If there are good apparatuses/ medication in the health , 
establishment 
D4A 11 If the physician ays me special attent ion , 
04A 12 If lhe attitude of staff is very good , 
No 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
048_8 at 2-nd lace 10 11 12 
04B_C at 3-rd lace 10 1, 12 
05. IN CASE YOU HAVE TO PAY FOR CERTA. IN HEALTH SERVICES, HQN WOU LD YOU 
PREFER TO PAY? 
Directly to the physician 
To lhe administration of the health establishment 
To an 1ntermediary: 1nsurance company/health fund/stale lns!Jiullon 
~~~lc!n·t iike!O\>Gy'il•lfN<>! rii,b8 .i'Nd ""c.,..~~"' -
OKI~A~,l!.i~~~-f~ix·,~~"'-~; , ~:;_;.;;..<x~~ ··~-i.. ~,, ~•.- .... ~ 
y eo1 r 
DO 
To pay a charge at the po1nl ot use fcx eactl VI Sit to physiCsan( e xam.nat~en. lest . 
!n the beg lnnlf'ICJ of each month to contnbute certa1n sum a"C1 1n case of 11lness to pay 
~:~~pen5 to you to get 1ll. to pay a small percentage of all expenses di.XIf"'9 the 
1reatment 
Otho<A WQu!dn,11il<o1o p~ at II Hollo ~»'"" 
DK.NA 
07 'NMAT KINO Of INSURANCE 00 YOU HAVE AT PRESENT? 
07_1 
01_2 
07_3 
or_• 
OI_S 
01_5 
Yes No DKINA 
?ropeny ~ ranee 1 2 3 
CM 10surance 1 2 3 
Accident ~ ~ranee 2 3 
Lde 1nsurance 2 3 
011"" 2 3 
Don't use 1n5urance 2 3 
HAvE Y OU EVER HAD (YOURSELF OA ANY OTHER MEMBER OF YOUR HOUSEHOlD) 
ioiEOICAL INSURANCE AOA!NST EXPENDITURE DURING ILLNESS OR FOA CAL Y 
CQ'YERA.OE DURING HOSPITAL. SU.Y? 
Insurance agency 
OKJCan'l remember the name 
No 
Yes, uncorw::t llionally 
Yes. under certa in COnditions 
No 
1 am already 1nsured 
DKINA 
99 
IF YOU DECIDE TO OET YOURSELF MEDICAL INSURANCE, WHERE WOULD YOU DO 
rr" 
!n a state insurance company 
ln a prrvate in3Urance company 
In a muted 1nsurance company (state and pnvate) 
Co--operat ive fund 
Do hef 
1 wou ldn't insure mysel1 
DKINA 
IF GENERAL HEAlTH INSURANCE IS TO BE INTRODUCED, WHICH INSTITlJTION 
SHOULD MANAGE THE MONEY, COLLECTED FROM THE COOTRIBUTIONS TO HEALTH 
F\JND7 
~~i;;Jl~ks:.U~~WWWJ{il<~~ittth.i;.s.JJ_,_~;t;;.%iit~~~t1 
Mnistry of Finance 
NGOs 
Mnislry of Heal1h 
Presidency 
Co--operative org ani sat ions 
Private orga.J"Usations 
Partiament or other elected body 
Do her 
Not Sl..lre INA 
No preferences 
No1 sure/NA 
HAVE YOU HEARD ABOUT ANY PlANS I DEBATES CONCERNING INTRODUCTION OF 
OENEIUL. HEAlTH INSURANCE? IF YES, FROM WHERE. ? 
015 A Newspapers 2 
015) TeleVIsion 2 
015_C Radio 2 
~:~=~ ~~:~~:~~uainlaN;es ~ 
015 F AdvertlSir'Q 2 
0 1( 0 Colleagues/at work 2 
DIS_H Otl"wtr 2 
015 I I haven't f'leard 1 2 
D1(J ·~[)I(INAHotto ~.-cf',z..;ii;Y0iil1 '~lM 
DISA Patient, who is satisfied with the treatment, but do not 
e<press his/he~ gratitude to the physician with 
presenVfavours 
D16B Palienl, who gives rroney to physician in a state health 
fac1lity on case of successful outcome of treatment 
1 2 J 4 
1 2 J 4 
472 
Rv«J: AI present lh8NI aro cllscuulor!S on cn. poulblllty 101' tnvodiJC11on of 
gonera/ he~/Ut Insurance. If hru/Ut /naurance Ia to b9 /ntrod~ eYety monf/1 
conlrlbullons wO/ be p.kt fn • hMith lund(a}, coYfllfng mosl of the up.ndhurfl 
fa< trHtm«>l ~nd medlcatlofl. • 
011A. IN CAS E THAT COMPU..SORY HEAL Tl-i INSURANCE IS INTRODUCED ltl 8 u..GARJA . 
'NOU.OYOU PA Y MONTHLY HEALTH CONTRIBUTIONS? 
On.~ra-
1 I am wilfing lo p ay even if I do not get 111 at a ll , for the securtty, that '" case of ~\ness 
'NOuld not h ave to pay 
I am Willi ng to pay rf there is a chance that I g et ,u 
l am not w1ll ing to pay 
01her 
Not sure 
NA 
I 01 18 . lT IS THOUGHT THAT THE HEALTH INSURANCE CONTRIBUTIONS WOE BY EACH PERSON SHOULD BE THE SAME EACH MON~. NO MATTER WHETHE.R HE.ISHE IS Ill 
OR HEAL THY. OniER PEOP\. E FEEL THA T THESE CONTRIBUTIONS SHOUlD VARY 
WITH THE CHANGES IN THE HEALTH STATUS . WHICH OF THESE TWOOPitUONS IS 
ClOSER TO YOURS? 
One answ&r I ~ .. ~ . . 
1 Fixed contr ibutions . no matter whether the perso-n is ill o r he an.h y 
2 Varying con tr ibutions, according to the health status 
3 OKINA 
I D11C. LETS ASSUME THAT COMPU.SORY HEALTH INSURANCE IS TO BE INTRODUCED IN 
8U.GARtA . T HERE ARE DIFFERENT OPINIONS AS TO HON TO UTILISE T"HE 
I 
I 
INONIOUAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE HEALTH FUNDS OF PEOPLE . WHO HAVEN'T 
BEEN ILL . YOU PERSONALLY WITH WHICH THREE OF THE FOLLO/t' ING OPINIONS 
WOU.D AGREE IN A LARGER E.XTENT? PLEASE RANG E THEM ACCOOOING TO THEIR 
IMPORTANCE . 
Up to 3 answel3. One answer I>« each column 
011C_1 D11 C_2 
1-st 2-nd 
ploco place 
My contnbutions in health fund(s). wh ich have not been used for 
me . must be returned to me at regular intervals 1 1 
M y contributions, whK:h have not been used for me . may be 
uti~sed . wrth my permission, for the treatment of my 2 2 
dependants/members of my household 
M y contnbutions. which have not been used fo r me. may be 
used for charitv , subsidies for social securov 3 3 
My contnbutions. which have not been used may be returned to 
1he stale budoe1 4 4 
My contributions , which have not been used for me to be utilised 
from the M inistry of Health in case of epidemics, health 5 5 
prophylaxis e1c. 
My contributions, which have not been used fo r me to be utilised 
bv the municipality (e.o. for infrastructure ) 6 6 
I wouldn't pay 998 
DKINA 999 
ACCORDING TO YOU , IS IT ACCEPTABLE FOR A PHYSICIAN IN A STATE HEALTH 
ESTABUSHt.AENT TO REQUIRE PAYMENT FOR CONSULTATION FROM T"HE PATIENT? 
11 is accep1able , because 1he physicians are poorly paid 
It is acceptable , because the state health establishment do not have the 
necessary medicationlconsumables/apparatuses 
It is acceptable . because rt is right to pay for service 
It is acceptable, because o f other reasons 
lt is rather unacceptable 
11 is no1 accep1able a1 alf 
DK I NA ·D<i;ntfi{N<(;"":;f,] 
IN YOUR VIEW, IF SOME CHARGES/CQ-PA YMENTS IN THE STATE HEALTH FACILITIES 
ARE GOING TO BE INTRODUCED, SHOU.D SOME PEOPLE PAY AT LOWER PRICES 1 
Yes 
No 
I 
019. W OU..D YOU AGREE ANY OF THE FOUONING SOCI AL GROUPS TO HAVE PRICE 
REDUCTIONS? 
Yes No 
0 19 1 Children 1 2 
01 9_2 People are breadwinners/support fam ily 1 2 
019_3 Peoole with certain merits/talent 1 2 
0 19 "' Older people/ pensioners I 2 
01 9_5 Families w ith yo una child ren 1 2 
01 9_6 Peoole havinQ heanhv lijestvle 1 2 
01 9_7 People . who are very careful to thei r own health and 
consult a doctor immediately if they feel unwell 1 2 
019 8 Disadvan1aged oeoole l orohans e1Cl 1 2 
019 _9 YounQ people 1 2 
01 9_ 10 People will ing to pay directly a much h igher fee than 1 2 
the official one 
01 9 II Peoole . who look after elderly/invalids 1 2 
019_ 12 Chronicallv iiVin valids 1 2 
01 9_ 13 01her ... 1 2 
Please write In . 
011 
3-r 
pia 
1 
2 
3 
• 
5 
DKIN 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
01961 
01982 
0198J 
020A 
0208 
020C 
0200 
020E 
020F 
0200 
020H 
1·11 group 1 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
2-nd group 1 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
3-th group 1 2 J 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
s: OKJNA ·~Not to bir.id"""l : >'·.~ 
Smokers should pay higher contributions for hea~h 
care 1 2 3 
People using he a~ services more ofte n. should pay 
higher contributions for hea~ care 1 2 3 
People, who drink too much alcollo l sllould pay higher 
contributions for hea ~h care 1 2 3 
People who endanger the hea~ of other people (e.g. 
have serious driving accidents shoukj pay higher 1 2 3 
contributions for health care 
Treatment of certain more common diseases must be 
free for everybody 1 2 3 
Everybody, rich or poor. have the right for 10 be 
treated fre!Hlf-oharge 1 2 3 
Everybody. regardless of age . has the right to be 
treated free of charge 
It is fair that lhe wea~y people must pay for hea~h 
services al higher prices 1 2 3 
AT PRESENT SEVERAL OIRECTlONS FOR REFORM OfF THE 8 lA.GARIAN HEALTH 
CARE SYSTEM HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED. WHCH OF THEM WOU.O YOU AGREE WITH 
? 
Everybody to contribute for heanh care certain percentage of their 
monthly income 
Everybody to pay the full price of treatment at the point of use for 
each contad woh physicianlfacil"y 
To retain the current formalty free system, with reallocatio n of more 
funds to health care from other sectors such as education , transport, 
culture, etc. 
To retain the current formally free system. w~h people paying small 
charyes for medication etc. at the point of use . when shortages in the 
state hea~ establishments occur 
ON THE WHOLE HOwV MANY PE OPLE IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD HAVE SOME INCOME AT 
AU ?(SAL.ARIES, PENSIONS. RENTS , 8ENEATS, SCHOLARSHIPS, ETC.) 
E4. APPROXJJM TELY IN WHICH OF THE FOLlOW !NO GROUPS IS TH E INCOME OF YOUR 
HOUSEHOLD AS A 'NHttD IN THE PAST MONTH? 
Qa.J~afftWPIW~&r~"';$a;._~~~ 
12 
12 
12 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
1 li 19,999 7 ~20.000 . 139,999 
2 20,000. J9.999 8 140.000 . 159,999 
3 40,000. 59,999 9 180.000- 179.999 
4 80,000 . 79.999 180.000. 199.999 
5 80,000. 99.999 200,000. 219.999 
13 
14 
15 
18 
99 
240,000 • 259,999 
280.000. 279,999 
280.000 . 299.999 
Above JOO. 000 
OKINA 
8 100,000. 119,999 220,000 . 239,999 
ES_AI•I! E5_81 • 17 E5 C 1• 17 
Typo of neomo v ... No No. of LV per month-
people TOT ALFOR 
HOUS EHOLD 
Salaries for the l ast month 1 2 
Pensions 1 2 
Additions to salaries chtld benefits. bonuses 1 2 
lncrea:~e in the last salary 1 pens10n compared II ll .JL 
lo lhe previou• (difference in leva( 1 2 
1-tonoranum I income from free-lance 'Mlrk 1 2 
Bene ~Sid isab~tl 'pensions 1 2 
Pr~erly """'' 1 2 BY~s only dlf'ect 1n ts in the household) 1 2 
Unemployment beneftl5 1 2 
Social benelis ( pove~y •nci.ECU. soc•al 1 2 
jlO_nS<On•) 
Scholarships 1 2 
S.ll•ng ol propeny 1 2 
R~ayment of tnsurai"'Ce d a1ms 1 2 
Presents /lottery 1 2 
Interest 1 ONtdl'\els 1 2 
Selling of home-j:X'oduced agrcullural 1 2 
_llroduel•on 
Other 1 2 
_111!1!'t_~now tJo not i'Wid 1 2 
1 
1 
-+73 
022 . l ~j l"h E UNFOR TUHA TES t TUATIO~l0F YOU 8EitG !LL . NOU..O VOUGO OSTAT E OA 
?qrJATE HEAL T'H FACILtfY? WHAT IF YOUR CHILO (OR VERY CLOSE REU. VE) ARE 
•U.' 
One an.swer per column 
22A 228 
Yo u Cll<ld I close 
relat ive 
Stale 1 1 
Prtvate 2 2 
02J . IF YOU HAVE TO PAY FOR YOUR TREATMENT OR FOR TREATMENT Of YOUR CHILO 
OR ClOSE RELATIVE, 'rtCHI MUCHWOU\..0 YOU PAY FOR: 
For evety ry,. of trHtmem ask for the respondent and for child/ c/ou 
refallve · 
02) Al-023 A8 
You (Lovi ) 
023 B1·02J a.a 
Child J(lose r8!.tiv 
000000 00000 0 
7 
8 
Section E: Demog ra phy 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
lnd ustry and building 
Agnculture and forestry 
Transport and communicatio ns 
Trade 
Services 
Scie nce and education 
Humanities and education 
Art . culture. media 
He alth care 
Finance, credit . insurance 
Civil service 
Army,po lice . lega l system 
Other sector 
Don 't work 
999999 999999 
999998 999998 
E6. IN THE LAST WEEK IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD, 010 YOU MAKE ANY OF THE FOLLONING 
EXPENSES? IF YES, APPROXIMATELY WHO MANY LEVA 010 YOU SPENO? 
Type weekly expenses Yes No Sum (leva) Don't kn 
howmu 
E5_A112 Food (at llome) 1 2 II II Jl JL 999999 
ES 8 112 Eating o ut 1 2 II II II II II 999999 
ES Cl/2 Aloohol for oome 1 2 999999 
oons umption 
ES 0112 Cigarettes I tobbacoo 1 2 II II II II II II 999999 
E6A. IN THE LAST MONTH IN YOUR HOSEHOLO 010 YOU MAKE ANY OF THE FOLLONING 
EXPENSES? IF YES , AFPROXIMATlEL Y HON MANY LEVA 010 YOU SP_E_N_O_? ___ __J 
ASk sepatateJrJ!l{ NC/l tyi)e,ar· ~wile 
nol expenditureJhas bee1J 
~.!ti{I _IIHI tmroonta:& 
Type monthly expenses Yes No Sum (leva) Don1 kn 
ESA A112 Transportation 1 2 II 
ESA Clothing 1 shoes 1 2 
8112-
E6A_C112 Furniture 1 2 
E5A_Dtl2 Housellold equipment 1 2 
E5A_E112 Education 1 2 
ESA_FI/2 Leisure (sport, cunural 1 2 
entertainment) 
ESA_GI/2 Illness 1 2 
E5A_H112 Hair-dresser, oosmet ic 1 2 II II II II II II 
services etc. 
E6A_I112 Purchase of home. car 1 2 
E8A_J1/2 Support of relatives from 1 2 J l JL 
other housellold 
ESA Kt/2 Other big expenses 1 2 
(redeooration.etc.) 
ESA Ll Don 't know 1 2 
E7 . IN YOUR HOUS EHO..O APPROXIMATELY HON MUCH 010 YOU SAVE IN THE LAST 
MONTH? 
Write In In leva at In currency 
E7A 000000LV 
nr1ng on the res~'s ari5WV 
• E78 .• 000000 USD 
E7C 000000 OM 
Don't know/no answer 999999 
howmu 
999999 
999999 
999999 
999999 
999999 
999999 
999999 
999999 
999999 
999999 
999999 
IN THE LAST WEEK IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD DID YOU CONSUME ANY OF THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF FOOD AND IN WHAT QUANTITY: 
Comsumed food 
1 I E 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 Fresh vegetables: tomatoes, cucumbers, 
~ cabba e, carrots, etc . 
.s... 7 Redishes.lettuce 
8 
9 
10 
11 I Pasta 
121 Tinned fruits and vegetables (number of 
tins 
131 Pulses: lentils, rice 
141 Graoe-brand 
15 
16 
17 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Completely 
bought 
foods 
ou have left 
. ~ . . ' 
PAGE 
NUMBERING 
\ 
AS ORIGINAL 
'r , 
--:--... ; 
·. 
".::A lfthft h..;.·~ ..U.:h lilu. .-onl how mueh In ~vii 
Type monthly Income Y .. No Sum (lv) Doo1 kno 
how muc 
E3 Al/2 Electricity 1 2 9 
E3_Bt l2 Central heatino and hot water 1 2 9 
E3_C II2 Telephone 1 2 9 
E3_0112 Hot water t 2 9 
E3 El/2 Cold water 1 2 9 
E3_FII2 Residential expenses 1 2 9 (electrichy at the ruirs , lift. 
tech.supoortl 
E9_0112 Taxes (home , property, TV 1 2 1r n nr 9 
licence. carl 
E1 2 A1+7 E1 2 81 +7 
Yes No Amount per month (tv) 
1 Yes, rent to owner 1 2 
2 Yes. rent to private company 1 2 
3 Yes. to the state I municipalhy 1 2 
4 Yes. to employer (P<ivate/and state 1 2 
5 No, free state . municioalitv. relatives 1 2 
6 Don't pay, because irs property of the 1 2 
oraanisation where I work 
7 Other 1 2 
E1J. WHAT IS THE APPROXIMATE MARKET VALUE Of YOUR MAIN PlACE OF RESIDENCE 
ET THE MOMENT? 
Et9_A t •1!1 Et9_8ht8 
w 
h 
y .. No Number Brand Brand Bou h 
Colour TV set 
Refriaerator with frizer 
Seoarate frizer 
Automatic wa.shinQ mactlne 
Vidao 
Video-camera 
Hi-Fi with cd a er 
Hi-Fi without cd aver 
Answerlilel machine 
10 Faxmachine 
It Comi>uler 
12 Dish washer 
13 Microwave 
14 Vacuum deaner 
15 Motorbike 
te Bicycle 
17 Car in use 
18 Satellite dish 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
[ E20. TO WHICH ETHNICAL. COMMUNITY 00 YOU BELONO ? 
Bulganan 
Ethnic Turk 
Bulgaro-mohamedans 
Rom a 
Other 
[lli WHAT I,S YOUR RELIOION? 
Eastern Orthodox 
Catholic 
Protestant 
Islam 
Judaism 
Other 
<1 
year lv 
I 
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! E 14 . H ON BIG IS YQ(.;R ?L..ACE OF ;:(ESIOEtCE 7 
One answer only 
Uo 10 50 SQ .m . 
51-100 SQ .m . 
100- t SO sq .m. 
Above t50 
E 15 . HCMt MANY ROOMS AL TOG ETl-E.R "RE THEAE IN YOUR MAIN ?VoCE Of RE~OE'fCE 
INCl UDING AITIC , • NO l-!OW W NY OF THEM .ARE BEING US ED BY YOOR , 
HOUS EHO...O ? 
Write number excluding balhroom•. confdon, storage 
rooma, etc4 . 
E t SA 00 rooms toral E 159 00 rooms . used by tile household 
E 15C. ARE THERE ANY PEOPLE. W HO 00 NOT BELONG TO YOUR HOUSEHa..O. BUT L E IN 
YOUR PLACE OF RESIDE NCE (E.G.RENnNG ) 7 
t. Yes 
2. No 
E1 5C1 00 number of people 
E 16 . IN YOUR MA IN PLACE OF RESIDENC E 00 YOV HAVE (AND USE): 
One answer pw- n;>w 
Yes No 
E16 I Runn ing cold water t 2 
E 16_2 Running hot water 2 
E 16_3 ElectrK:rty 2 
E 16_4 Telephone 2 
E 16_5 Central heati f19 2 
E16_6 Local heating 2 
E 16_ 7 Boiler 2 
E16_8 Fireplace 2 
E 17. DO YOU OR ANY OTHER MEMBER OF YOUR HOUSEHOlD ONN SECOND HOUSE I 
VILLA? AND LAND IN TONN I VILLAGE? 
One •I'JS1!!81'~~;~umS:c <:nd ..... - E17B ."~-nd in town E t 7C . Land in vi llag 
house/villa 
Yes t 
No 2 
E1 8 . IN THE LAST YEAR , OtO YOU OR ANY OTHER MEMBER Of YOUR HOUSEHOLD 00 
ABROAD ON EXCURSION, Vl SIT? 
One amwer only, Only for prtvm tnwellng 
1 Yes 
2 No 
I E 22. ARE You ARE ea1EVER? 
E 23 . 
Yes 
No 
an. .VJ.Wti' ,Ofl/y,_Do_not IWCI. 
State 
Private 
Mixed (slate and private) 
4 Cooperative 
5 Mumicipal 
6 Other 
7 I don1 wor1< 
E24 . Do YOU HAVE ANY MANAGERIAL FUNCTIONS IN THE ENTERPRISE I COf-.APANY 
WHERE YOU WORK? 
Yes. partial 
Yes. medium 
Yes. extensive 
None 
I don1 wor1< 
THE/NT,EfMEWER RECQ~D~ WITHOUT ASKJNG '(HE RESPONQCNT 
I E25 . T YPE OF RESIDENCE: 
1 One- family house 
2 Semi-detached 
3 Block of Oats (up to 20 Oats) 
4 Block of nats (above 20 nats ) 
5 Other 
I E26. DATE OF INT ERVIEW : 
26_ 1. Date DO ze_z. Month 0 
Sofia 
City (former district cen tre 
Town 
'/ill age 
Up to 99Q inhabitants 
1000 - 4 999 •nhabitants 
5 000 - 1 Q QQQ inhabitants 
20 000 · g9 999 mhab•lant• 
100 000 - 41191199 inhabitants 
Sofia 
Sofi1- city 
Bou(ljaiSrOIIion 
Varna reolon 
4 Lovech region 
5 Montana region 
6 Plovdiv reg ion 
1 Rousse reg10n 
a Sofia '"Ilion 
9 Haakovo regK>n 
NUMBER OF RESPONDENT IN Tl-tE SAMPLINO UNIT: 
I SETllEMENT: 
I E3l . NUMBER OF SAMPt.IHG UNIT: 
ODD 
I E32. cooe OF THE INTERVIEWER: 
DO DO 
Nurrber of region Number of interviewee in the 
team 
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T1 . 
LiFE-STYLE AND HEALTH SERVICES 
(ADDITIONAL QUESTIONNAIRE) 
DOD 
No.of duster 
DO 
No of resordent 
1n the duster 
0 
Code ol lhe 
merrOer ol the 
r-ouse hold 
Respondent 
CODE DO 
Person for whom the 
information Is provided 
T2. TJ. CODE DO 
Yes 
No 
B2_A. CODE DO 
0 0 T olal rurrber 
99 ~ even once 
F\E.ASE , Rftr.!Eiroi&EFI: YOUR LAST ILLNESS/ACCIDENT/OR HEALTH PROBLEM OF ANY 
lUND . WHAT WAS rr? 
DO CODE of the diMooo 
He/she is my district physician and I always v isit him 
We know each other well and usually he/she are treating my 
family 
Other 
DKI NA 
B27. WHAT HAPPEN AT YOUR LAST VISIT/CONSULTATION? WHAT DID THE PHYSICIAN 
(OTHER STAFF) 00? 
B27 1. Conversation with medical staff 
B27 2. Physical examination specialised 
B27 3. Check-up 
B27 4. Check-up (PC st trea1ment 
B27 5. Blood pressure measuring 
B27 6. X-raysl EKG / .. 
B27 7. Blood test (Laboratory tests) 
B27 8. Minor ooeration 
B27 9. Ooeration 
B27 10. Prescribino of medicines 
B27 11 . Vaccination 
B27 12. Other 
B27 13. DKJNA 
APPROXIMATELY HOW MUCH TIME DID YOU SPEND FOR THIS LAST 
VISIT/CONSULTATION, IN THIS NUMBER TRAVELUNG , WAITINGTiME, 
ADMINISTRATIVE FORMAUTIES. LOOKING FOR DRUGS ETC.? 
82X_1 . DO Days 82BX_2 . DO Hours B2BX_3. 
Rather satisfied 
Ne1ther satisfied, nor dissatisfied 
4 Rather dissatisfied 
5 Dissatisfied 
e ot<AV.4. t:tX..Iri~ ~w:; ~:1~  S1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
DOMin 
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3 10 NHEN HAS HE LAST TIME Tti A T YOU HA VE f.(PEP tE""CEO LLNESS'7 
My I.Jst illneu was recently (in the I.Jst 4 
WMks: Apr iUmay 1997) 
3 10 I a 
m o nlh 
co 
s.~.sons · code: 
wnter 1. spnng 2. 
summer J ; autlXT\n J 
My last Illness was long time ago (more than <4 
WMU ago) 
8 10 2a 
mo~th [i0 
3 10_~ 
se.ason 
0 
Doesn 't knOY.' I Never been ill 
=>Go_to 821 
Pers.on consutted Consultations 
Bt Sa. BtSb B15c. 8 15d. I 8~ 81Sf 1-st 2-nd 3-<d 4-th 6-th 
GP 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Specialist in po_ly_dinic 3 3 3 3 I J 3 
Specialist in hoS]J_oal 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Other .. ....................... 9 9 9 9 I 9 9 Pleue'Wrlte/n· - · -
Hasn't consulted 10 10 10 10 10 10 
8 17. PLEASE REMEMBER THE BEG INNING OF YOUR LAS T ILLNESS. 0 tD YOU TAKE ANY 
COURSE O F MED ICATI ON, SPECIALISED TREA TMENT , PROCEDURE S, 1-! ERBS , HOME 
TREATMENT, OVER SEVERAL CAYS? 
On. answer for·(X95Crlbed and one for non-prnscrfbed. Up lo IWo 
ilt!SWW3~1tcg~ -··'""""'·: __ > • 
B17A. Prescribed 
Medicines 
Procedures/treatment 
Herbs/home procedures 
Other 
8 179 . Non-prescribed 
Medicines 
Procedures/treatment 
Herbs/home procedures 
Other 
Only fo r your last for the only onel consultat ion during vour taS1 illness. 
1. 924 . When was your last (most recent) vtSIU consultaOOn with 
physidanlheanh worker? 
One answer (1, 2 or 3). Record the time of the last ronsunal ionltreatmenL 
8 10_2c 
year 
DO 
Ust consultations/v isit was recently (in the 
los14 weeks : ApriUmay 1997) 
B24_1a 
month 
DO 
Seasons- code : 
wtn tor t : Spi' lng 2: 
summer 3: autu mn 4 
Last consultations/visit was some time ago 
(more than 4 weeks ago) 
NAJ Never attended physicianlhealth worker 
B24_2a B24_2b B24_2c 
month season year 
DO 0 DO 
=>Go loOt 
Type of expenditure Yes No Leva D 
C1_1G. Travel expenses 1 2 C1_1G1 000000 
C1_2A Medication/consumables/ inc. 1 2 C1 2A1 0 
spectades and lenses etc. 
C1_3A. Herbs I other traditional 1 2 C1_3A1 000000 
remedies 
C1_5A. Payment for procedures/tests 1 2 C1_5A1 0 00000 
Cl _6. Payment for food/ bed liner>' , 2 C1 _6 A 0 00000 laundry 
C1_7 Payment for nursing care 1 2 C1 _7 A 0 00000 
C1_8. Payment for the services of 1 2 C1_8A 0 00000 physidanlother medical staff/ 
ind. healer etc. 
C1_9. Hospital admission charge 1 2 C1 _9 A 000000 
C1_ 10A. Absence from wcrk (days 1 2 Ct _10A 1 0 000days 
/months) 
C1_10B. Has a medical certificate been 1 2 C1_1081 0 000days issued? 
C1_13A. Gift(s), donatlon(s)l for 1 2 C1 _13B1 0 00000 
medical or administrative 
staff 
C1 _ 15A. Other expenditure Please 1 2 C1_ 1581 0 00000 
rea>rd .. 
······ 
C1_16 What proportion of the tolal 1 2 C 1_ 16A 0 0 0 0 00 
expenses are covered by the 
state. munidpality 
i CJ. W HAT PROPORTION OF THE EXPENDITURE ON YOU R LAST CONSULTATlONiviSIT 
j W ERE PAID BY YOURSELF ANOW HAT PROPORTION WAS PAID BY SOMEBODY ELSE ? 
Of1 h row • ~ruwer,.ruc _ .. 
·-- :...-
"!. of expenses 
C3A Yourself 
C3G Other 
UlJ to 100" 
C3H No expenses /insignificant 998 
C31. Can 't remember/OK 999 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
HAVE YOU~ PAID (IN CASH OR IN KINO) FOR SOME OF THE FOLLOWING 
REASONS : 
Yea No 
12A. tn case of serious illne» 1 2 
128. For oonsulation with a promtnert soedalist /dinic 1 2 
~12C BecauSe I k,_ thai I will receive a higt>-quat~y 1 2 
sel\'lce 
120. Because I ~thai I will be tteated immediately 1 2 
12E. Because I had enouah money 1 2 
12F. Because I was satisfied with the successful 1 2 
tteatment 
t2G. Because my child/person very close to me were ill 1 2 
12H. Because the pr"ce was affordable 1 2 
C121. To be treated close to my home 1 2 
C12J. Because I k,_ thai there would be good 1 2 
apparatuses/ medication in the heMh 
establishment 
C12K. Because the physician paid me special attention 1 2 
C12L. Because the attrtude of staff was very good 1 2 
06. IF YOU HAVE TO PAY FOR HEALTH CARE, WHAT IS YOUR PREFERRED OPTION? 
·~· . ' . ii . . •fh·~~~~~>f ~JJ{j 
1 To pay a charge at the point of use for each visrt to physidan(examination. test .. . 
2 In the beginning of each month to oontribute certain sum ard in case of illness to 
pay nothing 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
8 
7 
8 
If rt happens to you to get iU. to pay a small percentage of an expenses during the 
tteatment 
Other/! wouldn 't like to pay at all Not to be read 
OKINA 
IF YOU HAVE TO PAY FOR YOUR TREATMENT OR FOR TREA'NENTOF YOUR CHILD 
OR CLOSE RELATTVE, >ON MUCH WOULD YOU PAY FOR: 
023 A 1+023 AS 023 61 +023 B 
For you (LeV..l For-child/close 
relative (leva) 
Consultation with internist in II II II II II II II II I polydinic 
One-day stay at hospital II II 
Operation of appendicitis m Birth Physician on caU 
For what sum per year would you 
take an insurance with full ooveragei 
subscription 
000000 00000[ 
f.can say-,ucroot.-7~-'kt.414MV 999999 999999 
I don\:waJt.ID.!PI!Y .• ai.Pci oot·~: 999998 999998 
Type of lnoom• 1· 17 8 1·17 es c 1-11 
Yu No Tot•l P,.r~on• l 
monl Income 
SX_Ait81 9alanea for the last month I 2 
SX_A2/82 Ptnslons 
' 
2 
5X Al!BJ Add•bons to salat lu (ch•ld benents . bonuses ) 
' 
2 
SX_.ASIBS Honor anum I income from fre•IMce wor\ I 2 
5X .A&/84 Bu••n• s.s (only direct Inputs In the hou.sehold ) 
' 
2 I 
sx _A171B17 01ho< 
' 
2 I 
5X_AII Don'\"""" Do ltOI'i'ootl_w '"~· ~~~d d "' > 
' 
2 
I ESX YOU PERSOHALL Y 010 YOU MAKE .AJroiY OF Tl-IE FOLLOWING EXP£HSES 1H Tl1E t.AST 
WEEK!l.I)NTH (OA 'Tl1E PREV IOUSWEEK/t.IONTH) 7 IF YES. APPAOn.t.ATElY WHO ......voi Y 
LfVA 010 YOU SPENO li'OR ... : 
Tva• weeki ex.Den••• Yu No Sum • n t ._.,. 
E6X A t /81 Food( at home) 
' 
2 II 
E6X_A2182 Eaung out 
' 
2 II 
ESX_AJ/83 Alcohol fOf home consumption 
' 
2 II 
E6X_A416< Cigare ttes I tobbac:co 
' 
2 
Type monthly upenau 
E6X_A5185 Transportation I 2 
ESX_AS/86 Qolhlng I shoes I 2 l-E6X_A 7187 La1sure (sport , cu lluraJ enterta1nment ) 
' 
2 
E6X_A8188 Ulneu 
' 
2 l-
E6X_A9189 Other big expenses 
' 
2 l= 
E6X_A101810 IDKWOnofieild ,: 
-
. 
' 
2 
- fn ..,,foov<( 9l./l! CfKrWJey "-.ding .O<IIho rNpondOf!l'• .,.,..,. 
.,)(Aornooo e7xs.OOOOOO .,xcOOOOOO 
Leva USO OM 
Don't know/no answer 999999 
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FOCUS GROUPS GL:IDE 
1. warm up. 
11. Gtntnl dlssusslon: The cymn! health care Sn!em 
, Strengths and weaknesses (positive/ negative changes) 
• Is lhe system free allhe point of we? Incidents of infomtal payments? 
, In the last yean what has changed? 
, Molivation for change 
, What is the decisive factor for people to receive a high-quality service 
(money/connections) at pr<senl What should it be? 
, Who benefits and who loses under this system'> (no! only to compare physicians 
and patients, but also groups ofpatirnts. who have advantagc:J privilege under this 
system). Is this fair? 
Do the physicians benefit from the current system of infonnal payments gifts? 
, Who would oppose positive changes in the health system'! 
, What experts should deal with the health care reform (administrators, politicians, 
doctors, represrnratives of the public eu:.)? 
, How do you imagine the participation of the public? 
, Opinions ofrc:fonn direction 
111. Private practlct (doctors. dentists) 
, Attitude towards public-private in the area of medicine: strengths and weaknesses 
of the private sector 
, Anitude towOII'ds parallel functioning of private and sl<lte practices in health 
system 
, Business and medicine. Can there be something in common? 
, What is your anitude towards rntreprrneurs, owners of companies, traders with 
ph...maceuticals and equipment and towards newly established larger private 
clinics. 
, Should these activities exist outside the state control? To what extent should the 
government control the private business in this area'? 
, Who benefits and who loses'! 
, If there should be a paid elernrnt in the state health care, for what is acceptable? 
For which illnesses? 
, Experience when some people are treated differently way due to their financial 
status. 
IV. Voluntarv iosurance 
, Should people l<lke insurance and provide for themselves in the areas of health, 
and if not who should look afkr them? 
, If you take insurance, what would be your rrnrivation'! 
• Trust What type of companies do you trust more and would you l<lke insurance 
with (srate/private/Bulgarianlforeign)? 
• Practicalities: bow much should the insurers pay for pay in case of event (illness)? 
o To whom to pay (the insured)'': (to the insuretsi hospitals) 
VIII. Association test: With what would you associate the following 
words?(!ndividual or group on a board) 
national health insurance 
volunl<lry health insurance 
health fund 
private clinic 
decent physician 
gi fis for the doctors 
IX. Game (split the group into two) 
You are responsible for establishment of health insurance fund, whose aim is to 
support people in =e of illness. You personally participate in the fund too. 
~ How would you establish this fund? (only people ... working together/living 
together; other quality, profession) 
~ And if people from other groups want to be included? (degree of openness: 
whether comes close to national level) At what criteria will people be admitted? (e.g. 
healthy, "decent", suffering from certain illness) 
~ bnagine 100 people agreed to become members of the fund; 
How to collect the initial sums: whether everybody to give equal sums, or different for 
each person in rtlarion to income~ age, have children etc. 
~ How would the money be managed if no spending is required for 3 months? 
(business, investment etc.) 
~ Using the collected revenue what would you do: members pay in the existing 
health facilities for treatment medical insurance in another company, hiring a doctor 
or other? 
~ How would they be supplied with medicines (to buy every rime; buy larger 
quantities; esl<!blish revolving drug fund etc.) 
~ How ofien to contribute (monthly, single contribution etc.)? 
~ Who could pay higher prerrtiums than the others? 
~ Who should make the decisions? (elected leader, economis~ manager). Should 
the decision-maker also be a member? 
~ Should the contributions of people who have not been ill for quite some time, 
be used for their relatives as well as for their members. 
~ Do you think that the fund, having sufficient funds, should help some of its 
members who have immediate financial problem, unrelated to health? 
~ Do you think that a small percentage of the funds should be given to the 
municipality or to other local organisations for health care needs? Would you agree to 
cover some of the de licit of the nationaVregional fund, which covers the health care of 
other people in the area. 
Key words: secunty, trust, flexibility, choice 
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Size and 'Nilf of contnbutiom: for insurance. 
Hao,.e you heard what sums .1re be1ng paid for at present for consultatiOn. sLa:. Jt 
hospital admission in hospital i operatJOn, physician on call, insurance, 
subscription? 
What are the rea.sonJ.ble sums for the above? With what service would you 
compare it as a price (e.~. hospital stay and hotel bed) 
ln case Lhe empl-oyer provides insurance, how should the contributions be split 
among the employer and employee? 
V. National health Insurance 
How would you imagine such HI system? An ideal system'.' 
Trust I distrust in the system, what would make you trust it? 
At whatl.-cl should the HI funds be established'! (national. regional. municipal. 
labour unions~ at enterprises) 
Trust I distrUSt in the civil servants, who will manage the revenue collected into 
funds. 
What is your idea about democratic handling of the money (delegating of rights 
for making decisions to non-state institutions etc.) 
Equal contributions or differentiated for different groups. 
How to pay: monthly premiums I for each consultation , '% of treatment 
VI. Focus on the willingness to pav 
ln what situations would you pay for health services'! (scenar1o: imagine that there 
is free health care up to a certain limit per year, on what would you spend it? 
If you are admitted to hospital, for what would you pay: 
-pharmaceuticals 
- materials/consumables 
- consultation 
-bed 
-food 
To whom do you prefer to pay: Directly to the doctor, to the administration of the 
health facility, to intermediary (fund etc.) 
When and bow: single monthly contribution/for each visit/% of the treatment 
costs; in the end I beginning I during the treatment 
Do you think that some groups should pay more for health services (e.g. smokers, 
criminals) 
Traditional healers/ treatments: replace inaccessible conventional treatments or 
rational choice. 
VII. Statements to be finished (on individcwl sheep for each participant) 
=If l had the power to make a difference in the health care ... 
=Private physicians are more ... (-qualifiedl-responsible) 
=If paid user fees are legalised, some alleviations should be given to ... (elderly, 
poor .. ) 
=Patient who is satisfied with his/her treatment in a state facility ... 
=Physician in state facility, who requests money, is ... 
=Right to unconditional free-of-<:harge treatment should be given to ... 
=The health services for wealthier people should be ... 
=The best option for the Bulgarian health care should be .. 
QUESTION:-IAIRE FOR 1:-1-DEPTH INTERVIEW 
1. INTRODUCTION: General attitudes towards the current situation tn the 
Bulgarian health care sys~m 
, How would you, penonally, a.sess the Situation in the Bulgarian health care, 6-7 
years after Std.rt of the economic reforms in Bulgari.l'! 
[PROBES: now is worse or better; despite the difficulties, are there any grounds for 
optimism] 
, Do you think that the state should provide medical care, free of charge'! Should 
private initiative be e~pandcd tn this area'! 
[PROBES: test connections "free" vs "paid"; "free" vs ·•state-provided"[ 
, Should the patient contribute penonally for receiving a good health care'! How? 
• In your view, which is more important in the health care refonns in Bulgaria: to 
follow the national characteristics or to aim at modem ways of organisation of 
health care in Europe and in the world'! 
, Despite disagreement in opinion among politicians and the mistakes that were 
made. do you think that most of the politicians and experts in Bulgaria are trying to 
do what is best for the Bulgarian health care? 
, Do you think that despite the difficult economic situation at presen~ physicians are 
trying to do their best to provide good health care for the patients'! 
, Are the health status and morbidity of the population related to the problems of the 
environment'' [CONTINUE BELOW If "YES"[ 
[OPTIONAL: Do you think that there are serious ecological problems in Bulgaria in 
the past few yean'! 
Given the situation in Bulgaria at present, do you think that preserving the 
environment should be given priority, even if it leads to slow down of the 
economic development and less jobs?] 
Would you agree with the introduction of 'ecological tax', which to provide clean 
environment? What size? 
Would you buy goods that are e.g. 20% more expensive, but you are sure that are 
ecologically clean? 
Do you think that Bulgaria alone~ without contacts with international organisations, 
can and must solve its ecological problems?] 
• Do you have impression, information. whether the health services in Bulgaria are 
used more often or less often compared to other countries0 [IF THEY KNOW: 
How would you explain that'? Do you think that for the Bulgarian health is 
something very much valuable? Why? Are they different in this respect from 
people from other nationalities?] 
• What are the main difficulties facing people when they have to go to a physician? 
[OBJECTIVE FACTORS ONLY] 
• <!!!>Are there groups from the population that are treated better or worse than the 
othen (discrimination)?. Why? On what does the quality of treatment of the 
respective patient depend? 
[PROBES: on weather they are well-off; on social status·, on expected service or 
present in the future, if they are relatives, friends, colleagues, or other?] 
• What could the people do if they are dissatisfied with the attitude of a certain 
physician towards them'? [!FOR EXPERTS: Do you have impressions from your 
practice?] 
• And if they are satisfied? 
• Do you consider impolite patient who is satisfied with the medical services, but do 
not acknowledge it in any way, e.g. with tlowen, chocolates, or in another way? 
[FOR EXPERTS: Do you think it is good manners for the patien~ who is satisfied 
With the treatment. to express it in some way -e.g. with flowers, with a box. with 
chocolates'! Or in any other way?] 
• No_nnally what presents do physicians receive'? (size and type)? Are they given 
betore or after the treatment., operation'! 
' What is the largest present that you have heard. that a state-employed physician 
has received? [FOR PHYSICIANS: Have you personally ever received presents'? 
Some curious gifts? Do you manage to get another salary with presents?; FOR 
NGO/PATIENTS: Have you personally ever given presents?] 
' Is there any change in the form, size and way of giving presents compared to the 
ttmc before 1989'? 
• Do you think that these gifts increase substantially the incomes of the physicians? 
[[NOT FOR PHYSICIANS]] 
• In your opinion. should the giving of presents be regulated in some way, or 
banned, as an system for additional remuneration of physicians'! What is your 
recommendation. how should. this be arranged'! 
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II. lXPECT A TION A.'>/0 OPI~IO:"iS FOR CHANGES 1.'0 TilE HEAL Til 
FINA.'ICJNG IN BULGARIA 
\\hat methods or financing or a health care system do you know·! 
[If THE RESPONDENT LIST AT LEAST TWO:J 
• Which of these methods do you consider more transNrent and undentandabi< for 
the public'? Is that good? 
• Which method is easier to implement (accounting, trained personnel etc.)? 
• Which one do you personally consider more suitable for Bulgaria'! Why" 
• Which method, according to you, could be accepted easier by the public in 
Bulgaria'! Why'! 
!>According to you by what method Is the Bulgarian health care financed'! 
OBE: Encouraging: ... so far as you know ... ; If they cannot answer: The Bulgarian 
hc.:alth care 1s financed from gcncraJ ta:~.auon such as "'General lncomc Ta..x ··.and 
is thereafter distributed to finance pensions, social security, health care etc.] 
• Is this method suitable for Bulgarian conditions'! Why? 
• What arc the main difficulties in functioning of this health tinancing method'! 
• How would you assess [[NGO/PATIENTS: your impressions from]] the current 
financial situation in the state health facilities? ['FOR DOCTORS: ... in the health 
facility where you work?] 
• Under this financing system is there a fair treatment of ordinary citizens? Why yes/ 
not? 
• [[FOR PHYSICIANS/EXPERTS: Under the current conditions, what could be 
done so that the health sector or separate health facilities to become self-financed" 
[PROBES: Where to get money from0 : bigger budget. user fees, managerial savings 
etc.]] 
• In practice do some health establishments have additional revenues. apart from the 
state budget? 
[PROBES: E.g. payments from by patients for officially free medical services, 
purchase by patients of drugs, materials, food during hospital stay, etc.] 
• Does this way of organisation of the system stimulate sufficiently quality of 
service provided by the medical staff? Why yes/not? 
• On what does the motivation of the physician for high-quality service depend" On 
what should it depend, in your view'? 
• On what does the successful treatment of a given patient depends" [OBJECTIVE 
FACTORS ONLY] 
Would you describe the typical situation, in which a ordinary citizen visits 
physician for a health service. What happens'! Why? 
• In what cases people most often seek health professionals? [For prevention?] 
According to you, is the health education of the population high or low? 
• [FOR PHYSICIANS: How would you rate the size of your salary? 
Sufficient for a good standard of living I 
Sufficient only for basic needs 2 
lnsufficient for a normal existence 
Go back to the recruitment questionnaire (Version 1: PHYSICIANS) If at Al3, 
the respondent has pointed option I or 2. ask:) ASK: You determined your income 
as sufficient for normal existence, and your salary -as insufficient, you must have 
sources other than your salary to add to your income. For those. who has answered 
3 at A 13 and 3 here. ASK: Do you see any opportunities for you to obtain 
additional income?] 
• [[FOR EXPERTS/NGO/PA TIENTS: How would you rate the size of a physician's 
salary? 
Sufficient for a good standard of living 
Sufficient only for basic needs 
Insufficient for a normal existence]] 
• How would you assess the incomes of physicians/dentists, in comparison to other 
professions? Are their income really so low? 
[PROBE: what about salaries plus gifts] 
• [[FOR EXPERTS: What about the incomes of people working in the area of the 
health administration?]] 
• [[FOR NGO/PA TIENTS]] Do you think that the physicians have opportunity to 
obtain additional income? How? 
• Which physicians are the most privileged in this respect? Why? 
[PROBES: Sofia-small towns/villages; type of health facility; type of service]. 
• <!!!>According to your own experience and impressions, on what does the 
willingness to pay for health care depends? 
[FIRST UNPROMPTED; THEN SHOW CARD I {AT THE END Of Q-RE-P.8)-
TO SELECT WHICH FACTORS ARE IMPORTANT; AND THEN TO 
RANGE THE 3 MOST IMPORTANT] 
• [[FOR NGO: <!'!>In your view, are the people suffering from .................. (the 
respective disease related to the activity of the NGO) less or more willing to pay 
for health care than other patients? Why yes/no?]] 
• How do you see the situation, in which a physician in an ordinary health facility 
work? Wh1ch are the daily difficultit:s in th~ physac1an · s/your \\-Ork? 
[[!FOR EXPERTS: <!!!>How do you see the situation, in which an expert/economic 
director work..]] 
, Do you think the health facilities [[FOR EXPERTS: and administrative 
institutions]] have sufficient budget in order to provide the patients with the 
services they need'~ 
, On what docs the phys1c1an 's behaviour depend'> On matcnaJ mtcrcst? 
, Whether the low or delayed payment stimuiJte the physic1a.ns to expect presents? 
• <!!!>Do your support the collective .tctions of physicians to achieve aims related to 
their work'! [IF NOT MENTIONED: Do you justify the strikes?) 
• [[FOR NGO: <!!!>What does the current situation affect your organisation? 
Would you tell u.s brieny about your organisation: financing. structure etc.? 
, How does your organisation alleviate the problems of the people suffering from 
............. (respective disease). What is the difference between your and other 
:iimilar organ isations'!J] 
Information on Issues related to the health system & reform 
• Are you interested in the issues related to the situation and orgo:S.nisation of health 
care system'! 
[[FOR PHYSICIANS: In your daily work do you receive information regarding the 
situation and organisation of health care system?)) [[FOR EXPERTSINGO: Do 
you use such information in your work'.')) 
[PROBE: Sources of information? Have you recently read something in this 
area. which you found interesting?) 
, [[FOR EXPERTS: Do you have contacts with international institutions (exchanges, 
joint activities)? With whom?)) 
, Do you follow the political debates, regarding the health care reform? 
Under what conditions could consensus on these issues be reached'! 
At present what arc the predominant opinions regarding the reform of the health 
care? Which political forces stay behind them? 
According to you, is reform in the method for health care financing necessary? Is 
such refonn realistic in the present conditions? 
Which institutions, organisations, should be involved in the reform? 
[PROBES: National Assembly; Ministry of Health; the municipalities; health 
facilities: citizens' organisations; NGOs; Ministry of Finance etc.) 
, [(FOR NGO: In what way could your organisation participate and support the 
implementation of the health care reform?]] 
<!!!>Attitudes towards paid health care In the state and private health facilities 
, In your opinion, is the existence of private practice in health care suitable for the 
Bulgarian conditions? To what extenr' 
, What is your attitude towards the idea of introduction of forms of paid services 
(user fees) in the state health facilities? 
, According to you, should all patients pay the same sum for a particular health 
semco'' [IF 'NO': Why?; IF 'YES'· So you think that 11 is correct to pay the same 
regardless of differences in needs, income. education, age. ethnicity etc.? 
• You, personally, what percentage of your monthly income would you allot for a 
health insurance contnbution'? [[FOR NGOs: In your impressions, what percentage 
of their monthly income could your members be able to allot for ... ]] 
• Should some pay more for the health services that they receive than the rest of the 
population? 
[PROBES: more frequent users; better off) 
• How could this be achieved in practice? 
[PROBES: Higher prices/or health care tax for the better-<>ffs; to pay percentage of 
their treatmen~ sponsorship, donations etc.] 
• In case that user fees are Introduced In the state he2lth facilities, should some 
people pay lower prices or the state to give them benefits for this purpose? 
[PROBES: elderly, disabled, young; with chronic conditions, children, families with 
young children; poor etc. What about alleviations for people who alone support 
families or look after elderly; or people who look after their health, people with 
other merits to society) 
• [[FOR NGO: In your opinion, should those suffering from ..................... (the 
respective disease of the NGO) to pay for their treatment?]] 
• Should we, who are healthier, give priority to such people [[FOR NGS: suffering 
from. ...... ( respective illness)]] for treatment in state facilities, because they are 
often more vulnerable, in worse health? 
• Should people who are willing to pay directly twice the official user fee, be given 
priority? 
• Arc there groups who should not receive discowtt in user fees, even if they are 
entitled to it? 
[PROBES: smokers; alcoholics; people who demand unnecessary treatments; drunk 
drivers etc.) 
• What is your opinion, in terms of payment for health care, is it possible and should 
there be individualised approach, looking at the specific circumstances of each 
person'! [[FOR NGO: Or according to some group characteristics'?]] 
• Do you know of state health facilities, •I ready charging user fees'! 
[PROBES: For whar! In what size/type etc.] 
• In your personal view. is the moment ripe for introduction of user fees in the state 
health facilities'! 
[PROBI!: For what'!) 
• How would the public [[FOR NGO: member of your organisationJ] reac~ should 
the user fees become a mass practice in Bulgaria'? 
• Would there be people (or political forces) opposing introduction of paid medical 
care in the state health facilities'.' Which'.) Why? 
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How lhould the tssue be resohed wtth people ,~fOR SGO- from )OUT 
·)rg:amsation]J, who c..lilnot pay for heaJth care neHhcr tn pn• .. itc:, nor tn the state 
health fJ..._iJities? And for phanTlJ.ceuticals' 
[PROBES: to be covered entirely pai11Jlly by the state: to be co;ered by the 
patient., but wlth subsidies for those m need~ 
".\/hat is the most-.tppropriate ',l,'JY for the pJ!tcnt ro pay. either 1n pri" ate, either in 
>tdte facilities'.' To whom? !sit necessary to ha.e J.n mtcnnecLary between the 
patient and the health organisation'.' 
:SHOWCARD 2; AT THE El'D OF THE DOC!JM E'. T; 
'.V THERE IS SOME TALK ABOUT POSSIBLE INTRODl:CTION OF 
CO.\!PULSORY HEALTH L>.;SlJRANCE SYSTE.\1 
• '!iho should collect the monthly health insurance contributions? 
[PROBES: The government~ municipalitjes, ~I0H, ~Gas, co-operatives. private 
organisations] 
[[FOR "GO:<!!!> Do you think that if the legislatton is in place, NGOs such as 
yours should be given opporTunity to create and manage health insurance funds'? 
• <!~~>What difficulties could arise if this happens? 
<!!!>Ifyour organisation creates J fund. what people should be covered'? 
[PROBES: Only your members, people w1th Similar health problems in general] 
<!!!>Should the health insurance funds of:--IGOs compete with other professional 
and national funds? 
<!!!>What could the NGOs do to attract people, who to choose to in insured in 
these funds? GO TO QUESTION: On what should the revenue be used?Jl 
, Who should manage the funds/contributions'' [SA.\!E PROBES] 
, ~[FOR PHYSICIANS/EXPERTS: On what princ1plc should the health insurance 
timds be organised? 
[PROBES: national, regional, municipal, professional etc.]] 
How should the revenue from the health insurance be used? 
[PROBES: only for health care; social security; benefits for the poor; 
infrastructure] 
[[FOR PHYSICIANS AND EXPERTS: MORE SPECIALISED QUESTIONS= 
In our conditions what is more appropriate: integrated well organised centralised 
health insurance funds or multiple funds? IF THE LA TIER: Should there be 
competition between the funds for attracting patients? 
What do you think, should the membership in a health insurance funds be 
compulsory'? Should the users have a right to choose in which fund (if more than 
one) to enrol? 
Is it a good idea that the very rich people should be ••eluded from participation in 
a health insurance system and required to pay directly for medical services at 
substantially higher prices than the people who a members of, health insurance 
funds. 
What would be the effect of the introduction of paid services (user fees) in the state 
health facilities? 
[PROBES: for the patients, for the health facilities, for the health care as a 
whole] 
[[FOR NGO: How would this reform affect your organisation?]] 
lll. SCENARIOS: THE RESPONDENT AS PATIENT 
Imagine the following situation: Imagine the following situation: You are Ill, and 
,·ou need medical help. What are you going to do'! [[FOR NGO: If the 
;...pondent has illness ask only for his/her pe"onal choicell 
[PROBES: Where are you going to go'' polyclinics/hospital; private/state. Why? 
How much do you think is affordable for you to pay for one consultation at 
present? And for medicines? 
Are you going to use connections (friends, colleagues)? Why? 
How would you return the favour of the physician, who treated you? 
Would you think of taking insurance? What sum monthly could you allot for 
such insurance? 
What sum are you '1-Villing to pay monthly for the convenience the physician to 
be at your disposal 24 hours per day? 
Another hypothetical situation: if we assume that your child, or a pe"on very 
close to you, are ill. Please, describe step-by-step what would you do '! 
[PROBES: THE SAME AS IN THE FIRST SCENARJO, BUT SHORTER] 
If a relative of you" is ill and should be urgently admitted to hospita~ how 
would you act? 
[PROBES: THE SAME AS IN THE FIRST SCENARIO, BUT SHORTER 
What sum do your think atTordable for you to pay for admission to hospital? 
And for medicines, materials, food?] 
If we assume that you have a relative/friend with chronic condition [[FOR NGO: 
member or your organisation with chronic condition/disability}}, who often 
needs medical care and hospital treatment In case, person can select the way of 
payment, what would you advise them to do'! 
[PROBES: To pay every time, when ht~she had to be treated 
To take insurance (private, National lnsurancc Institute, or other) 
To pay directly to the physician who treats hinvher or to the administration] 
Let's imagine that you have to travel on business abroad and you. have to treat 
vour teeth beforehand. Your h:.nre enough time, to make an appomtment with 
the dentist in your district, if you decide. [THE SAME PROBES AS IN THE 
FIRST SCENARIO; SHORTER} 
'IF NOT MENTIONED: In .my of the above situat1ons, would you think oftalting an 
~nsu.rance or subscription to a clinic etc.? How would you return the f4vour to the 
phys~cian'! What sum are you willing to pay mon~hly for: the c~nvemencc th~ ., 
phySician to be at your disposal ~4 hour,; per day·. And tor a smgle consultaoon. J 
JV. PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 
ROlatdlng what problenu and suggestions (related to your work), did you have 
10 enter an argument with your physicians (colleagues), boss, poUtlclans etc. In 
the past year'! IIPATIENT: what problems related to the quality of health care, 
did you have to enter ... } 
[PROBES: presents. informal payments, financial shortages: shortages of drugs, 
centnily determined budgets; poor management etc.}} 
[[[PROCEED IN CASE .TilE RESPONDENT HAS A CASE TO REPORT: 
, \Vhat was your expenence on those arguments ·positive or negative? What 
happened'! How did you feel'! 
, Was your opinion accepted? If not, were you «plained why'! 
What was the attitude of your opponents towards you per.mnally in this argurnenr? 
Why? [PROBES: fair, unfair, special?) 
In your opinion what is more important to find the common language with the 
other.> in other similar arguments: clearly to present your position or to try to 
understand the position of your opponent? 
What did you do'! Are the measures that you took effective? What would you do 
now in a similar situation? 
[PROBES: insistence for your opinion to be considered 
refer the issues to higher authorities 
publications in the press 
attempt to evade the particular employee 
attempt to influence the decision-makers through: 
quote the law 
threatening the employee in certain way 
offering of services, gift (or bribe) 
use of connections (what'/ personal/professional) or other . describe )IJ 
<!!!>What expenses did you Incur during your Jut visit to a physician or 
dentist'! 
[PROBES:expertses on tests,procedures,food,travel,ioss ofworktime, gifts, etc.] 
Wore these resources a problem for you? If yes, did you take a loan? 
[PROBES: or from the salary, savings, loan, sale of goods etc.} 
<!!!>You know that in other countries people use health insurance to cover 
expenses made during illness. Have you ever taken health Insurance for yourself 
or other member of your family? Why yes/not? }(FOR NGO: Have you ever 
advlsr/dlscusses this issue with people from your organlsation'!IJ 
[IF ANSWERS "NO": If some day you have to take health insurance, where 
would you do it in state or private company? Why? In the current situation 
would you take insurance?) 
What kind of insurance do you use at present: Ufe insurance, property 
insurance, car Insurance, accident insurance etc.? 
<!!!>Did it ever happen to you personally to pay or to give gift on occasion of 
being treated in health facility? II FOR NGO: Has is happened to people from 
your organlsatlon'!ll 
• Are the separate health facilities to collect small user fees from the patients, to do 
the accounting, and to use the revenue rationally, according to for their own self-
financing? On what does their introduction depend? 
• <!!!>For you [[FOR NGO: and for the members of your organisation}] which is 
the best option and why: 
'to pay a user fee for each separate consultation with a physician (including all 
expenses: fee for the service, purchasing of drugs etc.) 
'in the beginning of each month to contnbute certain sum and from then on to pay 
nothing when you visit a physician. 
'to pay to say J-5% from all expenses incurred during the treatment 
• <!!!>Which is the most acceptable option for a patient who has to be treated 
regularly? And for people who use rarely? And for the pensioners? 
• If such fees are collected in the state health facilities, on what should the revenue 
be spen~ on bonuses for staff, drugs. supplying equipment, etc.? Why? 
[TO RANGE] 
• [[FOR NGO/PATIENTS: What do you prefer. to pay small fee in the state health 
facility in a situation of raised quality of service:. or to go directly in a private 
facility'! Why?] J 
• [[FOR PHYSICIANS: Do you practise privately'~ Would you start a private 
practice? Is that a risky step? 
• How did you (would you) determine the fees?)) 
• [[FOR EXPERTS/NGO/PA T!ENTS: Have you ever consulted a privately 
practising physician in a consultation room or in private state facility? 
• How would you assess the fee? 
• Are you inclined to go again? Why'/}} 
[[FOR EXPERTS: On what are you working at the moment'! 
[PROBE: something related to the health insurance?)] 
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PROBES: ',\'ould you describe 1n ·,hat c:rcumsta.nces.' 
W .LS that for the sc:r. ices of phys1crans. nL.;.nes. or for dru~. m.iten.~ls cr..: 
How ... ould you .usc:ss the fee'! 
What impressions were you left 'A'Hh.' 
Would you go again".'] 
V. A.SSESS:\IE;";TS A:"iD SL:GGESTIO.'IS FOR FI;';A,'ICI'IG REFOR.\IS 1:\ 
THE BL:LGARIA.'I HEALTH CARE SYSTDI 
Do you think that there is a change 1n !he motivation of the ph:rsicians now 
compared to before 10 November 1989? Is there a change in the social prestige of 
the medical professionals" [[FOR EXPERTS: motivation ond presnge of the health 
.J.drninistratoru experts/economic directors]] 
\Vhat measures could be taken to impro' e the situation of the Bulgari.1n health 
care'! lmagme that you have the power to change the things [[FOR :"-.GO: to 
introduce reforms that will benefit the members of your organisation]), ., .. ,hJ.t Me 
the three things that you would do first'.' 
[PROBES: radical change in the system of health financing: 
introduction of compulsory health insurance system 
more resources in the budget for health care 
Law for health (better arrangements for the private practice) 
better payment of the medical professionals 
tougher control by the ,\1 inistry over !he work of the physicians 
more professional information for those working in the health system; other] 
• [[FOR EXPERTS: What do you think >bout decentralisation of the health care 
management at municipality level? Do JOU think that there are enough good 
"Perts at regional b ei'!]J 
• Do you think that a system of health care financing which to achieve better results 
for the ordinary citizens [[FOR PHYSIClANS: for the health profeSSionals: FOR 
EXPERTS: for the citizens •nd for the health professionals: FOR NGO: for the 
people you represent/your membersJ), is possible •t ail? 
• [[FOR EXPERTS1PA TIENTSIN GO: Do you think that in the health care system 
there are informal payments by patients'? What is the reason for their nistence? 
Who benefits mostly from them? 
• Is this a wide-spread practice in your opinion'! Is it a serious problem? 
[PROBES: is it rather culturally determined. tradition. economic reaction}} 
• [[FOR EXPERTS: Do you think that there are incidents of corruption in the health 
administration or this is just a myth?]} 
• What do you think for a system for financial independence of the state health 
facilities, e.g. to support themsel\ es [hrough collection of user fees? Is it possible 
in [he current conditions? 
Showcard 1: Factors lnnuencing willingness to pay 
Which are important? 
• type of health facility (hospital I polyclinics) 
• seriousness of the i1lnessl how threatening it is 
• on how much are the patient values it own health 
• on the type of health service I product, e.g. pharmaceuticals, consurnabl<s, 
payment to physician, hospital admission 
• on the behaviour and attitudes (good manners) of patient 
• on whether the patient is satisfied with the service I is getting higher-quality 
service, or quick and convenient contact with a physician 
• on whether the patient is has money and is able to pay 
• on the way and moment of payment (large/small sum; money or in-kind, before or 
after the treatment 
• on whether the treattnent is in Sofia or in small towns/villages 
Please select the 3 most important factors 
Showcard 2: What Is the most appropriate way for you/any patient to pay for 
health care'! To whom'! 
• Directly to the physician 
• To the administration of the health establishments 
• Contributions to health insurance company 
• Contnbutions to health fund 
• To state institution 
Other 
, Themes for policy-makers lntervle"s (or to be used as supplementary In the 
bt~tlnnlng or th< end of the Interview) 
On what are you working at the momenf~ 
Any conflict> at work (to tell story/episode)'.' 
Some experience related to your t)lpericnce with health financing? 
Who stands in your way, prevents you to advance in the direction you deem 
.~ppropriate? 
To what extent are your informed about the current state of the health insurance 
Implementation'! 
Rtform content (Jill Walt's process, content, actors/or SWOT analysis): 
Introduction of national health insurance system 
Human resources/financial resources/timetable 
Administrative capacity 
Political climate 
Refonnlchange ·how? 
Which groups will be the winners and the losers under the HI system 
(physicians/users etc.) 
Which arc the main actors in a HI system'? (insurance companies! managers/ 
funds) 
Financial/ information exchange 
Voluntary insurance/ national health insurance system 
To what ex. tent to have public involvement and control over the resources 
Statelprivate participation 
Integrated national health insurance fund or multiple competing funds 
Payment ofphysiciansillospitals 
On what does the smooth functioning of the system depends? (people to pay 
contribution, stability. self-financing) 
Opportunities to implement the reform: which actors, to what extent are they 
are effective, do they have technical/political skills and political support; help 
from international donors; leaderships; public consensus for reform 
Obstacles: What could make the reform impossible (e.g. lack of understanding 
of the principle of insurance; complexity and untransparency of the system; 
informal payments; lack of skills; lack of acceptance from the public and the 
professionals, impossible to collect adequate funds; place of the private sector, 
change of the political situation) 
Reform context: situation in the health care system/ problems I history I national 
psychological characteristics; change of the values and attitudes; macroeconomic 
environment I health status of the population. 
Reform process: slow/fast: reasons. Actors, opposition to change, intentions for 
refonn? What measures were introduced while you were already at this position, 
positive/negative? 
A12.Since ....tlen are you at your current position? 
(Write in years) 
A13.What is the income of your family? 
Sufficient for a good standard of living 1 
Sufficient only for basiC needs 2 
Insufficient for a normal existence 3 
A14ApproximaUy in which of the following groups does your income (of the past 
month) falls? 
Below 19,999 1 160,000-179,999 9 
20,000-39,999 2 180,000-199.999 10 
40,000. 59,999 3 200,000. 219,999 11 
60,000. 79,999 4 220,000. 239,999 12 
60,000. 99,999 5 240,000.259,999 13 
100,000. 119,999 6 260,000.279,999 14 
120.000. 139,999 7 280,000. 299.999 15 
140.000- 159,999 8 Above 300,000 16 
DK!NA 99 
A15.Do you practice any religion? If, yes, which one? 
(Write in) 
A16 Do you engage in sports? 
Yes, actively 
From time to time 
No 
1 
2 
3 
A17.Are you a member of any organisation? If yes, in what kind? 
Cultural 1 
Labour union 2 
Political party 3 
Professional organisation 4 
Other organisation 5... . ........... (Write in) 
A18.Do you smoke? (If they answer that smoke rarely, circle "Yes") 
Yes 1 .............................. (cigarettes weakly) 
No 2 
A19 How often do you drink (per weak)? 
Drink almost every day 
Drink only at special occasions/ not every week 
Never drink 
1 
98 
99 
A20.How would you describe your own health status on the whole? 
Good 1 
~thergood 2 
Neither good, nor bad 3 
Quite poor 4 
Very poor 5 
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RECRCIT\IE:\T QCESTIO.'O:\AlRE FOR FOCCS GROLPS 
Vusion A: PIIYSICL\.'OS 
<!~:>Information to be recorded prior to rhe focuJ group<~~~> 
A 1 Fc..cvs ~roup code 
A2 Sex IJTI/f) 
A3 Age'"' tears) 
A4 //l11Cfl is the hoghest educational degree atta1ned 
Postgraduate degree 1 
Degree level education (un1versrty) 2 
'/ocationaVtechnical college 3 
Secondary: general 4 
Lower than secondary 5 (TERMINATE THE 
INTER'/IE'N; 
AS. What 1S your profession? 
Phys1aan (incl. physiotherapist. etc.) 
Nurse/ midwife 
Denbst 
Pharmaast 
Otner .... 
INTER'IIE'N) 
1 (GO TO A6) 
2 (GO TO A6) 
3 (GO TO A6) 
4 (GO TO A7) 
5 (TERMINATE THE 
A6. Only for physicians and nurses: What is your field? (e.g. dermatolog1st. etc.) 
(Write in) 
A7. What academic degree do you have? 
AsSIStant professor I lecturer 
Senior assiStant professor I senior lecturer 
Assoaate professor I reader 
Professor 
None 99 
A8. In which heanh establishment. medical universrty. or other instrtutK>n do you 
'M)rj(? 
(Write in) 
A9. In ....tlich settlement is rt? (Write in) 
A tO What is your posrtion at present? 
Phys1cian working in a ward 1 
Head of surgery I specialised consu~ation room 2 
Head of ward I department 3 
Semor nurse I ward nurse 4 
Ch1ef physician/senior nurse of clinic 5 
Chief physician/senior nurse of hosprtal, polyclinic 6 
Economic director 7 
Otl1er... (Wrrte in) 
A 11.Do you have staff directly subordinated to you? 
Yes 1.. .. ............... (Write in number of subordinates) 
No 2 
RECRUITMENT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FOCUS GROUPS 
Version B: PATIENTS 
<!!!>Information to be recorded prior to the focus group<!!!> 
D1. Focus group code 
02. Sex (rTVf) 
03. Age (in years) 
04. Which is the highest educational degree attained: 
Postgraduate degree 1 
Degree level education (university) 2 
VocationaVtechnical college 3 
Secondary: general 4 
Lower than secondary 5 
05. What is your profession? 
06. What is your main occupation at present? 
Full-time university student 1 
Freelance 
Ownerico-<Jwner of private company 3 
(Write in) 
Farmer/ employed in agriculture 4 
Employee 5 
Unemployed 6 
Pens1oner 7 
HousewJfelon maternity leave 8 
Other..... 9 
IF THE RESPONDENT IS WORKING 
D?. In what type of organisation/institution/company do you work? 
State 1 
Private 2 
Other. .(Write in) 
07 a. Where do you work? (name of the organisation/instituttOn/company) 
(Wnte in) 
DB What IS your position at present? 
(Write in) 
09. Do you have staff directly subordinated to you? 
Yes ........................ (Write tn number of subordinates) 
No 2 
010.Since .men are you at your current positiOnis? 
(Wnte in years) 
010.What IS the 1ncome of your famly? 
Suffiaent for a good standard of l1vtng 1 
Sutfic1ent only for bas1c needs 2 
lnsufficrent for a normal exrstence 3 
011 -a Approxrnatly in wh1d'1 at the totlowmg groups does )QUI 111come (of the past 
IT()nth) falls? 
Below 19,999 1 160,000 • 179,999 9 
20,000. 39,999 2 180,000. 199,999 10 
40,000. 59,999 3 200,000. 219,999 11 
60,000. 79,999 4 220,000. 239,999 12 
60,000. 99,999 5 240,000 . 259,999 13 
100,000. 119.999 6 260,000.279,999 14 
120,000. 139,999 7 280,000. 299,999 15 
140.000 • 159,999 8 Above 300,000 16 
Dt<JNA 99 
012.Do :,ou practice any religion? It, yes, whicn one? 
013.Do :,ou engage 1n sports? 
Yes, actively 
From time to time 
No 
(Write in) 
1 
2 
3 
014 Are :,ou a membef at any organisation? It yes. in what kind? 
Cuttural 1 
Labour union 2 
Pol~ical party 3 
Professional organisation 4 
Other organisation 5..... ...(Wme in) 
D15.Do you smoke? (It they answer that smoke rarely, circle 'Yes") 
Yes 1 .... (cigarettes weakly) 
No 2 
D16.How often do :,ou drink (per weak)? 
Drink almost every day 1 
Drink only at speoal occasions/ not every week 98 
Never drink 99 
017. How muld you descnbe your own health status on the whole? 
~00 1 
Rather gaoo 2 
NeMer good, nor bad J 
Qu~e poor 4 
Very poor 5 
D18.Do :,ou have any long-standing (cnronic) itlness or disabil~ (IF YES, AND 
THEY SAY WHAT IS THE ILLNESS, WRITE BELOW) 
.................... ......................... (Wntein) 
D19.Did )QU consutt a doctor/other heatth worker in a state heatth establishment 
regan:ling your last illness in the past 6 months? Or in private? 
State Private 
Yes. several times/qurte often 
Yes. once/twice 
1 1 
2 2 
No 3 3(1FTWO 
ANSWERS "NO", TERMINATE THE INTERVIEW) 
020. In which settlement do you live? ... ... (Write in) 
RECRUITMENT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW 
Version l: PHYSICIANS 
<!!!>Information to be recorded prior to the Interview<!!!> 
A 1. Interview Code 
A2. Sex (m'f) 
A3. Age 0n years) 
A4. Which is the highest educational degree attained: 
Postgraduate degree 1 
Degree level education (univers~) 2 
Vocationalllecnnical cotlege 3 
Secondary: general 4 
Lower than secondary 5 (TERMINATE THE 
INTERVIEW) 
AS. What is your profession? 
Physidan (ind. physiotherapist, etc.) 
Nurse/ midwife 
Dentist 
Pharmacist 
Other .............. . 
INTERVIEW) 
1 (GOTOA6) 
2(GOTOA6) 
3 (GO TO A&) 
4(GOTOA7) 
5 (TERMINATE THE 
A6. Only tor physicians and nurses: What is your field? (e.g. dermatologist, etc.) 
........................ ........ ...................... (Write in) 
A7. What academic degree do you have? 
Assistant professor 1 lecturer 1 
Senior assistant professor I senior lecturer 2 
Associate professor 1 reader 3 
Professor 
None 99 
AS. In which heatth establishment. medical univers~. or other instttution do you 
1>011<7 
(Write in) 
A9 In which settlement is~? ... ........ (Wme in) 
A 1 O.What is :,our pos~ion at present? 
Physidan working 1n a ward 1 
Head of surgery I specialised consultation room 2 
Head of wan:! I department 3 
Senior nurse I ward nurse 4 
Ch1et physician/senior nurse of clinic 5 
Clll&f physician/senior nurse of hospital, polycllmc 6 
Economic d~ector 7 (GO TO 
QUESTIONNAIRE Version II ECONOMIC DIRECTORS) 
Other... (Write in) 
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Short questionnaire filled by each focus group participant 
First name (for identification purposes) .. 
·Nitn what company would you take health 1nsurance? 
State 1nsurance company 
Pnvate 1nsurance company 
A 
Insurance compaby w~h joint ownership (pnvate and state) 
Co-operative fund 
Other 
B 
BULGARIAN 1 
FOREIGN 2 
JOINT VENTURE 3 
OTHER 4 
I would not take insurance 98 
DKINA.. . .. ....... 99 
How much (in leva) would you pay for your treatment or for treatment of your 
Child/ close relative. is some payment is necessary· 
Consu~ation wM internist in polyclinic ... Leva 
One-day stay at hospital ..... Leva 
Operation of appendic~is ...... Leva 
4 Childbirth ...... Leva 
5 PhysiCian on call ..... Leva 
6 For what sum per year would you take an insurance for full coverage! 
subscription ...... Leva 
7 Can't say/ not sure 99 
8 I don1 want to pay at all 98 
It you have to pay for health care. what is your preferred option? 
To pay a charge at the point of use tor each visit to 
physician( examination. test. etc.) 
In the beginning of each month to contribute certain sum and in 
case of illness to pay nothing 
When you are ill, to pay a small percentage of all expenses 
incurred during the treatment 
Other 
2 
3 
4 
If general health insurance is to be in~oouced, in your view, at what level shll\Jid the health 
funds be created? 
At enterprise level: tor the needs of people working tor certain enterprise 
At professional unions: tor the needs of people from certain profession 
At municipal level: tor the needs of people living in the respective 
municipal~ 
At regional level: for the needs ot people living in the respective region 
At national level: tor the needs of all Bulgarian ~izens 
Other 
A 11. Do you have staff directly subordinated to you? 
Yes 
No 
1 ...... 
2 
............ (Write in number of subordinates) 
A12.Since when are you at your current position? 
(Write in years) 
A13.What is the income of your family? 
Sufficient tor a good standard of living 1 
Sufficient only tor basic neecis 2 
Insufficient for a normal existence 3 
A14.Do you practice any religion? If, yes. which one? 
.......... ............ (Write in) 
A15.Do you engage in sports? 
Yes. actively 
From time to time 
No 
1 
2 
3 
A 16.Are you a member of any organisation? It yes, in what kind? 
ru~~ 1 
Labour union 2 
Political party 3 
Professional organisation 4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Other organisation 5... ...(Wnte in) 
A17.Do you smoke? (If they answer that smoke rarely. cirde 'Yes") 
Yes 1 ............. (cigarettes weakly) 
No 2 
A 18. How often do you drink (per weak)? 
Drink almost every day 1 
Drink only at special occasions/ not every week 98 
Never drink 99 
A 19 How would you describe your own health status on the whole? 
Good 1 
Rather good 2 
Neither good. nor bad 3 
Quite poor 4 
Very poor 5 
RECRUITMENT QUESTIO:'<NAIRE FOR IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW 
Vmion II: EXPERTS, ECONOMIC DIRECTORS 
<!!!>Information to be recorded prior to the lntenlew<!!!> 
61 lnteMeW Code 
62. Sex ( m'fl 
63. Age (in years) 
64. Which 1s the highest educational degree attained: 
Postgraduate degree . . 1 
Degree level education (unJVers1ty) 2 
VocationaVtechnieal college 3 
SecondaJY general 4 
Lower than secondary 5 (TERMINATE THE 
INTERVIEW) 
65. What is your profession? 
Physician/dentist (incl. physiotherapist, etc.) 
NurseJmdwife/laboratory assistant 
Economist 
1 
2 
3 
Other ..... 4 (TERMINATE THE 
INTERVIEW) 
66. In which health establishment, medical university, or other do you work? 
(Write in) 
87. In whiCh settlement is it? .... 
88. What is your position at present? 
Economic director 
Expert 1n the MoH 
Expert in the Regional Office of Health care 
Other... 
89. Do you have staff directly subordinated to you? 
(Write in) 
1 
2 
3 
(Write in) 
Yes 1......... .. ....... (Write in number of subordinates) 
No 2 
610.Since when are you at your current position? 
(Write in months/years) 
B 11 . What is the income of your family? 
Sufficient for a good standard of living 1 
Sufficient only for basic needs 2 
Insufficient for a normal existence 3 
RECRUITMENT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW 
Version Ill: NGOs 
<!!!>lor ormation to be recorded prior to the interview<!!!> 
C1. Interview Code 
C2. Sex (mlf) 
C3. Age (in years) 
C4. Which is the highest educational degree attained: 
Postgraduate degree 1 
Degree level education (university) 2 
Vocational/techniCal college 3 
Secondaty. general 4 
Lower than secondary 5 (TERMINATE THE 
INTERVIEW) 
CS. What is your profession? 
(Wr~e in) 
C6. What is your main occupation at present? 
Full-time university student 1 
Freelance 2 
Owner/co-owner of private company 
Farmer/ employed in agricutture 4 
Empioyee 5 
Unemployed 
Pensioner 
Housew~eton maternity leave 8 
Other........................... 9 
IF THE RESPONDENT IS WORKING 
C7. Where (organisationrmst~nlcompany) do your mainly work? 
....................... (Wr~e in) 
CB. Apan from the above mentioned, do you have a second job? 
No Yes 
99 
1.. .. (Wr~e in)) 
ASK SEPARATELY FOR THE MAIN JOB AND FOR THE SECOND JOB, IF ANY. 
C9. In what type of organisationlinst~utionlcompany do you work? 
a)Ma1n job b)Second job 
St.ato t State 1 
Pnvate 2 Private 2 
Other........ 3 Other... 3 
CtO.What is your DOs•ion at present? 
aiMa~njob 
.............................. (Wr~in) 
b)Second job 
Ct t.Since when are you at your current pasrtionls? 
a)Ma~n job b)Second job 
.......... (mostyears) 
.... (Wr~e n) 
.... (moS/years) 
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312 Approx~maUy 1n WhiCh of the following groups does your rncome I of the past 
rmnth) falls? 
Below 19.999 
20.000- 39.999 
40.000. 59,999 
60,000- 79.999 
60,000- 99.999 
100.000- 119,999 
120.000- 139.999 
140,000- 159,999 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
160,000- 179.999 
180,000- t99,999 
200,000- 219,999 
220,000. 239.999 
240,000- 259.999 
260,000- 279,999 
280,000- 299.999 
Abcve 300,000 
OKJNA 99 
813.0o you practice any relig1on? If, yes, which one? 
814 Do you engage in sports? 
Yes. actively 
From time to time 
No 
(Write in) 
1 
2 
3 
815.Are you a member of any organisation? If yes, in what kind? 
Cultural 1 
~bour~~ 2 
Political pany 3 
Professienal organisation 4 
Other organrsation 5 .. (Wntein) 
816.0o you smoke? (If they answer that smoke rarely, circle "Yes") 
Yes 1 ............................. (cigarettes weakly) 
No 2 
817. How often do you drink (per weak)? 
Drink almost every day 1 
Dnnk onJy at special occasronsl not every week 98 
Never drink 99 
818.How would you describe your own health status on the wrole? 
Good 1 
Rather good 2 
Nerther good, nor bad 3 
Quite poor 4 
Very poor 5 
C11.Are you paid for your work? 
a) Main job 
Yes 1 
No 2 
b) Second job 
Yes 
No 
C13.Do you have staff directly subordinated to you? 
a) Main job 
1 
2 
Yes 1....... ...(Write in number of subordinates) 
No 2 
b) Second job 
Yes 1.. ..... (Write in number of subordinates) 
No 2 
C14.What is the income of your family? 
Suffiaert for a good standard of living 1 
Suffidert only for basic needs 2 
InsuffiCient for a normal existence 3 
C15.Do you practice any religion? If, yes. which one? 
C16.Do you ef11lage in sports? 
Yes. actively 
From time to time 
No 
(Wnte in) 
1 
2 
3 
C17.Are you a member of any organisation? If yes. in what kind? 
Cu~ural 1 
Labour unvn 2 
Polijical parry 3 
Professional organisation 4 
Other organisation 5... .. .... (Wnte in) 
C18.Do you smoke? (If they answer that smoke rarely, circle "Yes") 
Yes t ...... (cigarettes weakly) 
NO 2 
C t 9.How often do you drink (per weak)? 
Drink almost every day 1 
Drink only at special occasions/ not every week 98 
Never dnnk 99 
C20.How would you describe your own health status on the whole? 
Good 1 
Rather good 2 
Neither good, nor bad 3 
OUite poor 4 
Very poor 5 
C21 (IF NOT OBVIOUS) Do you suffer/ have suffered from 
(the illnesstd,sab,hty assoc1ated with the NGO)? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
RECRUITMENT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW 
Version IV: PATIENTS 
<!!!>Information to be recorded prior to the Interview<!!!> 
01. lnter11iew COOe 
02. Se• (mil) 
03. Age (In years) 
D4. Which is the highest educational degree attained: 
Postgraduate degree 1 
Degree level education (university) 2 
Vocational/teChnical college 3 
Secondary: general 4 
Lower than secondary 5 
05. What Is your profession? 
06. What is your main occupation at present? 
Fu!Hime university student 1 
Freelance 
Owner/co-owner of private company 
Farmer/ employed in agriculture 
Employee 
Unemployed 6 
Pensioner 7 
(Write In) 
Housewife/on maternity leave 8 
Other.............. 9 
IF THE RESPONDENT IS WORKING 
07. In what type of organisation/institution/company do you work? 
State 1 
Private 2 
Other............. . .............. (Wr~e in) 
08. What Is your posron at present? 
(Write in) 
09. Do you have staff d~ectly subordinated to you? 
Yes ......................... (Write in number of subordinates) 
No 2 
010.Since when are you at your current posronls? 
(Write in years) 
011 What is the income of your fam~y? 
SuffiCient for a good standard of living 1 
SuffiCient only for basic needs 2 
Insufficient for a normal existence 3 
012.0o you practice any religion? If, yes, whiCh one? 
······················································ (Write in) 
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D1 0 Do you engage 1n sports? 
Yes, act1vely 
From time to time 
No 
1 
2 
3 
D14.Are you a member of any organJSatJon? If yes, in Nhat kind? 
Cultural 1 
labour union 2 
Political party 3 
Professional orgamsation 4 
Other organisation 5 . 
D15.Do you smoke? (If they answer that smoke rarely, circle 'Yes') 
(Wnte in) 
Yes 1 .... (cigaretles weakly) 
No 2 
D16.How often do you drink (per weak)? 
Drink almost every day 1 
Drink only at special occasions/ not every week 98 
Never drink 99 
D17. How would you describe your own health status on the whole? 
Good 1 
Rather good 2 
Neither good, nor bad 3 
Quite poor 4 
Very poor 5 
D18.Do you have any long-standing (chronic) illness or disability? (IF YES, AND 
THEY SAY WHAT IS THE ILLNESS, WRITE BELOW) 
(Write in) 
D19.Did you consult a doctor/other health worker in a state health establishment 
regarding your last illness in the past 6 months? 
Yes, several times/quite often 1 
Yes, once/twice 2 
No 3 (TERMINATE THE 
INTERVIEW) 
D20.1n which settlement do you live? ....... (Write in) 
